Fictional representations of dissociative identity disorder in contemporary American fiction by Merry, Hannah Kathryn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and 
duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be 
duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational 
purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-
commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to 
quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the 
copyright holder/s. 
 
		
	
Fictional	representations	of	dissociative	
identity	disorder	in	contemporary	
American	fiction	
	
	
	
Hannah	Kathryn	Merry	
PhD	
June	2017	
Keele	University	
	

1	
	
	
	
	
Abstract	
	
The	representation	of	mental	health	disorders	and	syndromes	has	increased	in	contemporary	
literature,	film	and	television.	Characters	with	disorders	and	syndromes	such	as	Post-Traumatic	Stress	
Disorder,	autism	and	Asperger’s	syndrome,	Tourette’s	syndrome,	and	dissociative	identity	disorder	
are	common,	leading	to	an	increased	critical	engagement	with	these	fictional	texts.	This	thesis	
examines	the	representation	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	(DID)	in	contemporary	American	fiction	
since	1994,	concentrating	on	a	small	selection	of	texts:	the	novels	Set	This	House	in	Order	(2003)	and	
Fight	Club	(1996),	and	the	television	shows	Dollhouse	(2009-2010)	and	United	States	of	Tara	(2009-
2011).	By	engaging	in	turn	with	trauma	theory,	illness	narratives	and	genre	theory,	and	queer	theory,	
this	thesis	argues	that	the	texts	metaphorically	employ	dissociative	identity	disorder	as	a	means	of	
resisting	normativity,	whether	this	is	the	systems	of	social	normativity	characters	find	themselves	
facing	within	the	texts,	or	generic	or	narrative	norms.	In	so	doing,	the	texts	position	DID	as	a	utopian	
condition:	one	that	enables	its	sufferers	to	resist	systems	of	normativity	they	encounter	and	
champion	non-normative	identities.	There	is	a	tension	evident	here	between	metaphorical	uses	of	
disease	within	fiction	and	the	real-world	experiences	of	those	who	suffer	from	these	disorders.	By	
examining	all	the	ways	in	which	the	texts	resist	norms	and	their	utopian	impulses,	this	thesis	
examines	the	extent	to	which	these	texts	suggest	DID	can	or	should	be	universalised	as	a	disorder	of	
non-normativity.	
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Introduction	
	
This	thesis	examines	representations	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	(DID)	in	contemporary	American	
fiction	since	1994	via	various	media	(literature,	film,	television	and	comics),	with	a	particular	focus	on	
the	ways	in	which	these	texts	engage	with	concepts	of	normativity.	This	thesis	concentrates	on	
fictional	texts	published	since	1994	because	this	is	when	dissociative	identity	disorder	first	appeared	
in	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	Fourth	Edition,	following	its	
reclassification	from	multiple	personality	disorder.	Throughout	the	course	of	the	thesis	I	concentrate	
my	analysis	on	a	small	sub-genre	of	‘dissociative	identity	disorder	texts’	including	the	novels	Fight	
Club	(Chuck	Palahniuk,	1996)	and	Set	This	House	In	Order	(Matt	Ruff,	2003),	and	the	US	television	
shows	United	States	of	Tara	(Showtime,	2009-2011)	and	Dollhouse	(Fox,	2009-2010).	I	also	make	
reference	to	the	film	adaptation	of	Fight	Club	directed	by	David	Fincher	(1999),	as	well	as	the	sequel	
comic	book	Fight	Club	2	(Chuck	Palahniuk	and	Cameron	Stewart,	2015-2016),	though	these	do	not	
feature	as	a	major	part	of	my	analysis.	This	thesis	focuses	on	dissociative	identity	disorder	because	
there	has	been	little	critical	attention	paid	to	fictional	texts	featuring	this	disorder,	despite	a	rise	in	
critical	work	examining	the	use	of	syndromes	and	disorders	within	fiction	in	recent	years,	which	I	
discuss	in	detail	in	Chapter	2.	While	critics	have	written	on	Fight	Club,	analysis	focusses	on	the	film	
adaptation	(which	significantly	changes	some	elements	of	the	narrative	including	the	ending)	and	
usually	examines	the	political	messages	within	the	text,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	film/novel’s	
engagement	with	capitalism	and	anarchy,	and	a	secondary	interest	in	contemporary	(Western)	
masculinity.1	This	analysis	is	not	always	viewed	in	connection	with	the	main	character’s	DID,	and	
																																								 																				
1	You	Do	Not	Talk	About	Fight	Club:	I	Am	Jack’s	Completely	Unauthorized	Essay	Collection	ed.	by	Read	Mercer	
Schuchardt.	Texas:	BenBella	Books,	2008;	Mark	Ramney.	Studying	Fight	Club	(Studying	Films).	Bedfordshire:	
Auteur	Publishing,	2012;	Thomas	E.	Wartenberg.	Fight	Club	(Philosophers	on	Film).	London	and	New	York:	
Routledge,	2012;	Bennett	Kravitz.	Representations	of	Illness	in	Literature	and	Film.	Newcastle	upon	Tyne:	
Cambridge	Scholars	Publishing,	2010.	
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indeed,	not	in	conjunction	with	other	texts	featuring	DID.	By	contextualising	Fight	Club	as	part	of	a	
subgenre	of	DID	texts,	I	am	able	to	analyse	the	novel	in	a	way	which	goes	beyond	that	offered	by	
critics	who	view	Fight	Club	in	isolation.	Indeed,	by	drawing	on	these	disparate	DID	texts	as	a	whole,	
this	thesis	is	able	to	examine	the	representation	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	within	fictional	texts	
more	widely	and	set	out	the	common	narrative	themes,	tropes,	and	stock	figures	found	within	these	
texts.		
	 This	interest	in	representation	and	representational	strategy	is	the	main	focus	of	this	thesis.	
As	such,	I	am	not	examining	literature	and	film’s	engagement	with	dissociative	identity	disorder	from	
an	integrated	medical	humanities	perspective.	Instead,	I	take	a	cultural	studies	approach	to	these	
texts,	while	allowing	critical	work	from	other	disciplines,	including	trauma	theory	(Chapter	3)	and	
interdisciplinary	work	on	illness	narratives	(Chapter	4)	influence	the	way	in	which	I	view	these	texts.	
The	first	chapter	therefore	concentrates	on	examining	the	debates	around	DID	from	within	the	
medical	community,	in	order	to	contextualise	fictional	texts’	use	of	the	disorder.	Chapter	1	provides	a	
literature	survey	of	critical	work	on	DID	from	within	the	field	of	psychology,	outlining	the	debates	
around	its	cause,	revisions	to	the	diagnostic	criteria	found	within	the	DSM,	and	suggestions	that	the	
disorder	may	be	culture-bound,	iatrogenic,	or	may	even	not	exist	at	all.	By	providing	this	base	from	
which	to	work,	I	then	move	on	to	examine	the	rise	in	representations	of	syndromes	and	disorders	
within	fictional	texts	in	Chapter	2.	I	begin	with	an	analysis	of	some	older	DID	texts—Sybil	(1973),	The	
Three	Faces	of	Eve	(1957),	and	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	(1981)—which	straddle	the	divide	between	
fiction	and	fact,	as	they	are	all	based	on	real-life	cases	of	people	with	DID.	These	texts	historicise	the	
representation	of	DID	and	help	to	explain	how	cases	of	‘multiple	personality’	captured	the	
imagination	of	laypeople	in	the	1950s,	70s,	and	80s.	I	then	move	on	to	study	the	representation	of	
DID	more	widely,	examining	the	appearance	of	villains	with	‘evil	personalities’	in	horror	films	and	the	
tradition	of	dual	identity	within	American	superhero	comic	books,	as	well	as	beginning	to	tease	out	
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some	of	the	common	threads	found	within	these	older	texts	and	the	more	contemporary	texts	I	
examine	throughout	this	thesis.	This	chapter	also	includes	a	brief	overview	of	some	of	the	other	
syndromes	and	disorders	which	have	frequently	appeared	in	fictional	texts	in	recent	years,	including	
representations	of	autism	and	Tourette’s	syndrome	to	help	further	contextualise	my	analysis	of	DID,	
and	why	representations	of	this	disorder	should	be	examined	in	more	detail.	From	here,	Chapter	3	
examines	the	DID	texts’	engagement	with	trauma,	which	is	sometimes	said	to	be	the	cause	of	the	
disorder,	and	features	in	all	the	DID	texts	I	examine	throughout	the	thesis.		Chapter	3	provides	an	
overview	of	critical	work	on	trauma	and	uses	this	analysis	to	argue	that	trauma	is	most	often	
associated	with	DID,	particularly	in	fictional	texts.	Though	trauma	is	present	in	all	of	the	texts	I	
examine,	the	characters	are	frequently	not	able	to	‘work	through’	their	trauma,	and	as	such	they	are	
not	cured	of	their	DID	by	the	end	of	the	texts.		
	 What	comes	out	of	Chapter	3,	then,	is	that	the	texts	are	seemingly	resistant	to	some	of	the	
norms	and	narrative	conventions	that	we	as	readers	might	expect.	As	such,	Chapter	4	examines	
critical	work	on	illness	narratives	and	genre	more	widely	to	determine	if	this	is	a	feature	of	the	DID	
texts	and	part	of	their	representational	strategies.	Chapter	4	once	again	finds	the	texts	resistant	to	a	
norm,	in	this	case	resistant	to	conventional	endings	and	the	need	to	cure	the	characters	of	DID	by	the	
end	of	the	narrative.	Chapter	5	takes	this	idea	of	non-normativity	and	applies	it	the	texts’	
engagement	with	gender	identity;	many	of	the	texts	feature	characters	with	non-(hetero)normative	
gender	identities	including	a	transgender	character	and	cross-gender	alters.	Chapter	5	seeks	to	
determine	if	this	interest	in	resisting	narrative	and	generic	norms	extends	to	the	texts’	approach	to	
normative	identity,	and	if	the	appearance	of	trans	characters	and	cross-gender	alters	is	another	
manifestation	of	the	texts’	interest	in	non-normativity.	This	ability	to	resist	norms,	linked	in	particular	
to	breaking	social	systems	of	normativity—which	could	be	viewed	as	a	positive	ability	depending	on	
one’s	political	beliefs—could	therefore	be	considered	utopian.	Chapter	6	examines	notions	of	utopia	
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and	dystopia	found	within	the	texts	and	makes	a	clear	link	between	this	utopian	impulse	and	the	
ability	to	subvert	expectations,	whether	these	are	generic	and	narrative	expectations,	or	social	norms	
people	are	expected	to	conform	to.		In	doing	so,	I	argue	that	these	texts	are	positioning	the	
multiplicity	afforded	to	characters	by	DID	as	a	solution	to	normative	social	systems	within	the	fictional	
worlds	and	societies	the	texts	describe.	
	 There	are	two	things	that	need	to	be	clarified	at	this	point.	When	I	talk	about	society	and	
normative	social	systems	within	this	thesis,	I	mean	social	and	identity	norms	found	within	
contemporary	Western	capitalist	societies	such	as	North	America.	All	of	the	DID	texts	are	American,	
and	the	societies	depicted	in	the	texts	are	reflective	of	and	based	upon	contemporary	North	
American	society.	Indeed,	I	discuss	in	Chapter	1	the	accusation	that	DID	is	over-diagnosed	in	North	
America	and	could	be	said	to	be	culture-bound,	that	is	there	is	something	about	North	American	
society	which	either	enables	and	creates	DID	in	its	citizens,	or	which	allows	for	its	over-diagnosis.	An	
example	of	what	I	mean	by	social	norms	is	the	perpetuation	of	binary	heteronormative	gender	
stereotypes	within	Western	capitalist	society	which	may	be	viewed	as	problematic	by	feminists	or	
queer	theory	critics	(see	Chapter	5).	Other	normative	social	systems	which	privilege	certain	types	of	
identity	may	relate	to	class,	race,	age.	These	types	of	social	systems	are	often	viewed	as	a	problem	by	
the	underprivileged	group	or	groups	affected	by	them.	These	social	norms	are	usually	perpetuated	
through	different	aspects	of	that	society	such	as	the	media	or	the	state,	as	well	as	through	the	
attitudes	of	its	citizens.	These	are	the	sorts	of	social	systems	and	norms	that	DID	texts	are	able	to	
resist.		
The	second	thing	I	wish	to	clarify	here	is	that	I	am	aware	of	the	tension	between	fictional	
representations	and	the	real-world,	which	this	thesis	engages	and	reengages	with	throughout.	Since	
this	thesis	deals	with	fictional	representations	of	a	real-world	medical	condition,	my	reading	of	DID	as	
a	means	of	resisting	social	norms	can	be	considered	problematic.	DID	is	a	real	medical	condition	that	
7	
	
	
	
can	adversely	affect	the	lives	of	those	who	suffer	from	it.	By	arguing	that	the	texts	present	multiplicity	
and	DID	as	positive	conditions,	I	risk	erasing	the	experience	of	DID	sufferers	in	the	real-world	and	
stigmatising	those	who	suffer	from	this	disease	who	are	not	able	to	view	or	experience	their	
condition	in	this	way.	The	work	of	Susan	Sontag	in	Illness	as	Metaphor	(1978)	becomes	a	useful	
touchstone	here.	Sontag	argues	that	metaphorical	uses	of	disease	within	fiction	are	harmful	in	exactly	
these	ways,	and	discussion	of	her	work	appears	in	several	places	in	this	thesis,	most	notably	Chapter	
4.	How	to	solve	and	reconcile	this	problem	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	work,	though	I	do	offer	
counterarguments	to	Sontag’s	criticism	in	Chapter	4	in	which	I	also	set	out	my	own	approach	to	the	
study	of	metaphorical	uses	of	disease	and	illness	within	fiction.		
The	problem	of	reconciling	fictional	disease	metaphors	and	the	real	world	reappears	in	
Chapter	6.	Can	a	utopian	disease	metaphor	which	offers	a	solution	to	a	social	problem	present	in	the	
real	world	remain	in	a	fictional	text	or	should	it	be	applied	to	that	real	world	situation?	The	
conclusion	draws	together	the	threads	of	the	previous	chapters	and	argues	that	while	fiction	is	more	
than	capable	of	critiquing	problems	which	authors	perceive	to	be	present	in	the	real	world,	it	is,	
ultimately,	not	a	blueprint	for	a	better	world.	As	such,	it	is	significant	that	these	DID	texts	in	this	
particular	moment	all	engage,	to	some	extent,	with	concepts	of	normativity,	but	neither	they	nor	I	
are	arguing	that	their	representation	of	DID	is	reflective	of	the	real-world	experience	of	DID	sufferers.	
In	the	same	way	that	the	DID	texts	are	resistant	to	typical	cathartic	narratives	and	endings,	so	too	
should	we	resist	the	urge	to	enact	their	solution	to	the	problem	of	social	norms	in	the	real	world.	
Instead,	we	should	view	them	in	the	context	of	both	the	increase	in	interest	in	fiction	dealing	with	
representations	of	syndromes	and	disorders	such	as	autism,	Asperger’s	syndrome,	and	Tourette’s	
syndrome,	and	the	DID	texts	which	have	come	before	them	like	Sybil	and	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve.	I	
therefore	conclude	by	drawing	together	the	different	elements	of	this	thesis	in	order	to	demonstrate	
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the	extent	to	which	DID	is	viewed	within	fiction	as	a	disease	of	radical	non-normativity,	inspiring	
debate	and	a	critical	engagement	with	the	‘problem’	of	social	normativity.	
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Chapter	1		
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder:	Medical	Discourse	
	
While	this	thesis	is	primarily	concerned	with	fictional	representations	of	dissociative	identity	disorder		
and	does	not	attempt	to	contribute	to	the	debate	surrounding	the	disorder’s	validity,	it	is	nonetheless	
important	to	discuss	the	psychological	literature	and	debates	surrounding	the	condition	to	give	some	
context	to	its	fictional	representations.		To	that	end,	this	chapter	begins	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	
condition	and	the	debates	surrounding	it	before	discussing	the	diagnostic	criteria	for	DID	found	in	the	
Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	(DSM),	including	how	these	have	changed	in	
the	latest	revision	(2013).	It	then	moves	on	to	discuss	the	debate	surrounding	the	validity	of	the	
condition,	providing	an	overview	of	literature	from	those	who	believe	DID	is	caused	by	trauma	and	
those	who	believe	it	is	iatrogenic.	Following	this,	the	chapter	will	discuss	the	idea	of	DID	as	a	culture-
bound,	American	condition,	addressing	in	particular	the	criticism	drawn	by	high	rates	of	diagnosis	in	
the	U.S.,	and	the	relationship	between	the	DSM	and	the	American	health	care	system.	The	chapter	
ends	with	a	discussion	of	the	aims	of	this	thesis	in	light	of	this	discussion	of	DID. 
Dissociative	identity	disorder	is	a	rare	psychological	condition	in	which	the	sufferer’s	identity	
becomes	fragmented,	resulting	in	the	creation	of	two	or	more	separate	personality	states.	These	
‘alter’	personalities	may	or	may	not	know	the	other	personalities	exist	and	are	able	to	take	control	of	
the	sufferer	when	triggered	by	negative	stressors.	As	a	result	of	the	switching	phenomena,	the	
sufferer	is	often	unable	to	recall	information	learnt	or	events	that	happened	while	alters	were	in	
control.	These	alters,	and	the	unpredictability	of	the	switching	phenomena	and	resultant	amnesia,	
can	cause	significant	distress	for	the	sufferer	and	impair	ordinary	social	and,	what	the	DSM	calls,	
occupational	functioning.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	the	condition	is	classed	as	a	‘disorder.’		It	is	
estimated	that	around	1-1.5%	of	people	suffer	from	dissociative	identity	disorder	(Haddock:	1,	DSM-
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V:	294)	with	adult	women	more	likely	to	seek	treatment	for	the	condition	than	adult	men	(Haddock:	
xvi).	DID	is	often	misdiagnosed	as	a	number	of	other	conditions,	such	as	Bipolar	Disorder,	Borderline	
Personality	Disorder,	Schizophrenia	or	Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder,	due	to	the	similar	symptoms	
and	behaviours	found	in	those	suffering	from	these	disorders.	Deborah	Bray	Haddock	estimates	that	
DID	patients	have	an	average	of	seven	misdiagnoses	before	they	are	correctly	diagnosed	with	DID	
(55).	This	may	in	part	be	due	to	the	high	rate	of	comorbidity	these	other	disorders	have	with	
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	(DSM-V,	297-298).	The	majority	of	therapeutic	treatments	available	for	
DID	are	based	on	the	idea	that	the	sufferer’s	personalities	must	‘reintegrate’	in	order	for	them	to	
become	a	healthy,	unified	person	again.	This	is	usually	achieved	through	therapy	and	memory	
recovery	work,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	patient	gaining	the	skills	they	will	need	to	cope	with	stressful	
situations	without	dissociating.	 
Despite	its	appearance	in	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	IV	in	
1994,	and	in	earlier	versions	of	the	DSM	as	‘Multiple	Personality	Disorder’,	the	condition	now	known	
as	DID	is	a	controversial	one	among	psychologists.	This	controversy	largely	derives	from	arguments	
over	its	cause	and	the	validity	of	the	diagnosis,	with	many	arguing	that	the	condition	does	not	actually	
exist.	Proponents	of	the	disorder	argue	that	it	is	caused	by	trauma	in	childhood,	such	as	sexual	or	
physical	abuse,	which	causes	an	individual	to	dissociate	to	such	an	extent	that	they	split	into	separate	
identities	in	order	to	cope.	Critics	argue	instead	that	the	condition	is	iatrogenic:	it	is	caused	in	
susceptible	patients	by	some	therapeutic	treatments	and	practices	such	as	memory	recovery	work	or	
hypnotism,	or	its	diagnosis	is	the	result	of	patients	playing	a	part	in	order	to	please	over-zealous	
therapists.	Indeed,	a	sharp	increase	in	the	amount	of	DID	diagnoses	in	the	United	States	has	led	to	
the	suggestion	that	the	condition	is	‘culture-bound’:	a	product	of	the	increasing	medicalisation	of	
psychological	disorders	and	over-reliance	on	the	DSM	as	a	diagnostic	aid	in	the	field	of	American	
psychology.	It	is	from	this	idea	that	concerns	about	iatrogenesis	arise.	Similarly,	it	is	believed	that	
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patients	who	are	simply	playing	the	part	for	their	therapists	are	fuelled	by	the	rise	in	awareness	of	the	
condition	caused	by	early	cultural	representations	of	DID	in	texts	such	as	Corbett	H.	Thigpen	and	
Hervey	M.	Cleckley’s	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve	(1957)	(adapted	into	a	film	that	same	year),	Shirley	
Jackson’s	The	Bird’s	Nest	(1954,	adapted	into	the	film	Lizzie	in	1957),	and	Flora	Rheta	Schreiber’s	Sybil	
(1973)	and	its	film	adaptations	in	1976	and	2007.	In	a	number	of	instances,	these	texts	offer	a	
sensationalised	view	of	the	disorder,	with	the	film	adaptations	in	particular	being	marketed	as	
something	shocking,	a	spectacle	to	be	voyeuristically	viewed	by	audiences.	 
Some	of	the	scepticism	about	the	disorder	in	the	American	context	also	arises	from	the	use	of	
DID	as	a	legal	defence	as	part	of	an	‘insanity’	plea.	Those	who	feel	there	is	no	proof	the	condition	
exists	point	out	that	the	disorder	could	be	used	by	those	who	seek	to	escape	punishment	for	crimes	
they	have	committed.	The	first	such	case	of	this	was	Billy	Milligan,	who	was	diagnosed	with	multiple	
personalities	when	on	trial	for	several	counts	of	rape,	kidnapping	and	aggravated	robbery	in	Ohio	in	
1978	and	so	was	committed	to	a	mental	health	facility	rather	than	sent	to	prison	for	his	crimes.	While	
in	a	series	of	state-run	hospitals	he	was	discovered	to	have	fourteen	alter	personalities,	including	a	
lesbian	personality	who	had	apparently	committed	the	rapes.	Possibly	influenced	by	this,	other	
people	have	attempted	to	use	DID	as	part	of	an	insanity	plea,	whether	or	not	they	had	the	condition.	
The	most	well-known	example	of	this	is	probably	Kenneth	Bianchi,	the	so-called	‘Hillside	Strangler’,	
who	pretended	to	have	multiple	personality	disorder	in	an	attempt	to	escape	conviction	for	the	rapes	
and	murders	of	12	women	between	1977	and	1979.	He	managed	to	convince	four	‘experts’	before	
the	prosecution	fed	him	false	information	about	DID	which	he	then	incorporated	into	his	act.		When	
questioned,	he	finally	admitted	he	had	made	up	the	alter	personalities.2	These	famous	cases	feed	
																																								 																				
2	Orne,	Martin	and	David	Dinges,	Emily	Carota	Orne.	“On	the	differential	diagnosis	of	multiple	personality	
in	the	forensic	context?”	International	Journal	of	Clinical	and	Experimental	Hypnosis	32.2	(1984):	118-169.	
Print.		
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back	into	cultural	representations	of	the	disorder,	so	it	has	been	common	for	individuals	with	
murderous	alter	personalities	to	appear	in	popular	fiction.	I	will	discuss	some	specific	examples	of	
these	in	Chapter	2. 
Having	briefly	outlined	DID	and	the	debates	surrounding	it	above,	we	can	now	look	at	the	
condition	in	more	detail,	beginning	with	its	first	appearance	in	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	
of	Mental	Disorders	in	1994.		The	fourth	edition	included	the	condition	under	the	name	‘dissociative	
identity	disorder’	for	the	first	time,	following	its	reclassification	of	Multiple	Personality	Disorder	
(MPD),	which	had	previously	appeared	in	DSM-III	in	1980.	This	‘new’	condition’s	diagnostic	criteria	
were	as	follows:		
A. The	presence	of	two	or	more	distinct	identities	or	personality	states	(each	
with	its	own	relatively	enduring	pattern	of	perceiving,	relating	to,	and	thinking	about	
the	environment	and	self).	
B. At	least	two	of	these	identities	or	personality	states	recurrently	take	control	
of	the	person’s	behaviour.	
C. Inability	to	recall	important	personal	information	that	is	too	extensive	to	be	
explained	by	ordinary	forgetfulness.	
D. The	disturbance	is	not	due	to	the	direct	physiological	effects	of	a	substance	
(e.g.,	blackouts	or	chaotic	behaviour	during	Alcohol	Intoxication)	or	a	general	medical	
condition	(e.g.,	complex	partial	seizures).	Note:	In	children,	the	symptoms	are	not	
attributable	to	imaginary	playmates	or	other	fantasy	play.	(499-500)	
Criteria	A	and	B	are	what	most	laypeople	think	of	when	they	think	of	DID—two	or	more	distinct	
personalities	that	are	able	to	take	over	and	control	behaviour—and	DSM-IV	describes	both	of	these	
diagnostic	criteria	in	more	detail:	“Each	personality	state	may	be	experienced	as	if	it	has	a	distinct	
personal	history,	self-image,	and	identity,	including	a	separate	name.	Usually	there	is	a	primary	
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identity	that	carries	the	individual’s	given	name	and	is	passive,	dependent,	guilty,	and	depressed”	
(496).	Indeed,	this	is	the	image	that	popular	fictional	representations	often	present	us	with:	a	passive	
main	personality	with	aggressive	or	controlling	alter	personalities.	The	idea	of	doubles	and	
doppelgängers	like	this	have	always	existed	in	popular	fiction.	Examples	of	dual	personalities	of	
conflicting	types	can	be	seen	in	texts	as	early	as	Nick	of	the	Woods	(Robert	Montgomery	Bird,	1837)	
and	The	Strange	Case	of	Dr.	Jekyll	and	Mr.	Hyde	(Robert	Louis	Stevenson,	1886).	These	texts	are,	in	
many	ways,	the	forerunners	of	the	later	DID	texts	that	I	discuss	in	this	thesis.3	This	idea	of	a	passive	
main	personality	with	aggressive	or	controlling	alter	personalities	is	also	seen	in	some	of	the	
contemporary	texts	I	discuss	in	this	thesis,	most	notably	in	Fight	Club	(1996)	in	which	Sebastian’s4	
passive	personality	is	juxtaposed	with	Tyler	Durden’s	aggressive,	hyper-masculine	charisma.	This	
popular	perception	of	alter	personalities	as	more	dominant	and	aggressive	than	the	‘main’	
personality	is	linked	to	the	idea	that	they	take	over	from	and	gain	control	of	the	main	personality.	
Taking	control	of	someone	is	an	aggressive	act,	and	it	seems	likely	that	this	use	of	language	in	medical	
discourse	surrounding	DID	has	fuelled	the	popular	fictional	idea	that	alters	are	often	dominant	and	
aggressive.	Indeed,	DSM-IV	describes	alters	thus:	“Alternative	identities	are	experienced	as	taking	
control	in	sequence,	one	at	the	expense	of	the	other,	and	may	deny	knowledge	of	one	another,	be	
critical	of	one	another,	or	appear	to	be	in	open	conflict”	(497).	It	is	this	switching	and	the	resulting	
conflict	that	impairs	ordinary	functioning	in	the	sufferer	and	often	leads	them	to	seek	treatment.	
These	ideas	again	feed	into	cultural	representations	of	the	condition,	with	the	average	fictional	
sufferer	often	appearing	as	a	person	fighting	their	alter	personalities,	who	appear	to	sabotage	or	
interfere	with	their	everyday	lives.	We	see	this	in	Fight	Club,	of	course,	but	we	also	see	it	in	United	
States	of	Tara	(2009-2011),	where	Tara’s	alters	not	only	cause	problems	for	Tara	but	also	for	her	
																																								 																				
3	I	will	discuss	this	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2.	
4	While	the	narrator	is	never	named	in	the	novel,	the	sequel	comic	Fight	Club	2	(Chuck	Palahniuk	and	Cameron	
Stewart,	2015)	reveals	that	his	name	is	Sebastian.	
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family,	and	in	Set	This	House	In	Order	(2003),	where	Penny’s	alters	interfere	with	her	life	before	she	
meets	Andrew.	This	interference	in	daily	life	is	what	causes	Criterion	C,	as	the	main	personality	often	
cannot	remember	what	alters	have	done	when	they	are	in	control.	DSM-IV	suggests	that	the	resultant	
amnesia	can	vary	between	personalities:	“the	more	passive	identities	tend	to	have	more	constricted	
memories,	whereas	the	more	hostile,	controlling,	or	‘protector’	identities	have	more	complete	
memories”	(497).	This	suggests	it	might	be	possible	for	some	personalities	to	keep	things	from	others,	
and	this	links	to	the	above	idea	that	alters	may	keep	things	from	the	main	personality.	These	ideas	
are	again	well-represented	in	fictional	representations	of	the	condition:	the	image	of	(the	main	
personality	of)	a	DID	sufferer	‘waking	up’	confused	and	alone	in	an	unfamiliar	place	is	one	which	
appears	in	almost	all	DID	texts.	Similarly,	there	are	instances	when	personalities	keep	things	from	
others,	such	as	when	Andrew’s	‘father’	personality	keeps	the	knowledge	of	what	happened	to	Andy	
Gage	as	a	child	from	Andrew	in	Set	This	House	in	Order,	or	when	Alice	tries	to	hide	Gimme	from	Tara	
in	the	first	season	of	United	States	of	Tara.		Fight	Club	plays	with	the	idea	of	waking	up	in	unfamiliar	
places	in	its	third	chapter,	with	the	repeated	refrain	of	“You	wake	up	at	[…]”	(Palahniuk:	23-33)	as	
Sebastian	arrives	at	different	airports	around	the	United	States	as	he	travels	for	his	job	intercut	with	
Sebastian’s	description	of	Tyler’s	work	as	a	projectionist.	This	highlights	the	extent	to	which	
Sebastian’s	life	is	disconnected	and	dissociative	while	also	alluding	to	the	links	between	his	condition	
and	his	job	which	the	text	will	go	on	to	explore	more	thoroughly,	and	also	hinting	at	the	true	nature	
of	Sebastian’s	relationship	with	Tyler:	when	Sebastian	is	asleep,	Tyler	is	in	control	and	vice	versa.	
Indeed,	the	film	version	makes	this	more	explicit	as	this	sequence	eventually	culminates	in	his	
meeting	Tyler	Durden	on	a	plane.	 
Outside	of	these	four	main	diagnostic	criteria,	there	are	other	sections	of	DSM-IV’s	
description	of	the	condition	which	should	be	noted.	Firstly,	while	DSM-IV	does	not	state	what	the	
cause	of	DID	is,	it	does	say	that	“individuals	with	Dissociative	Identity	Disorder	frequently	report	
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having	experienced	severe	physical	and	sexual	abuse,	especially	during	childhood”	(497).		From	later	
writing	on	and	research	into	DID,	we	know	that	this	physical	and	sexual	abuse	is	believed	to	be	the	
principal	cause	of	the	condition,	but	here	it	is	mentioned	only	as	an	“associated	descriptive	feature”	
(DSM-IV:	497).	DSM-IV	also	points	out	that	DID	is	“diagnosed	three	to	nine	times	more	frequently	in	
adult	females	than	in	adult	males”	and	that	“females	tend	to	have	more	identities	than	do	males,	
averaging	15	or	more,	whereas	males	average	approximately	8	identities”	(498).	For	those	who	
believe	that	physical	and	sexual	abuse	is	the	main	cause	of	the	condition	this	discrepancy	in	
diagnostic	rates	by	gender	makes	sense:	women	are	more	likely	to	be	victims	of	sexual	abuse	and	so	
more	likely	to	develop	DID.	U.S.	Government	child	abuse	statistics	from	2012	indicate	that	there	is	a	
slightly	higher	incidence	of	child	abuse	(including	neglect,	physical	abuse,	psychological	
maltreatment,	sexual	abuse,	and	other	forms	of	maltreatment)	in	girls	than	boys—50.9%	of	all	cases	
are	girls	and	48.7%	are	boys—but	this	difference	does	not	seem	high	enough	to	account	for	the	
difference	in	diagnostic	frequency.5	This	report	on	child	maltreatment	does	break	down	frequency	of	
abuse	into	different	categories	(for	example:	physical	abuse	makes	up	18.3%	of	all	abuse	while	sexual	
abuse	makes	up	9.3%	of	all	abuse)	but	it	does	not	then	offer	statistics	on	gender	difference	within	
these	categories	so	there	are	no	government	statistics	on	the	frequency	of	sexual	abuse	amongst	
genders.		However,	research	by	the	Crimes	Against	Children	Research	Centre	at	the	University	of	New	
Hampshire	suggest	that	girls	are	more	likely	to	be	sexually	abused	than	boys,	with	“a	meta-analysis	of	
22	American-based	studies	suggesting	30-40%	of	girls	and	13%	of	boys	experience	sexual	abuse	
during	childhood”	(Douglas	and	Finkelhor:	3).	While	these	statistics	indicate	why	there	is	a	higher	
diagnostic	rate	among	women	than	men,	they	still	do	not	seem	to	indicate	as	big	a	difference	as	the	
DSM	suggests.	Indeed,	sexually	abused	women	dominate	psychological	literature	on	DID	to	the	
																																								 																				
5	Statistics	taken	from	the	U.S	Department	of	Health	and	Human	Services,	Administration	for	Children	and	
Families.	“Child	Maltreatment	2012”	http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf	(Accessed	
January	2015).	
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extent	that,	in	a	review	of	DID	literature,	Paulette	Marie	Gillig	describes	the	typical	patient	as	“a	
woman,	about	age	30	[…]	There	generally	is	a	reported	history	of	childhood	abuse,	with	the	
frequency	of	sexual	abuse	being	higher	than	the	frequency	of	physical	abuse”	(26).	Deborah	Bray	
Haddock	also	uses	‘she’	as	the	default	pronoun	to	refer	to	DID	patients	throughout	The	Dissociative	
Identity	Disorder	Sourcebook	(2001),	due	to	the	higher	rate	of	female	patients	she	has	seen.	 
This	gender	difference	appears	in	fictional	texts	as	well,	with	many	fictional	DID	sufferers	
being	female.	Indeed,	the	most	well-known	early	examples	I	have	already	cited,	Sybil	and	The	Three	
Faces	of	Eve,	both	feature	female	characters	with	DID,	while	many	of	my	contemporary	examples	also	
feature	female	main	characters:	Tara	in	United	States	of	Tara	(2009-2011),	Penny	in	Set	This	House	In	
Order	(2003),	and	Echo	in	Dollhouse	(2009-2010).	This	is	indicative	of	the	fact	that	trauma	is	often	the	
cause	of	DID	in	these	fictional	examples	and	the	perception	that	sexual	abuse	and	rape	is	a	traumatic	
event	that	most	often	happens	to	women	in	Western	society	and	therefore	also	in	its	fiction	and	
popular	culture.	In	contrast,	the	contemporary	stereotypical	‘male’	trauma	is	often	that	of	the	
traumatised	soldier,	and	fictional	texts	featuring	these	types	of	characters	often	feature	Post-
Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	rather	than	DID.6		It	is	important	to	note	here	that,	in	fictional	texts	at	least,	
trauma	seems	split	along	gendered	lines:	men	are	seemingly	more	likely	to	experience	trauma	related	
to	their	experiences	in	wars	and	so	develop	PTSD,	while	women	are	more	likely	to	experience	forms	
of	interpersonal	violence	such	as	rape	and	physical	abuse	and	so	develop	DID.		 
However,	this	difference	does	not	seem	to	be	supported	by	the	psychological	literature.	The	
latest	edition	of	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	(DSM-V)	was	published	in	
2013.	This	edition	includes	numerous	revisions	to	various	diagnostic	criteria	and	classifications—
including	changes	to	the	diagnostic	criteria	for	DID	which	I	will	go	on	to	discuss—but	also	adds	
separate	sections	to	the	discussion	of	each	condition	including	‘Culture-related	Diagnostic	Issues’	and	
																																								 																				
6	I	discuss	some	of	these	stereotypes	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	3.	
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‘Gender-related	Diagnostic	Issues.’		These	two	areas	have	been	separated	out	from	the	small	section	
titled	‘Specific	Culture,	Age,	and	Gender	Features’	in	DSM-IV.	Under	the	entry	for	DID	in	DSM-V,	
gender-related	diagnostic	issues	include: 
Females	with	dissociative	identity	disorder	predominate	in	adult	clinical	settings	but	
not	in	child	clinical	settings.	Adult	males	with	dissociative	identity	disorder	may	deny	
their	symptoms	and	trauma	histories,	and	this	can	lead	to	elevated	rates	of	false	
negative	diagnosis.	(295) 
This	confirms	that	though	the	disorder	does	not	necessarily	have	a	higher	prevalence	among	women	
as	was	suggested	in	DSM-IV,	Haddock’s	suggestion	that	“women	are	more	likely	to	seek	treatment”	is	
correct	(Haddock:	xvi).	Indeed,	DSM-V	states	that	in	one	small	U.S.	community	study	the	prevalence	
of	the	disorder	was	1.5%,	which	broke	down	to	“1.6%	for	males	and	1.4%	for	females”	(294).	In	this	
study	then,	there	was	a	slightly	higher	prevalence	in	men,	than	women.	While	this	is	a	very	small	
difference,	it	would	not	have	been	included	in	such	a	widely-used	and	authoritative	book	as	the	DSM	
without	the	authors	having	faith	in	the	study’s	methods,	or	finding	its	results	worthy	of	inclusion.	
Even	if	we	believe	the	difference	between	genders	is	so	small	as	to	be	negligible,	it	is	still	worth	
noting	that	this	means	that	the	prevalence	across	genders	is	the	same,	despite	what	fictional	texts	or	
more	widely	held	views	in	popular	culture	suggest. 
DSM-V	also	suggests	that	there	can	be	differences	in	the	presentation	of	DID	according	to	
gender,	such	that:	 
Females	with	dissociative	identity	disorder	present	more	frequently	with	acute	
dissociative	states	(e.g.,	flashbacks,	amnesia,	fugue,	functional	neurological	
[conversion]	symptoms,	hallucinations,	self-mutilation).	Males	commonly	exhibit	
more	criminal	or	violent	behaviour	than	females;	among	males,	common	triggers	of	
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acute	dissociative	states	include	combat,	prison	conditions,	and	physical	or	sexual	
assaults.	(295)	 
This	suggests	that	there	can	be	differences	in	the	way	men	and	women	experience	the	same	
condition.	Indeed,	the	list	of	symptoms	women	more	frequently	present	with	could	be	said	to	
account	for	the	high	rate	of	misdiagnosis	noted	by	Haddock:	these	symptoms	can	also	be	present	in	
some	of	the	disorders	that	have	comorbidity	with	DID	such	as	PTSD,	Borderline	Personality	Disorder,	
conversion	disorder	and	depressive	disorders.	Both	DSM-V	and	Haddock	note	that	patients	are	often	
treated	for	these	conditions	rather	than	DID	with	“limited	overall	treatment	response	and	resultant	
demoralization”	(DSM-V:	297).	It	is	also	significant	to	note	here	that	DSM-V	suggests	men	with	DID	
commonly	exhibit	more	criminal	or	violent	behaviour	than	women.	Amongst	fictional	texts,	we	can	
point	to	Fight	Club	and	Tyler	Durden’s	hyper-masculine,	violent	nature	as	an	example	of	this.	In	the	
real	world,	since	Billy	Milligan’s	successful	use	of	DID	as	a	legal	defence,	there	have	been	many	
examples	of	men	attempting	to	plead	not	guilty	to	violent	crimes	by	reason	of	insanity	(due	to	DID)	
such	as	State	v	Darnall	(1980;	murder),	State	v	Jones	(1988;	murder),	State	v	Greene	(1998;	murder),	
and	State	v	Lockhart	(2000;	sexual	assault).7	In	all	of	these	cases,	the	defence	was	unsuccessful,	
perhaps	due	to	an	increasing	scepticism	amongst	the	public—who	make	up	the	jury—when	faced	
with	a	psychological	condition	that	is	very	difficult	to	verify	scientifically.	 
	 While	looking	at	issues	facing	men	with	DID,	it	is	also	important	to	recognise	that	combat	is	
specifically	mentioned	here	as	a	trigger	for	acute	dissociation	in	men.	This	should	come	as	no	
surprise,	and	yet	the	layperson’s	view	is	that	traumatic	experience	in	combat	usually	leads	to	PTSD	
amongst	veterans	rather	than	DID.	This	is	certainly	the	case	in	fictional	representations	of	modern	
warfare	and	combat	veterans,	with	men	suffering	from	DID	as	a	result	of	their	experiences	in	warfare	
something	of	a	rarity.	This	is	a	good	example	of	how	a	fictional	representation	of	something	can	
																																								 																				
7	Farrell,	Helen	M.	“Dissociative	Identity	Disorder:	No	Excuse	for	Criminal	Activity”	Current	Psychiatry	10.6	
(2011).	
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become	ingrained	in	popular	consciousness.	In	this	case,	the	disorder	is	represented	in	this	way	so	
often	that	it	comes	to	be	taken	as	fact	by	the	general	population.	It	is	not	uncommon	for	people	to	
only	know	about	conditions	such	as	these	through	fictional	representations	if	they	have	not	
encountered	the	condition	in	their	own	lives.	This	is	why	early	representations	of	DID,	so	often	over-
sensationalised,	may	have	had	such	a	lasting	effect	on	later	representations	in	fictional	texts.	I	will	
discuss	these	early	examples	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter,	as	well	as	tracing	some	of	the	more	
popular	narrative	tropes	and	stock	characters	found	within	them.	Given	the	enduring	popularity	of	
some	of	these	narrative	tropes,	we	should	consider	the	extent	to	which	these	fictional	
representations	could	come	to	affect	the	‘real	world’	such	as	by	influencing	changes	in	the	diagnostic	
criteria.	We	know	that	the	real	world	influences	popular	culture,	but	when	certain	stock	characters	or	
particular	types	of	narratives	come	to	be	seen	as	shorthand	indicators	that	a	certain	medical	
condition	is	being	dealt	with,	the	ability	to	read	a	text	for	these	indicators	is	no	longer	limited	to	the	
fictional	world.	This	is	to	say	that	people	can	take	what	they	have	learnt	from	fictional	texts—
examples	of	how	people	with	these	conditions	behave—and	then	apply	this	to	people	they	meet	in	
their	real	lives.	Some	of	the	scepticism	at	the	increasing	rates	of	diagnosis	of	DID	in	America	is	that	
people	(both	psychologists	and	patients)	are	more	aware	of	the	condition	due	to	fictional	
representations	and	so	are	more	aware	of	the	symptoms,	may	be	taken	in	by	them	and	are	falsely	
diagnosing	DID.	Given	the	enduring	popularity	of	some	of	these	narrative	tropes,	we	should	therefore	
consider	the	extent	to	which	these	fictional	representations	could	come	further	to	affect	the	‘real	
world’	by	influencing	changes	in	the	diagnostic	criteria,	for	example.	This	is	something	to	bear	in	mind	
as	we	consider	the	updated	diagnostic	criteria	in	the	fifth	edition	of	the	DSM. 
	 Indeed,	the	diagnostic	criteria	for	DID	have	changed	significantly	in	DSM-V:	 
A. Disruption	of	identity	characterised	by	two	or	more	distinct	personality	
states,	which	may	be	described	in	some	cultures	as	an	experience	of	possession.	The	
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disruption	in	identity	involves	marked	discontinuity	in	sense	of	self	and	sense	of	
agency,	accompanied	by	related	alterations	in	affect,	behaviour,	consciousness,	
memory,	perception,	cognition,	and/or	sensory-motor	functioning.	These	signs	and	
symptoms	may	be	observed	by	others	or	reported	by	the	individual.	
B. Recurrent	gaps	in	the	recall	of	everyday	events,	important	personal	
information,	and/or	traumatic	events	that	are	inconsistent	with	ordinary	forgetting.	
C. The	symptoms	cause	clinically	significant	distress	or	impairment	in	social,	
occupational,	or	other	important	areas	of	functioning.	
D. The	disturbance	is	not	a	normal	part	of	a	broadly	accepted	cultural	or	
religious	practice.	Note:	In	children,	the	symptoms	are	not	better	explained	by	
imaginary	playmates	or	other	fantasy	play.	
E. The	symptoms	are	not	attributable	to	the	physiological	effects	of	a	substance	
(e.g.,	blackouts	or	chaotic	behaviour	during	alcohol	intoxication)	or	another	medical	
condition	(e.g.,	complex	partial	seizures).	(292)	
As	well	as	now	having	five	diagnostic	criteria	rather	than	four,	there	have	been	significant	changes	to	
the	criteria	found	in	the	fourth	edition.		To	begin	with,	the	criteria	in	DSM-V	place	a	higher	emphasis	
on	the	extent	to	which	dissociative	identity	disorder	causes	disruption	to	the	individual’s	life.	Indeed,	
this	is	confirmed	by	the	very	first	word	of	criterion	A	being	‘disruption’	and	the	addition	of	the	new	
criterion	C,	explicitly	stating	that	the	condition	must	cause	distress	or	impairment	in	areas	of	
functioning.	In	the	fourth	edition	this	word	was	missing	from	all	diagnostic	criteria.	This	is	suggesting,	
albeit	subtly,	that	it	is	possible	to	live	with	DID	and	seek	no	treatment	if	the	condition	is	not	causing	
disruption	to	the	person’s	life.	Rather	than	the	existence	of	the	condition	being	the	problem,	it	is	now	
the	effect	the	condition	has	on	the	sufferer’s	life	that	is	the	problem.	This	is	particularly	important	
when	we	consider	fictional	texts	such	as	Set	This	House	in	Order,	in	which	Andrew	is	perfectly	happy	
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to	coexist	with	all	of	the	other	personalities	and	has	created	a	system	that	allows	them	all	to	manage	
the	day-to-day	affairs	of	the	body.		Indeed,	Haddock	calls	this	stabilising	the	“internal	system”	(128)	
and	says	it	is	an	important	first	step	in	DID-focused	therapy.	After	this	first	step,	it	is	the	DID	sufferer’s	
choice	whether	or	not	to	work	towards	a	more	formal	reintegration	of	the	alters	or	to	work	on	
developing	an	internal	system	that	allows	them	to	function	more	successfully	in	the	world,	removing	
the	disruption	that	DID	causes.	Though	Haddock’s	writing	predates	the	fifth	edition	of	the	DSM,	it	is	
likely	that	if	Haddock’s	ideas	represent	one	side	of	a	debate	about	DID,	the	fifth	edition	is	responding	
to	that	debate	and	creating	room	for	a	variety	of	approaches	to	treatment. 
	 Criterion	A	in	the	fifth	edition	also	gives	a	further	and	clearer	description	of	the	alter	
personalities,	mentioning	changes	present	in	the	behaviour	of	the	person	when	an	alter	is	present,	as	
well	as	changes	in	memory,	perception	and	cognition.	The	fourth	edition	stated	that	alter	
personalities	must	only	have	their	“own	relatively	enduring	pattern	of	perceiving,	relating	to,	and	
thinking	about	the	environment	and	self”	(DSM-IV	499).	The	changes	in	the	fifth	edition	account	for	
more	observable	changes	between	the	behaviour	of	alter	personalities	and	the	behaviour	of	the	
person	suffering	from	DID.		The	fifth	edition	also	removes	the	fourth	edition’s	criterion	B,	which	
stated	that	alters	must	recurrently	take	control	of	the	person’s	behaviour.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	
significant	change	except	for	the	insistence	that	the	disorder	cause	disruption	to	the	sufferer:	while	
the	criteria	in	the	fifth	edition	are	largely	modified	or	rewritten	versions	of	those	in	the	fourth	edition,	
this	diagnostic	criterion	has	simply	been	removed.	It	is	particularly	significant	as	this	understanding	of	
DID—two	or	more	personalities	who	take	control	of	the	person—has	long	been	considered	to	be	the	
main	hallmark	of	DID	in	the	popular	consciousness,	and	certainly	in	fiction.	This	again	seems	tailored	
to	viewing	the	condition	as	a	disorder	only	if	it	causes	disruption;	alters	taking	control	of	a	person	
against	their	will	is	disruptive,	whereas	a	functional	internal	system	(one	in	which	the	personalities	
interact	harmoniously	in	order	to	function	successfully	in	the	world—even	if	personalities	must	
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switch	who	is	in	control	to	deal	with	certain	situations)	is	now	not	necessarily	a	problem	worthy	of	
psychiatric	help.	If	the	internal	system	does	not	cause	disruption	and	switching	is	taking	place	by	
choice,	under	a	strict	interpretation	of	the	new	diagnostic	criteria	it	could	be	argued	that	no	disorder	
is	present.	Indeed,	by	shifting	the	emphasis	to	the	condition	causing	disruption	and	removing	the	
need	for	personalities	to	take	control	of	the	sufferer,	the	fifth	edition	could	be	said	to	be	radical.	
What	I	mean	by	this,	is	that	this	authoritative	medical	textbook	only	considers	DID	a	‘disorder’	if	it	
disrupts	the	life	of	the	sufferer.	The	presence	of	DID	is	no	longer	in	itself	cause	for	concern:	these	new	
diagnostic	criteria	now	suggest	that	it	is	possible	for	DID	to	be	present—for	a	person	to	have	a	
functioning	internal	system	of	alter	personalities—and	for	that	person	to	be,	by	its	own	criteria,	
psychologically	healthy	because	no	disruption	takes	place.	When	we	consider	that	there	are	those	in	
the	field	of	psychology	who	believe	the	condition	doesn’t	actually	exist,	this	is	a	significant	departure	
from	the	position	presented	in	the	fourth	edition. 
	 The	distinction	between	DID	itself	and	the	disruption	it	causes	is	an	important	one	in	the	fifth	
edition.	Indeed,	there	is	another	new	section	in	DSM-V	titled	“Functional	Consequences	of	
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder,”	which	states	that	the	disruption	caused	by	the	condition	can	vary	
from	relatively	minor	to	profound.	“With	appropriate	treatment,”	it	continues,	“many	impaired	
individuals	show	marked	improvement	in	occupational	and	personal	functioning”	(295).	This	section	
goes	on	to	note	that	individuals	may	“only	respond	to	treatment	very	slowly”	and	that	“long-term	
supportive	treatment	may	slowly	increase	these	individuals’	ability	to	manage	their	symptoms”	(295-
296).	I	find	the	use	of	the	phrase	‘manage	their	symptoms’	significant	here,	as	it	continues	to	suggest	
there	may	be	an	alternative	to	curing	the	disease	through	reintegration	therapy.	This	distinction	
becomes	important	when	we	consider	the	fictional	texts,	particularly	Set	This	House	in	Order,	in	
which	Andrew	rejects	an	integrative	cure	therapy	in	favour	of	working	out	a	system	in	which	the	alter	
personalities	are	able	to	cohabit	and	manage	the	affairs	of	Andy	Gage	together.	Haddock	is	a	
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supporter	of	this	form	of	clinical	treatment	in	the	real	world,	stating	that	“the	most	important	issue	in	
any	DID	treatment	is	empowering	the	client	to	live	a	more	integrated	life,	living	with	increased	
awareness	and	internal	cooperation.	That	does	not	mean	that	parts	have	to	disappear	or	cease	to	
exist”	(85).		Haddock	stresses	that	it	is	the	client’s	choice	whether	to	attempt	full	integration	or	not,	
and	some	people	refuse	because	they	feel	integration	is	“like	a	death”	(141).	This	is	Andrew’s	
justification	for	rejecting	reintegration	in	Set	This	House	in	Order,	and	a	point	of	view	he	expresses	to	
Penny	when	she	chooses	to	reintegrate	her	personalities	at	the	end	of	the	novel.	It	may	be	the	case	
that	Haddock’s	views	represent	a	widely	held	view	in	the	field	of	psychology,	but	the	fact	remains	
that	to	a	layperson,	who	may	only	know	DID	as	the	condition	in	which	hostile	alter	personalities	take	
control	of	a	person	and	must	be	excised	or	reintegrated	in	order	for	the	person	to	be	cured—as	it	is	
most	often	presented	in	the	media—the	idea	that	someone	can	live	with	a	functional	internal	system	
in	which	“the	parts	communicate,	share	space,	and	make	decisions	together”	is	quite	a	radical	
departure	(Haddock:	140).	Indeed,	these	ideas	would	be	viewed	as	controversial	or	even	extreme	by	
those	on	the	opposite	side	of	the	debate	within	the	field	of	psychology. 
	 Rather	than	simply	opposing	Haddock’s	approach	to	therapy,	there	are	those	who	believe	the	
condition	does	not	actually	exist.	This	debate	centres	on	what	it	is	that	causes	DID,	with	one	side	
arguing	that	it	is	a	result	of	trauma,	most	often	experienced	in	childhood,	while	the	other	argues	that	
the	condition	is	iatrogenic,	and	caused	in	susceptible	patients	by	over-zealous	therapists.	Neither	the	
fourth	or	fifth	editions	of	the	DSM	offer	a	definitive	explanation	for	what	causes	DID:	the	fifth	edition	
states	that	the	disorder	is	“associated	with	overwhelming	experiences,	traumatic	events	and/or	
abuse	occurring	in	childhood”	(DSM-IV:	294)	while	the	fourth	refers	to	trauma	as	an	“associated	
descriptive	feature”	(DSM-IV:	497).	Note	that	neither	state	that	the	disorder	is	directly	caused	by	
traumatic	events	and	experiences,	merely	that	it	is	‘associated’	with	them.	In	refusing	to	state	that	
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the	condition	is	definitively	caused	by	trauma,	both	editions	have	allowed	the	debate	to	continue	and	
acknowledge	the	differences	of	opinion	within	the	field.	 
	 For	those	who	believe	DID	is	caused	by	childhood	trauma,	the	disorder	occurs	following	
“exposure	to	situations	of	extreme	ambivalence	and	abuse	in	early	childhood	that	are	coped	with	by	
an	elaborate	form	of	denial	so	that	the	child	believes	the	event	to	be	happening	to	someone	else	
(perhaps	starting	out	as	an	imaginary	companion)”	(Gillig:	25).	Dissociation	is	a	mechanism	which	
allows	the	child	to	cope	with	the	trauma	they	are	faced	with	by	giving	up	control	to	an	alter	
personality	better	suited	to	the	situation.	This	means	that,	“like	other	coping	mechanisms,	
dissociation	can	be	protective”	(McAllister:	25).	Haddock	supports	this	view,	calling	DID	“life	saving”	
and	stating	that	it	is	“about	survival”	in	the	introduction	to	her	book	on	the	subject	(Haddock:	xvii).	
Indeed,	Haddock	classifies	the	disorder	as	a	kind	of	“adaptive	functioning”	(32)	which	occurs	when	
people	are	exposed	to	a	series	of	long-term	traumas.	This	use	of	language	could	give	the	impression	
that	Haddock	thinks	DID	could	be	classed	as	a	‘positive’	thing,	but	this	is	not	the	case.	Instead,	she	
believes	that	DID	has	an	important	function	to	play,	but	that	it	should	be	treated	because	people	
continue	to	live	and	function	in	this	adapted	state	once	the	danger	or	trauma	has	passed,	and	this	can	
negatively	affect	their	daily	lives.	While	she	may	believe	the	condition	has	a	very	real,	‘life	saving’	
function	to	fulfil	during	the	trauma,	she	believes	that	patients	must	be	given	the	tools	to	return	to	
what	we	would	think	of	as	a	‘normal’	(reintegrated)	style	of	functioning	in	order	to	carry	on	with	their	
lives.		Indeed,	most	critics	who	believe	that	the	disorder	is	caused	by	trauma	would	argue	that	this	is	
the	ultimate	goal	of	treatment,	whether	the	aim	is	for	a	more	traditional	reintegrative	approach	or	
Haddock’s	more	radical	ideas	around	finding	a	way	for	the	internal	system	to	function	and	remove	
the	disruption	and	negative	consequences	of	DID	from	the	sufferer’s	life.	The	reintegration	approach	
is	supported	by	the	International	Study	of	Dissociation	(ISSD),	which	“recommends	that	treatment	
should	move	the	patient	towards	a	sense	of	integrated	functioning”	(McAllister:	30).	It	is	also	more	
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generally	perceived	to	be	the	way	to	treat	DID	by	laypeople,	and	in	popular	culture	and	media	
representations.	Among	the	fictional	texts	that	I	will	discuss	in	this	thesis,	reintegration	is	suggested	
to	Tara	as	a	cure	throughout	United	States	of	Tara,	and	is	what	Penny	chooses	to	undergo	when	she	
enters	treatment	in	Set	This	House	in	Order,	despite	Andrew’s	misgivings.			 
	 While	the	view	that	DID	is	caused	by	trauma	represents	one	side	of	the	debate	surrounding	
the	validity	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	there	are	also	those	who	argue	that	the	disorder	does	
not	exist	at	all,	or	that	it	is	a	subtype	or	more	severe	version	of	existing	conditions.	In	this	way	of	
thinking,	the	two	conditions	it	has	most	commonly	been	associated	with	are	Borderline	Personality	
Disorder	and	Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder.	In	a	1984	article,	Horevitz	and	Braun	found	that	70%	of	
patients	who	had	been	diagnosed	with	multiple	personalities	could	also	meet	the	criteria	for	BPD.	
While	they	did	not	believe	this	meant	DID	was	not	a	distinct	entity	as	some	30%	of	patients	did	not	
meet	the	criteria	for	an	alternative	diagnosis,	they	did	believe	this	to	mean	that	DID	was	over	
diagnosed.	This	link	was	examined	again	in	1986,	when	Coons	and	Sterne	reported	that	they	believed	
DID	was	a	syndrome	that	occurred	in	people	with	personality	disorders,	particularly	Borderline	
Personality	Disorder.	A	syndrome	is	a	group	of	symptoms	which	consistently	occur	together,	whereas	
a	disorder	is	something	which	impairs	normal	functioning,	so	Coons	and	Sterne	are	arguing	that	DID	is	
a	collection	of	symptoms	often	found	within	those	who	already	suffer	from	a	disorder	which	impairs	
their	functioning	(in	this	case	BPD)	rather	than	a	disorder	itself.	Indeed,	they	argued	that	BPD	and	DID	
were	on	the	same	character	disorder	spectrum,	with	DID	being	a	more	severe	form	of	BPD.	Lauer,	
Black	and	Keen	concluded	much	the	same	in	1993,	arguing	that	DID	was	an	epiphenomenon—a	
secondary	effect	or	by-product—of	BPD	which	shared	many	of	the	same	symptoms.	In	her	2009	
overview	of	DID	literature,	Gillig	states	that	“[Lauer,	Black	and	Keen]	concluded	that	DID	had	‘no	
unique	clinical	picture,	no	reliable	laboratory	tests,	could	not	be	successfully	delimited	from	other	
disorders,	[and]	had	no	unique	natural	history	and	no	familial	pattern’”	(Gillig:	25).	It	is	this	inability	to	
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differentiate	the	symptoms	from	those	of	other	conditions	that	has	contributed	to	the	scepticism	
surrounding	the	disorder.	Due	to	the	similar	symptoms	found	in	those	with	DID	and	BPD,	and	the	
theory	that	DID	is	linked	to	and	caused	by	traumatic	experiences,	the	condition	has	also	been	
extensively	compared	to	PTSD	in	psychological	writing.		In	1992,	Herman	suggested	that	DID	could	be	
a	disorder	of	extreme	stress	or	a	complex	form	of	PTSD	with	others	such	as	Gelinas	suggesting	DID	
patients	could	exhibit	PTSD	symptoms	as	a	response	to	the	trauma	they	had	faced	in	the	past	such	as	
sexual	and	physical	abuse	in	childhood.	Spiegel	and	Rosenfeld	also	discussed	the	links	between	the	
two	conditions,	suggesting	that	PTSD	symptoms	related	to	trauma	were	central	to	DID.	 
	 As	well	as	those	who	express	doubt	over	DID	as	a	distinct	condition,	there	are	those	who	
believe	DID	to	be	caused	in	vulnerable	patients	by	therapists.	This	argument	states	that	DID	has	no	
legitimate	cause	and	is	instead	iatrogenic.	McAllister	explains	it	thus:	“Because	society,	including	
therapists,	is	now	more	willing	to	hear	victims’	stories	and	to	believe	them,	therapists	have	been	
accused	of	‘creating’	DID	by	encouraging	their	patients	to	see	themselves	as	having	many	parts,	or	as	
having	inner	children”	(27).	In	this	view,	vulnerable	patients	entering	therapy	are	seen	as	more	
susceptible	to	suggestion	and	so	try	to	please	their	therapists	by	confirming	that	they	do	indeed	have	
different	‘parts’	or	personalities.	They	begin	to	perform	symptoms	and	come	to	believe	they	have	
them,	encouraged	by	their	therapist’s	pleasure	at	the	apparent	success	the	patient	is	having	in	
coming	to	terms	with	their	condition.	The	two	feed	each	other,	such	that	the	therapist’s	treatment	of	
the	patient	causes	the	patient	to	continue	to	perform	the	role	and	symptoms	the	therapist	expects.	 
	 Those	who	believe	this	view	are	usually	also	sceptical	of	the	validity	of	the	condition	as	a	
unique	and	distinct	disorder.	This	scepticism	arises	from	the	fact	that	treatment	of	DID	deals	with	re-
experiencing	and	coming	to	accept	memories	of	trauma	experienced	by	the	patient	in	the	past.	The	
validity	of	these	memories	has	been	questioned	by	critics,	who	ask	how	adult	patients	can	remember	
things	that	happened	to	them	as	young	children,	particularly	when	it	is	claimed	these	memories	have	
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been	repressed	for	many	years.	Once	again,	there	are	concerns	that	patients	could	be	inventing	
traumatic	memories	in	a	bid	to	please	therapists,	but	also	that	there	is	often	no	way	for	a	therapist	to	
corroborate	many	of	these	memories	and	so	they	may	be	unknowingly	encouraging	a	patient	to	lie	
and	‘perform’	the	symptoms	of	DID.	This	means	that	the	general	“trustworthiness	of	childhood	
memories	of	abuse	is	questioned”	in	a	clinical	setting	as	well	as	in	research	about	DID	(McAllister:	28).	 
	 In	their	two-part	article	“The	Persistence	of	Folly:	A	Critical	Examination	of	Dissociative	
Identity	Disorder”	(2004),	Piper	and	Merskey	argue	that	the	lack	of	evidence	of	trauma	is	the	biggest	
indication	that	the	condition	does	not	exist.	They	argue	that	much	of	the	DID	literature	which	
supports	the	existence	of,	and	influences	treatment	of,	the	disorder	is	based	on	studies	with	
methodological	problems.	They	state	that	“participants’	self-reports	were	highly	likely	to	contain	
exaggerations,	distortions	and	confabulations”	and	question	why	the	term	‘sexual	abuse’	is	rarely	
concretely	defined	(595).	In	their	view,	if	an	argument	is	being	made	that	childhood	sexual	and	
physical	abuse	is	the	cause	of	the	condition,	“one	needs	to	know	exactly	what	happened	to	the	child”	
as	the	‘vague’	use	of	terms	like	‘sexual	abuse’	or	‘trauma’	limits	the	terms’	scientific	value	(593).	They	
give	the	example	of	one	study	which	states	that	sexual	abuse	is	any	sexual	contact	between	a	girl	
under	the	age	of	15	years	and	someone	at	least	5	years	older	(Piper	and	Merskey:	593).	Piper	and	
Merskey	then	state:	“The	authors	apparently	do	not	consider	whether	the	young	woman	desired,	
initiated,	or	willingly	participated	in	the	activity	or	whether	she	actually	found	it	traumatic”	(593).	This	
could	be	considered	problematic	for	the	following	reasons.	Firstly,	Piper	and	Merskey	refer	to	this	
fictional	trauma	sufferer	as	a	‘young	woman’	which	is	clear	misrepresentation.	In	most	of	the	
Western	world,	a	girl	under	the	age	of	15	would	be	(legally)	classed	as	a	child,	so	the	use	of	the	term	
‘young	woman’	is	rather	disingenuous.	Furthermore,	this	could	be	considered	an	instance	of	what	
feminists	call	‘rape	culture’	in	that	it	seems	designed	to	hint	at	the	idea	that	the	girl	should	take	some	
responsibility	for	her	abuse.	Piper	and	Merskey’s	comments	both	sexualise	a	female	child,	and	
28	
	
	
	
suggest	the	girl	could	have	“desired	[or]	initiated”	the	contact	herself.	The	fact	remains	that	sexual	
contact	between	a	girl	under	the	age	of	15	and	an	older	man	or	woman	is	statutory	rape	in	most	
Western	countries;	legally	the	girl	described	in	this	scenario	is	not	able	to	consent	to	any	sexual	
activity.	Indeed,	in	the	very	next	sentence,	Piper	and	Merskey	add	that	“conversely,	the	term	sexual	
abuse	is	also	applied	to	children	much	more	severely	victimised”	(594),	as	though	the	girl	in	the	
scenario	they	describe	has	not	really	been	victimised	at	all.	This	is	misrepresenting	the	issue	at	hand	
in	an	attempt	to	cast	doubt	on	DID’s	validity.	 
	 After	questioning	the	use	of	the	term	‘abuse’,	Piper	and	Merskey	go	on	to	place	the	burden	of	
proof	on	the	victim:	 
Some	kinds	of	evidence	will	obviously	carry	more	weight	than	others.	Written	
confessions	by	perpetrators	would	be	valuable,	if	not	obtained	under	severe	stress	
and	high	social	pressure.	Also	quite	significant	would	be	photographs,	diaries	written	
by	perpetrators	detailing	specific	acts	at	the	time	of	the	act,	and	contemporary	
eyewitness	accounts	from	unimpeachable	sources.	(594). 
This	statement	is	equally	problematic	from	a	feminist	point	of	view.	As	we	have	already	seen,	the	
typical	DID	patient	is	a	woman.	DID	is	caused	by	or	associated	with	sexual	abuse	or	trauma	and	so	
once	again	this	has	to	be	placed	into	context	alongside	feminist	work	on	rape	and	sexual	violence.	
Whether	knowingly	or	unknowingly,	Piper	and	Merskey	are	subscribing	to	the	belief	that	women	
cannot	always	be	trusted	when	they	claim	they	have	been	raped	or	sexually	assaulted,	and	should	
therefore	not	always	be	believed.	The	inference	seems	to	be	that	a	confession	from	a	(male)	abuser	
would	hold	more	weight	than	the	female	DID	sufferer’s	statement.	In	this	case,	some	of	the	concern	
also	arises	from	scepticism	of	recovered	repressed	memories	as	I	have	already	discussed	above,	but	
nevertheless,	Piper	and	Merskey	are	suggesting	that	female	rape	victims	are	(seemingly)	
untrustworthy	in	an	attempt	to	discount	the	validity	of	a	psychological	disorder.	It	is	easy	to	view	
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their	criticism	through	a	feminist	lens	and	question	what	it	is	about	this	particular	topic	that	makes	
Piper	and	Merskey	question	the	(female)	patient’s	statement.	It	is	a	question	to	which	they	never	give	
a	satisfactory	answer.		 
	 Piper	and	Merskey	also	point	to	Child	Protective	Services	records	as	an	example	of	evidence	
that	would	prove	abuse,	as	though	these	records	always	accurately	record	every	instance	of	abuse	
that	occurs	in	the	United	States.	Unfortunately,	we	know	that	this	is	not	always	the	case	and	that	
there	are	many	children	who	escape	the	attention	of	agencies	designed	to	help	them.	They	also	
question	why	it	is	that	DID	is	most	often	diagnosed	in	later	life,	as	it	should	presumably	be	visible	in	
abused	children	if	this	trauma	is	the	cause	of	DID.	One	reason	for	the	lack	of	children	seeking	
treatment	for	DID	could	be	that	a	child	would	have	to	rely	on	their	parents	to	facilitate	any	
professional	medical	care;	if	a	child’s	parents	are	abusing	them,	there	seems	little	chance	those	same	
parents	would	take	a	child	to	a	psychologist,	or	indeed	take	the	chance	of	putting	the	child	in	front	of	
a	medical	professional	who	may	spot	signs	of	abuse.	Furthermore,	the	presence	of	alter	personalities	
in	children	could	be	attributed	to	play	or	an	imaginary	friend;	if	the	parents	are	not	the	perpetrators	
of	abuse,	they	may	not	be	able	to	distinguish	signs	of	DID	from	‘normal’	childhood	behaviour.	As	I	
discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter,	this	is	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	diagnostic	criteria	for	DID	in	DSM-V	
(criterion	D):	it	presumably	takes	the	trained	eye	of	a	professional	to	be	able	to	distinguish	this	play	
behaviour	from	the	presence	of	alters.	Parents	may	not	be	adequately	equipped	to	make	this	
judgement	and	so	would	not	believe	anything	was	wrong	or	seek	medical	help. 
	 Much	of	the	scepticism	surrounding	DID	comes	from	the	idea	that	patients	may	be	
malingering	or	feigning	symptoms	and	we	can	see	this	concern	in	Piper	and	Merskey’s	work,	though	
they	express	it	in	problematic	ways.	For	those	who	doubt	the	condition	exists,	the	fear	of	malingering	
or	feigned	symptoms	is	linked	to	many	different	things.	One,	as	we	have	seen,	is	the	concern	over	
memory	recovery	work,	and	the	extent	to	which	patients	are	playing	a	part,	or	inventing	false	
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memories,	to	please	their	therapists.		However,	there	is	also	a	concern	that	the	increased	appearance	
of	DID	in	the	media—where	it	is	often	sensationalised,	particularly	in	media	reporting	of	real-life	
cases,	such	as	people	with	DID	appearing	on	talk	shows—and	the	resulting	increased	awareness	of	
the	condition	has	raised	the	chances	of	patients	claiming	to	have	the	condition	in	a	sort	of	“copycat	
phenomenon”	(McAllister:	28).	Indeed,	DID	has	come	to	be	seen	by	critics	as	“fashionable	and	related	
to	psychiatric	fads”	and	the	increase	in	diagnoses	seems	to	confirm	these	fears	(Traub:	347).	Those	
who	view	DID	as	a	psychiatric	‘fad’	point	to	its	over-diagnosis	in	the	United	States,	in	particular,	as	
evidence.	As	a	result	of	this,	DID	has	been	called	‘culture-bound’.	This	phrase,	originally	used	by	
medical	anthropologists,	refers	to	symptoms	which	are	only	considered	to	be	a	recognisable	disease	
within	a	specific	society	or	culture.	There	is	a	list	of	such	‘culture-bound’	conditions	in	Appendix	I	of	
DSM-IV.	Its	use	to	describe	DID	by	psychologists	who	believe	the	condition	is	iatrogenic	or	a	product	
of	the	medicalisation	of	mental	health	in	American	society	therefore	carries	negative	connotations.	
Its	use	once	again	casts	doubts	on	the	validity	of	DID	and	whether	or	not	the	disorder	is	‘real’	or	a	
fiction	perpetuated	by	the	American	medical	system. 
	 Proponents	of	the	view	that	DID	is	culture-bound	ask	what	is	about	the	American	experience	
that	allows	people	to	make	this	connection,	and	why	it	is	that	most	of	the	literature	available	on	DID	
comes	from	the	U.S.	It	has	been	suggested	that	life	is	more	traumatic	in	the	U.S.	or	that	child	abuse	is	
more	common,	or	that	the	type	of	media	coverage	the	condition	receives	in	America—in	particular,	
on	talk	shows—has	led	to	the	condition	becoming	ingrained	in	the	popular	consciousness	and	
therefore	the	subject	of	‘copycats’	who	feign	symptoms.8	It	has	also	been	suggested	that	DID	seems	
to	appear	more	frequently	in	the	U.S.	due	to	a	medicalised	culture	in	which	behaviour	is	increasingly	
viewed	as	pathological,	and	the	subject	of	psychiatric	diagnosis.	 
																																								 																				
8	McAllister,	M.	M.	‘Dissociative	Identity	Disorder:	A	Literature	Review.’	Journal	of	Psychiatric	and	Mental	Health	
Nursing	7	(2002):25-33.	
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	 Kutchins	and	Kirk	in	particular	are	sceptical	of	the	DSM’s	role	in	this	culture,	and	its	overuse	
as	a	diagnostic	aid.	The	DSM,	they	state,	“is	at	the	core	of	so	many	controversies	not	only	because	it	
attempts	to	construct	diagnostic	categories	out	of	everyday	behaviours	but	also	because	it	has	grown	
to	encompass	more	and	more	behaviours	that	are	less	and	less	abnormal”	(240).	Kutchins	and	Kirk	
note	that	the	DSM	does	not	offer	any	suggestions	for	how	to	treat	the	conditions	it	lists.	Instead,	it	is	
increasingly	used	in	the	field	of	psychology	to	enable	the	reimbursement	of	therapists	and	other	
professionals	through	patients’	health	care	insurance.	Kutchins	and	Kirk	see	the	DSM	as	part	of	the	
larger,	capitalist-driven	medical	establishment	in	the	U.S.,	one	that	is	not	interested	in	the	
betterment	of	patients	but	in	the	betterment	of	therapists	and	pharmaceutical	companies.	The	
disorders	listed	in	the	DSM	enable	the	easy	prescription	of	drugs,	and	the	easy	completion	of	
insurance	forms,	and	even	the	book	itself	is	a	way	to	make	money:	“in	its	first	10	months,	the	DSM-IV	
alone	is	reported	to	have	brought	in	$18	million”	(Kutchins	and	Kirk:	247).	This	is	a	slightly	different	
interpretation	of	the	term	‘culture-bound’	but	it	is	nevertheless	an	important	one.	Rather	than	
arguing	that	it	is	something	about	American	life	which	causes	people	to	have	mental	disorders—to	
dissociate,	for	example—Kutchins	and	Kirk	instead	argue	that	it	is	the	American	health	care	system	
which	has	a	vested	interest	in	perpetuating	the	idea	that	the	incidence	of	mental	disorder	is	
particularly	high	in	the	U.S.:	“DSM	is	used	to	directly	affect	national	health	policy	and	priorities	by	
inflating	the	proportion	of	the	population	that	is	defined	as	‘mentally	disordered’”	(243).	Indeed,	they	
argue	that	the	DSM	has	come	to	be	seen	as	the	definitive	sourcebook	of	medical	knowledge	and	is	
now	used	throughout	America	by	a	number	of	different	groups	and	agencies: 
Its	approach	and	definitions	are	required	for	those	seeking	research	funding	from	the	
National	Institute	of	Mental	Health	or	writing	textbooks	about	abnormal	behaviour.	It	
is	used	in	schools,	prisons,	welfare	offices,	and	other	social	agencies	grasping	for	
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labels	and	rationales.	And,	of	course,	it	is	on	the	desks	of	almost	all	mental	health	
clinicians.	(Kutchins	and	Kirk:	247). 
What	this	means	is	that	rather	than	American	culture	producing	people	who	are	disordered,	people	
and	their	behaviour	are	increasingly	medicalised	by	the	American	health	care	system	which	seeks	to	
perpetuate	the	idea	that	there	is	a	high	incidence	of	mental	health	problems	in	order	to	make	money.	
It	is	this	aspect	of	American	culture	that	‘causes’	mental	health	disorders.	While	they	stop	short	of	
saying	that	all	mental	disorders	found	in	the	DSM	are	invented	by	psychologists,	they	do	question	
how	the	diagnostic	criteria	for	some	disorders	in	particular	can	be	distinguished	from	behaviours	and	
feelings	“that	are	rather	ubiquitous,	for	example,	depressed	mood,	insomnia,	inflated	or	deflated	self-
esteem,	fears,	anxiety”	(252).	In	their	opinion,	the	DSM	does	not	offer	enough	information	
successfully	to	make	this	distinction	and	therefore	fails	as	a	diagnostic	aid.	 
	 For	Kutchins	and	Kirk	this	widespread	use	of	and	reliance	on	the	DSM	is	problematic	because	
of	the	way	that	the	DSM	is	constructed:	conditions	are	added	and	taken	away,	and	the	text	contains	
gendered	and	racial	biases.	Kutchins	and	Kirk	use	the	examples	of	homosexuality	being	removed	from	
the	DSM	and	PTSD	being	added	to	the	DSM,	both	of	which	followed	periods	of	prolonged	activism	
from	gay	people	and	veterans	respectively.	The	DSM	is	subject	to	external	pressures	and	politics,	as	
these	examples	show,	and	Kutchins	and	Kirk	find	this	problematic	because	it	cuts	to	the	heart	of	their	
main	criticism	of	the	DSM:	that	there	is	no	definition	of	what	exactly	constitutes	a	mental	illness.	
There	is	no	defined	process	by	which	behaviours	come	to	be	viewed	as	a	disorder	(or	no	longer	
considered	a	disorder)	and	this	means	that	something	that	has	at	one	time	been	viewed	as	‘normal’	
might	be	redefined	and	added	to	the	DSM	for	reasons	which	are	culturally	or	politically	determined	
and	which	might	have	the	effect	of	ostracising	or	punishing	people	who	exhibit	those	behaviours.	
Indeed,	Kutchins	and	Kirk	describe	the	treatment	of	a	proposal	to	add	a	disorder	to	the	DSM	which	
would	have	dealt	with	“the	question	of	whether	the	role	or	behaviour	of	powerful	men	could	possibly	
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be	evidence	of	mental	disorder”	(Kutchins	and	Kirk:	241)	and	contrast	this	with	the	way	that	
borderline	personality	disorder	has	come	to	be	used	in	relation	to	women.	In	the	first	instance,	the	
proposal	to	add	‘Delusional	Dominating	Personality	Disorder’	to	the	DSM	was	rejected	“quickly	and	
quietly,	under	the	dominance	of	the	male	psychiatric	establishment”	(241)	as	this	aspect	of	male	
behaviour	was	not	viewed	as	pathological,	and	there	were	no	organised	activists	who	exerted	
political	and	social	pressure	to	have	it	added	to	the	DSM.	In	contrast	to	this,	BPD,	now	enshrined	in	
the	DSM	as	a	mental	disorder	(which	particularly	afflicts	women),	had	been	used	by	“a	well-respected	
psychiatrist	[…]	to	explain	how	patients	induce	the	sexual	misbehaviour	of	their	therapists”	(242).	For	
Kutchins	and	Kirk	this	is	an	example	of	men	in	a	position	of	power,	in	this	case	psychologists,	
exploiting	and	abusing	vulnerable	women	and	pushing	the	blame	for	these	actions	on	to	the	women	
themselves.	The	diagnosis	of	BPD,	which	the	psychiatrists	themselves	assign,	allows	psychiatrists	to	
cast	doubt	on	the	competence	of	the	(female)	BPD	sufferer	and	their	version	of	events.	This	example	
shows	an	obvious	gender	bias	in	that	a	condition	which	would	largely	affect	men	is	rejected	as	the	
(male)	developers	of	the	DSM	do	not	view	this	behaviour	as	‘abnormal’,	though	feminists	would	
argue	that	it	is,	at	the	very	least,	problematic.	In	contrast	to	this,	BPD	has	a	history	of	being	used	as	a	
way	to	dismiss	women’s	problems	by	attributing	them	to	a	disorder.9	Though	Kutchins	and	Kirk	do	
not	go	as	far	as	to	say	the	(male)	gatekeepers	who	work	on	the	DSM	are	knowingly	inserting	these	
gender	biases	into	the	text,	one	cannot	ignore	that	gender	bias	plays	a	role	in	its	construction.	 
	 It	is	important	to	be	aware	of	the	cultural	biases	present	in	the	DSM,	such	as	the	gendered	
ones	I	have	mentioned	throughout	this	chapter.	These	aspects	of	the	DSM	and	its	construction—the	
political	and	social	pressures	on	the	American	Psychiatric	Association	to	add	or	remove	certain	
																																								 																				
9	Susanna	Kaysen’s	memoir	Girl	Interrupted	is	the	classic	example	of	this.	She	was	diagnosed	with	BPD	by	a	
therapist	she	only	saw	once,	and	was	sent	to	a	mental	institute	to	‘recover.’	Kaysen	does	not	dismiss	the	fact	
she	had	real	problems	at	that	point	in	her	life,	but	questions	the	medical	establishment	and	the	way	that	her	
case	was	handled,	particularly	because	she	was	a	woman.	In	many	ways,	her	behaviour	did	not	fit	into	what	was	
believed	to	be	acceptable	for	a	woman	at	that	time,	and	so	she	believes	her	diagnosis	was	an	attempt	at	
controlling	her,	as	therapy	was	designed	to	curb	these	behaviours.	
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conditions,	the	biases	that	find	their	way	into	the	DSM	from	those	who	create	and	verify	the	
content—mean	that	the	DSM	is	not	the	objective,	authoritative	sourcebook	that	it	has	sometimes	
been	viewed	as.	Indeed,	we	have	seen	this	throughout	this	chapter,	as	I	have	outlined	the	arguments	
of	those	who	disagree	with	the	diagnostic	criteria	set	out	in	the	DSM	for	DID,	or	even	disagree	that	it	
should	be	included	at	all.	We	should	therefore	not	point	to	the	DSM	as	a	definitive	source	that	
confirms	DID	exists,	or	believe	it	to	be	representative	of	the	views	of	all	in	the	field	of	psychology.	
Equally,	we	cannot	point	to	the	counter-arguments	provided	by	psychologists	who	believe	the	
condition	does	not	exist	as	definitive	proof	of	their	view	either.	It	is	certainly	not	the	purpose	of	this	
thesis	to	support	any	particular	claim	about	the	nature	of	DID	as	an	actual	clinical	condition,	not	least	
because	this	is	a	work	of	literary	scholarship	and	not	of	psychology.	From	the	overview	I	have	
provided	in	this	chapter,	it	is	clear	to	me	that	problems	can	be	found	on	both	sides	of	the	debate,	and	
that	holes	can	be	found	in	both	sides	of	the	argument.	Indeed,	for	those	I	have	mentioned	who	
specifically	believe	the	condition	does	not	exist	or	is	a	subtype	of	another	condition	there	are	just	as	
many	who	do	believe	the	condition	is	a	valid	diagnosis:	Kluft,	Traub	and	McAllister	have	all	written	on	
the	subject	and	attempted	to	counter	the	counter-arguments,	supporting	the	validity	of	DID.	DID	will	
continue	to	be	a	controversial	diagnosis,	but	this	diagnostic	problem	is	not	one	I	wish	to	be	at	the	
forefront	of	this	thesis.	While	it	is	important	to	have	knowledge	of	these	debates	in	order	to	assess	
how	real-world	knowledge	of	DID	interacts	with	fictional	representation,	this	thesis	is	ultimately	more	
interested	in	studying	fictional	representations	of	the	disorder,	and	the	use	to	which	authors	put	the	
disorder	in	their	fiction.	 
	 To	that	end,	this	thesis	will	examine	representations	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	in	
contemporary	fiction	since	1994,	the	year	in	which	DID	first	appeared	in	DSM-IV,	with	a	particular	
focus	on	the	following	texts:	the	novels	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	Fight	Club,	and	the	television	
shows	United	States	of	Tara	and	Dollhouse.	While	the	information	outlined	in	this	chapter	will	allow	
35	
	
	
	
me	to	contextualise	some	of	the	narratives	and	character	types	found	within	fictional	DID	texts,	it	is	
not	important	for	me	to	attempt	to	prove	that	DID	does	or	does	not	exist	in	the	real	world.		I	will	
instead	be	assessing	the	way	in	which	the	discourse	of	DID	surfaces	and	is	represented	in	these	texts.	
Chapter	2	will	begin	to	examine	these	fictional	texts,	as	well	as	representations	of	syndromes	and	
disorders	found	within	the	DSM	more	widely,	and	seek	to	historicise	contemporary	(fictional)	
representations	of	DID	by	examining	some	of	the	early,	seminal	DID	texts	including	Sybil,	The	Minds	of	
Billy	Milligan	and	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve.	 
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Chapter	2		
Dissociative	Identity	Disorder:	Fictional	Representations	
	
This	chapter	examines	classic	representations	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	beginning	with	early	
texts	such	as	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve	(1957),	Sybil	(1973),	and	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	(1981).	It	
then	moves	on	to	examine	later	DID	texts,	and	the	trends,	narrative	stereotypes,	and	stock	figures	
found	within	them.	In	doing	so,	I	historicise	the	representation	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	and	
demonstrate	how	the	contemporary	texts	I	examine	in	this	thesis	build	on	those	that	came	before.	To	
that	end,	I	begin	by	examining	the	three	earlier	texts	already	mentioned,	all	of	which	are	based	on	
real-life	cases	of	DID	and	went	on	to	become	extremely	popular	and	inform	general	attitudes	towards	
and	knowledge	of	DID	in	laypeople.	These	texts	are	seminal	ones	for	DID	representation,	and	many	of	
the	themes	found	in	later	texts	have	their	roots	here.	Specific	areas	I	examine	in	these	texts	include	
the	representation	of	the	condition	itself,	including	how	alters	are	presented	and	how	symptoms	are	
presented;	how	psychologists	feature	in	the	texts,	both	in	their	attitudes	towards	the	condition	and	
their	treatment	of	it;	the	way	texts	engage	with	trauma	and	the	notion	that	trauma	causes	DID;	and	
how	the	texts	construct	the	‘real’	in	writing	about	real-life	people	with	DID.	From	here,	I	examine	
what	happened	next	for	DID	representation,	looking	at	such	trends	as	that	of	thrillers	and	horror	films	
using	characters	with	DID	as	villains	or	serial	killers,	as	well	as	the	‘evil	twin’	often	found	in	science	
fiction,	against	the	background	of	the	popularity	of	contemporary	fiction	which	deals	with	mental	
illness,	disorders	and	syndromes.	The	chapter	concludes	by	tracing	these	trends	through	to	the	
selection	of	contemporary	DID	texts	I	examine	in	the	central	chapters	of	this	thesis,	highlighting	some	
of	the	similarities	and	differences	found	within	them	when	compared	to	the	early	DID	texts.	I	
demonstrate	the	case	for	studying	these	texts	now,	and	the	extent	to	which	these	texts	interact	with	
modern	debates	around	identity,	society,	and	normativity. 
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To	begin	with	then,	a	brief	overview	of	the	early	texts.	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve,	Sybil,	and	The	
Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	are	all	based	on	real-life	cases	of	people	with	what	would	now	be	called	
dissociative	identity	disorder	but	was	then	known	as	multiple	personality	disorder.	The	Three	Faces	of	
Eve	is	written	by	psychiatrists	Corbett	H.	Thigpen	and	Harvey	M.	Cleckley	about	their	treatment	of	a	
woman	they	call	“Eve	White,”	who	came	to	them	suffering	from	headaches	and	blackouts	and	was	
eventually	discovered	to	have	a	further	two	personalities:	Eve	Black	and	Jane.	Eve	White	is	timid	and	
does	not	know	about	the	existence	of	her	other	personalities,	while	Eve	Black	is	wild,	reckless	and	
knows	she	is	an	alter	personality.	The	Jane	personality	falls	somewhere	between	the	two,	and	it	is	she	
who	is	gradually	able	to	remember	everything	that	has	happened	to	all	three	personalities.	During	
the	course	of	the	treatment,	Eve	remembers	a	traumatic	event	from	her	childhood	that	caused	her	to	
split	into	multiple	personalities	and	the	book	ends	with	the	reintegration	and	the	re-emergence	of	a	
singular	self.	Sybil	is	written	by	Flora	Rheta	Schreiber,	a	former	psychology	editor	for	Science	Digest,	
who	was	introduced	to	the	real-life	‘Sybil’	by	Sybil’s	psychologist,	Dr.	Cornelia	Wilbur,	because	Wilbur	
thought	Schreiber	might	like	to	write	about	the	case.	The	book	follows	Sybil’s	treatment	by	Wilbur,	
and	the	gradual	discovery	of	fifteen	alter	personalities	through	therapy.	The	book	details	Sybil’s	past	
(as	told	to	Schreiber	and	Wilbur	by	Sybil’s	alter	personalities),	and	the	physical	and	sexual	abuse	Sybil	
suffered	at	the	hands	of	her	mother,	who	Wilbur	believes	to	be	schizophrenic,	which	caused	Sybil	to	
split	into	a	multiple	personality.	Wilbur	was	the	first	psychoanalyst	to	treat	a	person	who	had	been	
diagnosed	with	DID,	and	the	book	covers	the	treatment	plan	Wilbur	creates	and	uses,	which	
culminates	in	Sybil	reintegrating	all	of	her	alter	personalities	and	becoming	singular	again.	The	Minds	
of	Billy	Milligan	is	the	biography	of	Billy	Milligan,	the	first	person	in	the	United	States	to	be	found	not	
guilty	by	reason	of	insanity	due	to	his	multiple	personalities.	It	is	written	by	Daniel	Keyes,	who	is	well	
known	for	writing	the	science	fiction	short	story	Flowers	for	Algernon	(1959),	later	turned	into	a	novel	
of	the	same	name	(1966).	Keyes	met	Milligan	(and	many	of	his	23	alter	personalities)	on	several	
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occasions	and	interviewed	62	other	people	who	met	Milligan	during	his	life	(Keyes:	v).	The	novel	
covers	the	time	period	from	Milligan’s	arrest	for	the	rapes	and	robberies	of	three	women	on	a	
university	campus	in	1977	and	the	legal	proceedings	that	followed,	culminating	in	his	being	sent	to	a	
series	of	state-run	mental	hospitals	in	Ohio	following	his	diagnosis	with	DID	and	the	subsequent	not-
guilty	verdict.	The	middle	section	of	the	book	recounts	Milligan’s	early	life,	told	to	Keyes	by	The	
Teacher,	a	fusion	of	all	Milligan’s	alter	personalities	who	remembers	everything	that	has	ever	
happened	to	Milligan,	no	matter	which	alter	was	in	control,	and	who	emerges	during	the	most	
successful	period	of	Milligan’s	treatment.	The	Teacher	tells	Keyes	that	Milligan	was	abused	by	his	
stepfather	when	he	was	younger,	and	though	we	might	assume	this	was	the	cause	of	Milligan’s	DID,	it	
is	suggested	that	Milligan	already	had	some	of	his	alter	personalities	before	this	happened.	Unlike	
Sybil	and	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve,	Milligan	is	never	‘cured’	of	his	disorder	and	is	not	reintegrated	by	
the	end	of	the	text. 
As	these	brief	summaries	suggest,	there	are	several	similarities	not	only	between	these	texts	
and	those	(fictional	texts)	that	came	later,	but	also	between	these	texts	and	the	descriptions	of	the	
disorder	found	within	medical	discourse.	These	include	the	representation	of	the	disorder	(patients	
not	knowing	they	have	DID,	‘losing	time’	and	suffering	amnesia,	alters	being	disruptive	and	taking	
control	from	the	‘original’	or	host	personality,	alters	with	a	different	gender	identity	than	that	of	the	
host),	the	links	between	trauma	and	dissociation,	the	way	that	the	characters	are	treated	by	
psychologists,	and	the	attempt	to	‘cure’	the	patients	through	reintegration	therapy.	Indeed,	these	
were	established	as	areas	of	interest	in	fictional	representations	of	DID	and	became	something	of	a	
blueprint	for	later	texts,	and	many	of	the	events,	descriptions	of	the	disorder,	and	representations	of	
treatment	and	psychology	can	be	found	in	the	contemporary	novels	and	films	I	examine	later	in	the	
thesis.	There	are	a	number	of	points	of	connection	between	the	texts	which	become	obvious	once	
pointed	out.	In	all	three	books,	none	of	the	patients	initially	know	they	have	DID.	Sybil	and	Eve	see	
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psychologists	for	different	concerns	(headaches,	amnesia,	blackouts,	‘losing	time’)	and	their	DID	is	
discovered	in	therapy	sessions	when	alters	attend	instead	of	the	‘original’	personality.	Sybil	and	
Milligan	both	have	personalities	who	are	able	to	handle	certain	situations	and	take	control	when	the	
‘original’	personality	is	having	difficulty	dealing	with	the	situations	they	find	themselves	in.	All	three	
patients	have	traumatic	events	in	their	past	which	are	speculated	to	have	caused	them	to	dissociate.	
The	traumatic	event	in	Milligan	and	Sybil’s	past	is	physical	and	sexual	abuse	by	family	members.	And	
finally,	for	all	three	patients	the	psychologists	treating	them	view	reintegration	as	the	long-term	goal	
of	treatment.	 
As	the	review	of	critical	literature	available	on	DID	in	Chapter	1	demonstrated,	many	of	these	
things	may	seem	obvious	and	fit	in	with	what	we	have	already	read	about	the	disorder.	Psychology	
literature	frequently	describes	patients	who	don’t	know	they’re	multiple	until	treatment,	who	lose	
time	and	suffer	from	amnesia,	while	trauma	is	frequently	cited	as	the	cause	of	the	disorder	(though	
not	without	controversy,	as	discussed	earlier.)	But	these	texts	were	written	at	a	time	when	the	bulk	
of	this	literature	did	not	exist.	There	was	no	body	of	work	available	on	DID,	and	there	had	been	no	in-
depth	studies	of	the	condition.	It	is	perhaps	an	exaggeration	to	say	that	these	texts	were	written	in	a	
complete	vacuum,	as	there	were	a	few	documented	cases	of	‘multiple	personalities’	as	noted	in	Sybil:	
“Now,	however,	as	[Wilbur]	read	into	the	night,	the	names	Mary	Reynolds,	Mamie,	Felida	X,	Louis	
Vine,	Ansel	Bourne,	Miss	Smith,	Mrs.	Smead,	Silas	Prong,	Doris	Fisher,	and	Christine	Beauchamp	
became	known	to	the	doctor.	These	were	the	people	with	multiple	personalities	whom	medical	
history	had	recorded:	seven	women	and	three	men.	The	newly	reported	case	of	Eve	made	it	eight	
women,	and	Eve	was	the	only	multiple	personality	known	to	be	alive”	(Schreiber:	102).	 
The	relative	scarcity	of	literature	on	the	disorder	(both	fiction	and	non-fiction)	is	what	helped	
these	texts	capture	the	public’s	imagination,	and	we	can	learn	a	great	deal	from	how	these	works	
were	positioned	within	the	cultural	marketplace.	While	Sybil	and	Eve	are,	on	the	surface,	narratively	
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conventional—ill	person	is	diagnosed	with	a	mental	disorder,	receives	treatment	and	is	cured—it	is	
the	rarity	and	exotic	nature	of	the	disease	itself	that	sets	these	texts	apart.	The	sensational	lives	of	
Eve,	Sybil	and	Milligan	are	presented	as	something	odd	and	shocking,	with	the	implicit	promise	that	
the	reader	will	gain	pleasure	by	reading	about	an	experience	so	alien	to	their	own.	All	DID	texts	hold	
this	promise	to	the	reader,	including	the	contemporary	ones	I	will	discuss	later,	but	it	originates	here	
despite	the	seriousness	with	which	the	authors	write	about	the	condition	and	patients.	Tonally,	the	
books	seek	to	be	objective,	and	facts	are	relayed	journalistically,	with	forewords	at	the	beginning	
explaining	the	extensive	research	done	by	each	author	prior	to	writing.	Despite	this,	the	nature	of	the	
condition	sets	the	disorder	apart	as	something	unusual.		Sybil	is	the	first	DID	sufferer	ever	to	be	
psychoanalysed,	while	Milligan	is	the	first	DID	sufferer	ever	found	not	guilty	by	reason	of	insanity	due	
to	the	condition.	The	very	nature	of	these	stories	makes	them	new	and	exciting,	and	the	way	their	
publishers	played	on	and	encouraged	these	expectations	led,	in	part,	to	their	success.	The	back	cover	
of	my	2009	edition	of	Sybil	claims	that	the	book	“riveted	the	consciousness	of	the	world”	while	the	
front	cover	exclaims	“the	#1	bestseller	–	over	6	million	copies	in	print!”	The	front	cover	of	my	1995	
reissue	of	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	features	a	quotation	from	Flora	Rheta	Schreiber—“author	of	
Sybil”—above	even	the	title	of	the	book.	These	intertextual	links	between	the	books	highlight	the	
extent	to	which	they	used	each	other’s	reputations	to	build	their	own,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	
should	be	viewed	as	a	subgenre	of	(non-)fiction	and	examined	together.	These	intertextual	links	do	
not	exist	only	on	the	book	covers:	Wilbur	examines	Billy	Milligan	and	confirms	his	diagnosis	and	
consults	with	Milligan’s	psychologists	about	his	treatment;	in	Sybil,	Wilbur	tries	to	find	a	copy	of	
Thigpen	and	Cleckley’s	original	journal	article10	about	Eve	but	it	is	not	yet	available.	Even	the	film	
adaptations	of	these	texts	encourage	the	viewer	to	relate	them	to	each	other:	in	The	Three	Faces	of	
Eve	(1957)	the	role	of	Eve	is	played	by	Joanne	Woodward;	in	the	1976	version	of	Sybil,	Woodward	
																																								 																				
10	Corbett	H.	Thigpen	and	Hervey	M.	Cleckley.	“A	Case	of	Multiple	Personality”	The	Journal	of	Abnormal	and	
social	Psychology	49.1	(1954):	135-151.	
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plays	Wilbur.	If	we	accept	the	psychology	literature	available	on	DID	as	a	collective,	a	group	of	works	
that	must	be	studied	in	relation	to	each	other,	then	so	too	must	we	view	these	texts.	It	is	not	one	of	
these	texts	which	established	so	much	of	the	way	DID	was	viewed	and	represented	in	popular	
culture,	but	all	of	them	together.	My	analysis	therefore	addresses	these	texts	together,	rather	than	
examining	each	one	in	turn. 
I	begin,	then,	with	a	discussion	of	the	way	the	disorder	functions	in	the	texts.	In	the	previous	
chapter,	I	outlined	the	view	held	by	some	psychologists	that	DID	is	a	form	of	‘adaptive	functioning’	in	
which	a	person	dissociates	in	order	to	cope	with	trauma,	and	though	this	may	have	not	been	clearly	
articulated	in	work	on	the	disorder	available	at	the	time,	all	of	the	texts	retrospectively	fit	this	way	of	
understanding	the	disorder.	This	is	clearly	the	case	in	Sybil	and	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan.	In	both	
texts,	Milligan	and	Sybil	are	survivors	of	childhood	abuse:	Milligan	was	physically	and	sexually	abused	
by	his	stepfather,	while	Sybil	was	physically	and	sexually	abused	by	her	mother.	In	both	cases,	the	
child	learnt	to	dissociate	and	‘go	away’	while	these	events	were	happening	to	them,	which	eventually	
led	to	the	creation	of	their	alter	personalities.	In	Milligan’s	case,	it	led	to	the	creation	of	a	specific	
personality	who	became	the	‘keeper	of	pain’:	the	alter	David	remains	a	child	even	as	Milligan	grows	
up,	and	his	job	is	to	take	control	whenever	Milligan	(or	an	alter)	is	in	pain	or	frightened,	to	stop	the	
other	alters	and	Milligan	himself	from	feeling	it.	Indeed,	Milligan’s	personalities	have	the	clearest	
system	of	roles	and	responsibilities	in	these	texts:	he	has	two	personalities,	Arthur	and	Ragen,	who	
set	the	rules	within	the	system	and	have	ultimate	responsibility	over	the	other	alters.	They	are	the	
only	two	capable	of	designating	another	alter	as	‘undesirable’	and	banishing	them	from	‘taking	the	
spot’,	their	term	for	being	able	to	take	control	of	the	body.	Arthur	is	in	charge	except	for	when	
Milligan	is	in	prison	or	in	mental	hospitals,	termed	‘dangerous	situations’	by	Arthur	and	Ragen,	when	
Ragen	takes	control.	This	plays	to	their	strengths:	Arthur	is	an	intellectual,	able	quickly	and	logically	to	
assess	situations	they	find	themselves	in	and	determine	what	they	should	do.	Ragen	is	‘the	keeper	of	
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hate’,	a	fighter,	and	protector	of	the	other	personalities	and	the	body.	He	takes	control	in	dangerous	
situations,	where	his	fighting	skills	are	of	more	use	than	Arthur’s	intellect.	Each	of	Milligan’s	main	ten	
personalities	have	specific	skills	that	are	called	upon	in	various	circumstances.	In	addition	to	Arthur	
and	Ragen	taking	control	depending	on	the	situation,	Allen	is	a	con	man	and	a	manipulator,	so	he	
most	often	takes	control	when	Milligan	has	to	communicate	with	outside	people,	while	Tommy	is	an	
escape	artist	(skills	he	learnt	to	escape	the	abuses	of	Milligan’s	stepfather,	who	often	left	Milligan	tied	
or	locked	up)	and	takes	control	when	Milligan	is	in	prison	or	the	hospital	and	uses	his	skills	to	get	out	
of	handcuffs	and	straitjackets.	 
While	Milligan’s	alters	are	the	clearest	example	of	a	system	in	which	each	alter	has	a	different	
role	and	responsibility,	we	also	see	this	to	a	lesser	extent	in	Sybil.	Here,	certain	personalities	are	more	
adept	at	handling	certain	situations,	or	take	over	when	they	feel	their	skills	will	be	more	useful:	Peggy	
Lou	feels	all	the	anger	Sybil	cannot,	so	she	stands	up	to	people;	Peggy	Ann	is	more	fearful	than	Peggy	
Lou,	so	she	runs	away	and	removes	Sybil	from	potentially	harmful	situations;	Victoria	is	better	at	
handling	social	situations	so	she	makes	and	maintains	friendships;	Mike	and	Sid	are	carpenters	and	
handymen,	so	they	fix	things	around	the	house.	Even	Eve	Black	acts	out	the	desires	that	Eve	White	
cannot	in	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve,	though	she	does	not	take	control	in	a	way	designed	to	help	the	
‘original’	personality.	The	idea	that	alters	function	in	this	way—with	specific	roles—is	one	commonly	
found	in	fictional	representations,	perhaps	as	a	result	of	the	lasting	influence	of	Sybil.	We	see	it	in	
particular	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	and	to	some	extent	in	The	United	States	of	Tara	and	Fight	Club,	
while	it	is	reason	for	the	existence	and	function	of	the	dolls	in	Dollhouse:	that	by	implanting	new	
personalities	in	them	they	will	be	able	to	fulfil	specific	roles.		 
There	are	exceptions	to	this,	of	course.	The	characters	are,	after	all,	disordered,	and	the	
cathartic	narrative	the	texts	pursue	would	not	be	served	by	a	perfectly	functioning	internal	system	of	
alters.	We	see	this	in	Milligan’s	‘undesirables’	who	were	banished	by	Arthur	and/or	Ragen	because	of	
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the	way	they	behaved	when	they	took	control	(usually	committing	crimes	or	getting	Milligan	into	
trouble	as	a	result	of	their	actions).	He	also	has	personalities	capable	of	‘stealing	time’	from	the	
others:	most	noticeably	Adalana,	the	lesbian	personality	who	stole	time	from	Ragen	and	raped	the	
three	women	he	was	robbing,	the	crimes	for	which	Milligan	was	arrested.	He	also	experiences	a	
number	of	“mix	up	times”	(Keyes:	218)	during	which	the	system	ceases	to	function,	and	Arthur	and	
Ragen	are	unable	to	exert	their	influence	over	the	other	personalities.	These	usually	happen	when	
Milligan	experiences	a	setback	in	his	treatment,	or	when	he	is	moved	to	facilities	under	the	care	of	
doctors	who	do	not	believe	in	dissociative	identity	disorder	and	discontinue	his	treatment	altogether.	
In	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve,	Eve	Black	is	an	obvious	negative	influence	on	Eve’s	life,	taking	control	and	
frequently	getting	her	into	trouble.	In	Sybil,	Sybil	frequently	switches	between	alters	and	then	finds	
herself	in	unfamiliar	situations,	unable	to	recall	how	she	got	there.	There	are	a	number	of	examples	
of	this	in	Sybil,	most	notably	when	Sybil	‘wakes	up’	in	the	fifth	grade	classroom	unable	to	remember	
anything	since	she	was	in	the	third	grade,	or	when	the	Peggys	take	Sybil	from	university	to	
Philadelphia	without	Sybil’s	knowledge	(Schreiber:	3).	This	is	clearly	not	a	successful	form	of	adaptive	
functioning.	DID	is	understood	to	be	a	disorder	that	should	be	treated	in	these	texts	because	Sybil,	
Eve	and	Milligan	continue	to	function	in	this	way	once	the	danger	(caused	by	the	trauma	in	their	
pasts)	has	passed,	and	this	form	of	functioning	now	causes	them	problems	and	prevents	them	from	
going	about	their	lives.	This	fits	Haddock’s	analysis	that	while	dissociation	can	be	‘useful’	to	some	
extent	while	trauma	is	ongoing,	it	should	still	be	treated	once	the	patient	is	no	longer	living	under	
traumatic	conditions	because	it	prevents	them	from	continuing	their	lives	(Haddock:	54).	 
Indeed,	it	is	these	problems	that	first	send	them	to	psychologists	for	treatment.	Eve	seeks	out	
help	due	to	headaches	and	amnesia;	Sybil,	who	has	suffered	with	‘nervous	conditions’,	losing	time,	
and	amnesia	her	whole	life,	seeks	out	help	when	the	problem	finally	becomes	too	big	to	ignore	and	
causes	her	to	be	sent	home	from	university;	Milligan,	whose	condition	has	left	him	unable	to	hold	
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down	a	stable	job,	is	arrested	when	Ragen	resorts	to	robbery	in	order	to	pay	Milligan’s	bills,	and	
Adalana	steals	time	and	rapes	the	women	Ragen	robs.	Milligan	is	diagnosed	in	prison,	after	exhibiting	
vastly	different	personalities,	accents	and	behaviours,	when	Danny,	one	of	the	younger	alters,	is	
scared	and	tells	a	psychologist	about	the	other	personalities.	From	here,	the	texts	are	all	in	
agreement	about	what	the	main	form	of	treatment	should	be	for	dissociative	identity	disorder—
psychoanalytic	therapy,	with	secondary	treatments	like	art	therapy	or	hypnosis	used	alongside	this—
and	are	very	clear	about	what	the	goal	of	treatment	is:	the	reintegration	of	all	alters	with	the	original	
or	host	personality	and	the	return	to	a	singular	identity.	Eve	and	Sybil	both	undergo	this	treatment,	as	
does	Milligan	when	he	is	in	facilities	with	doctors	sympathetic	to	his	condition.	In	all	cases,	weekly	
therapy	sessions	are	designed	to	enable	the	DID	sufferer	to	remember	what	has	happened	to	them	
when	alters	are	in	control,	the	event(s)	in	the	past	that	caused	the	person	to	dissociate	in	the	first	
place,	and	to	attempt	to	allow	the	‘original’	identity	to	have	co-consciousness	(be	aware	of	and	
communicate)	with	the	alter	personalities.	 
However,	in	each	text	it	is	not	only	the	‘host’	identity	that	attends	these	therapy	sessions.	Eve	
Black	attends	therapy	sessions	in	Eve	White’s	place.	The	‘original’	Billy	Milligan	is	kept	‘asleep’	by	the	
alters	as	a	way	of	protecting	him	(and	themselves/the	body,	because	they	believe	Billy	will	kill	himself	
if	he	is	in	control	due	to	his	severe	depression)	and	so	the	alters	attend	the	therapy	sessions	in	his	
place,	but	gradually	allow	Billy	to	wake	up	and	participate	in	‘his’	therapy.	Sybil’s	personalities	
frequently	attend	her	sessions	with	Wilbur,	as	it	is	they	who	have	the	memories	of	Sybil’s	childhood	
and	the	abuse	that	she	suffered.	Like	Milligan,	the	‘original’	Sybil	had	missed	long	periods	of	her	life,	
most	noticeably	losing	almost	two	years	to	her	alters	between	the	third	and	fifth	grades	of	
elementary	school,	and	Wilbur	quickly	comes	to	realise	she	must	treat	all	of	Sybil’s	alters	as	patients	if	
she	is	to	cure	Sybil	of	the	disorder.	The	doctors	who	believe	in	dissociative	identity	disorder	take	the	
same	approach	to	Milligan	during	his	treatment.	At	first,	this	is	because	the	‘real’	Billy	is	kept	‘asleep’	
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by	the	alters	and	is	unable	to	assume	control	of	the	body.	The	psychologists	are	therefore	forced	to	
talk	to	the	alters	if	they	want	to	communicate	with	and	treat	Milligan.	But	even	after	Billy	is	allowed	
out	‘on	the	spot,’	the	other	alters	continue	to	attend	the	therapy	sessions	and	take	part	in	the	
treatment.	The	types	of	secondary	therapy	the	patients	are	exposed	to	(i.e.	beyond	‘talk’	therapy	
and/or	psychoanalysis)	varies:	Wilbur	gives	Sybil	drugs	and	tries	hypnosis	as	part	of	her	
psychoanalysis,	while	Milligan	takes	part	in	art	therapy,	because	a	number	of	his	personalities	like	to	
paint.	In	all	cases,	these	types	of	therapy	are	aimed	at	remembering	things	that	have	happened	while	
alters	were	in	control	and	discovering	the	truth	about	the	traumatic	events	that	caused	the	original	
personality	to	split	in	the	first	case.	 
In	Eve	and	Sybil’s	cases,	therapy	proceeds	in	much	the	way	the	reader	has	been	conditioned	
by	these	sorts	of	narratives	to	expect.	The	psychologists	are	successful	in	gradually	recovering	the	
patient’s	repressed	memories,	and	are	able	to	help	the	patient	accept	that	they	have	multiple	
personalities	and	then	gradually	reintegrate	them.	In	Milligan’s	case,	it	is	a	little	more	complicated.	
When	Milligan	enters	treatment,	the	original	Billy	personality	has	been	kept	asleep	by	Arthur	and	
Ragen	for	a	long	time,	and	it	is	the	two	alters	who	have	been	controlling	Billy’s	life	in	his	absence.	This	
creates	an	unusual	situation	in	which	Billy	is	a	largely	absent	figure	through	much	of	the	treatment	
designed	to	help	him.	Indeed,	Billy	hardly	features	in	a	novel	about	his	own	life,	a	text	in	which	the	
reader	would	expect	Billy	to	be	the	main	character.	This	is	a	stark	contrast	to	Eve	and	Sybil,	who	still	
retain	some	control	over	their	lives	and	actions,	and	seek	out	help	themselves.	Billy	has	no	agency,	
and	though	he	is	eventually	‘allowed’	to	participate	in	treatment	by	Arthur	and	Ragen,	he	still	remains	
a	passive	figure.	A	‘cure’	for	Billy	does	not	involve	his	reasserting	dominance	over	the	other	alters	and	
taking	his	life	back;	instead	it	hinges	on	his	ability	to	communicate	with	the	alters,	and	to	access	their	
skills	and	draw	on	their	experiences	when	functioning	in	the	world.	In	other	words,	while	Sybil	and	
Eve	both	want	to	resume	control	of	their	own	lives	without	the	alters’	interference,	The	Minds	of	Billy	
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Milligan	suggests	Billy	would	be	best	served	by	finding	a	way	for	his	system	to	function	successfully	
and	becoming	a	participating	alter	within	this	system.	Indeed,	during	the	more	successful	periods	of	
Milligan’s	treatment,	Billy	takes	the	spot	more	often	and	begins	to	communicate	with	his	alters	and	
draw	on	their	experiences	to	help	him	negotiate	his	time	in	the	mental	hospitals.	This	is	as	close	to	a	
‘cure’	as	Milligan	ever	comes	during	the	events	described	in	the	novel.	 
Milligan	is	distinct	from	Eve	and	Sybil	in	that	he	is	never	fully	reintegrated	or	cured	during	the	
course	of	the	text.	As	well	as	having	to	do	with	the	patchy	nature	of	the	treatment	he	receives	in	
different	facilities	(in	some,	where	the	doctors	believe	in	DID	and	want	to	help	him,	it	is	successful,	in	
others	his	treatment	is	overseen	by	doctors	who	do	not	believe	dissociative	identity	disorder	exists	
and	have	no	interest	in	continuing	treatment	which	has	helped	him	elsewhere),	one	must	also	look	to	
the	description	of	Milligan’s	early	life	as	an	indication	of	why	this	might	be	the	case.	Unlike	Eve	and	
Sybil,	who	split	following	a	traumatic	experience	(or	repeated	traumatic	experiences),	it	is	suggested	
by	The	Teacher	that	Milligan	was	already	multiple	before	he	was	abused	by	his	stepfather.	While	the	
majority	of	Milligan’s	alters	appeared	following	the	abuse,	The	Teacher	claims	that	Milligan’s	“first	
inner	friend”	was	a	small	nameless	boy	who	appeared	just	after	Milligan’s	fourth	birthday	(before	his	
mother	married	his	stepfather)	and	played	with	him	when	he	was	lonely	(Keyes:	147).	The	same	day	
the	boy	appeared,	Milligan’s	father	committed	suicide	by	overdosing	on	pills.	In	the	“days	that	
followed”	his	child-like	alter	Christine	appeared	and	began	to	interact	with	members	of	his	family	
(Keyes:	148).	If	we	read	Milligan	as	someone	who	was	already	multiple,	this	could	be	the	reason	why	
the	text	seems	to	suggest	that	finding	a	way	for	the	system	to	function	would	better	serve	Milligan	
than	forcing	Billy	and	the	alters	to	reintegrate.	Though	this	is	not	necessarily	a	treatment	plan	the	
psychologists	who	treat	Milligan	would	agree	with. 
Indeed,	the	goal	of	the	psychologists	in	these	texts	is	always	to	reintegrate	the	alter	
personalities,	allowing	the	sufferer	to	have	a	singular	identity	again.	Though	I	demonstrated	in	the	
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previous	chapter	that	recent	study	of	DID	has	moved	to	a	point	where	reintegration	therapy	is	not	
the	only	approach	to	treatment	(see	Haddock,	and	my	reading	of	DSM-V),	these	early	texts	were	not	
working	within	this	theoretical	framework.	As	pioneers	in	the	field,	the	doctors	who	treated	Sybil,	Eve	
and	Milligan	saw	only	that	they	were	functioning	incorrectly	and	wanted	to	correct	this.	
Unfortunately,	this	meant	that	reintegration	therapy	was	seen	as	the	only	way	to	treat	DID,	despite	
the	alternative	suggested	by	Milligan’s	situation.	This	is	perhaps	in	part	due	to	the	commercial	
success	of	Sybil	in	particular,	both	as	a	book	and	the	two	film	adaptations	(1976	and	2007),	and	the	
extent	to	which	it	came	to	define	what	dissociative	identity	disorder	meant	in	the	popular	
consciousness.	Indeed,	there	is	a	larger	issue	here	about	the	extent	to	which	popular	cultural	
representations	can	influence	not	only	laypeople’s	views	of	a	medical	condition	but	also	medical	
professionals,	made	more	complicated	by	the	relationship	between	fact	and	fiction	in	these	texts.	
There	is	no	doubt	that	Sybil	came	to	influence	other	(fictional)	representations	of	DID.	Indeed,	Matt	
Ruff	notes	in	a	written	interview	at	the	back	of	Set	This	House	In	Order	that	the	idea	for	his	novel	
came	shortly	after	he	had	reread	Sybil.	Given	how	many	copies	of	Sybil	were	sold	following	its	
publication,	we	can	also	infer	that	it	served	to	increase	awareness	of	multiple	personalities,	perhaps	
leading	to	the	copycat	phenomena	so	often	decried	by	critics	of	the	condition	in	psychology	
literature.	But	did	Sybil	also	influence	medical	professionals?	This	question	is	not	so	easy	to	answer.	 
We	see	in	Sybil	that	Wilbur	researches	DID	and	comes	across	the	original	article	on	which	The	
Three	Faces	of	Eve	was	based,	so	it	is	possible	to	speculate	that	a	psychologist	researching	the	
condition	following	the	publication	of	Sybil	is	almost	certain	to	come	across	the	case;	as	the	cover	of	
Sybil	proudly	proclaims,	over	6	million	copies	have	been	sold,	and	some	of	these	were	surely	to	
psychologists.	Many	of	the	criticisms	surrounding	the	validity	of	DID	by	psychologists	also	reference	
Sybil-like	symptoms	and	raise	concerns	about	false	memories,	or	the	extent	to	which	patients	
‘perform’	alter	personalities	in	order	to	please	their	therapists.	These	are	all	accusations	that	have	
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been	levelled	at	Wilbur	and	Sybil	since	the	book’s	publication,	most	notably	by	Debbie	Nathan	in	Sybil	
Exposed:	The	Extraordinary	Story	Behind	the	Famous	Multiple	Personality	Case	(2011).	There	is	a	
complex	symbiosis	at	work	here	that	is	difficult	to	unpick.	For	those	who	believed	DID	was	a	real	
condition11,	Sybil	represented	a	breakthrough	of	understanding	and	presented	a	detailed	description	
of	a	‘typical’	case:	young	women	suffers	from	trauma,	splits	into	a	number	of	alter	personalities	as	a	
result	and	goes	through	therapy	in	order	to	reintegrate	her	selves.	It	raised	awareness	of	the	
condition	not	just	among	medical	professionals	but	also	among	the	general	population.	For	those	on	
the	other	side	of	the	debate12,	Sybil	was	the	start	of	overzealous	therapists	inducing	DID	in	their	
susceptible	patients,	a	phenomenon	which	would	lead	to	a	huge	increase	in	the	number	of	DID	cases	
in	America. 
Indeed,	Sybil	has	become	a	controversial	text	in	recent	years.13	It	has	been	blamed	by	some	
critics	for	the	later	increase	in	diagnoses	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	and	the	concerns	raised	in	
the	previous	chapter	about	people	pretending	to	have	DID	following	media	exposure	to	the	condition	
can	be	traced	back	to	Sybil’s	popularity.	In	her	2011	book,	Sybil	Exposed:	The	Extraordinary	Story	
Behind	the	Famous	Multiple	Personality	Case,	Debbie	Nathan	dismissed	all	the	claims	made	in	Sybil,	
offering	her	own	research	into	Sybil’s	life	and	arguing	that	the	whole	story	was	a	fabrication	
perpetuated	by	Sybil,	Wilbur	and	Schreiber.	The	real	Sybil	(Shirley	Ardell	Mason)	was,	Nathan	
claimed,	highly	suggestible	and,	whether	knowingly	or	unknowingly,	acting	out	her	personalities	to	
please	her	therapist.	She	accuses	Wilbur	of	giving	Sybil	drugs	which	confused	her,	and	then	
																																								 																				
11	Such	as	Haddock,	Traub,	Kluft	etc.	(See	Chapter	1).	
12	Such	as	Piper,	Merskey,	Spanos	etc.	(See	Chapter	1).	
13	Please	see:	Debbie	Nathan.	Sybil	Exposed:	The	Extraordinary	Story	Behind	the	Famous	Multiple	Personality	
Case.	New	York:	Free	Press,	2011;	“Exploring	Multiple	Personalities	in	‘Sybil	Exposed.’	NPR.	21	Oct	2011.	
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/21/141591185/exploring-multiple-personalities-in-sybil-exposed;	Mark	
Pendergrast.	Victims	of	memory:	sex	abuse	accusations	and	shattered	lives.	Vermont:	Upper	Access	Books,	
1996;	Joan	Acocella.	Creating	Hysteria:	Women	and	Multiple	Personality	Disorder.	New	York:	Jossey-Bass,	1999;	
Robert	W.	Rieber.	"Hypnosis,	false	memory	and	multiple	personality:	A	trinity	of	affinity."	History	of	Psychiatry	
10.37	(1999):	3–11.	
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encouraging	Sybil	to	talk	about	her	early	life	when	she	was	in	this	state,	leading	to	some	of	the	stories	
found	in	the	text.	For	her	part,	Sybil	went	along	with	Wilbur’s	treatment	because	she	became	
addicted	to	the	drugs	and	had	real	problems	that	she	thought	therapy	could	help.	Nathan	claims	
Schreiber	had	written	so	much	of	the	book	and	already	had	a	contract	with	a	publisher	before	she	
decided	to	fact-check	and	that	it	was	too	late	to	stop	once	she	found	holes	in	the	evidence.	Nathan	
spent	time	researching	through	an	archive	belonging	to	Schreiber,	as	well	as	Sybil’s	medical	records,	
case	notes,	and	letters,	often	reviewing	material	included	in	Sybil	itself	to	lend	weight	to	her	
argument.	So	a	letter	Sybil	writes	to	Wilbur	in	which	she	claims	to	have	made	up	the	personalities	is	
classified	as	‘resistance’	to	treatment	in	Sybil	and	largely	ignored	whereas	Nathan	claims	it	as	an	
attempt	by	Sybil	to	be	honest	with	Wilbur	and	seek	a	different	form	of	treatment	for	her	problems;	
Sybil	and	Wilbur’s	close	relationship	is	depicted	as	a	necessity	of	treating	an	isolated	young	woman	
with	mental	health	problems	in	Sybil	whereas	it	becomes	more	sinister,	indicative	of	Wilbur’s	
malpractice,	in	Sybil	Exposed.	 
Sybil	has	become	just	as	contested	as	the	condition	itself.	All	of	the	criticisms	I	outlined	in	the	
previous	chapter	can	and	have	been	levelled	at	Sybil	by	critics	and	psychologists	eager	to	use	it	to	
further	their	own	agendas:	they	suggest	that	Wilbur	created	the	personalities	by	suggesting	them	to	
Sybil	under	hypnosis;	Sybil	made	up	the	personalities	herself;	or	that	the	allegations	of	abuse	cannot	
be	corroborated.		In	much	the	same	way	that	I	did	not	make	a	judgement	on	the	debate	as	to	DID’s	
validity	in	Chapter	1,	I	am	not	going	to	make	a	judgement	as	to	the	truth	of	Sybil’s	story	here.	Instead,	
Sybil’s	value	lies	in	looking	at	the	text	as	a	cultural	artefact	and	one	of	the	foundational	texts	of	
(fictional)	DID	representation.	Indeed,	although	these	texts	claim	to	be	non-fiction,	they	have	much	
more	in	common	with	their	fictional	counterparts.	Sybil	isn’t	written	as	a	medical	case	study,	for	
example.	It	is	a	novelisation	of	the	case,	and	the	numbers	of	copies	sold	and	the	way	it	was	
marketed—“the	#1	best	seller!”—suggest	that	it	was	consumed	by	readers	like	a	novel.	As	much	as	
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Schreiber	insists	in	her	foreword	that	Sybil	is	an	accurate	depiction	of	the	case,	she	put	together	
Sybil’s	story	by	reading	Wilbur’s	case	notes	and	interviewing	both	Wilbur	and	Sybil.	She	was	not	
present	during	the	events	she	was	describing,	and	though	she	had	access	to	audio	tapes	of	therapy	
sessions	and	case	notes	to	work	from,	she	does	not	transcribe	the	tapes	but	recounts	them	in	the	
same	novelised	style	found	in	the	rest	of	the	book,	adding,	for	example,	descriptions	of	the	room	and	
items	in	it	or	what	Sybil	and	Wilbur	were	wearing.	In	her	introduction,	Schreiber	says	that	both	Wilbur	
and	Sybil	have	read	the	text	and	agree	it	is	an	accurate	depiction	of	the	events	as	they	occurred:	
“Upon	reading	the	finished	book,	Sybil	remarked,	‘Every	emotion	is	true’;	Dr.	Wilbur	commented,	
‘Every	psychiatric	fact	is	accurately	represented’”	(Schreiber:	xvi)	but	for	critics	such	as	Debbie	Nathan	
who	doubt	the	integrity	and	validity	of	Wilbur’s	work	and	question	the	extent	to	which	Sybil	was	
playing	along,	their	word	that	the	text	is	accurate	remains	unconvincing.	 
Similarly,	Keyes’	notes	at	the	start	of	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	explain	exactly	who	he	was	
and	was	not	able	to	interview	and	the	access	he	had	to	Milligan’s	medical	and	legal	records	during	his	
time	writing	the	book.	Despite	clearly	listing	people	who	he	was	unable	to	speak	to	or	were	unwilling	
to	talk	to	him	such	as	Dr	Harold	Brown	who	treated	Milligan	when	he	was	fifteen	and	Dorothy	Turner	
and	Dr	Stella	Karolin	who	first	diagnosed	Milligan	with	multiple	personalities,	these	people	still	
appear	in	the	text,	speaking	and	acting	just	like	the	people	he	was	able	to	interview,	though	he	does	
offer	their	reports	or	medical	case	notes	as	corroborating	evidence	for	the	things	he	writes	about	
them	(Keyes:	vi).	Like	Schreiber,	Keyes	was	not	present	during	many	of	the	events	in	the	text	and	has	
no	real	way	of	knowing	exactly	what	was	said	or	done	in	certain	situations.	Indeed,	the	conflict	
between	what	is	real	and	what	is	fiction	is	further	problematised	by	Keyes’	work	as	a	comics	and	
science-fiction	writer,	for	which	he	was	well	known	and	won	both	Hugo	and	Nebula	Awards.	For	
someone	familiar	with	Keyes’	work,	would	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan	appear	any	different	than	
Charlie	Gordon’s	experiences	with	the	surgical	operation	that	raises	his	intelligence	in	Flowers	for	
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Algernon	(1966)	and	the	subsequent	differences	in	the	way	he	relates	to	and	is	treated	by	society?	
Flowers	for	Algernon	can	be	read	as	an	allegory	about	attitudes	towards	those	with	mental	health	
issues	and	how	we	treat	those	different	from	ourselves,	and	given	Keyes’	obvious	interest	in	this	area,	
readers	who	know	his	work	might	be	encouraged	to	see	Billy	Milligan	as	another	fictional	character	
with	mental	health	problems.	 
Given	these	examples,	we	cannot	lose	sight	of	the	fact	that,	no	matter	how	much	their	
forewords	insist	on	their	truthfulness	and	the	extensive	research	that	went	into	each	text,	these	are	
fictionalised	accounts	of	a	series	of	events	the	reader	has	no	way	of	knowing	actually	happened.	This	
problematic	relationship	between	the	real	and	the	fictional	is	kept	in	sharp	focus	throughout	the	
texts.	Indeed,	the	authors	appear	as	‘characters’	in	all	three	books:	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve	is	written	
from	the	point	of	view	of	Thigpen	and	Cleckley	and	they	appear	in	the	text	throughout;	in	Sybil	
Schreiber	writes	about	her	interactions	with	both	Sybil	and	Wilbur,	writing	about	herself	in	the	third	
person	as	if	she	was	any	other	‘character’	in	the	text;	in	The	Minds	of	Billy	Milligan,	Keyes	calls	himself	
only	The	Writer,	and	describes	a	number	of	occasions	when	he	visited	Milligan	and	spoke	with	him	or	
his	alters.	While	Thigley	and	Cleckley	try	to	remove	themselves	from	the	text	as	much	as	possible,	
simply	describing	their	interviews	and	therapy	sessions	with	Eve	and	explaining	their	diagnosis	and	
treatment,	Schreiber	hides	herself	in	plain	sight,	making	no	special	mention	of	the	fact	that	she	is	
researching	Sybil	and	the	case	and	treating	herself	as	any	other	character	who	comes	into	contact	
with	Sybil	and	Wilbur.	Keyes’	inclusion	of	The	Writer	is	the	most	significant	instance	of	an	author	
appearing	in	the	text	here,	because	it	overtly	draws	attention	to	the	fact	that	this	is	a	fictionalised	
account	of	events.	It	is	a	clear	literary	device,	a	signal	to	the	reader	that	this	is	a	text	constructed	by	a	
writer	after	the	fact.	It	is	as	close	as	any	of	the	texts	come	to	admitting	the	extent	to	which	they	are	
representations	of	the	stories	of	those	people	within	them	and	is	indicative	of	the	authors’	different	
backgrounds:	Thigley	and	Cleckley	are	psychologists	and	Eve	reads	like	a	case	study;	Schreiber	is	a	
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journalist	and	Sybil	reads	like	a	sensationalised	tabloid	story;	Keyes	is	a	novelist	and	Billy	Milligan	
reads	like	a	crime	thriller,	exposing	Milligan’s	secrets	as	he	awaits	his	day	in	court.	 
This	troubled	relationship	between	fact	and	fiction	is	one	which	must	be	acknowledged,	
though	the	validity	of	DID	found	in	these	texts	remains	difficult	to	assess.	For	our	purposes,	this	does	
not	necessarily	matter.	The	important	point	to	take	away	from	these	texts	is	the	extent	to	which	they	
established	DID	in	the	public	consciousness,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	present	the	disorder.	Despite	
the	differences	in	their	style	and	the	authors’	approach	to	the	material,	all	three	established	some	of	
the	narratives,	stock	figures	(usually	alters)	and	issues	that	would	go	on	to	feature	in	later	texts	
featuring	dissociative	identity	disorder.	These	include	cross-gender	alters,	the	idea	that	reintegration	
is	the	goal	all	dissociative	patients	should	be	moving	towards	(a	curing	or	cathartic	narrative),	alters	
with	clearly	defined	roles	or	abilities	such	as	protecting	the	host	in	times	of	danger,	and	the	
suggestion	that	trauma	(particularly	sexual	and	physical	abuse)	causes	dissociative	identity	disorder.	
All	of	these	appear	in	various	forms	in	the	contemporary	texts	I	examine	in	this	thesis,	so	that	it	is	
possible	to	say	these	have	become	hallmarks	or	stereotypes	of	the	DID	text.	Before	I	move	on	to	
discuss	these	contemporary	texts,	I	want	to	offer	a	brief	overview	of	the	subgenre	of	fiction	dealing	
with	mental	disorders	and	syndromes.	Contemporary	DID	texts	appear	against	a	different	cultural	
backdrop	from	that	which	Sybil,	Billy	Milligan	and	Eve	did	in	the	50s	and	70s.	While	these	texts	were	
the	first	to	deal	with	this	topic,	contemporary	DID	texts	are	part	of	a	larger	cultural	preoccupation	
with	mental	illness,	and	it	is	necessary	to	explore	this	background	in	order	fully	to	appreciate	how	
contemporary	texts	interact	with	it.	 
In	the	last	ten	to	fifteen	years	there	have	been	a	large	number	of	novels,	films	and	television	
shows	that	feature	main	characters	with	mental	or	neurological	illnesses	including,	but	not	limited	to,	
Tourette’s	syndrome,	autism	and	Asperger’s	syndrome,	paranoid	schizophrenia,	Capgras	syndrome,	
de	Clérambault’s	syndrome,	Post-Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	and	dissociative	identity	disorder.	
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Contemporary	popular	culture	seems	preoccupied	with	these	syndromes	and	disorders	like	never	
before,	leading	to	an	increase	in	critical	work	examining	these	texts.	While	the	terms	used	by	critics	to	
define	this	genre	or	phenomenon	vary—names	such	as	‘cognitive	fiction’	(Tabbi	2002),	‘neurological	
realism’	(Harris	2008),	the	‘neuronovel’	(Roth	2009),	or	the	‘syndrome	syndrome’	(Lustig	and	Peacock,	
2013)	have	all	been	suggested—it	is	clear	that	there	has	been	a	shift	towards	using	mental	illness	in	
fiction	as	a	way	for	authors	to	understand	and	comment	upon	human	existence	and	contemporary	
social	structures.	Whether	or	not	we	believe	Bent	Sørensen’s	assertion	that	“Tourette’s	Syndrome	
has	become	a	trope	for	the	whole	post-modern	condition”	(1)	or	Stuart	Murray’s	claim	that,	in	terms	
of	fictional	representations,	“we	live	in	a	time	of	an	autism	‘epidemic’”	(25),	it	is	clear	that	we	must	
begin	to	question	“whether	syndrome	fiction	signals	or	participates	in	a	recognisable	cultural	
movement”	(Lustig	and	Peacock:	10). 
Indeed,	while	even	a	cursory	reading	of	the	list	of	conditions	above	suggests	that	these	
novels,	films	and	television	shows	are	wide	ranging	and	varied,	a	close	inspection	quickly	reveals	that	
there	are	a	number	of	links	between	these	texts.	Common	themes,	recurring	plotlines,	and	stock	
figures	serve	to	connect	the	various	texts	together.	Autism	texts	frequently	draw	parallels	between	
technology	and	the	disorder,	for	example,	suggesting	that	autistic	brain	patterns	and	savant	skills	are	
machine-like.	These	texts	ask	how	we	can	learn	to	communicate	on	an	emotional	level	in	a	
technologically	advanced	and	disconnected	world,	as	in	the	case	of	such	seemingly	different	texts	as	
Stieg	Larsson’s	Swedish	crime	trilogy	Millennium	(2005-2007),	the	low	budget	romantic	comedy	
Mozart	and	the	Whale	(2005),	and	the	DC	superhero	comic	Birds	of	Prey	(1999-Present).	Similarly,	a	
recurrent	theme	in	Tourette’s	texts	is	the	therapeutic	power	of	music	and	the	extent	to	which	music	
allows	characters	to	express	themselves	when	language	fails,	as	in	the	children’s	book	Quit	It	(2002),	
thriller	Skull	Session	(1998)	and	the	coming	of	age	novel	Icy	Sparks	(1998).	In	much	the	same	way,	
Fight	Club,	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	United	States	of	Tara	explore	the	social	construction	of	
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identity	and	performativity	through	the	lens	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	as	I	argue	in	later	
chapters.	What	becomes	clear	from	this	brief	summary	is	the	way	in	which	all	these	texts	are	
concerned	with	the	relationship	between	individuals	and	society;	with	how	we	relate	to	and	
communicate	with	each	other,	and	with	how	we	perform	identities	capable	of	being	read	and	
recognised	by	other	members	of	our	society. 
This	rise	in	the	awareness	of	these	syndromes	and	disorders	seems	like	a	thoroughly	modern	
condition,	then,	a	product	of	a	culture	hyper-aware	of	psychological	concepts	and	where	almost	
anything	can	be	diagnosed	as	a	disorder	of	some	sort.	Indeed,	in	the	same	way	that	modern	readers	
are	capable	of	reading	genre	cues	and	anticipating	narratives	that	hinge	on	specific	types	of	character	
stereotypes,	the	modern	reader	is	now	also	capable	of	diagnosing	fictional	characters	with	mental	
disorders,	even	when	a	text	does	not	explicitly	say	that	a	character	has	a	disorder	or	syndrome.	We	
see	this	in	the	ease	with	which	we	might	‘diagnose’	a	character	who	has	limited	social	and	
communication	skills	with	an	autistic	spectrum	disorder,	for	example,	without	examining	the	
narrative	reasons	why	that	character	might	have	trouble	communicating	with	other	people.	Indeed,	
the	dissemination	of	these	disorders	is	such	that	one	can	read	non-syndrome	texts	as	being	
metaphorically	about	these	conditions,	or	diagnose	characters	with	various	syndromes	and	disorders	
quite	easily	due	to	similar	thematic	concerns	or	narrative	focus.	In	this	way,	the	science	fiction	
television	show	Dollhouse	(2009-2010),	in	which	people	are	technologically	wiped	of	their	original	
personality	and	implanted	with	new	ones,	can	be	read	as	an	allegory	for	dissociative	identity	disorder.	
Similarly,	we	can	diagnose	Oskar	from	Extremely	Loud	and	Incredibly	Close	(2005)	and	Marcus	from	
About	A	Boy	(1998),	both	characters	who	have	trouble	reading	social	cues,	interacting	with	other	
people,	and	have	fixations	with	certain	colours,	objects	and	sounds,	as	autistic.	Both	Oskar	and	
Marcus	learn,	throughout	these	narratives,	how	better	to	fit	into	society	and	make	emotional	
connections	with	people	that	they	were	unable	to	before,	whilst	teaching	other	characters	this	same	
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lesson.	In	other	words,	though	there	is	no	‘cure’	for	autism	in	the	real	world,	both	novels	put	these	
characters	through	an	allegorical	narrative	of	curing,	easing	the	impact	of	the	stereotypical	symptoms	
most	often	associated	with	autistic	spectrum	disorders.	While	these	neat	narratives	often	risk	
trivialising	very	real	medical	conditions,	they	are	nevertheless	used	quite	frequently	in	these	types	of	
fiction. 
Susan	Sontag	anticipates	the	ethical	problems	associated	with	seeing	syndromes	and	
disorders	everywhere	and	readers	diagnosing	literary	characters,	particularly	when	one	is	arguing	
that	mental	disorders	are	being	used	as	literary	metaphors	for	other	conditions	like	postmodern	
alienation	and	disconnectedness.	In	Illness	as	Metaphor	(1978)	she	warns	that	seeing	illness	in	this	
way	risks	denying	the	experience	of	real	sufferers	of	these	diseases,	trivialising	what	is	a	very	serious	
medical	disorder.	“My	point,”	she	writes,	“is	that	illness	is	not	a	metaphor,	and	that	the	most	truthful	
way	of	regarding	illness—and	the	healthiest	way	of	being	ill—is	one	most	purified	of,	and	most	
resistant	to,	metaphoric	thinking”	(1).	Despite	this	warning,	contemporary	texts	seem	to	employ	
neurological	syndromes	as	metaphors	in	almost	every	case.	Lionel’s	Tourette’s	syndrome	becomes	a	
convenient	metaphor	for	the	postmodern	breakdown	of	language	in	Motherless	Brooklyn	(1999),	
while	Sebastian’s	dissociation	becomes	a	cautionary	metaphor	for	the	alienation	felt	by	workers	in	a	
late	capitalist	system	in	Fight	Club,	to	offer	two	brief	examples.	Autistic	characters	must	better	learn	
to	fit	into	society,	while	the	non-autistic	characters	who	surround	them	learn	this	same	lesson,	
encouraging	the	reader	to	see	the	link	and	think	about	the	extent	to	which	we	are	all	‘a	little	bit	
autistic’	in	a	postmodern	world.	In	these	texts	Tourette’s	sufferers	must	learn	to	express	themselves	
when	language	fails	and	the	relationship	between	sign	and	referent	breaks	down,	but	postmodern	
theorists	would	argue	that	this	is	not	the	sole	concern	of	(fictional)	people	with	Tourette’s	syndrome.	
These	metaphors	appear	again	and	again. 
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It	is	precisely	because	of	the	prevalence	of	these	metaphors	that	we	should	not	ignore	
Sontag’s	work.	This	ethical	question	will	continue	to	haunt	illness	texts	and	critical	work	surrounding	
representations	of	illness.	Indeed,	Sontag	clearly	anticipates	the	kind	of	metaphors	employed	by	texts	
interested	in	mental	disorders	when	she	states	that,	“Illness	comes	from	imbalance.	Treatment	is	
aimed	at	restoring	the	right	balance—in	political	terms,	the	right	hierarchy”	(77).	We	see	this	in	the	
autistic	character	finding	their	place	within	society,	the	Tourette’s	sufferer	learning	to	communicate	
despite	an	excess	of	language	or	language	which	is	considered	inappropriate	by	the	rest	of	society,	
the	character	with	multiple	personalities	who	seeks	a	way	to	reintegrate	their	alter	personalities	into	
one	identity	to	allow	them	to	function	in	their	society.	In	all	cases,	these	characters	must	find	a	way	
to	fit	dominant	social	norms	and	behaviours,	and	fulfil	the	role	society	expects	of	them.	These	
metaphors	therefore	become	about	society	and	an	individual’s	place	within	it:	all	of	these	characters,	
whether	they	are	on	the	autistic	spectrum	or	have	Tourette’s	syndrome	or	dissociative	identity	
disorder,	must	learn	to	communicate	and	behave	in	the	ways	that	society	expects.	The	texts	privilege	
normative	modes	of	communication,	normative	(singular)	identities,	and	normative	relationship	
models,	and	we	are	expected	to	read	the	plight	of	those	characters	with	mental	illness	as	somehow	
universal.	Reconciling	this	use	of	metaphor	in	fiction	with	the	real-world	experience	of	people	with	
illnesses	is	a	problem	these	texts	never	quite	manage	to	overcome,	and	will	therefore	be	an	issue	that	
I	return	to	throughout	this	thesis. 
These	metaphors	are	all	concerned	with	the	individual’s	engagement	with,	and	relationship	
to,	normative	social	structures,	whether	this	is	how	characters	communicate	with	one	another	or	
how	characters	identify	and	behave,	and	indeed,	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	seem	more	
interested	in	this	idea	than	even	autistic	spectrum	disorder	and	Tourette’s	syndrome	texts.	I	have	
avoided	a	close	analysis	of	representations	of	this	condition	until	now	because	it	is	the	subject	of	this	
thesis,	but	a	quick	examination	shows	that	representations	of	this	disorder	in	contemporary	fiction	
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are	often	intent	on	metaphorically	exploring	social	systems.	There	are,	of	course,	a	great	variety	of	
texts	that	feature	dissociative	identity	disorder.	Novels	such	as	Fight	Club,	Set	This	House	In	Order,	the	
Regeneration	trilogy	(1991-1995),	the	Dexter	book	series	(2004-2015),	and	Penny	Dreadful	(2000),	
films	like	Me,	Myself	and	Irene	(2000),	Haute	Tension	(2003)	and	Hide	and	Seek	(2005),	and	the	
television	shows	United	States	of	Tara	and	My	Own	Worst	Enemy	(2009)	span	a	range	of	genres	from	
comedy	to	thriller	to	horror	to	drama.	Many	of	these	texts	are	interested	in	the	pressures	society	
puts	on	its	members	to	conform	to	normative	behaviours,	and	we	frequently	see	examples	of	the	
dissociative	characters	fighting	these	norms	or	dissociating	due	to	the	pressures	society	places	on	
them	and	forming	separate	personalities	as	a	coping	mechanism.	Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	dissociates	
and	creates	Tyler	Durden	in	order	to	combat	the	late	capitalist	system	he	finds	himself	trapped	in,	for	
example.	The	characters	of	Penny	Dreadful	create	alter	egos	in	order	to	play	a	real-life	urban	fantasy	
role-playing	game,	and	increasingly	stay	in	character	as	they	make	a	game	out	of	adhering	to	a	strict	
class	system	and	trying	to	stay	alive,	despite	the	protagonist’s	observation	that	this	makes	the	game	
just	like	real	life	(Baer:	529),	albeit	in	a	form	that	easily	enables	(and	indeed	demands)	that	they	
follow	the	‘rules’.	In	the	Regeneration	trilogy,	Billy	Prior	is	so	unable	to	cope	with	the	mental	
pressures	of	warfare	and	the	social	pressures	on	him	to	be	a	‘real	man’	and	do	his	duty	as	a	soldier	
that	he	dissociates	and	creates	an	emotionless	alter	personality	that	can	take	over	when	he	is	too	
scared	to	fight.	Further	to	this,	these	dissociative	characters	also	frequently	embrace	other	non-
normative	identities,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	gender	and	sexual	identity.	Tara	has	a	male	alter	
named	Buck	(United	States	of	Tara);	Andrew	has	a	female	alter	named	Sam	(Set	This	House	in	Order);	
Marie	has	a	murderous	male	alter-ego	(Haute	Tension);	Prior	is	bisexual	(Regeneration	trilogy);	
Sebastian	is	positioned	as	emasculated	when	compared	to	the	hyper-masculine	Tyler	Durden	(Fight	
Club).	This	is	also	something	we	see	in	earlier	DID	texts:	Milligan	has	a	number	of	female	alters,	most	
notably	the	lesbian	Adalana	who	“cooks	and	keeps	house	for	the	others”	(Keyes:	xii),	while	Sybil	has	
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two	male	alters	who	act	as	handymen	and	fix	things	in	Sybil’s	apartment.	It	is	also	significant	here	
that	both	of	these	early	examples—Adalana	and	Sybil’s	two	male	alters—take	on	stereotypically	
gendered	roles,	as	though	having	a	gender	identity	at	odds	with	one’s	physical	body	must	be	
compensated	for	by	conformity	to	normative	gender	stereotypes.	We	also	see	this	to	some	extent	in	
United	States	of	Tara	where	Buck	is	a	typical	Southern	redneck,	overtly	performing	a	stereotypical	
southern	American	working-class	masculinity	despite	finding	himself	in	a	female	body.	This	interest	in	
gender	and	non-normative	identity	will	be	one	of	the	main	areas	of	investigation	in	this	thesis,	and	I	
return	to	it	in	later	chapters. 
In	addition	to	the	texts	that	deal	with	dissociative	identity	disorder	overtly	such	as	those	
mentioned	above,	there	are	some	texts	that	deal	with	the	condition	allegorically,	in	the	same	way	
that	some	‘autism’	texts	do	not	overtly	mention	the	syndrome	yet	construct	themselves	in	such	a	way	
that	the	reader	can	‘read’	them	through	this	lens.	Monica	Drake’s	novel	Clown	Girl	(2007)	plays	with	
notions	of	identity	in	a	way	reminiscent	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	but	stops	short	of	suggesting	
that	its	protagonist	actually	has	the	condition.	Nita’s	clown	persona,	Sniffles,	is	at	times	treated	as	an	
alternative	personality	that	Nita	hides	behind	to	avoid	having	to	face	the	realities	of	her	life.	The	
novel	plays	with	identity	and	performance	in	other	ways	too,	most	notably	through	the	character	of	
Jarrod,	who	struggles	to	reconcile	his	identity	as	a	policeman	with	the	crime-ridden	neighbourhood	
he	grew	up	in	and	still	cares	about.	Similarly,	science-fiction	television	show	Dollhouse	(2009-2010)	
revolves	around	an	organisation	that	possesses	the	technological	means	to	wipe	their	employees,	
‘Actives’,	of	their	original	personality	and	implant	them	with	new	ones	in	order	to	carry	out	missions	
for	their	paying	clients.	So,	for	example,	there	is	a	first	season	episode	where	an	Active	is	implanted	
with	the	personality	and	skills	of	an	expert	safe	cracker	and	sent	on	a	mission	with	a	group	of	thieves	
to	steal	a	priceless	painting.	At	the	end	of	a	mission,	these	actives	are	wiped	of	these	new	
personalities	and	returned	to	their	blank	‘doll	state’,	devoid	of	any	personality	at	all.	The	series’	
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protagonist,	Echo,	has	the	ability	to	retain	the	personalities	she	is	implanted	with	and	access	them	at	
will.	While	this	is	a	more	fantastical	example	of	multiple	personalities,	it	is	yet	another	appearance	of	
the	condition	in	popular	culture	and	proves	the	extent	to	which	the	knowledge	of	the	condition	has	
permeated	different	genres	and	types	of	fiction. 
In	addition	to	these	examples	of	allegorical	DID,	there	are	a	number	of	popular	narrative	
tropes	that	have	their	root	in	the	disorder.	For	example,	the	science	fiction	cliché	of	the	‘evil	twin’	is	a	
direct	descendant	of	early	gothic	texts	like	The	Strange	Case	of	Dr.	Jekyll	and	Mr.	Hyde	(1886)	or	
Edgar	Allan	Poe’s	“William	Wilson”	(1839),	which	are	themselves	early	split/multiple	personality	
texts.		In	more	recent	years,	the	‘evil	twin’	trope	has	featured	in	such	varied	television	shows	as	Buffy	
the	Vampire	Slayer	(1997-2003);	Star	Trek	(1966-1969);	Legend	of	the	Seeker	(2008-2010);	Futurama	
(1999-2003,	2008-Present);	and	even	Sabrina	the	Teenage	Witch	(1996-2003).14	The	evil	twin	
narrative	trope	is	used	often	enough	that	it	has	become	something	of	a	truism	that	characters	with	
multiple	personalities	will	almost	always	have	an	‘evil’	personality,	in	the	same	way	that	a	character	
with	autism	or	Asperger’s	is	more	often	than	not	a	hyper-intelligent	maths	whiz	or	computer	hacker,	
or	the	way	that	almost	all	Tourette’s	sufferers	shout	out	swear	words.	Part	of	the	reason	for	this	is	
that	many	texts	featuring	dissociative	identity	disorder	tend	to	be	thrillers	and	horror	films	and	so	the	
revelation	that	the	murderer	is	actually	a	psychopathic	alternative	personality	of	the	main	character	
																																								 																				
14	In	Buffy	there	are	two	season	three	episodes	(“The	Wish”	1998	and	“Doppelgangland”	1999)	that	feature	an	
alternate	reality	in	which	Willow	and	Xander	are	vampires	(and	thus	evil),	and	a	later	season	five	episode	(“The	
Replacement”	2000)	where	a	demon’s	spell	causes	Xander	to	split	into	a	‘strong’	twin	and	a	‘weak’	twin,	though	
in	this	case	the	trope	is	subverted	somewhat	by	the	revelation	that	Xander	had	been	the	‘weak’	twin	all	along.	
The	original	Star	Trek	series	features	the	‘Mirror	Universe’	where	everyone	has	an	evil	counterpart.	Fantasy	
show	Legend	of	the	Seeker	also	plays	with	this	trope	in	an	episode	(“Torn”)	where	a	magical	amulet	causes	
Kahlan	to	split	into	two	people,	one	who	is	a	slave	to	her	emotions	(the	“good”	half)	and	the	other	who	
mercilessly	carries	out	her	duty	to	the	letter	of	the	law	(the	“bad”	half),	by	the	end	of	the	episode	Kahlan	has	
accepted	that	she	needs	both	sides	of	her	personality	to	temper	each	other	in	order	to	continue	to	help	the	
Seeker	with	his	quest.	In	Futurama	Bender	has	an	“evil	twin”	named	Flexo	though	it	is	later	revealed,	to	the	
shock	of	no	one,	that	Bender	is	actually	the	evil	twin.	Finally,	Sabrina	has	a	season	long	plot	arc	dealing	with	the	
secret	that	every	member	of	the	Spellman	family	has	an	evil	twin,	and	Sabrina	is	forced	to	go	through	a	series	of	
tests	with	hers	to	determine	which	one	of	them	is	the	evil	one.	For	more	examples,	the	fan-compiled	internet	
database	TvTropes.com	has	a	page	devoted	to	the	Evil	Twin:	
http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/EvilTwin	(Accessed	June	2015).	
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as	part	of	a	twist	ending	has	become	something	of	a	staple	of	the	genre	(Psycho	[1960]	is	an	early	
example	of	this	but	more	recent	films	include	Haute	Tension	and	Identity	[2003]).	These	sorts	of	texts	
ostensibly	reject	the	social	metaphors	found	within	modern	day	texts	featuring	mental	disorders	and	
syndromes,	and	yet	even	a	film	like	Haute	Tension—on	the	surface	nothing	more	than	a	gory	slasher	
film—uses	DID	as	a	coping	metaphor	for	the	main	character’s	repression	of	a	desire	which	she	
believes	society	forbids:	Marie	is	in	love	with	her	female	friend,	Alex,	but	due	to	internalised	
homophobia	she	represses	these	desires	until	her	subconscious	creates	a	murderous	alter	ego	that	
tries	to	kill	anyone	he	perceives	to	be	keeping	Alex	and	Marie	apart.	Despite	their	prevalence	in	the	
mainstream	media,	these	texts	are	unrepresentative	of	‘real-life’	dissociative	identity	disorder.	
Indeed,	there	is	a	moment	in	Sybil	where	Wilbur	tells	her,	“You’re	too	intelligent	to	subscribe	to	the	
popular	misconception	that	has	evolved	from	fiction.	[…]	The	facts	are	quite	different.	I’ve	been	
reading	about	people	who	have	this	condition.	They	don’t	have	a	good	side	and	a	bad	side.	They’re	
not	torn	by	the	conflict	between	good	and	evil”	(Schreiber:	109).	In	Sybil,	this	is	an	attempt	to	
distance	notions	of	the	disorder	from	those	found	in	fiction—the	classic	Jekyll	and	Hyde	version	of	
split	or	multiple	personalities—and	establish	the	fact	that	this	is	a	complicated	mental	disorder	that	
does	not	present	itself	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	in	fiction.	Fortunately,	contemporary	texts	like	
United	States	of	Tara	and	Set	This	House	in	Order	reject	this	narrative	in	favour	of	a	more	rounded	
exploration	of	characters	with	dissociative	identity	disorder;	both	these	texts	feature	characters	that	
manage	to	live	a	fairly	‘normal’	life	despite	their	disorder,	and	while	both	characters	have	alters	who	
are,	at	different	times,	in	conflict	with	the	original	personality	or	other	alters	in	each	character’s	
system,	they	are	not	presented	as	a	simple	case	of	good	alter	vs.	evil	alter. 
The	science-fiction	and	fantasy	genre	is	particularly	fond	of	using	the	figure	of	the	evil	twin	as	
a	way	of	exploring	the	opposition	between	a	character’s	social	obligations	and	private	desires,	with	
the	‘evil	twin’	often	being	a	manifestation	of	the	Freudian	id,	selfishly	following	its	own	desires	to	the	
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detriment	of	the	character’s	life	and	relationship.	We	see	echoes	of	this	in	The	Three	Faces	of	Eve	
with	the	juxtaposition	of	Eve	Black	and	Eve	White,	as	highlighted	by	their	symbolic	names.	In	almost	
all	cases,	the	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	blend	the	two	personalities	in	order	to	balance	these	two	
opposing	forces.	We	see	this	reflected	in	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts,	where	the	most	common	
cure	for	the	condition	is	reintegration	therapy	that	seeks	to	reunite	the	separate	personalities,	as	
happens	to	Eve.	This	metaphorical	relationship	is	one	that	is	frequently	explored	within	popular	
culture	but	nowhere	more	closely	than	in	the	superhero	comic	book,	a	genre	that	has	a	long	history	
of	hidden	and	dual	identities.	A	good	recent	example	of	this	can	be	found	in	Joss	Whedon’s	movie	
adaptation	of	Marvel’s	The	Avengers	(2012),	which	gave	us	a	version	of	Bruce	Banner	struggling	to	
control	his	superhero	alter	ego,	the	Hulk.	After	unsuccessfully	trying	to	distance	himself	from	his	alter	
ego	and	consequently	the	rest	of	the	Avengers,	Banner	returns	to	fight	alongside	his	friends	in	the	
final	climactic	battle	for	New	York;	“That’s	my	secret,	Captain,”	he	tells	Captain	America,	when	Cap	
asks	if	Banner	can	use	the	Hulk	to	help	in	the	final	battle,	“I’m	always	angry.”	Following	this	
acceptance	that	his	alter	ego	is	always	a	part	of	him,	Banner	transforms	and	is	shown	to	be	able	to	
control	his	Hulk	side	enough	to	be	able	to	aid	his	friends.	Banner’s	character,	it	should	be	noted,	owes	
a	great	deal	to	The	Strange	Case	of	Dr.	Jekyll	and	Mr.	Hyde,	but	Whedon’s	interpretation	of	the	
character—and	this	one	line	in	particular—makes	this	metaphorical	idea	obvious	and	takes	the	
genre’s	interest	in	the	divided	self	into	a	new	form	(film)	for	a	new	audience	(the	film	is	the	highest	
grossing	superhero	movie	of	all	time).15 
These	characters	do	not	have	dissociative	identity	disorder,	of	course,	but	the	genre’s	
engagement	with	these	kind	of	metaphors	is	obvious	and	continuing.	Indeed,	Douglas	Wolk	argues	
that	one	of	the	most	useful	and	interesting	aspects	of	superhero	comics	is	that	they	are	“the	closest	
thing	that	exists	right	now	to	the	‘novel	of	ideas’”	and	that	they	are	“a	form	that	intrinsically	lends	
																																								 																				
15	Statistic	taken	from	http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=superhero.htm	(Accessed	June	2015).	
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itself	to	grand	metaphors	and	subjective	interpretations	of	the	visual	world”	(92).	While	it	is	true	that	
comic	books	flirt	with	metaphorical	multiple	personalities	by	tightly	linking	superheroes	with	a	
supervillain	arch-nemesis—the	Joker’s	chaotic	madness	and	desire	to	destroy	is	a	dark	reflection	of	
Batman’s	unrelenting	drive	to	save	his	city,	while	Lex	Luthor	can	be	viewed	as	a	Nietzchean	
’superman’	at	odds	with	the	real,	alien	Superman—there	are	also	comics	that	deal	more	directly	with	
the	issue.	One	such	character	is	DC’s	Jack	Ryder,	who	gains	a	separate	‘superhero’	personality	when	
he	is	implanted	with	experimental	drugs	that	give	him	superpowers	and	change	his	appearance.	
Ryder	and	the	Creeper	are	two	separate	people,	able	to	‘trade	places’	and	mentally	communicate	
with	each	other.	Similarly,	Marvel’s	Moon	Knight,	does	not	just	have	one	civilian	identity,	Marc	
Spector,	but	several	others	that	he	creates	as	covers	and	eventually	comes	to	believe	are	real	people.	
During	the	Marvel	Universe’s	Civil	War	(2006-2007)	crossover	event,	Spector	is	forced	to	undergo	a	
psychiatric	examination	before	he	can	be	registered	as	a	superhero	following	the	passing	of	the	
Superhuman	Registration	Act.	It	is	suggested	by	the	examining	psychiatrist	that	Spector	is	too	
mentally	unstable	to	be	registered,	even	amongst	people	who	dress	in	costumes	and	adopt	
alternative	identities	in	order	to	fight	crime,	and	should	be	locked	up	instead.	Another	example	is	
DC’s	minor	title	Doom	Patrol	(1963-1968).	One	member	of	this	superhero	team,	a	character	named	
Crazy	Jane,	has	multiple	personalities	before	she	gains	her	superpowers	and	so	each	personality	gains	
its	own	superpower	and	superhero	identity.	During	the	course	of	the	narrative,	the	reader	learns	that	
Jane	was	sexually	abused	by	her	father	and	that	this	caused	her	to	dissociate	as	a	child.	She	later	
confronts	her	past	and	accepts	what	happened	to	her,	causing	her	personalities	to	reintegrate	and	
her	superpowers	to	disappear. 
Other	comic	books	have	used	dissociative	identity	disorder	as	part	of	a	so-called	‘supercrip’	
narrative	in	which	an	individual	must	‘overcome’	their	disability,	often	by	performing	superhuman	
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actions	in	order	to	prove	that	they	are	‘just	like	everyone	else.’16	A	notable	example	of	this	is	DC	
comics’	Barbara	Gordon,	the	first	Batgirl,	who	fought	crime	as	an	able-bodied	person	before	the	Joker	
shot	and	paralyzed	her	at	her	home	after	learning	of	her	civilian	identity	(Batman:	The	Killing	Joke,	
1988).	She	decided	that	she	still	wanted	to	be	a	crime	fighter	so	she	used	her	intelligence,	computer	
hacking	skills	and	photographic	memory	(all	stereotypical	‘autistic	savant’	traits)	to	become	a	
wheelchair-bound	information	broker	codenamed	Oracle.	She	helps	Batman	and	the	Justice	League	
on	a	regular	basis	before	forming	her	own	superhero	group	called	the	Birds	of	Prey.	It	is	not	revealed	
that	Barbara	Gordon	is	Oracle	until	two	years	after	Oracle	first	appeared,	and	this	coupled	with	the	
fact	that	Gordon’s	intelligence,	photographic	memory	and	computer	skills	were	hardly	referenced	
during	her	time	as	Batgirl	seem	to	make	this	an	obvious	example	of	this	trope.	Within	superhero	
comic	books	there	are	also	more	fantastical	examples	of	this	such	as	paraplegic	Professor	Charles	
Xavier	from	the	X-men	who	is	hyper-intelligent	and	has	telepathic	powers,	or	Matt	Murdock’s	
Daredevil	who	was	blinded	by	chemicals	as	a	child	and	gained	the	sonar-like	ability	to	‘see’	as	a	result.	
These	characters	are	well-known	to	more	mainstream	audiences	as	well:	Barbara	Gordon	(as	Oracle)	
was	the	main	character	in	the	WB’s	Birds	of	Prey	TV	show;	Professor	X	has	featured	prominently	in	all	
six	of	the	X-men	live	action	films;	and	Daredevil	has	appeared	in	a	movie,	and	has	recently	been	given	
his	own	show	as	part	of	the	series	of	TV	shows	Marvel	have	produced	for	Netflix.	 
From	these	few	examples	it	is	clear	that	superhero	comics	as	a	genre	are	deeply	interested	in	
wider	issues	of	identity.	They	are	also	concerned	with	how	heroes’	identities	are	shaped	by,	and	
relate	to,	society.	This	is	the	driving	metaphor	behind	Marvel’s	X-men	(1963-Present),	in	which	a	
group	of	super	powered	mutants	struggle	to	come	to	terms	with	their	treatment	at	the	hands	of	
‘normal’	human	society,	made	overt	in	the	movie	adaptations’	continued	framing	of	the	villain	
Magneto’s	motivations	through	his	Jewish	identity.	Magneto	survived	the	Holocaust	as	a	child,	and	
																																								 																				
16	See	Jenny	Morris’s	Pride	Against	Prejudice:	Transforming	Attitudes	to	Disability	(1991)	for	a	more	detailed	
discussion	of	the	problems	with	this	representational	strategy.	
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his	actions	throughout	the	films	seek	to	prevent	a	similar	fate	befalling	mutants.	The	series	features	
one	group	of	mutants	who	wish	to	break	away	from	society	in	order	to	form	their	own,	and	another	
group	that	wishes	to	integrate	into	‘normal’	society	and	live	‘normal’	lives.	These	stories	can	very	
clearly	be	read	as	a	series	of	metaphors	dealing	with	difference	and	identity	politics.17	This	
preoccupation	with	social	attitudes	and	an	individual’s	place	within	society	is	a	prevailing	concern	of	
the	genre.	Indeed,	one	has	only	to	look	at	the	most	well-known	example	of	this	genre	to	recognise	
this	fact:	Superman	is	an	alien	immigrant	who	works	hard	to	become	a	force	for	good	and	is	
eventually	recognised	as	a	great	American	hero.	This	use	of	Superman	as	a	metaphor	for	the	
immigrant	experience,	and	as	an	assimilation	metaphor	in	particular,	has	been	well	noted	by	critics.18	 
Metaphors	such	as	these,	and	the	enduring	popularity	of	superheroes	within	American	
popular	culture,	suggest	there	might	be	more	at	work	within	these	texts.	They	would	seem	to	suggest	
that	there	is	something	unique	about	American	society	that	contributes	to	this	identity	crisis,	
something	that	leads	its	members	to	dissociate.	The	notion	that	it	is	American	society	itself	which	
cause	characters	to	dissociate	can	be	found	elsewhere	in	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts,	most	
notably	United	States	of	Tara,	the	very	title	of	which	reinforces	this	idea.	Set	in	the	Midwest,	the	
show	clearly	positions	the	main	character,	Tara,	her	husband,	Max,	and	their	two	children	as	a	
‘typical’	American	family	despite	Tara’s	condition,	and	the	main	characters’	drive	to	lead	‘normal’	
lives	is	at	the	heart	of	much	of	the	series’	narrative.	The	typicality	of	the	central	characters	is	further	
reinforced	by	two	of	Tara’s	alter	personalities,	both	archetypal	American	figures:	the	Southern	
redneck	and	the	1950s	housewife.	Further,	Tara	overtly	makes	reference	to	the	idea	that	we	all	have	
multiple	personalities	when	Tara’s	employer	tells	her	that	she	feels	like	everyone	has	DID	“a	little	bit”	
in	the	first	season.	She	continues,	“Over	the	course	of	a	day	how	many	different	women	do	we	have	
																																								 																				
17	See	Douglas	Wolk	in	Reading	Comics	who	argues	this	basic	premise,	or	William	Earnest	in	Uncovering	Hidden	
Rhetorics	who	argues	that	the	recent	X-men	trilogy	of	films	in	particular	can	be	read	as	an	extended	queer	
metaphor.	
18	See	Superman	at	Fifty:	the	Persistence	of	a	Legend	ed.	by	Dennis	Dooley	and	Gary	Engle	(1987).	
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to	be?	You	know,	work	Tiffany,	sexy	Tiffany,	dog	owner	Tiffany...	and	it’s	hard,	right?”	That	Tara	
draws	attention	to	this	issue	so	early	in	the	first	season	strengthens	the	show’s	employment	of	this	
metaphor	and	interest	in	examining	the	extent	to	which	this	condition	is	indicative	of	a	wider	
problem	within	society.	Tara	Gregson’s	experience,	the	show	suggests,	could	be	the	experience	of	any	
American,	and	it	is	not	the	only	text	to	do	so.	Steven	Gold	argues	that	the	central	message	of	Fight	
Club	is	that	“contemporary	society	promotes	a	dissociative	mode	of	existence”	(14)	and	indeed,	it	
seems	to	be	materialistic,	capitalist,	American	society	that	‘causes’	Sebastian’s	dissociative	identity	
disorder.	Feeling	emasculated	and	trapped	within	this	system,	he	creates	the	hyper-masculine	Tyler	
Durden	to	help	him	find	a	way	out.	Indeed,	the	idea	that	DID	is	a	culture-bound	disorder,	and	seems	
particularly	prevalent	in	America	is	one	criticism	of	the	disorder	I	explored	in	the	previous	chapter.	
The	three	early	DID	texts	are	all	American,	as	are	the	contemporary	texts	I	focus	on	in	this	thesis:	
Fight	Club,	United	States	of	Tara,	Dollhouse	and	Set	This	House	In	Order	are	all	set	in	America	and	
written	by	American	authors.	 
I	have	chosen	these	texts	in	particular	because	they	emerge	as	part	of	the	contemporary	
preoccupation	with	mental	disorder	in	fiction,	already	discussed	here,	and	therefore	have	interesting	
things	to	say	about	society,	identity	and	the	representation	of	the	disorder,	but	also	because	they	
owe	much	of	the	way	they	represent	the	disorder	to	Sybil,	Billy	Milligan	and	Eve	and	many	of	the	
trends	in	representation	(evil	twins,	gothic	doubles)	I	have	noted	before.	Fight	Club	is	a	thriller	in	
which	Sebastian’s	‘evil	twin’	wreaks	havoc	in	his	life.	United	States	of	Tara	gives	us	a	woman	
attempting	to	negotiate	relationships	with	her	family	while	searching	for	the	event	in	her	past	that	
made	her	dissociate.	Dollhouse	is	an	allegorical	representation	of	DID	through	a	science-fiction	lens,	
but	explores	questions	of	trauma	and	identity	in	contemporary	society.	Set	This	House	In	Order	is	
another	thriller,	in	which	Andrew	searches	for	the	truth	about	Andy	Gage’s	past,	while	helping	Penny	
come	to	terms	with	her	own	dissociative	identity	disorder.	Beyond	these	brief	descriptions,	there	are	
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other	points	of	connection	with	the	early	texts:	Tara	and	Andrew	visit	psychologists	for	treatment	and	
encounter	different	attitudes	to	the	disorder,	from	those	who	believe	it	exists	to	those	who	don’t	and	
reintegration	therapy	is	often	presented	as	the	only	‘cure’	for	their	condition.	All	texts	engage	with	
ideas	of	trauma,	with	Tara,	Penny	and	Andrew’s	DID	all	being	caused	by	sexual	abuse	in	their	
childhoods.	Andrew	has	a	system	of	alters	in	place	much	like	Milligan	does,	and	visualises	a	house	in	
his	head	in	which	the	alters	all	live,	like	the	dark	room	and	spotlight	that	Milligan	contains	in	his.	
Many	of	the	characters	have	alters	with	different	roles,	including	protectors	(like	Milligan’s	Ragen	or	
Sybil’s	Peggy	Ann),	alters	with	gender	identities	different	from	the	original	personality	(like	Milligan’s	
Christine	and	Adalana,	or	Sybil’s	Sid	and	Mike),	and	child-like	alters	who	bore	witness	to	the	abuse	
(like	Milligan’s	Danny	and	David	or	Sybil’s	Peggy	Lou).	The	contemporary	texts	all	owe	much	of	their	
representations	of	the	disease	to	these	early	texts,	and	it	was	necessary	to	discuss	these	early	texts	
here	in	order	to	give	context	to	the	contemporary	representations.	Having	provided	this	overview,	we	
will	be	able	to	see	how	contemporary	texts	have	developed	from	these	early	examples,	and	explore	
the	new	uses	to	which	authors	are	putting	the	disorder	following	the	trend	of	mental	illness	
metaphors	employed	by	contemporary	fiction. 
These	narrative	tropes	and	stock	figures	appear	time	and	again	in	these	texts	as	the	above	list	
suggests,	allowing	us	to	study	the	links	between	them.	We	cannot	ignore	the	fact	that	so	many	of	
these	texts	are	concerned	with	society	and	our	place	within	it,	yet	it	seems	overly	simplistic	to	reduce	
texts	featuring	mental	illness	to	a	series	of	works	about	contemporary	postmodern	society,	as	though	
this	is	all	they	are	interested	in.	Instead,	I	believe	we	should	examine	this	preoccupation	more	closely.	
What	is	it	about	these	disorders	that	allow	authors	to	use	them	as	a	way	of	relating	to	and	examining	
contemporary	society?	What	can	these	texts	teach	us	about	society	as	a	whole	and	our	place	within	
it?	And	perhaps	most	importantly,	if	these	texts	highlight	these	social	problems,	do	they	also	suggest	
answers	to	them?	While	examples	I	have	given	seem	to	make	the	case	that	all	members	of	
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contemporary	American	society	are	dissociative,	or	that	we	are	all	autistic	now	because	society	
isolates	us	from	one	another,	a	deeper	examination	of	these	texts	may	prove	more	useful.	We	can	
acknowledge	these	universalising	tendencies	and	also	examine	why	these	illnesses	are	used	as	a	
platform	from	which	to	examine	society,	relationships,	identity,	and	the	self.	Tourette’s	syndrome	is	
all	about	language	and	meaning	so	it	is	the	perfect	tool	for	a	novelist	who	wants	to	examine	language	
and	meaning	in	society,	for	example,	but	this	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	it	is	the	only	thing	the	
Tourette’s	syndrome	novel	can	do.	Similarly	DID	texts	might	offer	an	indictment	of	a	society	that	
causes	us	to	become	dissociative,	but	they	also	offer	us	interesting	ways	of	looking	at	identity	and	
performance.	Contemporary	syndrome	and	disorder	texts	offer	us	much	more	than	one	endlessly	
repeated	metaphor	about	society,	and	it	is	these	to	which	we	must	turn	our	attention.	 
It	is	clear	that	these	texts	offer	a	very	real	area	of	work	within	literature,	film	and	cultural	
studies,	with	emergent	trends,	narrative	tropes,	stock	figures	and	metaphors	starting	to	appear	
across	different	media	as	diverse	as	novels,	films,	television	and	comic	books.	Having	explored	the	
debates	surrounding	dissociative	identity	disorder	found	in	psychology	literature	in	Chapter	1,	and	
here	provided	an	overview	of	fictional	representations	of	this	condition	from	the	early	to	the	
contemporary,	I	now	turn	my	attention	to	examining	contemporary	examples	of	DID	texts	more	
closely.	I	have	established	in	this	chapter	that	there	are	a	number	of	significant	narratives,	figures	and	
tropes	often	employed	by	texts	dealing	with	fictional	representations	of	DID,	and	that	these	often	
interact	with	and	comment	upon	notions	of	normative	identity	and	one’s	place	within	society.	Issues	
of	identity,	society	and	normativity	are	key	to	understanding	the	use	to	which	these	texts	put	DID,	
and	so	I	begin	the	next	chapter	by	examining	the	use	of	trauma	in	these	texts,	and	the	way	this	
interacts	with	identity	and	notions	of	the	self.		As	we	have	seen,	trauma	is	closely	linked	to	DID,	and	
the	next	chapter	therefore	explores	trauma	theory	and	fictional	representations	of	trauma	before	
moving	on	to	examine	my	primary	texts	in	more	detail.					 	
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Chapter	3		
Trauma	and	the	Shattered	Self	
	
In	Chapter	1	I	demonstrated	the	sometimes	contentious	link	between	trauma	and	dissociative	
identity	disorder	within	medical	discourse.	Whether	one	believes	that	trauma	causes	DID	or	not,	it	
cannot	be	denied	that	trauma	is,	as	the	DSM	suggests,	an	“associated	descriptive	feature”	(DSM-IV:	
497)	of	the	disorder	and	instances	of	trauma	frequently	appear	in	texts	in	which	dissociative	identity	
disorder	features.	The	debate	around	whether	or	not	trauma	causes	DID	shows	no	signs	of	abating.	
This	is	clear	from	the	overview	of	psychology	theory	I	gave	in	Chapter	1,	while	the	texts	I	examined	in	
the	previous	chapter	all	include	instances	of	trauma	experienced	by	their	dissociative	characters.	It	is	
clear	from	this	overview	that	trauma	and	trauma	theory	deserve	to	be	examined	more	closely.	What	
it	is	it	about	trauma	that	means	it	is	so	often	associated	with	DID?	
	 In	recent	years,	and	particularly	following	the	September	11th	attacks	on	the	World	Trade	
Center	and	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	there	has	been	a	renewed	media	interest	in	trauma	and	
the	representation	of	traumatised	subjects.	Many	contemporary	novels,	films,	television	shows	and	
comics	have	portrayed	both	individual	characters	and	whole	communities	suffering	from	the	effects	
of	trauma.	Common	portrayals	centre	around	combat	veterans	“faced	with	sudden	and	massive	
death	around	[them]	…	who	[suffer]	this	sight	in	a	numbed	state,	only	to	relive	it	later	on	in	repeated	
nightmares”	(Caruth:	11),	or	communities	trying	to	make	sense	of	violent	events	that	have	happened	
in	their	midst	and	“abruptly,	and	harmfully,	affected	collective	identity”	(Alexander:	10).	In	Western	
fiction,	these	narrative	trends	have	clear	links	to	the	September	11th	attacks,	indicating	the	extent	to	
which	‘9/11’	has	become	a	defining	cultural	trauma	of	our	time	and	the	extent	to	which	symptoms	
and	discussion	of	trauma	have	become	common	knowledge.	This	rise	in	cultural	awareness	of	trauma	
as	both	a	collective	and	individual	experience	has	coincided	with	an	increased	interest	in	theorising	
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trauma	from	within	academia,	from	fields	such	as	psychology,	sociology	and	literary	criticism.	While	
the	approaches	vary,	this	interest	in	trauma	theory	has	moved	the	term	beyond	Freud’s	early	
twentieth-century	definition	and	taken	it	into	the	twenty-first	century	against	a	backdrop	of	events	
like	the	First	and	Second	World	Wars,	the	Holocaust,	the	bombing	of	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki,	the	
Vietnam	War,	the	September	11th	attacks,	and	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.		
Academic	theories	of	trauma	emphasise	the	way	trauma	disrupts	history,	time,	and	meaning	
amongst	survivors,	and	this	work	can	help	us	understand	why	trauma	is	so	often	associated	with	DID.	
DID	is	a	disorder	in	which	ordinary	functioning	is	disrupted	by	alter	personalities,	often	causing	the	
‘host’	or	‘original’	personality	to	lose	time,	knowledge	of	their	past	actions,	and	understanding	of	
their	own	identity.	The	psychological	effects	of	trauma	therefore	mirror	the	symptoms	of	dissociative	
identity	disorder	and	demonstrate	why	these	two	conditions	are	so	often	linked.	This	chapter	
examines	this	link	in	more	detail.	Once	again,	I	do	not	wish	to	enter	into	the	medical	debate	about	
whether	or	not	trauma	causes	dissociative	identity	disorder.	My	analysis	will	instead	be	limited	to	an	
examination	of	the	relationship	fictional	texts	create	between	trauma	and	dissociation.	In	order	to	do	
this,	I	first	engage	with	theoretical	concepts	of	trauma,	beginning	with	Freud	and	moving	forward	to	a	
more	contemporary	understanding.	Having	defined	trauma	as	a	theoretical	concept,	this	chapter	
examines	some	images	of	trauma	within	popular	culture	before	focussing	on	the	representation	of	
trauma	within	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts.		
Trauma,	from	the	Greek	word	for	‘wound’,	originally	meant	a	physical	injury	inflicted	on	the	
body,	but	this	definition	changed	in	later	years	and	is	now	frequently	understood	to	mean	a	wound	
inflicted	upon	the	mind	or	psyche.	This	understanding	of	trauma	as	a	psychological	condition	owes	a	
great	deal	to	Sigmund	Freud’s	examination	of	the	so-called	‘trauma	neuroses’	in	Beyond	the	Pleasure	
Principle	(1920),	which	in	turn	grew	out	of	his	work	on	hysteria	with	Josef	Breuer	in	Studies	in	
Hysteria	(1895).	In	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	Freud	first	defined	‘traumatic	neurosis’	as	a	disorder	
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that	involved	physical	injury	to	the	nervous	system	from	“mechanical	concussions,	railway	disasters	
and	other	accidents	involving	a	risk	to	life”	(12).	This	insistence	on	a	physical	injury	was	removed	
following	Freud’s	study	of	‘shell-shocked’	First	World	War	veterans,	as	many	of	these	men	exhibited	
the	war	neurosis	symptoms	despite	being	physically	uninjured:	“the	terrible	war	which	has	just	ended	
gave	rise	to	a	great	number	of	illnesses	of	this	kind,	but	it	at	least	put	an	end	to	the	temptation	to	
attribute	the	cause	of	the	disorder	to	organic	lesions	of	the	nervous	system	brought	about	by	
mechanical	force”	(Freud:	12).	The	idea	that	injuries	to	the	nervous	system	caused	war	neuroses	was	
dismissed	because	it	was	often	the	nature	of	trench	warfare	during	the	First	World	War	that	was	a	
major	contributing	factor	to	the	development	of	nervous	disorders	among	soldiers.	It	was	not	only	
the	injuries	they	received,	but	the	mental	effects	of	sitting	in	trenches,	witnessing	the	deaths	and	
injuries	of	fellow	soldiers	who	were	ordered	‘over	the	top’,	and	waiting	to	receive	this	order	
themselves	that	heavily	contributed	to	mental	breakdown.	
Indeed,	fictional	representations	of	traumatised	war	veterans	often	demonstrate	the	stresses	
that	soldiers	face	under	combat	that	leads	them	to	break	down.	For	example,	in	Regeneration	(1991)	
Billy	Prior	becomes	angry	when	he	remembers	that	the	moment	that	caused	him	to	breakdown	was	
his	reaction	to	two	men	in	his	unit	being	killed	in	a	trench	bombing,	something	that	he	has	witnessed	
many	times.	His	psychiatrist	has	to	remind	him	that	“You’re	thinking	of	breakdown	as	a	reaction	to	a	
single	traumatic	event,	but	it’s	not	like	that.	It’s	more	like…	erosion.	Weeks	and	months	of	stress	in	a	
situation	where	you	can’t	get	away	from	it”	(Barker:	105).	There	are	other	characters	in	this	novel	
who	demonstrate	the	effects	of	stress	rather	than	injuries	during	combat:	a	soldier	blown	from	a	
trench	lands	face	first	on	the	rotting	body	of	a	fellow	soldier	and	is	unable	to	eat	anything	afterwards	
without	reliving	the	event;	an	army	surgeon	witnesses	so	many	horrific	injuries	to	soldiers	that	he	can	
no	longer	stand	the	sight	of	blood	and	becomes	violently	ill	whenever	he	encounters	it.	This	
understanding	of	trauma	during	wartime	is	echoed	in	later	texts	about	later	wars,	such	as	Band	of	
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Brothers	(new	ed.	2001),	in	which	Ambrose	notes	that	“a	situation	of	endlessness	and	hopelessness”	
is	created	by	the	U.S.	army’s	policy	of	keeping	infantry	units	on	the	front	line	for	as	long	as	possible	
and	making	up	losses	through	individual	replacement	(202).	Ambrose	continues,	“Army	psychiatrists	
found	that	in	Normandy	between	10	and	20	percent	of	the	men	in	rifle	companies	suffered	some	
form	of	mental	disorder	during	the	first	week”	(203).	We	see	the	same	sentiment	echoed	by	Norman	
Bowker,	endlessly	driving	around	a	lake	as	he	relives	the	night	he	spent	under	attack	in	a	field	used	as	
a	communal	latrine	in	Vietnam	in	The	Things	They	Carried	(1991):	“Sometimes	the	bravest	thing	on	
earth	was	to	sit	through	the	night	and	feel	the	cold	in	your	bones.	Courage	was	not	always	a	matter	
of	yes	or	no”	(O’Brien:	146).	There	are	also	numerous	contemporary	texts	that	engage	with	Post-
Traumatic	Stress	Disorder	during	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	and	feature	similar	instances	of	
trauma	among	modern	soldiers	such	as	Stop-Loss	(2008),	and	The	Hurt	Locker	(2009).		
It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	these	are	fictional	accounts	of	trauma	during	wartime,	and	I	
by	no	means	offer	these	as	accurate	examples	of	PTSD	during	combat.	Fiction	is	not	‘the	real’,	but	it	is	
not	entirely	disconnected	from	the	real	either.	These	fictional	examples	all	contain	links	and	
references	to	theoretical	work	on	trauma,	and	contribute	to	what	Raymond	Williams	refers	to	as	a	
‘structure	of	feeling.’19		This	thesis	is	primarily	concerned	with	fiction,	though	I	engage	with	medical	
concepts	and	disorders,	and	so	my	examination	of	these	conditions	is	limited	to	a	concern	with	their	
use	and	representation	within	fictional	works.	Rather	than	being	concerned	with	medical	validity,	this	
chapter	instead	examines	the	common	portrayals	of	trauma	within	a	variety	of	media,	such	as	the	
examples	I	give	above.	What	becomes	clear	from	this	brief	list	of	texts	is	that	there	is	a	shared	
understanding	of	trauma	amongst	media	producers	and	media	consumers.	It	is	one	in	line	with	
Freud’s	early	discussions	of	trauma	but	also	references	more	contemporary	understandings	of	
																																								 																				
19	The	term	‘structure	of	feeling’	was	first	coined	by	Williams	in	A	Preface	to	Film	(1954)	and	developed	in	his	
later	work.	It	refers	to	the	way	in	which	fiction	can	respond	to	and	comment	upon	the	real	world,	and	popular	
responses	to	issues	found	in	the	real	world.	
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trauma	found	within	academic	theory	in	order	to	produce	a	structure	of	feeling	of	trauma.	In	order	to	
discuss	these	fictional	representations	and	how	they	engage	with	concepts	of	trauma,	I	first	give	a	
brief	summary	of	Freud’s	definition	of	trauma	and	his	early	work,	and	then	move	on	to	look	at	
contemporary	trauma	theory	that	has	built	on	Freud’s	work.	Through	this	discussion	I	give	examples	
of	fictional	representations	that	engage	with	the	specific	concepts	I	am	discussing,	before	moving	on	
to	examine	how	trauma	is	represented	in	my	primary	DID	texts,	Fight	Club,	The	United	States	of	Tara,	
Dollhouse	and	Set	This	House	In	Order.		
In	Beyond	the	Pleasure	Principle,	Freud	discusses	the	ways	in	which	people	who	have	
experienced	trauma	become	unable	to	move	past	the	event	and	relive	it,	usually	in	their	dreams.	The	
trauma	sufferer	will	frequently	awaken	from	nightmares	that	take	them	back	to	the	traumatic	events	
in	“renewed	terror”	(Freud:	12).	Indeed,	nightmares	are	often	a	common	aspect	of	fictional	
representations	of	trauma,	and	feature	in	many	of	the	texts	mentioned	above.	Freud	believes	these	
nightmares	are	surprising	because	dreams	should	be	engaged	in	wish	fulfilment;	his	expectation	is	
that	traumatised	patients	should	be	dreaming	of	their	healthy	past	or	their	future	cure.	What	these	
dreams	do	instead	is	put	the	patient	in	the	position	of	passively	reliving	the	event	that	traumatised	
them.	Freud	is	quick	to	point	out	that	this	passivity	is	the	key	factor	in	the	emergence	of	the	
nightmares	and	the	trauma	sufferer’s	inability	to	move	past	the	traumatic	events	that	happened	to	
them.	Freud	relates	this	to	a	child’s	game	he	calls	“Fort-Da”	(Go	Away-There).	The	game	involves	a	
child	repeatedly	throwing	a	wooden	reel	with	a	piece	of	string	wound	around	it	out	of	his	cot,	holding	
onto	the	string	and	then	pulling	it	back	in.	Freud	explains	that	this	allows	the	child	to	master	the	
‘traumatic’	experience	of	his	mother	leaving	him;	the	repetition	of	the	retrieval	of	the	toy	allows	him	
the	pleasure	of	the	reappearance	of	the	thing	that	he	wants	over	and	over	again	and	makes	up	for	its	
disappearance	in	the	first	place.	
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The	passivity	inherent	in	reliving	trauma	through	dreams	is	a	key	element	in	Freud’s	
understanding	of	the	trauma	neurosis	and	the	major	obstacle	that	must	be	overcome	in	order	for	the	
condition	to	be	cured.	Freud	believed	that	the	patient	would	be	able	to	banish	their	nightmares	by	
taking	on	an	active	role	and	mastering	their	trauma	in	the	same	way	that	the	child	does	in	the	game.	
Freud’s	understanding	of	trauma	was	informed	by	his	observation	of	soldiers	suffering	from	the	war	
neuroses	during	the	First	World	War,	and	to	return	to	this	earlier	example,	it	was	often	sitting	and	
waiting	to	be	killed	in	the	trenches—being	passive	and	helpless	to	prevent	what	almost	seemed	
inevitable—that	contributed	to	many	soldiers’	PTSD.	Suffering	from	shell-shock	was	therefore	seen	as	
being	weak,	passive,	and	‘unmanly.’	Shell-shock	was	positioned	in	this	way,	firstly,	because	it	was	not	
correctly	understood	as	a	psychological	condition,	and	secondly,	because	the	military	commanders	
didn’t	want	the	soldiers	thinking	it	was	an	‘honourable’	way	to	escape	the	war.	We	can	see	this	
gendered	aspect	of	the	condition	quite	clearly	in	fictional	examples.	The	social	pressure	to	do	one’s	
duty	is	evident	in	Regeneration	when	Prior	tells	Rivers	“When	this	is	all	over,	people	who	didn’t	go	to	
France,	or	didn’t	do	well	in	France—people	of	my	generation,	I	mean—aren’t	going	to	count	for	
anything”	(Barker:	135).	Prior	is	talking	about	his	ambitions	for	after	the	war—he	believes	that	being	
a	well-liked,	decorated	soldier	will	afford	one	similar	career	benefits	that	a	Cambridge	or	Oxford	
degree	did	before	the	war—but	there	is	also	the	implicit	threat	that	one	would	not	be	viewed	as	a	
‘real	man’	either.	Suffering	from	trauma	during	wartime	is	often	linked	to	a	failure	of	masculinity	in	
this	way.	Men	are	encouraged	to	measure	themselves	against	a	traditionally	masculine,	stoic,	soldier	
stereotype	and	anyone	who	cannot	conform	to	this	expectation	is	considered	a	failure.	In	The	Things	
They	Carried,	Tim	O’Brien	describes	the	fear	he	felt	when	he	was	drafted	to	serve	in	Vietnam	and	the	
temptation	to	flee	to	Canada.	He	imagines	the	citizens	of	his	conservative	hometown	talking	about	
“how	the	damned	sissy	had	taken	off	for	Canada”	(O’Brien	43)	and	later	shouting	insults	“Traitor!	[…]	
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Turncoat!	Pussy!”	(54)	at	him.	The	choice	of	words	here—‘sissy’,	‘pussy’—suggests	someone	who	
would	run	from	the	draft	is	feminine,	‘unmanly’,	lacking.	
Wartime	trauma	is	often	bound	up	with	issues	of	gender,	particularly	in	the	period	in	which	
Freud	was	working.	While	there	is	no	doubt	in	the	contemporary	reader’s	mind	that	post-traumatic	
stress	disorder	is	a	very	real	medical	condition—it	was	added	to	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	
of	Mental	Disorders	Third	Edition	in	1980,	largely	as	a	result	of	efforts	by	Vietnam	veterans—suffering	
from	trauma	during	earlier	wars	was	viewed	simply	as	a	coward’s	reaction	to	warfare.	It	is	significant	
to	note,	then,	that	Freud’s	understanding	of	trauma	was	also	closely	linked	with	his	understanding	of	
‘hysteria’	and	his	earlier	work	on	this	condition	with	Josef	Breuer.	Historically,	hysteria	had	been	
viewed	as	an	exclusively	female	disease:	“The	term	‘hysteria’	is	obviously	derived	from	the	Greek	
word	hystera,	which	means	‘uterus.’	...	It	was	formerly	believed	to	be	solely	a	disorder	of	women,	
caused	by	alterations	of	the	womb”	(Veith:	1-2).	At	various	times	throughout	history	the	disease	was	
linked	to	female	sexuality,	with	an	often	confusing	and	contradictory	set	of	causes	and	symptoms.	
Some	doctors	believed	the	disease	was	caused	by	the	repression	of	sexuality,	others	believed	
hysterics	were	hypersexual	nymphomaniacs,	and	yet	others	believed	hysteria	was	caused	by	injuries	
to	the	womb	or	genitals.	Definitions	of	hysteria	often	changed	depending	on	the	time	period	and	
society’s	attitudes	to	women,	as	Veith	explains:		
The	symptoms,	it	seems,	were	conditioned	by	social	expectancy,	tastes,	mores,	and	
religion,	and	were	further	shaped	by	the	state	of	medicine	in	general,	and	the	
knowledge	of	the	public	about	medical	matters.	[…]	Furthermore,	throughout	history	
the	symptoms	were	modified	by	the	prevailing	concept	of	the	feminine	ideal.	In	the	
nineteenth	century,	especially	young	women	and	girls	were	expected	to	be	delicate	
and	vulnerable	both	physically	and	emotionally,	and	this	image	was	reflected	in	their	
disposition	to	hysteria	and	the	nature	of	the	symptoms.	(209)	
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Hysteria,	like	the	trauma	neuroses,	was	a	disease	closely	tied	to	gender.	Furthermore,	the	condition	
as	Breuer	and	Freud	understood	it	was	believed	to	have	a	similar	cause	to	the	trauma	neuroses—a	
memory	that	the	sufferer	could	not	help	but	relive—and	was	to	be	treated	in	the	same	way,	through	
psychoanalysis.	I	have	offered	only	a	brief	outline	of	hysteria	here,	but	I	have	done	so	because	of	the	
clear	similarities	between	Freud’s	work	with	trauma	sufferers	and	his	work	with	hysterics.	Hysterics,	
too,	“suffer	mainly	from	reminiscences”	(Breuer	and	Freud:	7),	and	must	be	treated	with	therapy	that	
enables	them	to	come	to	terms	with	the	event	that	caused	their	disease:	“The	psychical	process	
which	originally	took	place	must	be	repeated	as	vividly	as	possible”	(Breuer	and	Freud:	6).	This	links	
back	to	the	child’s	game	that	I	mentioned	above;	in	the	treatment	of	both	trauma	and	hysteria,	the	
patient	must	take	on	an	active	role	and	relive	the	event	in	order	to	come	to	terms	with	it.	Breuer	
referred	to	this	as	the	‘cathartic	model’	after	the	Greek	word	catharsis	meaning	‘cleansing’	or	
‘purging’.	This	model	was	referred	to	as	a	“talking	cure”	by	one	of	Breuer’s	hysterical	patients,	and	
this	term	was	taken	up	by	Freud	and	used	more	generally	to	describe	his	practice	of	psychoanalysis	
and	psychoanalytic	treatment	methods	in	general	(Freud	and	Breuer:	30).	
There	seems	a	clear	gender	divide	here,	when	it	is	more	useful	to	highlight	the	similarities	
between	these	obviously	related	conditions.	Indeed,	throughout	Breuer	and	Freud’s	case	studies	in	
hysteria,	the	condition	is	often	considered	to	have	sexual	causes	such	as	assault,	which	Breuer	and	
Freud	term	“sexual	trauma”	on	more	than	one	occasion	(299,	313).	Trauma	is	the	cause	of	both	
hysteria	and	the	war	neuroses;	clearly	these	disorders	are	very	closely	linked	yet	in	early	
psychoanalysis	theory	the	two	conditions	remain	separate.	Hysteria	was	often	dismissed	as	a	
woman’s	disease,	and	it	was	not	until	Freud	and	Breuer’s	time	period	that	the	medical	profession	
began	to	take	it	more	seriously.	Indeed,	the	similarities	between	the	war	neuroses	and	hysteria	is	
what	legitimised	hysteria	in	the	eyes	of	many	doctors;	it	was	not	a	valid	medical	concern	until	men	
suffered	from	the	same	symptoms.	These	gender	politics	are	problematic,	particularly	from	a	
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contemporary	gender	studies	or	feminist	perspective,	such	as	I	employ	throughout	this	thesis.	It	is	
significant	in	both	cases	that	the	specific	instances	of	trauma	associated	with	these	conditions—
women	being	sexually	assaulted,	men	breaking	down	during	wartime—are	positioned	as	gendered	
experiences.	We	see	this	in	DID	texts,	where	the	cause	of	female	characters’	dissociative	identity	
disorder	will	almost	always	be	sexual	assault,	as	though	there	are	no	other	traumatic	experiences	
available	for	women.	(There	are	of	course	other	examples	of	female	characters	suffering	from	trauma	
in	the	media,	but	for	the	DID	texts	in	particular	this	is	the	case.20)	While	we	can	attribute	the	
gendered	division	of	trauma	to	the	time	period	in	which	Breuer	and	Freud	were	working,	it	is	a	divide	
that	still	haunts	contemporary	trauma	texts.		
As	stated	earlier,	trauma	is	often	the	cause	of	fictional	examples	of	dissociative	identity	
disorder	and	there	are	often	similar	gendered	associations	at	work	here	too.	For	female	characters,	
trauma	is	still	usually	sexual	in	nature:	Sybil	in	Sybil,	Tara	in	United	States	of	Tara,	and	Penny	in	Set	
This	House	in	Order	are	all	subject	to	sexual	abuse	from	family	members,	for	example,	which	leads	
them	to	dissociate.	Sexual	trauma	is	viewed	as	the	ultimate	attack	on	the	female	subject,	something	
so	powerful	it	causes	the	self	to	fragment	because	it	is	unable	to	cope.	By	comparison,	Victor	in	
Dollhouse	has	been	traumatised	by	his	experiences	as	a	soldier	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	while	
Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	is	traumatised	by	the	emasculating	effects	of	late	capitalism.	This	divide	is	
significant,	and	it	is	one	I	return	to	in	later	chapters.	For	now,	given	the	way	fictional	texts	which	deal	
with	psychological	disorders	are	frequently	concerned	with	notions	of	a	Western	capitalist	society	
																																								 																				
20	The	science-fiction	genre	in	particular	offers	a	number	of	female	characters	who	are	traumatised	by	their	
activities	during	wartime,	perhaps	because	women	are	often	featured	alongside	men	in	combat	situations	in	
these	texts.	A	few	notable	and	popular	examples	include	Katniss	in	the	Hunger	Games	trilogy	(2008-2010),	who	
quite	clearly	has	PTSD	from	her	experiences	in	the	Games	in	the	second	and	third	books;	Sarah	Connor	in	
Terminator	2	(1991),	who	suffers	from	trauma	after	the	events	of	the	first	film;	and	many	of	the	female	
characters	from	the	re-imagined	Battlestar	Galactica	(2004-2009)	television	series,	most	notable	amongst	them	
Admiral	Helena	Cain,	who	is	forced	to	make	an	increasingly	hard	series	of	decisions	in	order	to	do	what	she	
believes	is	best	for	her	ship	and	struggles	with	the	traumatic	events	which	follow	her	decisions,	and	Kendra	
Shaw,	a	soldier	who	struggles	to	live	with	the	consequences	of	following	Cain’s	orders.		
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and	how	we	relate	to	it,	as	detailed	in	the	previous	chapter,	we	must	consider	the	extent	to	which	
this	is	a	comment	on	heteronormative	gender	systems	and	the	society	which	perpetuates	them.	Why	
is	female	trauma	so	often	sexual	trauma	while	male	trauma	is	so	often	emasculating?	Are	these	texts	
suggesting	that	women	must	dissociate	from	society	in	order	to	cope	with	its	patriarchal	gender	
biases,	for	example?	These	are	questions	suggested	by	other	texts	that	flirt	with	dissociative	identity	
disorder	imagery	and	motifs.		
There	are	a	number	of	texts	that	offer	examples	of	young	girls	who	struggle	to	cope	with	
reality	and	become	dissociative,	escaping	into	fantasy	worlds.	Alice’s	Adventures	in	Wonderland	
(1865)	is	often	cited	as	antecedent	to	these	texts,	something	the	Tim	Burton	film	adaptation	(2010)	
made	overt	by	framing	Alice’s	adventures	within	the	real-world	high	society	party	and	marriage	
proposal	she	leaves	behind.	Burton’s	Alice	does	not	want	to	get	married	and	settle	down	but	take	
over	her	father’s	company,	and	upon	her	return	from	slaying	the	Jabberwocky	she	finds	the	courage	
to	tell	her	parents	this	and	turn	down	the	marriage	proposal.	In	homage	to	Alice,	the	film	version	of	
Tideland	(2005),	based	on	the	Southern	Gothic	novel	of	the	same	name,	features	a	sequence	in	which	
the	young	protagonist,	Jeliza-Rose,	falls	down	a	rabbit	hole	while	exploring	the	countryside	around	
the	Texan	farmhouse	she	has	been	left	in	following	her	parents’	deaths	from	drug	overdoses.	She	
dissociates	from	her	real	life	and	escapes	into	an	increasingly	strange	fantasy	world	in	order	to	cope,	
talking	to	a	number	of	dismembered	Barbie	doll	heads	who	become	her	only	friends.	Following	a	
summer	of	neglect,	it	is	suggested	by	the	end	of	the	film	that	she	has	split	into	multiple	personalities	
based	on	the	‘voices’	she	would	act	out	for	her	doll	heads	so	she	had	someone	to	talk	to.	While	these	
texts	are	not	overt	trauma	narratives,	the	experiences	the	characters	face—particularly	Jeliza-Rose,	
who	continues	to	live	with	the	decomposing	body	of	her	dead	father	because	she	thinks	he	might	be	
passed	out	from	drug	use	as	he	has	so	many	times	before—could	be	considered	traumatising,	and	the	
links	to	DID	and	dissociation	are	clear.	Tideland	does	not	particularly	engage	with	the	issue	of	gender	
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(beyond	the	image	of	dismembered	dolls	heads),	but	Burton’s	Alice	is	a	clear	example	of	a	female	
character	who	finds	herself	unable	to	cope	with	the	demands	of	her	gender.		
While	these	examples	engage	with	these	issues	only	fleetingly,	the	2011	film	Sucker	Punch	
deals	more	overtly	with	this	issue	of	gendered	trauma.	After	being	institutionalised	by	her	father	and	
being	told	she	will	have	a	lobotomy	at	the	end	of	the	week,	Babydoll	(no	real	name	given)	finds	
herself	completely	helpless.	She	dissociates	from	reality	and	escapes	into	a	fantasy	where	she	and	her	
fellow	patients	are	prostitutes	in	a	nightclub/brothel	owned	by	Blue	Jones,	an	orderly	at	the	hospital	
who	illegally	arranges	her	lobotomy.	With	only	the	sympathies	of	the	equally	powerless	female	
psychiatrist	Dr	Gorski	(Madame	Gorski,	an	aging	prostitute	who	tries	to	look	after	the	girls,	in	the	
nightclub	‘reality’),	Babydoll	enlists	the	help	of	the	other	patients	to	steal	items	to	aid	in	their	escape.	
Babydoll	then	dissociates	again:	from	the	fantasy	world	she	has	created	into	another	hyper-fantasy	
world	in	which	the	girls	fight	monsters,	robots,	dragons	and	steampunk-inspired	Nazis	with	samurai	
swords	and	machine	guns	as	part	of	missions	to	retrieve	the	items	they	need	in	order	to	escape.	It	
sounds	ludicrous,	and	to	some	extent	it	is,	but	under	the	surface	the	film	makes	a	deeper	point	about	
the	powerlessness	of	women	in	the	1960s,	and	particularly	as	regards	abuses	suffered	by	women	in	
mental	health	facilities	during	this	time.	Even	the	first	of	Babydoll’s	escapes—the	nightclub/brothel	
fantasy—does	not	allow	her	to	fight	back	against	her	abusers	but	simply	highlights	the	things	she	is	
trying	to	escape:	the	girls	all	belong	to	Blue	and	are	subject	to	his	control.	He	thinks	of	them	as	
nothing	more	than	property,	something	to	make	money	from.	When	he	finds	out	about	the	girls’	plan	
he	shoots	two	of	the	girls,	fulfilling	his	threat	from	earlier	that	they	“need	to	re-establish	the	
parameters	of	[their]	relationship.”	Babydoll’s	world(s)	are	ones	subject	to	male	control,	and	she	has	
to	escape	by	dissociating	into	an	increasingly	deeper	fantasy	in	order	to	regain	her	agency.	
When	viewed	alongside	the	earlier	examples	of	male	trauma	in	Regeneration	and	The	Things	
They	Carried,	texts	such	as	Sucker	Punch,	Alice	in	Wonderland,	and	Tideland	become	significant	not	
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for	the	differences	they	portray	but	for	the	similarities:	in	both	cases,	the	trauma	is	linked	to	gender	
and	gender	roles,	most	often	the	inability	of	the	characters	to	match	expectations	placed	on	them	by	
heteronormative	society.	While	real-life	trauma	should	not	be	trivialised	in	this	way,	this	recurring	
metaphor	within	fictional	representations	of	these	issues	cannot	be	ignored,	in	much	the	same	way	
that	we	cannot	ignore	the	social	metaphors	in	other	texts	which	deal	with	psychological	illness.	Much	
like	the	examples	in	the	previous	chapter,	this	small	selection	of	texts	demonstrates	that	this	is	a	
recurring	motif.	Indeed,	these	examples	could	lead	one	to	question	whether	or	not	the	
representation	of	trauma	has	moved	on	from	Freud’s	time.	‘Shell-shock’	and	‘hysteria’	informed	
Freud’s	work	on	trauma	at	this	time,	but	theories	of	trauma	have	obviously	evolved	in	the	last	
century,	even	if	fictional	representations	of	trauma	have	not.	Indeed,	we	see	this	in	the	very	
terminology	used	to	describe	these	conditions.	Hysteria	is	no	longer	a	medical	diagnosis	(though	
some	of	its	symptoms	can	be	found	in	Conversion	Disorder,	Schizophrenia,	and	PTSD	more	generally),	
while	‘shell-shock’	became	‘combat	fatigue’	in	the	Second	World	War,	and	‘Post-Traumatic	Stress	
Disorder’	in	the	Vietnam	War.	Freud’s	work	pre-dates	these	developments,	and	given	the	patriarchal	
nature	of	the	medical	profession	as	well	as	the	gender	conventions	of	the	time,	some	of	his	
conclusions	seem	inevitable.	As	such,	when	men	began	to	suffer	from	‘shell-shock’	in	the	First	World	
War,	the	similarity	of	some	symptoms	to	hysterical	behaviour	primarily	found	in	women	led	to	the	
negative	associations	we	find	in	portrayals	of	male	trauma	in	this	time	period.		
As	a	base	understanding	of	trauma,	Freud’s	work	is	useful,	and	allows	us	to	identify	where	
common	media	stereotypes,	motifs	and	tropes	come	from.	Briefly	to	summarise,	Freud’s	contentions	
were:	firstly,	that	trauma	was	brought	about	by	an	accident	or	shock	that	threatened	the	life	of	the	
people	involved;	secondly,	that	this	accident	or	event	was	a	surprise	the	subject	was	not	prepared	to	
face;	thirdly,	that	the	subject	was	passive,	that	is	to	the	say	the	accident	or	event	happened	to	them;	
and	fourthly,	that	this	accident	would	be	repeated	in	the	subject’s	mind/dreams	until	such	time	as	
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the	subject	was	‘cured’	of	their	trauma	by	assuming	an	active	role	and	facing	what	had	happened	to	
them.	Many	of	these	early	points	still	survive	in	trauma	theory	today;	some—like	traumatic	
repetition—form	the	basis	for	other	concepts	such	as	Kalí	Tal’s	“liminal	time”	(118),	and	the	lack	of	
history	and	meaning	discussed	by	critics	like	Cathy	Caruth	and	Dominick	LaCapra.	These	critics	all	
discuss	the	ways	that	trauma	is	disruptive,	and	this	seems	to	be	crucial	to	a	modern	understanding	of	
trauma	within	academia.	According	to	critics	such	as	these,	trauma	breaks	apart	and	disrupts	time,	
history,	language,	and	meaning,	leaving	the	sufferer	in	a	liminal,	meaningless	state	and	unable	to	
make	sense	of	the	trauma	that	has	affected	them.	These	ideas	are	built	on	Freud’s	earlier	analysis,	so	
that,	for	example,	it	is	the	repetition	of	the	traumatic	event	that	disrupts	time	and	history	because	
the	patient	is	trapped	in	the	moment	of	trauma	and	relives	it	constantly.	The	range	of	themes	
invoked	in	representations	of	traumatic	experience	–	meaning,	language,	time,	history—read	like	a	
short	checklist	of	postwar	critical	theory,	and	in	particular	of	postmodernism.	These	understandings	
of	trauma	offer	more	opportunity	for	analysis	of	the	appearance	of	trauma	within	dissociative	
identity	disorder	texts,	and	I	will	return	to	this	point	after	a	brief	overview	of	these	critics’	arguments.	
In	his	book,	Writing	History,	Writing	Trauma,	LaCapra	discusses	the	idea	of	‘acting	out’	and	
‘working	through’	trauma	in	relation	to	traumatic	repetition,	in	a	way	reminiscent	of	Freud’s	Fort-Da	
game.	For	LaCapra,	‘acting	out’	refers	to	how	trauma	sufferers	relive	their	trauma	through	
nightmares	and	hallucinations.	Building	on	Freud’s	work,	he	suggests	that	the	continual	acting	out	of	
trauma	disrupts	time,	as	the	trauma	sufferer	relives	the	past	and	is	unable	to	see	a	future	beyond	his	
or	her	traumatic	experience.	LaCapra	explains	that	in	‘working	through’	the	trauma—mastering	it	
through	repetition,	as	Freud	discusses—the	trauma	sufferer	gains	“distance	or	critical	perspective”	on	
the	events	that	allows	them	to	attempt	to	move	forward	with	their	lives	(LaCapra:	70).	LaCapra	also	
acknowledges	what	Freud	does	not:	working	through	trauma	can	be	extremely	difficult	and	that	in	
many	cases	one	cannot	completely	overcome	what	has	happened	in	the	past.	It	is	clear	that	‘acting	
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out’	and	‘working	through’	are	descendants	of	Freud’s	interpretation	of	the	trauma	sufferers’	
repeated	nightmares	and	the	child	gaining	mastery	over	his	‘trauma’	by	repeating	it	in	his	games;	the	
nightmares	are	a	patient	‘acting	out’	his	trauma,	while	the	child	is	‘working	through’	his.	Where	these	
ideas	differ	is	in	LaCapra’s	exploration	of	time	in	relation	to	trauma.	For	LaCapra,	time	is	thoroughly	
bound	up	with	trauma;	trauma	disrupts	time	and	prevents	the	sufferer	from	moving	forward	with	
their	life	such	that	“distinctions	tend	to	collapse,	including	the	crucial	distinction	between	then	and	
now	wherein	one	is	able	to	remember	what	happened	to	one	in	the	past	but	realises	one	is	living	in	
the	here	and	now	with	future	possibilities”	(46).	The	trauma	sufferer	becomes	‘trapped’	in	the	
repeated	series	of	events,	unable	to	move	forward	or	go	back	to	a	time	before	they	were	
traumatised.		
The	idea	that	trauma	disrupts	time	is	one	that	appears	frequently	within	critical	work	on	
trauma.	Kalí	Tal,	in	particular,	takes	up	this	idea	and	argues	that	trauma	disrupts	history	and	time	to	
such	an	extent	that	the	traumatised	subject	is	stuck	in	‘liminal’	time,	unable	to	reintegrate	back	into	
‘normal’	time.	For	Tal,	liminal	time	is	a	separate	space	outside	of	history;	a	transitional	space	
occupied	by	traumatised	people.	They	are	unable	to	experience	time	in	the	same	way	that	everybody	
else	does,	because	their	time	seems	meaningless	and	is	no	longer	linear	due	to	the	repetition	of	the	
traumatic	event.	Subjects	remain	traumatised	until	they	are	able	to	escape	liminal	time	by	becoming	
post-liminal,	working	through	their	trauma,	and	returning	to	‘normal’	society.	Tal	uses	the	example	of	
First	World	War	veterans,	arguing	that	many	returning	soldiers	were	unable	to	adjust	to	peacetime	
life	after	witnessing	the	horrors	of	trench	warfare.	This	experience	is	not	limited	to	the	First	World	
War;	we	see	this	idea	in	almost	all	of	the	fictional	texts	about	war	veterans	cited	above.	These	
characters	often	are,	as	Tal	argues,	“liminal	figures	who	must	remain	[...]	on	the	fringes	of	society”	
(122).	Nowhere	is	this	idea	as	clear	as	in	Norman	Bowker’s	revolutions	of	the	lake	in	The	Things	They	
Carried:	“The	war	was	over,”	O’Brien	tells	us,	“and	there	was	nowhere	in	particular	to	go”	(139).		
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This	concern	with	the	disruptive	effect	of	trauma	on	history	and	time	is	often	bound	up	with	
an	interest	in	trauma	narratives	and	survivor	testimonies.	For	LaCapra,	“testimonies	are	significant	in	
the	attempt	to	understand	experience	and	its	aftermath	[…]	in	coming	to	terms	with—or	denying	and	
repressing—the	past”	(87).	Testimonies	are	therefore	another	way	of	working	through	trauma.	Again,	
this	is	evident	in	much	of	O’Brien’s	work.	He	often	retells	events	in	The	Things	They	Carried	from	
different	perspectives,	with	a	different	focus,	or	out	of	the	order	in	which	they	happened.	In	the	
book,	O’Brien	discusses	the	process	of	bearing	witness	to	the	war	and	describes	his	continued	writing	
about	it	as	“a	natural	inevitable	process,	like	clearing	the	throat.	[…]	Partly	catharsis,	partly	
communication”	(157).	Survivor	testimony	has	become	an	important	area	of	trauma	theory,	though	
other	critics	are	sceptical	of	its	use	as	a	cathartic	exercise.	Tal,	for	instance,	also	argues	that	survivors	
feel	compelled	to	bear	witness	to	the	traumatic	events	in	which	they	have	been	involved,	such	that	
“their	responsibility	as	survivors	is	to	bear	the	tale”	(120).	However,	Tal	finds	this	compulsion	
problematic	because	she	believes	the	traumatic	events	that	shaped	the	writers’	lives	can	never	be	
reproduced	in	literature.	She	argues	that	retelling	the	event	can	never	have	the	same	effect	as	
experiencing	it;	that	is,	the	reader	will	never	be	traumatised	in	the	same	way	that	the	writer	was.	Tal	
argues	that	this	becomes	another	liminal	state	in	which	the	survivor	is	trapped:	caught	between	the	
compulsion	to	tell	what	has	happened	to	them	and	an	inability	accurately	to	do	so.	Tal	justifies	this	by	
suggesting	that	trauma	not	only	disrupts	time	and	history,	but	that	it	disrupts	language,	meaning,	and	
reference	as	well.	For	people	who	have	survived	traumas	such	as	the	Holocaust,	the	words	take	on	
very	different	meanings	that	outside	observers	can	never	fully	appreciate.	Trauma	is	impossible	to	
describe	because	the	survivor-author	does	not	have	the	same	frame	of	reference	as	a	reader	who	has	
not	experienced	that	trauma.	Tal	explains:	“Words	such	as	blood,	terror,	agony,	and	madness	gain	
new	meaning	within	the	context	of	the	trauma,	and	survivors	emerge	from	the	traumatic	
environment	with	a	new	set	of	definitions”	(16).	These	words	do	not	mean	the	same	thing	to	a	non-
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survivor	because	trauma,	according	to	Tal,	“displaces	[the	survivor’s]	preconceived	notions	about	the	
world”	(15)	or	to	put	it	another	way,	trauma	rips	apart	survivors’	frames	of	reference	and	gives	them	
new	ones	non-survivors	cannot	understand.	Survivors	are	compelled	to	explain	what	happened	to	
them,	but	this	can	never	be	understood	by	a	non-survivor;	reading	a	survivor’s	experiences	can	never	
have	the	same	effect	on	a	non-survivor	as	the	original	event	did	on	the	writer.		
This	is	problematic	in	terms	of	fictional	trauma	texts	because	Tal	is	effectively	arguing	that	
someone	who	has	not	experienced	trauma	cannot	write	a	‘true’	trauma	narrative,	because	they	
cannot	possibly	imagine	what	happens	during	a	traumatic	encounter.	This	is	in	part	to	do	with	Tal’s	
wider	problem	with	literary	criticism	and	the	use	of	metaphor:	“Literary	critics	concentrate	on	symbol	
and	image,	on	‘reading’	texts	rather	than	on	reporting	them.	Literary	critics,	like	the	authors	and	
readers	of	Vietnam	war	literature	(con)fuse	fact	and	fiction”	(75).	She	discounts	trauma	fiction	as	an	
area	of	study	completely,	and	instead	concentrates	her	analysis	on	trauma	survivors’	
autobiographical	literature.	Tal	seems	to	deny	the	very	things	at	which	literature	excels—the	
representation	of	events,	empathy,	subjectivity—and	what	trauma	literature	and	fictional	accounts	of	
trauma	in	particular	seek	to	do.	While	I	am	sensitive	to	the	differences	between	fictional	
representations	and	their	real-world	conditions,	I	do	not	believe	that	this	should	prevent	us	from	
studying	fictional	texts.	Indeed,	O’Brien’s	work	intentionally	blurs	the	distinction	between	the	truth	
and	what	really	happened	to	O’Brien	in	Vietnam—“I	want	you	to	know	why	story-truth	is	truer	
sometimes	than	happening-truth,”	he	tells	us	(179)—and	this	emphasises	the	value	in	O’Brien’s	work	
and	positions	him	as	an	important	‘witness’	to	the	experiences	of	soldiers	during	the	conflict.	O’Brien	
is,	in	many	ways,	an	antidote	to	Tal,	and	demonstrates	the	importance	of	trauma	literature,	not	only	
for	survivors	to	work	through	what	happened	to	them,	but	also	as	important	cultural	artefacts.	
O’Brien	draws	explicit	attention	to	the	problem	of	traumatic	truth-telling,	but	he	does	not	do	so	in	
order	to	discount	the	importance	of	fictional	representations	of	traumatic	events.						
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I	said	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	that	I	was	not	interested	in	the	medical	validity	of	my	
fictional	trauma	texts,	and	this	should	be	reiterated	here.	Tal	argues	her	point	by	using	trauma	
survivors’	literature	and	fact,	and	gives	no	thought	to	fictional	trauma	texts.	In	contrast,	the	
dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	this	thesis	examines	are	all	fictional	and	feature	fictional	instances	
of	trauma.	As	such,	there	is	little	use	in	my	subscribing	to	the	view	that	non-survivors	cannot	
accurately	write	about	trauma	because	this	choice	of	texts	indicates	that	I	accept	that	non-survivors	
can	write	about	trauma,	and	have	done	so	in	a	manner	worthy	of	study.	Tal’s	concern	comes	partly	
from	the	representation	of	trauma	sufferers	and	events	like	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	Holocaust;	she	
does	not	want	the	true	nature	of	these	events	to	be	hidden	behind	metaphors	and	empty	signifiers.	
While	issues	of	representation	of	historical	events	are	largely	outside	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	I	do	not	
believe	that	novelists	are	attempting	to	hide	the	nature	of	traumatic	events	when	they	use	
metaphors	to	describe	them.	A	common	dissociative	identity	disorder	metaphor	is	that	of	the	self	
shattered	by	trauma,	for	example,	and	rather	than	trying	to	hide	the	nature	of	the	disease,	this	
literary	device	emphasises	it	and	offers	novelists	a	way	clearly	to	express	the	condition	to	the	reader.	
Set	This	House	in	Order	is	a	perfect	example	of	the	way	that	a	novelist	can	use	a	metaphor	(the	
original	trauma	which	caused	the	main	characters	to	split	is	referred	to	as	a	‘death’)	to	explain	the	
effect	the	traumatic	events	in	Andrew	and	Penny’s	childhood	had,	and	how	these	characters	
developed	multiple	personalities	as	a	consequence.	That	Ruff	chooses	to	use	this	metaphor	in	no	way	
detracts	from	the	sympathy	the	reader	feels	for	Andrew	and	Penny	or	prevents	us	from	analysing	the	
novel	as	a	dissociative	identity	disorder	text	or	trauma	text.		
Despite	Tal’s	dislike	of	literary	criticism	and	her	belief	that	fictional	accounts	of	trauma	can	
never	accurately	represent	the	literature	of	trauma	survivors,	her	work	does	offer	several	important	
points.	The	idea	that	trauma	cannot	be	understood	by	people	who	have	not	experienced	it	because	
trauma	destroys	language,	meaning	and	reference	is	an	important	one,	and	one	that	other	critics	
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such	as	Caruth	and	LaCapra	also	discuss.	The	traumatic	events	do	this	because	they	are	so	far	outside	
the	‘normal’	realm	of	experience	that	the	trauma	sufferer	has	no	way	to	process	and	understand	
them;	they	are	forever	changed	by	what	they	have	experienced.	This	makes	reference	to	Freud’s	
discussion	of	the	element	of	fright	required	for	someone	to	develop	a	trauma	neurosis.	Fright	
suggests	that	the	trauma	sufferer	is	not	prepared	to	face	what	they	are	about	to	experience,	and	this	
is	the	same	idea	behind	the	destruction	of	reference:	the	trauma	sufferer’s	current	frame	of	
reference	is	insufficient	to	deal	with	the	experience	they	are	faced	with.	In	practical	terms,	and	
returning	to	Tal’s	statement,	the	previous	frame	of	reference	when	it	comes	to	words	like	‘blood,’	
‘terror,’	‘agony,’	and	‘madness’	is	now	completely	inadequate,	and	no	longer	seems	to	express	the	
reality	that	the	trauma	sufferer	has	experienced.		
Cathy	Caruth	expands	this	destruction	of	reference	so	that	it	not	only	works	for	individual	
trauma	survivors	but	for	entire	cultures	bound	up	in	specific	traumatic	events	of	history	such	as	the	
bombing	of	Hiroshima	or	the	Holocaust.	We	can	also	extend	this	to	later	events	such	as	the	
September	11th	Attacks	or	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	Each	of	these	events	affects	a	large	group	
of	people	(Japanese	people,	Jewish	people,	Americans/New	Yorkers)	and	has	very	real	traumatising	
effects	on	the	people	involved.	Caruth	offers	Hiroshima,	Mon	Amour	(1959)	as	an	example	of	a	film	
that	deals	with	this	issue.	The	film	centres	on	a	Japanese	man	and	a	French	woman	who	meet	in	
Hiroshima	after	the	Second	World	War	and	discuss	the	ways	the	war	and	the	bombing	of	Hiroshima	
have	affected	them.	The	woman	explains	that	she	has	“always	wept	over	the	fate	of	Hiroshima”	but	
the	man	denies	her	right	to	do	so:	“what	would	you	have	cried	about?”	(qtd.	in	Caruth:	28).	He	asks	
her	what	Hiroshima	means	to	her	as	a	French	woman,	and	she	replies	that	it	means	the	end	of	the	
war.	Caruth	suggests	that	this	contrasts	sharply	with	his	own	experiences	of	Hiroshima	as	for	him	it	
signalled	the	beginning	of	Japanese	suffering.	For	the	Japanese,	Hiroshima	was	a	catastrophic	event;	
an	attack	on	a	largely	civilian	population	that	resulted	in	thousands	of	deaths	and	injuries.	For	the	rest	
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of	the	world,	Hiroshima	was	the	end	of	the	war	and	the	start	of	peacetime,	and	the	Japanese	man	has	
trouble	overcoming	this	disconnect.	The	Japanese	man	repeatedly	tells	the	woman	that	he	saw	what	
really	happened	and	she	did	not;	she	did	not	see	‘correctly’	because	the	images	do	not	have	the	same	
meaning	for	her	as	they	do	for	him.		
At	first,	the	Japanese	man	seems	to	be	an	example	of	Tal’s	survivor-writer;	his	own	
experiences	are	the	important	ones	and	they	cannot	be	shared	by	those	who	did	not	witness	the	
event.	But	there	is	a	distinction	to	be	made	here	between	the	Japanese	man	and	Tal’s	survivor-writer:	
the	man	was	not	actually	involved	in	the	Hiroshima	bombings.	He	was	not	in	the	city	at	the	time	but	
he	did	lose	his	family	in	the	bombing,	and	he	believes	the	traumatising	effects	are	the	same	for	him	as	
they	would	be	for	any	other	survivor.	What	he	is	arguing	for	is	a	unique	sense	of	cultural,	Japanese	
trauma	that	was	not	experienced	by	people	in	other	countries.	This	idea	of	cultural	trauma	is	an	
important	one.	It	is	experienced	when	“members	of	a	collectivity	feel	they	have	been	subjected	to	a	
horrendous	event	that	leaves	indelible	marks	upon	their	group	consciousness,	marking	their	
memories	forever	and	changing	their	future	identity	in	fundamental	and	irrevocable	way”	(Alexander:	
1).	We	see	this	in	narratives	of	the	September	11th	attacks	where	main	characters	are	not	directly	
involved	in	the	events	but	still	suffer	from	trauma	(for	a	fictional	example,	please	see	Extremely	Loud	
and	Incredibly	Close,	which	I	discussed	in	Chapter	2).	We	also	see	it	in	texts	that	deal	with	war	and	
PTSD	in	soldiers.	There	is	a	sense	in	these	texts	that	all	men	are	traumatised	by	these	events,	
something	that	is	suggested	by	many	of	the	examples	I	have	chosen	in	this	chapter.	Regeneration	is	a	
British	text,	The	Things	They	Carried	is	an	American	one.	A	text	such	as	the	television	show	Bomb	Girls	
(2012-2014)	serves	as	a	Canadian	example.	Further,	many	of	the	male	characters	in	these	texts	have	
fathers	who	also	served	in	a	previous	war.	O’Brien’s	father	served	in	the	Second	World	War,	and	it	is	
implied	that	Norman	Bowker’s	father	is	also	a	veteran	when	it	is	stated	that,	despite	his	eagerness	for	
Bowker	to	win	medals,	he	knows	(perhaps	due	to	past	experience)	“that	there	are	many	brave	men	
87	
	
	
	
who	do	not	win	medals	for	bravery,	and	that	others	won	medals	for	doing	nothing”	(142).	Bomb	Girls,	
set	in	1941,	makes	this	legacy	of	trauma	overt	through	the	character	of	Bob	Corbett	and	his	son	
Eugene.	Bob	served	in	the	First	World	War,	was	injured	on	the	Western	Front	and	is	now	confined	to	
a	wheelchair,	still	unable	to	talk	about	or	process	what	happened	to	him.	Eugene	comes	home	on	
leave	as	a	‘war	hero’	and	it	quickly	becomes	obvious	that	he	is	suffering	from	PTSD	due	to	the	things	
he	has	seen	and	done	as	a	member	of	the	Air	Force	during	the	Second	World	War.	Bob,	having	spent	
the	last	twenty-five	years	of	his	life	traumatised	by	his	experiences	in	combat,	urges	Eugene	to	talk	
about	it,	but	Eugene	quickly	replies,	“Why?	You	never	did.”	Eugene’s	inability	to	process	his	
experiences	exactly	mirrors	his	father’s,	highlighting	the	extent	to	which	trauma	can	affect	whole	
generations,	and	even	an	entire	gender.		
This	demonstrates	that	trauma’s	disruption	of	language	and	meaning	is	not	limited	to	
individuals,	but	also	to	social	groups	and	cultures.	This	destruction	of	language	becomes	significant	in	
the	case	of	cultural	trauma	when	words	such	as	‘Holocaust’,	‘Vietnam’,	or	‘9/11’	come	to	represent	
an	entire	event,	and	the	entire	experience	of	a	group	of	people.	Survivors	and	veterans	may	have	very	
different	impressions	of	what	those	words	mean	to	them	from	non-survivors	and	civilians.	Amos	
Goldberg	suggests	that	this	use	of	language	can	contribute	to	further	trauma	for	the	survivor,	and	
that	it	may	lead	to	a	crisis,	or	ultimately	the	death,	of	the	self.	Goldberg	cites	the	example	of	the	Jews	
in	the	Third	Reich,	arguing	that	the	Nazis	turned	the	word	‘Jew’	into	a	“negative	master	signifier	
distinguished	from	its	opposite	positive	master	signifier—Aryan—in	the	racist	Nazi	worldview”	(124).	
‘Jew’	came	to	be	a	bad	word,	indistinguishable	from	the	negative	connotations	it	held.	The	Nazis	then	
set	about	making	this	word	inseparable	from	Jewish	people,	first	by	marking	Jewish	businesses	and	
properties,	then	marking	Jews’	official	identification	documents	such	as	passports,	then	by	literally	
marking	Jewish	people	with	the	yellow	Star	of	David	badge	and	the	camp	tattoos	that	all	imprisoned	
Jews	were	given.	This	had	a	dehumanising	effect,	obviously,	but	each	step	of	the	process	also	marked	
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an	increase	in	the	discrimination	and	horrific,	traumatising	crimes	perpetrated	against	the	Jewish	
people.		
Goldberg	argues	that	this	forcing	of	the	signifier	‘Jew’	on	to	the	bodies	of	the	Jewish	people	
causes	the	‘death’	of	the	self	by	linking	the	process	to	Jacques	Lacan’s	understanding	of	metonymy,	
which	Goldberg	describes	as	the	subject’s	constant	“impossible	search	for	a	signifier	that	will	suit	him	
or	her”	(132).	This	search	is	ongoing	because	no	one	signifier	can	completely	explain	the	subject’s	
identity.	Instead,	a	number	of	signifiers	must	be	used,	and	the	subject	spends	his	life	searching	for	
new	ways	to	describe	his	identity.	By	forcing	the	subject	into	one	identity/signifier,	such	as	‘Jew’,	the	
self	suffers	an	identity	crisis	that	is	therefore	tantamount	to	death.	Goldberg	says	that	this	death-by-
signifier	can	be	challenged	by	an	individual	confronting	the	signifying	chain	and	refusing	to	accept	
their	signifier.	This	was	not	an	option	for	the	Jews,	who	were	literally	marked	on	their	bodies	as	a	
constant	reminder	of	who	and	what	they	were	viewed	as	under	the	Nazi	regime.		
Goldberg’s	discussion	of	symbolic	death	is	a	return	to	the	idea	that	trauma	disrupts	meaning,	
as	we	have	seen	before	from	LaCapra,	Caruth	and	Tal,	but	his	wording	becomes	particularly	
important	when	we	consider	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts.	For	Goldberg,	trauma	results	in	the	
death	of	the	self.	This	is,	I	believe,	why	trauma	is	so	often	tied	to	dissociative	identity	disorder	within	
fictional	texts.	Trauma	disrupts	time,	history,	meaning,	and	language;	the	combination	of	these	
factors	leads	to	the	destruction	of	identity,	resulting	in	a	fragmented	(multiple	or	dissociated)	self.	
The	destruction	of	the	unified	self	stems	from	the	trauma	because	without	time,	history,	meaning,	
and	language,	there	can	be	no	self.	Goldberg	makes	this	explicit	when	he	states	that	“the	greatest	
catastrophe	that	is	implicit	in	the	traumatic	encounter	is	the	potential	eradication	of	the	entire	grid	of	
meaning,	or,	to	put	it	differently,	the	point	when	the	subject	is	left	with	no	relevant	cultural,	
historical,	or	personal	context	from	which	to	work	through	the	trauma”	(134).	By	destroying	these	
things,	trauma	leaves	a	person	with	no	cultural	or	personal	identity,	unable	to	make	sense	of	what	
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has	happened	to	them.	People	can	therefore	develop	dissociative	identity	disorder	as	a	response	to	
this:	without	these	things,	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	have	a	unified	self	or	identity.		
When	examined	in	this	way,	it	becomes	obvious	why	trauma	is	so	often	associated	with	
dissociative	identity	disorder,	at	least	in	fiction.	For	novelists	or	screenwriters	looking	to	explore	
identity	and	the	self,	trauma	and	dissociation	would	seem	to	offer	productive	themes	on	which	to	
build	a	narrative.	Postmodern	concerns	with	how	identity	is	constructed	and	mediated	in	a	
contemporary	Western	late-capitalist	society	can	be	explored	through	characters	with	DID,	and	
frequently	are.	Indeed,	this	link	does	seem	to	be	specific	to	DID	texts,	and	it	does	not	appear	in	the	
same	way	in	other	texts	featuring	psychological	illness.	This	is	not	to	say	that	other	texts	do	not	
mention	trauma	or	engage	with	its	effects.	Rather,	characters	that	are	involved	in	traumatic	events—
Lisbeth	Salander	suffers	years	of	neglect	by	social	services,	abuse	from	her	father,	and	is	violently	
beaten	and	raped	in	The	Girl	With	The	Dragon	Tattoo;	Oskar	is	traumatised	by	his	father’s	death	
during	the	World	Trade	Center	attacks	in	Extremely	Loud	and	Incredibly	Close;	Phineas	Poe	is	drugged	
and	has	his	kidney	stolen	at	the	start	of	the	Phineas	Poe	trilogy—do	not	develop	their	conditions	as	a	
response	to	their	trauma.	Trauma	is	present	in	these	texts,	but	the	disorders	that	these	characters	
suffer	from—autistic	spectrum	disorders,	paranoid	schizophrenia—do	not	stem	from	traumatic	
events.	Dissociative	identity	disorder,	and	the	common	metaphors	used	when	writing	about	this	
condition,	seems	uniquely	suited	to	engage	with	contemporary	theorists’	understanding	of	trauma	
and	do	so	again	and	again.		
	Having	examined	some	of	the	theoretical	work	on	trauma	and	suggested	why	it	is	so	often	
linked	to	DID,	I	now	turn	my	attention	to	a	discussion	of	the	representation	of	trauma	within	DID	
texts.	Is	trauma	represented	in	the	same	way	it	is	in	non-DID	texts	or	do	these	texts	more	closely	
engage	with	the	theoretical	discussions	of	trauma	outlined	above?	In	fictional	texts	featuring	
dissociative	identity	disorder,	trauma	causes	characters	to	dissociate,	to	split,	and	to	develop	multiple	
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personalities.	In	the	previous	chapter’s	analysis	of	the	early	DID	texts,	trauma	was	the	cause	of	both	
Sybil	and	Billy	Milligan’s	dissociative	identity	disorder.	Sybil	was	physically	and	sexually	abused	by	her	
mother,	while	Milligan	was	physically	and	sexually	abused	by	his	stepfather.	In	the	case	of	Sybil,	this	is	
another	example	of	a	woman	developing	multiple	personalities	following	sexual	abuse,	as	in	The	
United	States	of	Tara,	or	Set	This	House	in	Order.	This	is	a	further	example	of	the	‘gendered	trauma’	I	
discussed	early	in	this	chapter,	but	the	fact	that	Milligan	also	suffered	sexual	abuse	is	significant	
because	it	is	unusual:		men	are	underrepresented	in	DID	literature	and	Milligan	is	the	only	male	
character	who	is	sexually	abused.	While	there	is	some	suggestion	that	the	physical	and	sexual	abuse	
did	not	cause	Milligan’s	DID—he	had	already	dissociated	following	his	father’s	death,	before	his	
stepfather	married	his	mother—it	is	obvious	that	the	abuse	makes	it	worse	and	facilitates	the	
creation	of	new	alter	personalities.	This	is	significant	in	terms	of	trauma	being	gendered	because	one	
man	sexually	abusing	another	can	be	viewed	as	emasculating:	Milligan’s	stepfather	holds	power	over	
Billy	and	sexually	abuses	him	to	make	that	clear.21	Viewed	in	this	way,	it	becomes	clear	that	while	
Milligan’s	trauma	is	not	related	to	war	in	the	way	that	male	trauma	often	is,	it	does	have	a	gendered	
element	to	it.	Indeed,	there	are	moments	in	the	book	when	Chalmer	Milligan’s	abuse	takes	on	clear	
gendered,	and	consequently	homophobic,	overtones:	“Billy	loved	flowers	and	poetry	and	helping	his	
mother	around	the	house,	but	he	knew	that	Chalmer	called	him	‘a	sissy’	and	‘a	little	queer.’	So	he	
stopped	helping	his	mother	and	writing	poetry”	(Keyes:	166).	This	is	immediately	followed	by	a	
description	of	Milligan’s	stepfather	beating	Milligan	with	a	garden	hose	when	he	finds	him—actually	
Milligan’s	female	alter	personality	Adalana—washing	dishes.	The	association	is	clear:	Billy	(or	Billy’s	
alters)	behaved	in	stereotypically	feminine	ways	and	his	stepfather	hit	him	because	of	it.		
																																								 																				
21	Of	course,	this	is	not	to	say	that	a	man	sexually	abusing	a	woman	is	not	about	exerting	power	over	the	
woman.	The	point	I	am	making	is	that	Milligan	is	put	in	a	position	usually	occupied	by	a	woman,	and	so	in	
addition	to	the	power	dynamic	inherent	in	any	instance	of	rape,	there	is	a	further	gendered	element	at	work.	
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	 In	both	of	these	examples,	the	‘cure’	for	dissociative	identity	disorder	is	for	Sybil	and	Milligan	
to	‘work	through’	their	trauma	and	come	to	terms	with	what	has	happened	to	them.	According	to	the	
various	medical	authorities	within	the	texts,	this	will	allow	the	personalities	to	reintegrate	and	the	
person	to	become	whole	again.	In	both	of	these	texts,	the	main	characters	first	had	to	remember	that	
the	abuse	had	taken	place,	and	this	search	for	the	cause	of	their	DID	is	an	important	part	of	the	
narrative.		Indeed,	in	many	DID	texts,	the	search	for	the	event	that	originally	traumatised	the	
dissociative	character	is	at	the	centre	of	the	narrative.	This	happens	in	seasons	one	and	two	of	United	
States	of	Tara,	for	example.	We	also	see	this	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	with	Andrew’s	discovery	of	
what	happened	to	the	original	Andy	Gage,	and	a	first	season	episode	of	Dollhouse	in	which	the	doll’s	
original	personalities	are	restored	and	each	character	searches	for	closure	from	the	trauma	that	
originally	sent	them	to	the	Dollhouse.	Indeed,	my	primary	texts	often	position	DID	sufferers	as	people	
looking	for	answers;	managing	their	condition	and	trying	to	come	to	terms	with	what	has	happened	
to	them.	The	narratives	are	often	ones	in	which	the	dissociative	characters	seek	a	cure	or	want	to	
discover	what	made	them	dissociate	in	the	first	place.	In	most	cases	this	means	the	sufferer	has	to	
come	to	terms	with	their	trauma	and	‘work	through’	it	in	order	to	cure	themselves	of	DID.	Again,	this	
works	in	terms	of	the	metaphor—trauma	splits	the	self,	so	in	order	to	put	the	self	back	together	again	
one	must	overcome	or	work	through	the	trauma—but	in	many	of	the	texts	it	is	not	that	simple.	The	
notion	of	curing	the	disease	is	often	problematised,	with	some	texts	such	as	United	States	of	Tara	and	
Set	This	House	In	Order	questioning	the	extent	to	which	the	disease	can	be	cured,	if	at	all.	From	this	
brief	description,	it	seems	that	the	texts	are	simultaneously	confirming	what	a	reader	familiar	with	
trauma	theory	might	expect	while	also	resisting	following	a	typical	‘trauma	narrative’	in	which	the	
trauma	sufferer	works	through	their	trauma.	While	the	next	chapter	will	examine	narrative	
convention	more	closely,	and	how	DID	texts	conform	to	or	resist	these	conventions,	the	rest	of	this	
chapter	examines	Set	This	House	in	Order,	United	States	of	Tara,	Dollhouse,	and	Fight	Club	in	order	to	
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determine	to	what	extent	the	trauma	sufferers	of	these	texts	are	able	to	work	through	their	trauma	
in	order	to	cure	their	disorder,	and	what	this	might	mean	for	the	representation	of	trauma	within	
dissociative	identity	disorder	texts.	
	 Ruff’s	novel	features	two	characters	with	dissociative	identity	disorder:	Andy	Gage,	who	has	
found	a	way	to	manage	his	condition	by	creating	a	house	in	his	head	in	which	all	of	his	personalities	
can	co-exist	and	interact,	and	Penny	Driver,	who	does	not	realise	she	has	multiple	personalities	and	
struggles	to	come	to	terms	with	her	condition	during	the	course	of	the	novel.	The	‘Andrew’	who	
narrates	much	of	the	novel	is	not	the	original	Andy	Gage	personality;	he	was	created	by	Aaron,	the	
previous	dominant	personality,	in	order	to	run	the	body	and	become	the	‘Andy	Gage’	who	interacts	
with	the	outside	world.22	Ruff’s	treatment	of	DID	uses	metaphorical	language	in	order	to	describe	the	
characters	and	the	formulation	of	alter	personalities,	and	this	language	is	highly	significant	in	terms	of	
trauma	metaphors.	Ruff	states	that	the	traumatic	event	‘kills’	the	original	‘soul’	(personality),	and	
when	the	soul	‘dies’	it	breaks	into	pieces	that	become	separate	‘souls’	(new	personalities)	in	their	
own	right.	It	is	suggested	that	new	instances	of	trauma	and/or	abuse	create	new	personalities.	For	
example,	there	are	several	traumatised	child	personalities	in	Gage’s	head	that	Andrew	refers	to	as	
“witnesses...	fragmentary	souls	created	by	a	single	traumatic	event	or	act	of	abuse”	(Ruff:	99).	These	
Witnesses	aren’t	fully	fledged	personalities	in	the	sense	that	Andrew	or	the	other	‘dominant’	
personalities	are,	but	the	novel	is	quite	clear	that	traumatic	events	create	new	personalities	and	
further	fragment	the	soul.	This	makes	sense	in	terms	of	the	trauma	metaphor	that	I	discussed	earlier;	
traumatic	events	shatter	the	self	so	each	act	of	abuse	creates	a	new	soul	fragment.	Andrew	explains	
that	of	the	seven	souls	who	were	created	when	the	original	Andy	Gage	was	‘murdered’,	“five	were	
later	murdered	themselves”	and	that	by	the	time	Gage	got	free	of	his	stepfather	and	his	abuse	“there	
were	over	a	hundred	souls	in	Andy	Gage’s	head”	(2).	The	use	of	this	terminology	is	an	example	of	a	
																																								 																				
22	I	use	Andrew	to	refer	specifically	to	the	Andrew	personality,	while	Andy	Gage	refers	more	generally	to	the	
character	as	a	collective,	multiple,	personality.		
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novel	overtly	acknowledging	and	engaging	with	trauma	theory.	That	this	explanation	of	the	effect	of	
trauma	is	given	right	at	the	very	start	of	the	novel	is	even	more	significant	as	it	means	that	one	
cannot	help	but	read	everything	that	comes	afterwards	within	this	framework.	
	 Having	so	clearly	referenced	this	metaphor,	an	astute	reader	might	expect	the	novel	to	then	
set	about	allowing	Andrew	to	‘work	through’	his	trauma	in	order	to	cure	it,	but	this	does	not	happen.	
While	Andrew	does	set	out	to	learn	the	traumatic	cause	of	his	dissociative	identity	disorder,	this	
search	does	not	allow	him	to	reintegrate	his	personalities	or	rid	himself	of	his	DID.	Instead,	the	novel	
offers	us	something	much	more	radical.	At	the	end	of	the	novel,	Andrew	discovers	that	the	trauma	
Andy	Gage	experienced	as	a	child	was	repeated	sexual	abuse	at	the	hands	of	his	stepfather.	But	the	
sexual	abuse	alone	did	not	cause	Gage	to	become	multiple;	instead,	it	was	the	moment	when	his	
mother	discovered	the	abuse	and	chose	to	ignore	it,	effectively	choosing	her	husband	over	her	child.	
Andrew	does	not	know	this	until	he	goes	back	to	Gage’s	childhood	home	and	discovers	clues	that	lead	
him	to	the	truth.	After	these	revelations,	it	quickly	becomes	clear	that	Andrew’s	search	did	not	arise	
out	of	a	need	to	cure	himself	of	his	multiple	personalities.	Instead,	he	simply	wanted	to	know	the	
truth	about	the	original	Andy	Gage,	and	discover	the	past	that	Aaron	had	kept	hidden	from	him.	
Indeed,	Andrew	is	happy	to	continue	to	manage	his	condition	by	means	of	the	‘house’	he	has	built	in	
his	head,	with	himself	as	the	dominant	personality	and	the	others	helping	when	needed.	Rather	than	
attempting	to	cure	himself,	Andrew	needs	to	learn	the	truth	in	order	to	manage	one	disruptive	
personality	who	attempts	to	seize	control	of	the	body.	Positioned	in	this	way,	Andrew’s	search	is	not	
for	an	original	trauma	or	a	cure	but	a	quest	for	independence.	As	a	result	of	this,	the	novel	could	be	
said	to	be	a	coming-of-age	narrative	for	Andrew,	a	relatively	‘new’	personality	who	needs	to	mature	
in	order	to	control	the	day-to-day	affairs	of	Andy	Gage’s	life.	At	the	start	of	the	novel,	Andrew	is	
innocent,	naive,	and	doesn’t	know	the	complete	history	of	what	has	happened	to	his	body	and	
personalities.	His	‘father’,	Aaron,	continues	to	manage	the	internal	workings	of	the	house	he	has	
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created	and	the	personalities	that	live	within	it,	and	Andrew	defers	to	him	and	his	experience.	By	the	
end	of	the	novel,	Andrew	has	discovered	all	that	happened	to	the	original	Gage,	absorbed	most	of	the	
Witnesses	and	their	memories	of	abuse,	runs	the	internal	workings	of	the	house,	and	manages	the	
personalities	himself.	He	has	to	some	extent,	therefore,	worked	through	his	trauma.	His	absorption	of	
the	Witnesses	is	the	biggest	piece	of	evidence	for	this.	Despite	this,	at	the	end	of	the	novel	Andrew	is	
still	managing	his	dissociative	identity	disorder	in	the	same	way	his	father	did,	and	seemingly	has	no	
interest	in	‘curing’	himself	completely.	Here	then,	although	trauma	causes	Andy	Gage	to	split	into	
multiple	personalities,	working	through	the	trauma	does	not	lead	to	a	cure	for	DID.	This	is	significant	
because	critical	work	about	DID	and	trauma	implies	that	this	should	be	the	case;	working	through	the	
traumatic	experience	that	caused	an	individual	to	split	should	enable	them	to	put	themselves	back	
together	again.	However,	by	returning	to	the	early	metaphorical	language	that	Ruff	uses	to	describe	
the	moments	when	Andy	Gage	became	multiple	we	can	begin	to	understand	why	this	is	not	the	case	
in	the	novel.	The	original	Andy	Gage	personality	was	‘killed’	by	the	abuse,	and	no	longer	exists.	
Further,	the	alters	that	exist	are	not	all	fragments	of	this	original	soul;	some	were	formed	from	
fragments	of	other	souls	which	were	later	killed.	Ruff	is	deliberate	in	his	use	of	language.	Death	is	
irreversible,	and	there	is	therefore	no	way	to	put	the	pieces	back	together	in	order	to	resurrect	the	
original	soul.	It	is	perhaps	for	this	reason	that	Andrew	is	so	sceptical	of	much	of	the	treatment	
available	to	people	with	DID,	backed	up	by	Aaron’s	awful	experiences	with	various	forms	of	
treatment.	Andrew	understands	how	the	alters	were	formed,	and	does	not	therefore	seem	to	believe	
that	dissociative	identity	disorder	can	or	should	be	cured.	This	is	made	particularly	clear	at	the	end	of	
the	novel	when	Andrew	describes	the	fights	he	and	Penny	have	over	her	choice	to	attempt	
reintegration	therapy:	“Crazy,	I	was	going	to	say;	like	opting	for	a	lobotomy.	I	tried	for	a	more	tactful	
phrasing:	‘Reintegration	doesn’t	work,	Penny.	It	doesn’t	work,	and	if	it	did,	it’d	be	like	dying.	You	
wouldn’t	be	you	anymore’”	(Ruff:	469).		It	is	interesting	that	Andrew	refers	to	reintegration	as	‘like	
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dying’,	given	the	novel’s	employment	of	this	language	to	discuss	the	death	of	the	original	personality	
and	alter	creation.	Andrew	is	seemingly	projecting	his	own	anxieties	and	experiences	of	treatment	on	
to	Penny,	but	he	is	also	proved	right	in	his	assertion	that	reintegration	doesn’t	work	when	one	of	her	
alter	personalities	attaches	a	postscript	on	to	the	end	of	an	email,	thus	suggesting	that	her	other	
personalities	aren’t	fully	integrated	(Ruff:	478).	If	one	of	Penny’s	alters	is	able	to	exist	outside	of	the	
reintegrated	self,	then	Andrew’s	fears	about	Penny’s	personalities	‘dying’	in	order	to	become	
something	new	and	singular	are	unfounded.	Andrew’s	use	of	this	language	here	then	is	perhaps	
nothing	more	than	an	overly	emotional	appeal	to	stop	Penny	from	going	through	with	her	plan	to	
reintegrate	by	using	the	language	of	their	shared	(dissociative)	experience.		
	 From	this	brief	overview	of	the	novel’s	approach	to	trauma,	it	is	clear	the	novel	is	resisting	
what	we	might	think	of	as	a	typical	trauma/DID	narrative,	by	which	I	mean	the	idea	that	working	
through	the	trauma	is	enough	to	cure	the	DID.	However,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	novel’s	coming-
of-age	or	bildungsroman	narrative	could	be	said	to	work	in	similar	ways.	For	example,	typical	coming-
of-age	narratives	often	centre	on	a	character’s	search	for	independence	and	their	place	within	
society.	Here,	it	is	Andrew’s	relative	lack	of	experience	in	the	real	world	(because	he	is	a	new	
personality)	that	is	the	main	obstacle	to	his	ability	to	run	the	house	in	Andy	Gage’s	head;	his	naivety	
allows	other	personalities	to	take	advantage	of	him	and	talk	him	into	letting	them	take	control	of	the	
body	for	their	own	ends,	for	example.	Coming-of-age	narratives	often	feature	‘outsider’	characters	
that	have	several	obstacles	to	overcome	before	they	reach	maturity	and	become	accepted	members	
of	society.	Chapter	2	discussed	this	idea	in	relation	to	autism	texts,	and	Ruff’s	novel	works	in	a	similar	
way	except	that	Andy	Gage’s	disorder	is	not	the	main	obstacle	he	has	to	overcome.	This	is	the	crucial	
point.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	autistic	bildungsroman	narrative	is	similar	to	the	ways	that	trauma	
sufferers	must	search	for	and	overcome	the	original	event	which	traumatised	them—only	here	the	
‘cure’	is	reaching	maturity	and	finding	social	acceptance—because,	in	both	cases,	trauma	and	its	
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associated	illnesses	(DID,	PTSD),	and	the	‘outsider’	status	of	the	main	(autistic)	character	at	the	start	
of	the	bildungsroman,	are	negative	conditions	that	must	be	overcome.	However,	this	is	not	the	case	
for	Andrew	in	Set	This	House	In	Order.	While	Andrew	clearly	fits	into	society	much	better	than	the	
other	dissociative	character	in	the	novel,	he	continues	to	resist	the	pressure	to	fit	into	society	by	
ridding	himself	of	his	other	personalities	and	becoming	a	singular	person.	Instead,	Andrew	represents	
a	‘new’	way	of	managing	his	condition	(more	in	line,	perhaps,	with	Haddock’s	treatment	of	DID	as	
discussed	in	Chapter	1)	and	represents	a	third	option	not	usually	offered	by	typical	trauma	or	
trauma/DID	narratives.	By	‘typical	narrative’,	I	mean	the	tendency	of	literature,	and	literature	which	
deals	with	syndromes	and	disorders	in	particular,	to	cure	its	characters	and	make	them	‘better’	by	the	
end	of	the	text.	This	not	only	means	simply	curing	them	of	their	disease	but	also	allowing	them	to	fit	
into	society	in	a	normative	way,	particularly	if	the	condition	is	being	used	as	a	metaphor	for	social	
difference,	as	often	happens	with	texts	featuring	autistic	characters.	In	these	texts,	the	character	is	
‘cured’	when	they	are	able	to	overcome	the	differences	that	stem	from	their	condition	and	better	fit	
into	society.	In	DID	texts,	the	normative	model	of	curing	is	one	in	which	DID	sufferers	work	through	
and	come	to	terms	with	their	trauma	and	reintegrate	their	personalities	into	one	unified	whole.	Set	
This	House	In	Order	is	quite	radical	in	terms	of	the	narratives	usually	offered	to	characters	with	
psychological	syndromes	or	disorders	because	it	breaks	from	this	pattern	by	suggesting	that	working	
through	trauma	is	not	going	to	cure	Andrew	of	his	disorder,	and	goes	further	in	implying	that	this	is	
not	a	problem	for	Andrew.	His	behaviour	is	not	disordered	in	the	way	we	expect	someone	suffering	
from	DID	to	be,	and	therefore	his	condition	does	not	need	to	be	cured.	However,	while	Andrew	is	
afforded	some	freedom,	Ruff	falls	back	on	more	familiar	narratives	for	the	other	dissociative	
character,	Penny	Driver.		
	 In	stark	contrast	to	Andrew,	Penny	does	not	know	she	has	multiple	personalities,	though	she	
frequently	‘loses’	time	and	finds	evidence	of	herself	doing	things	that	she	cannot	remember.	Penny	
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knows	that	she	was	subjected	to	years	of	physical	and	emotional	abuse	by	her	mother,	but,	like	
Andrew,	she	discovers	one	particular	instance	of	sexual	abuse,	which	she	had	completely	repressed,	
as	the	moment	when	she	became	dissociative.	Also	like	Andrew,	she	and	her	personalities	use	the	
same	language	to	describe	this	event	as	the	moment	when	the	original	Penny	Driver	was	‘killed’.	In	
contrast	to	Gage,	Driver’s	dominant	personality	still	thinks	of	herself	as	‘Penny	Driver’,	though	her	
other	personalities	refer	to	her	as	‘Mouse’,	a	nickname	given	to	her	by	her	abusive	mother.	While	
Andrew	is	interested	in	managing	his	condition,	Penny	would	rather	cure	hers	completely,	and	by	the	
end	of	the	novel	she	has	‘reintegrated’	her	personalities	with	the	help	of	a	therapist,	though	there	is	
some	doubt	as	to	how	successful	she	has	actually	been,	as	discussed	above.	
	 In	contrast	to	Andrew’s	storyline,	Penny’s	narrative	follows	a	more	traditional	trajectory.	She	
enters	into	therapy,	presumably	to	work	through	the	trauma	she	has	experienced,	and	then	goes	to	a	
specialist	facility	in	order	to	reintegrate	her	personalities	and	‘cure’	her	condition.	And	yet	even	
within	this	normative	narrative	there	are	moments	that	suggest	that	Penny’s	treatment	is	not	that	
simple.	Ruff	hedges	his	bets	somewhat	by	never	explicitly	stating	how	successful	Penny’s	
reintegration	is.	Andrew	remains	vehemently	opposed	to	it,	though	he	does	grudgingly	come	to	
accept	that	it	might	be	an	appropriate	treatment	for	Penny,	if	not	for	himself.	Further,	he	seems	to	
suggest	that	Penny’s	personalities	might	not	be	quite	as	integrated	as	she	thinks:	“There	were	times,	
most	often	in	moments	of	stress	or	great	emotion,	but	occasionally	in	calmer	moments	too,	when	a	
single	soul	seemed	to	predominate”	(473).	The	novel	sows	these	seeds	of	doubt	and	avoids	giving	
Penny	a	clear	cut	‘happy	ending’,	but	I	think	she	can	be	said	to	represent	a	more	normative	narrative	
in	which	her	disorder	must	be	cured,	her	trauma	worked	though,	and	that	Andrew	represents	
something	new.	Ultimately	Ruff’s	novel	offers	multiple	ways	to	be	multiple,	as	it	were.	Being	multiple	
seems	to	simply	be	another	way	of	being,	rather	than	a	negative	condition	that	needs	to	be	cured	
through	therapy	to	overcome	trauma.	In	some	ways,	it	is	not	treated	as	a	disorder	at	all,	at	least	not	
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in	a	narrative	sense.	It	is	not	a	problem,	within	the	novel’s	fictional	universe	and	the	logic	it	presents	
to	us,	for	Andrew	to	remain	multiple.	He	has	not	failed	in	some	way	by	rejecting	a	normative	ending	
to	his	own	story.	Indeed,	Andrew	is	uniquely	placed	to	occupy	this	position:	as	a	newly	created	
personality	he	does	not	fully	understand	social	norms	or	feel	the	same	pressure	to	conform	to	them.	
A	small	incident	at	the	beginning	of	the	novel	highlights	this:	when	getting	dressed	in	the	morning,	
Andrew	has	to	seek	Aaron’s	approval	of	the	clothes	he	wants	to	wear,	with	Andrew	complaining,	“I	
hate	having	to	give	things	up	just	because	of	what	other	people	might	think”	(11).	Set	This	House	In	
Order	does	not	explore	social	normativity	in	quite	the	same	way	that	some	other	texts	dealing	with	
disorders	and	syndromes	do	(see	Chapter	2),	but	we	do	see	reflections	of	the	other	texts’	non-
normativity	in	Andrew’s	resistance	to	social	and	narrative	norms.	The	novel	does	not	suggest,	for	
example,	that	society	is	in	some	way	the	cause	of	Andrew	or	Penny’s	DID,	as	happens	in	other	texts	
such	as	United	States	of	Tara.	Instead,	it	allows	its	characters	to	play	with	notions	of	non-normative	
behaviour	without	consequence,	and	does	not	feel	the	need	to	‘cure’	or	normalise	them	by	the	
conclusion	of	the	narrative.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	radical	aspect	of	Ruff’s	novel,	and	certainly	one	
of	the	most	interesting	in	terms	of	metaphorical	representations	of	both	trauma	and	dissociative	
identity	disorder.	It	is	an	idea	that	I	will	return	to	throughout	the	remainder	of	this	thesis.	
Ruff’s	novel	represents	a	more	radical	interpretation	of	the	disease,	both	in	terms	of	the	
language	used	to	describe	it,	and	Andrew’s	non-normativity	in	what	is	a	departure	from	the	more	
normative	narratives	that	predominate	in	other	syndrome	and	disorder	texts.	It	is	not	the	only	
dissociative	identity	disorder	text	to	do	so.	United	States	of	Tara	is	another	text	that	seemingly	
conforms	to	trauma/DID	narrative	expectations	while	subtly	offering	evidence	of	a	more	radical	
interpretation	of	the	condition.	On	the	surface,	the	show	appears	to	be	a	typical	example	of	a	DID	
narrative:	in	the	first	season,	Tara	decides	to	stop	taking	the	medication	which	keeps	her	alters	
suppressed	(and	had	been	keeping	her	numb	and	desensitised	to	everyday	life)	in	order	to	discover	
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what	caused	her	dissociation.	For	all	of	her	life,	Tara	has	believed	she	was	raped	while	she	was	at	
boarding	school,	though	she	has	no	memory	of	this	event	happening,	and	so	she	searches	for	her	old	
classmates	and	tries	to	discover	the	truth.	At	the	end	of	the	first	season	it	is	revealed	that	Tara	has	no	
memory	of	the	sexual	encounter	because	she	was	not	in	control	of	her	body	at	the	time;	it	was	
actually	one	of	her	alters,	T,	who	had	the	(consensual)	sexual	experience.	This	shatters	Tara’s	beliefs	
about	what	caused	her	condition	and	she	is	left	to	wonder	what	the	real	cause	of	her	disease	was	or	
even	if	there	was	no	cause	at	all.	This	subversion	of	the	expected	ending	could	easily	be	credited	to	a	
quirk	of	television	form;	Tara	finding	out	what	had	caused	her	disease	would	have	left	the	show	with	
little	narrative	ground	to	cover	in	a	second	season	and	beyond.	While	this	seemingly	explains	the	
show’s	avoidance	of	narrative	norms,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	first	season	finale	was	written	
without	the	knowledge	of	whether	the	show	would	be	renewed	for	a	second	season.	This	means	that	
when	the	finale	was	written	it	was	designed	to	act	as	both	a	season	finale—which	it	would	become—
and	a	series	finale	in	the	event	of	a	cancellation.	Due	to	this,	if	Showtime	had	not	opted	to	pick	Tara	
up	for	a	second	season,	this	ending	would	have	been	even	more	subversive	as	there	would	have	been	
no	hope	of	finding	out	what	really	caused	Tara	to	become	dissociative	in	the	first	place.	The	tone	of	
the	show	would	have	changed	completely	if	this	had	happened,	and	the	viewer	would	have	been	left	
to	think	there	was	no	cause	of	Tara’s	condition.	Of	course,	the	show	was	picked	up	for	a	second,	and	
later	a	third,	season,	but	the	writers’	willingness	to	embrace	what	would	have	been	an	
unconventional	ending	suggest	that	the	text	is	committed	to	resisting	normativity	and	approaching	
the	representation	of	the	disorder	from	a	new	angle.	
It	is	not	only	the	ending	of	the	first	season	that	is	somewhat	radical;	there	are	moments	
throughout	the	first	season	that	suggest	the	show’s	creators	are	attempting	to	subvert	the	normative	
narrative	of	syndrome/disorder	texts.	For	example,	in	the	third	episode	Tara	does	some	interior	
design	work	for	her	sister’s	boss,	Tiffany.	Tiffany	is	fascinated	by	Tara’s	condition	and	asks	her	lots	of	
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questions.	Eventually,	after	Tara	becomes	defensive,	Tiffany	explains:	“I	kind	of	feel	like	everyone	has	
[DID]	a	little	bit.	Over	the	course	of	a	day	how	many	different	women	do	we	have	to	be?	You	know,	
work-Tiffany,	sexy-Tiffany,	dog-owner-Tiffany...	and	it’s	hard,	right?”	It’s	clear	Tara	finds	this	a	little	
offensive—it’s	a	very	real	condition	to	her	with	a	lot	of	negative	associations—but	the	suggestion	that	
everyone	has	roles	to	play	is	one	that	continually	recurs	in	the	first	season.	Indeed,	Tara	herself	is	
accused	of	simply	‘playacting’	by	her	sister	Charmaine	on	more	than	one	occasion,	and	she	does	not	
seem	to	believe	that	Tara	has	a	real	disorder.	Instead,	Charmaine	thinks	Tara	hides	behind	different	
‘characters’	when	things	get	hard,	and	that	she	picks	whichever	‘character’	would	be	best	equipped	
to	handle	the	particular	situation	she	is	faced	with.	(Sometimes	the	alters’	appearances	do	appear	to	
be	context-sensitive	so	Charmaine’s	idea	does	seem	to	have	some	basis	in	fact.	One	of	Tara’s	alters,	
Alice,	indicates	that	this	is	the	case	when	she	is	in	control	of	Tara’s	body	in	an	early	season	one	
episode:	“Tara	is	not	equipped	to	handle	this	family	at	the	moment	and	we’ve	all	come	to	a	
consensus	and	I	think	you	need	me	right	now.”)	Charmaine’s	belief	that	Tara	is	simply	taking	on	
different	roles	fits	in	with	the	behaviour	of	several	of	the	other	characters,	who	often	pretend	to	be	
people	that	they	are	not	for	their	own	ends.	For	example,	Tara’s	gay	son	Marshall	pretends	to	be	
religious	and	attends	a	homophobic	church	group	in	order	to	get	closer	to	the	boy	he	likes,	while	his	
sister	Kate	advises	him	that	in	relationships	you	“don’t	ever	be	yourself,	it’s	the	kiss	of	death.”	
Charmaine	herself	seems	eager	to	distance	her	identity	from	that	of	her	family	and	is	overly	
concerned	with	the	image	she	presents	to	the	outside	world.	This	becomes	obvious	in	the	episode	in	
which	she	has	breast	augmentation	surgery;	a	surgery	she	is	having	in	order	to	live	up	to	some	
idealised	feminine	beauty	standard	and	‘normalise’	her	body.			
Indeed,	in	the	first	season	it	often	feels	like	each	character	has	an	alter	personality,	as	they	
try	to	assume	identities	they	do	not	possess.	This	introduces	a	problem	to	the	viewer:	each	character	
seems	to	exhibit	dissociative	behaviour,	but	it	is	only	Tara	who	is	said	to	have	a	disease.	The	only	
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difference	seems	to	be	that	Tara	cannot	control	her	dissociation	or	when	her	alters	appear,	whereas	
the	other	characters	all	assume	different	identities	in	order	to	further	their	own	agendas.	This	creates	
a	relationship	between	the	two	conditions	and	suggests	that	there	is	not	much	difference	between	
them.	Indeed,	if	the	other	characters	are	supposed	to	represent	‘normal’	non-dissociative	members	
of	society,	then	it	quickly	becomes	apparent	that	‘normal’	society	is	not	that	different	from	Tara.	
Whether	or	not	a	character	has	dissociative	identity	disorder	seems	merely	to	be	a	matter	of	degrees	
rather	than	a	simple	yes	or	no;	everyone	in	Tara	is	multiple,	the	show	suggests,	whether	they	have	
‘true’	multiple	personalities	or	not.	This	issue	is	further	problematised	by	Tara’s	search	for	the	‘cure’	
for	her	condition,	as	the	rest	of	her	society	seems	to	be	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	it	too	is	dissociative	
and	should	be	seeking	a	‘cure’.	They	do	not,	and	yet	they	demand	that	Tara	seeks	treatment	for	her	
condition	again	and	again.	Indeed,	there	is	a	further	problem	here.	In	seeking	a	cure,	Tara	should	be	
searching	for	a	way	to	work	through	the	trauma	of	the	rape	she	believed	caused	her	condition	in	
order	to	become	‘normal’	like	the	rest	of	her	family,	but	this	reading	of	the	text	suggests	that	Tara	
cannot	go	back	to	being	a	‘normal’	member	of	society	if	she	rids	herself	of	her	multiple	personalities.	
How	would	Tara	adopt	the	different	personas	required	in	day-to-day	life	if	she	has	her	alters	taken	
away	from	her?	In	the	common	way	that	texts	use	syndromes	and	disorders	as	metaphors	for	social	
inclusion,	these	conditions	are	‘cured’	when	characters	are	able	to	fit	in	with	normative	society	like	
everybody	else:	the	autistic	character	learns	better	to	relate	to	other	people	for	example.	But	in	this	
case,	Tara	would	be	unable	to	fit	in	if	she	were	cured	because	the	rest	of	society	is	still	‘dissociative’.	
Indeed,	if	Tara	were	to	find	a	cure	for	her	condition	(working	through	her	trauma,	or	something	else	
entirely),	the	other	characters	would	still	suffer	from	some	form	of	‘dissociation’.	Until	society	can	be	
‘cured’,	any	‘cure’	that	Tara	found	would	not	address	the	cause	of	her	illness.	This	leaves	the	series	in	
a	curious	position:	far	from	fulfilling	a	narrative	in	which	a	cure	is	expected,	the	viewer	is	left	with	the	
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feeling	that	a	cure	is	not	possible.	It	is	a	position	which	seems	to	be	reinforced	elsewhere	in	the	
series.	
	 Tara’s	narrative	arc	in	the	first	season	ends	on	a	subversive	note	that	fits	well	with	the	idea	
that	everyone	has	‘a	little	bit	of	DID’,	with	Tara	positioned	as	the	most	‘normal’	character	despite	her	
condition.	Season	Two	at	first	seems	to	undo	some	of	this	subversion	by	having	Tara	resume	her	hunt	
for	a	cure.	The	second	season	ends	with	her	discovering	the	original	trauma	that	caused	her	to	
become	dissociative:	she	was	sexually	abused	as	a	child	by	her	older	half-brother.	Despite	the	fact	
that	Tara’s	narrative	follows	a	more	well-worn	path	this	season,	the	other	characters	seem	to	be	even	
more	intent	on	acting	like	other	people,	reinforcing	the	idea	that	all	of	society	is	dissociative	
established	in	season	one.	Marshall	meets	a	boy	at	school	named	Lionel	who	is	out,	proud,	and	makes	
no	apologies	for	his	queerness.	Lionel’s	easy	acceptance	of	his	sexuality	scares	Marshall	back	into	the	
closet	and	he	spends	much	of	the	season	trying	to	have	a	relationship	with	a	girl,	ultimately	having	
sex	with	her	before	he	finally	accepts	that	he	is	gay.	Kate	meets	a	comic	book	artist	and	spends	much	
of	the	season	dressing	up	as	one	of	her	characters,	Princess	Valhalla	Hawkwind,	and	hiding	behind	
her	new	persona.	Prior	to	this,	she	gains	her	GED—an	early	high	school	graduation	certificate—and	
gets	a	job	at	a	collection	agency,	where	she	dresses	the	way	she	thinks	an	adult	would	and	in	many	
ways	appears	to	‘play’	at	working.	Charmaine	finally	has	everything	she	wants—what	appears	to	be	a	
perfect	relationship	with	the	perfect	man—but	finds	herself	in	love	with	Max’s	more	ordinary	best	
friend,	Neil,	and	tries	to	hide	her	feelings	from	everyone.	As	we	can	see	from	this	brief	summary,	the	
other	characters	act	less	like	themselves	(Marshall,	Kate)	and	more	like	the	people	society	expects	
them	to	be	(Marshall,	Charmaine)	as	Tara	gets	closer	to	her	‘cure’.	The	show	is	once	again	underlining	
the	fact	that	while	Tara	searching	for	a	cure	seems	quite	normative,	the	rest	of	society	is	not	as	
‘normal’	as	we	believe;	a	cured	Tara	would	not	be	able	to	find	a	place	within	it.		
	 The	show	stops	short	of	suggesting	that	Tara	can	find	a	way	to	manage	her	condition	as	
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Andrew	does	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	but	the	show	is,	in	many	ways,	equally	sceptical	of	traditional	
treatment	methods.	The	show	is	quite	clear	about	the	fact	that	Tara’s	medication	does	not	‘cure’	her	
DID,	it	simply	suppresses	the	alters	and	causes	her	to	become	numb	to	her	life.	In	addition,	there	are	
moments	that	suggest	a	‘cure’	might	not	be	as	final	or	as	successful	as	it	appears	such	as	when	Tara	
meets	a	fellow	DID	sufferer	named	Jenny	who	has	successfully	reintegrated	her	personalities,	or	
believes	she	has,	at	the	second	attempt	because	“last	time	they	were	just	hiding.”	Jenny’s	experience	
with	reintegration,	in	particular,	is	quite	similar	to	Penny’s	experience	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	and	
undermines	the	standard	curing	narrative.	At	the	treatment	centre,	Tara	introduces	Jenny	to	Max	and	
whispers	that	Jenny	is	integrated.	When	Max	asks	why	they’re	whispering,	Jenny	replies,	“You	know	
how	some	people	aren’t	happy	for	you	when	you’ve	lost	a	bunch	of	weight?”	This	suggests	that	
reintegration	is	viewed	with	some	scepticism,	that	it’s	not	the	ultimate	cure	that	some	medical	
professionals	say	it	is.	These	moments,	as	well	as	the	other	characters’	behaviour,	suggest	that	Tara’s	
search	for	a	cure	may	be	a	futile	one.	If	Tara	does	find	a	cure	for	her	condition—indeed,	one	that	may	
not	even	work—she	will	seemingly	be	unable	to	go	back	to	being	a	‘normal’	member	of	society	
because	‘normal’	society	is	dissociative	itself.	This	idea	seems	confirmed	by	the	ending	of	the	third	
and	final	season,	in	which	Tara	is	leaving	to	seek	treatment	with	a	specialist	in	Boston	but	seems	to	
have	accepted	that	her	alters	will	always	be	a	part	of	her	and	that	they	must	all	work	together	to	find	
a	‘cure’.	Of	course,	the	show	was	not	picked	up	for	a	fourth	season,	so	the	audience	never	discovers	if	
this	treatment	works,	but	Tara’s	acceptance	of	her	alters	in	the	final	episode	indicates	that	any	cure	
she	finds	will	include	them.	Tara,	like	Andrew,	is	embracing	a	‘new’	cure	for	her	condition	because	the	
text	does	not	allow	her	any	other	choice.	Her	condition	cannot	be	cured	without	curing	the	rest	of	
society,	and	the	rest	of	the	society	does	not	think	it	has	a	problem	that	needs	curing.	This	is	perhaps	
the	final	message	of	Tara:	she	spends	three	seasons	trying	to	discover	what	happened	to	her	to	make	
her	dissociate	and	pursuing	different	courses	of	treatment	to	rid	herself	of	her	alters,	but	instead	
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finds	a	solution	like	Andrew’s;	a	kind	of	adjustment,	a	non-normative	cure.		
	 So	far	I	have	demonstrated	how	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	United	States	of	Tara	both	work	
to	subvert	a	normative	narrative	concerned	with	curing	the	main	characters’	dissociative	identity	
disorder,	usually	by	working	through	their	trauma.	My	remaining	texts	are	not	as	clearly	concerned	
with	DID	or	trauma	as	Set	This	House	and	Tara,	and	this	enables	them	to	focus	their	narratives	on	
other	things	that	the	condition,	characters’	experiences	of	trauma,	and	their	search	for	a	cure.	This	is	
not	to	say	that	they	do	not	work	in	similar	ways,	or	avoid	‘normalising’	narratives	completely,	but	the	
primary	narrative	drive	in	these	texts	is	not	the	characters’	desire	to	work	through	their	trauma	and	
find	the	cure	for	their	DID.	Despite	this,	it	is	still	possible	to	analyse	these	texts	in	terms	of	the	trauma	
found	within	them	and	how	this	affects	their	representations	of	DID.		
	 Fight	Club	is	a	novel	that	revolves	entirely	around	a	character	with	dissociative	identity	
disorder,	and	yet	the	term	hardly	appears	in	the	narrative.	The	novel	is	perhaps	more	correctly	
categorised	as	a	thriller	in	which	DID	is	a	narrative	twist	rather	than	a	dissociative	identity	disorder	
text,	and	yet	it	works	in	many	of	the	same	ways	as	the	other	texts	discussed	in	this	chapter.	Unlike	Set	
This	House	and	Tara,	there	is	no	specific	traumatic	event	in	Sebastian’s	past	that	leads	to	the	creation	
of	his	‘Tyler	Durden’	alter	personality.	Instead,	the	novel	suggests	that	it	is	the	cumulative	effect	of	
Sebastian’s	place	as	a	consumer	in	a	late	capitalist	society	that	causes	him	to	dissociate.	Immediately,	
then,	this	allows	us	to	link	Fight	Club	to	United	States	of	Tara	because	both	suggest	that	society	
contributes	to,	and	even	encourages,	its	members’	dissociation.	In	Fight	Club,	this	is	made	explicit	by	
Sebastian’s	increasing	frustration	with	his	emasculated	role	as	a	consumer,	which	leads	to	the	
creation	of	Tyler	Durden,	an	‘alpha	male’	personality	that	can	not	only	get	him	out	of	the	endless	
consumer	cycle,	but	change	society	so	that	the	cycle	no	longer	exists.	Without	a	clear	incident	of	
trauma,	the	novel	suggests	that	the	‘traumatic’	cause	of	Sebastian’s	DID	is	the	uncertainty	of	his	
gender	identity	when	put	into	this	role.	Indeed,	the	role	of	a	consumer	is	one	that	has	been	
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traditionally	associated	with	women,	in	large	part	due	to	the	idea	of	the	private	and	public	spheres	
that	men	and	women	belonged	to.	This	idea	stated	that	while	men	were	at	work	in	the	public	sphere,	
women	were	primarily	wives,	mothers	and	consumers	in	the	private	sphere.	Thornstein	Veblen	
developed	this	into	‘conspicuous	consumption’	in	his	book	The	Theory	of	the	Leisure	Class	(1899)	in	
which	he	argued	that	well-off	men	could	afford	to	let	their	wives	endlessly	spend	money	as	it	
increased	their	social	status	and	made	them	appear	more	affluent.	In	Fight	Club,	Sebastian	seems	to	
work	simply	so	that	he	can	buy	things;	his	advances	in	the	workplace	fuel	his	consumption	and	vice	
versa.	We	are	told	how	Sebastian	spends	hours	viewing	the	Ikea	catalogue	and	buying	items	for	his	
home	that	he	does	not	need	in	an	attempt	to	perpetuate	the	idea	that	he	is	well-off	financially	and	
happy	with	his	life,	just	as	Veblen	describes.	Indeed,	the	film	version	of	Fight	Club	makes	this	clear	in	
the	scene	in	which	a	page	from	the	Ikea	catalogue	is	transposed	over	a	shot	of	Sebastian’s	apartment.	
Labels	appear	on	screen	telling	us	what	each	item	of	furniture	is	and	how	much	it	costs	as	Sebastian	
walks	through	the	shot	on	the	phone,	ordering	more	things	for	his	apartment.	This	serves	as	a	clever	
non-diegetic	moment	to	further	confirm	Sebastian’s	place	as	a	consumer	to	the	audience.	
	 Sebastian’s	‘trauma’	is	this	continual	emasculation	by	late	capitalism,	then.	There	is	no	fixed	
traumatic	event,	such	as	Andrew,	Penny	or	Tara’s	abuse,	that	causes	him	to	dissociate.	Sebastian’s	
‘trauma’	is	caused	by	his	failure	to	live	up	to	a	masculine	ideal	and	his	position	in	a	traditionally	
‘feminine’	role,	leading	him	to	dissociate	as	a	coping	mechanism.	We	also	see	this	in	United	States	of	
Tara	with	Tara’s	family	members,	who	are	all,	to	some	extent,	unable	to	live	up	to	the	expectations	
placed	on	them	by	society	and	choose	to	take	on	different	roles	as	a	result.	This	is	particularly	obvious	
with	Marshall	in	the	second	season,	when	he	pretends	to	be	heterosexual	instead	of	embracing	his	
sexuality	like	Lionel,	or	when	Charmaine	continues	her	seemingly	perfect	romantic	relationship	with	
Nick	because	he	represents	everything	society	says	she	should	want,	despite	the	fact	that	she	would	
rather	be	with	Neil.	These	texts	suggest	that	normative	roles	within	society	can	be	a	form	of	‘trauma’	
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for	those	who	are	unable	to	live	up	to	these	expectations	and	fulfil	these	roles.	According	to	the	texts,	
Marshall	and	Charmaine	are	not	‘ill’	in	the	same	way	that	Tara	and	Sebastian	are,	yet	they	attempt	to	
play	different	roles—to	fit	in	with	normative	expectations—in	order	to	try	to	conform	to	what	society	
expects	of	them.	Sebastian’s	dissociation	and	his	Tyler	Durden	personality	are	a	more	extreme	
example	of	this,	brought	about	by	the	trauma	he	experiences	within	the	capitalist	system.		
	 In	both	texts	the	characters’	dissociation	is	attributed	to	the	social	structures	in	which	they	
exist,	and	both	texts	suggest	that	society	is	not	as	‘normal’	as	we	are	led	to	believe.	Fight	Club	further	
compounds	this	problem	by	having	the	system	that	Durden	creates,	Project	Mayhem,	become	even	
more	dissociative	than	the	original	capitalist	society	in	which	Sebastian	was	trapped.	The	men	who	
join	Project	Mayhem	are	chosen	from	Fight	Club,	given	a	uniform,	stripped	of	their	names	and	
belongings,	and	encouraged	to	become	mindless	automata	that	unquestioningly	follow	Durden’s	
rules.	They	each	have	little	tasks	to	fulfil	as	part	of	a	larger	system	and	are	kept	deliberately	in	the	
dark	as	to	the	true	nature	of	their	work.	They	become	cogs	in	the	machine	that	is	Project	Mayhem,	
and	lack	any	sense	of	individuality	and	independence.	In	short,	the	alternative	society	that	Durden	
creates	becomes	even	more	normative	and	demands	even	higher	levels	of	conformity	from	its	
members.	Indeed,	Sebastian	repeatedly	refers	to	members	of	Project	Mayhem	as	‘space	monkeys’	
after	the	animals	who	were	sent	on	early	space	missions,	and	this	name	serves	to	dehumanise	them	
even	further.	Durden	keeps	Project	Mayhem’s	members	separate	and	disconnected,	fulfilling	little	
tasks	that	add	up	to	larger	missions	with	anti-capitalist	objectives.	Having	already	accustomed	these	
men	to	following	rules	in	Fight	Club	through	the	oft	repeated	“the	first	rule	of	fight	club	is...”	mantra,	
Durden	continues	to	use	rules	to	keep	his	new	troops	oppressed:	“The	first	rule	about	fight	club	is	you	
do	not	talk	about	fight	club...	and	the	last	rule	about	Project	Mayhem	is	you	don’t	ask	questions”	
(Palahniuk:	140).	As	a	result,	Durden’s	new	world	order	becomes	even	more	dissociative	than	the	one	
he	is	fighting	against,	with	its	members	losing	their	sense	of	self	completely.	Project	Mayhem	
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members	mindlessly	conform	to	Durden’s	expectations	even	more	so	than	Sebastian	is	expected	to	
conform	to	the	social	norms	of	late	capitalism;	the	new	system	designed	to	free	Sebastian	from	one	
oppressive	social	system	gives	birth	to	another,	even	more	oppressive	than	the	first.		
	 Though	dissociation	is	everywhere	in	Fight	Club,	Palahniuk	is	seemingly	uninterested	in	curing	
Sebastian’s	condition,	and	Sebastian	makes	no	attempt	to	seek	treatment	for	his	disease.	This	makes	
sense	as	Fight	Club	is	not	a	‘straight’	DID	text	in	the	same	way	as	Set	This	House	and	Tara.	While	those	
texts	have	the	disease	at	their	narrative	centres,	it	is	very	much	a	means	to	an	end	in	Fight	Club;	a	
clever	plot	twist	introduced	halfway	through.	We	very	briefly	see	a	form	of	treatment	for	Sebastian’s	
condition	at	the	end	of	the	novel	when	the	reader	is	told	Sebastian	is	recovering	in	a	psychiatric	
hospital,	but	this	is	undercut	at	the	very	end	when	it	is	suggested	that	Fight	Club	and	Project	Mayhem	
are	continuing	without	him,	as	Durden	seemingly	intended	all	along:	“Because	every	once	in	a	while,	
somebody	brings	me	my	lunch	tray	and	my	meds	and	he	has	a	black	eye	or	his	forehead	is	swollen	
with	stitches	and	he	says,	‘We	miss	you	Mr	Durden’”	(208).	It	is	possible	to	read	this	as	the	novel	
expressing	scepticism	towards	treatment	of	DID,	and	much	like	with	the	reading	of	Tara	above,	
Sebastian	cannot	be	cured	because	any	successful	treatment	will	only	ever	send	him	back	to	the	
society	that	caused	him	to	dissociate	in	the	first	place.	This	conclusion	is	reinforced	by	Project	
Mayhem	becoming	a	self-sustaining	system	in	the	same	way	that	late	capitalism	is	at	the	start	of	the	
novel.	The	space	monkeys	are	now	under	pressure	to	conform	to	Durden’s	rules	because	they	are	
trapped	in	this	new	system	and	see	no	alternative.		
This	reading	of	the	ending	of	Fight	Club	is	revisited	and	commented	upon	in	the	sequel	comic	
Fight	Club	2	(Palahniuk	and	Stewart,	2015-16),	which	largely	reads	as	Palahniuk’s	response	to	the	
original	novel’s	popularity	and	long-lasting	cultural	appeal.	At	the	beginning	of	Fight	Club	2,	Sebastian	
has	been	taking	medication	which	he	believes	keeps	Durden	dormant.	Much	like	Tara	in	United	States	
of	Tara,	Sebastian	has	become	increasingly	numb	to	and	detached	from	his	life,	including	his	
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relationships	with	Marla	Singer	(now	his	wife)	and	their	young	son,	Junior.	He	therefore	finds	himself	
in	a	similar	position	to	that	which	he	occupied	at	the	beginning	of	the	original	novel:	struggling	to	
fulfil	the	masculine	roles	of	‘husband’	and	‘father.’	The	focus	on	consumerism	is	seemingly	gone	
(although	we	do	see	several	pictures	of	the	family’s	large,	well-kept	house	which	implies	Sebastian	
and	Marla	are	doing	well	financially),	but	there	are	other	concerns	here	that	link	to	the	original	novel.	
Sebastian’s	ability	to	be	a	husband	and	father	is	called	into	question,	in	the	same	way	that	his	gender	
identity	is	problematised	in	Fight	Club.	We	see	this	as	early	as	the	second	page	of	issue	one,	when	
Sebastian	returns	home	from	work	early	with	flowers	to	celebrate	his	and	Marla’s	anniversary.	The	
babysitter	is	not	expecting	him	home,	and	is	on	the	phone	to	the	police,	telling	them,	“a	crazed	man	
just	burst	through	the	front	door.”	The	next	panel	shows	Sebastian	holding	up	his	hands	in	protest	as	
he	tells	her,	“I’m	not	a	man”	(Fight	Club	2	#1).		In	fact,	it	is	Marla’s	dissatisfaction	with	their	
relationship	and	their	sex	life	specifically	which	leads	her	to	switch	Sebastian’s	medication	for	aspirin,	
in	the	hopes	this	will	force	Durden	to	reappear	and	allow	them	to	resume	their	sexual	relationship,	
which	Marla	considers	better	than	that	which	she	shares	with	her	husband.	It	is	this	decision	which	
prompts	the	events	of	the	sequel.		
Once	again,	Sebastian	is	not	traumatised	in	the	same	way	that	characters	with	DID	are	in	
other	texts;	there	is	no	specific	instance	of	trauma	which	seems	to	have	caused	Durden	to	appear	for	
the	first	time.	The	comic	is	similarly	hesitant	to	reveal	the	moment	that	Tyler	first	appeared	for	
Sebastian	as	the	original	novel	was.	Indeed,	the	closest	thing	we	have	to	a	moment	of	trauma	in	the	
comic	is	the	death	of	Sebastian’s	father,	but	while	Durden	seems	to	make	himself	known	for	the	first	
time	to	Sebastian	here,	it	is	not	this	traumatic	event	which	creates	Durden.	Durden	already	exists,	as	
he	had	previously	acted	to	set	the	fire	which	killed	Sebastian’s	father	(Fight	Club	2	#2.)	This	is	not	a	
typical	representation	of	DID	then,	and	in	fact,	the	comic	implies	that	the	condition	is	somewhat	
hereditary,	as	Durden	has	appeared	to	all	male	members	of	Sebastian’s	family,	starting	with	his	
109	
	
	
	
Great-Great	Grandfather,	and	will	soon	be	moving	on	to	his	son.	Sebastian’s	psychologist	explains	this	
to	him	thus:		
For	a	decade,	I’ve	been	studying	your	case.	To	cure	you.	Your	disorder,	it’s	congenital.	
It	didn’t	manifest	as	full	blown	until	your	parents	were	gone.	Tyler	won’t	die.	He’s	
already	insinuated	himself	into	your	son’s	life.	[…]	He’s	an	archetype.	Tyler	works	like	
a	superstition	or	a	prejudice.	He	becomes	part	of	the	lens	through	which	you	see	the	
world.	[…]	Tyler	survives	across	time	by	infecting	one	generation	after	another	(Fight	
Club	2,	issue	6).			
This	is	the	first	time	in	any	of	these	texts	that	dissociative	identity	disorder	has	been	implied	to	be	
hereditary,	although	given	Palahniuk’s	avoidance	of	the	term	throughout	Fight	Club	(and	even	in	this	
speech,	given	that	the	psychologist	does	not	specify	which	disorder	Sebastian	has)	it	is	possible	that	
Palahniuk	thinks	he	is	not	making	this	connection.	The	comic	goes	on	to	expand	this	idea	so	that	
Durden	has	come	to	stand	for	a	cultural	‘idea’	in	which	contemporary	masculinity	needs	to	be	
challenged	and	a	return	to	a	more	primal,	stereotypical	version	should	be	sought.	This	is	in	large	part	
due	to	the	popularity	of	the	film	adaptation	of	the	novel,	and	the	character	of	Palahniuk	in	the	comic	
makes	several	pejorative	comments	about	the	film,	noting	particularly	that	they	changed	the	ending	
and	that	Fincher	cut	out	Marla	telling	Durden	that	she	would	have	his	abortion	after	they’ve	had	
sex.23	While	Palahniuk’s	seeming	disapproval	of	and	response	to	the	enduring	popularity	of	Durden’s	
philosophy	as	represented	in	the	film	is	fascinating,	it	takes	the	representation	of	the	disorder	in	the	
comic	even	further	away	from	the	reality	of	DID	than	the	original	novel	did.		This	is	not	to	say	that	
some	elements	of	the	comics,	including	those	highlighted	above,	are	not	useful	in	understanding	
further	the	novel’s	position	on	late	capitalism	and	masculinity,	and	the	‘trauma’	Sebastian	
																																								 																				
23	In	the	film,	Marla	says,	“I	haven’t	been	fucked	like	that	since	grade	school.”	Commentary	on	the	DVD	notes	
that	they	changed	the	line	because	abortion	is	always	such	a	controversial	and	divisive	subject	in	America,	and	
they	thought	the	line	might	be	more	than	they	could	get	away	with.		
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experiences.	It	also	worth	noting	that	Durden	once	again	survives	at	the	end	of	the	comic	and	
Sebastian	is	therefore	not	‘cured’	of	his	alter	personality	by	the	conclusion	of	the	narrative.	Whether	
we	will	see	Durden	again	in	a	Fight	Club	3	remains	to	be	seen.	
I	have	mentioned	elsewhere	that	the	term	‘dissociative	identity	disorder’	never	appears	in	
Fight	Club,	thought	Sebastian’s	condition	can	clearly	be	read	as	a	(albeit,	heavily	fictionalised)	version	
of	the	disorder.	My	final	text	is	another	that	can	be	read	as	an	allegorical	representation	of	
dissociative	identity	disorder.	Fox’s	Dollhouse	is	a	science-fiction	show	set	in	the	near	future.	It	is	
about	an	organisation	called	the	Dollhouse	that	possesses	the	technology	to	wipe	away	people’s	
personalities	and	implant	them	with	purpose-built	personalities	to	fulfil	specific	tasks.	These	people—
referred	to	as	Dolls	or	Actives—are	then	hired	out	on	missions	to	people	who	can	afford	to	pay.	While	
this	can	be	read	as	technologically	induced	dissociative	identity	disorder,	the	show	goes	a	little	
further	in	linking	this	technology	to	DID	with	several	of	the	main	Actives	having	instances	of	trauma	in	
their	past	from	which	they	are	trying	to	escape.	Tony	(codenamed	Victor	during	his	time	as	an	Active)	
is	a	soldier	suffering	from	severe	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	from	his	tour	in	Iraq,	and	Priya	
(codenamed	Sierra)	had	been	romantically	pursued	and	abused	by	a	man	she	did	not	want	to	sleep	
with,	and	is	then	raped	once	she	is	in	the	Dollhouse	by	her	handler	(the	member	of	staff	assigned	to	
each	Active	to	keep	them	safe.).		
Priya’s	rape	is	the	most	obvious	example	of	trauma	similar	to	that	of	other	DID	texts,	but	
there	are	also	examples	of	DID	texts	that	feature	men	with	PTSD,	such	as	Pat	Barker’s	Regeneration	
trilogy.	It	should	be	noted,	of	course,	that	there	is	a	gendered	aspect	to	their	trauma,	as	I	discussed	
earlier	in	this	chapter.	In	Dollhouse,	many	of	the	Actives	have	come	to	the	Dollhouse	as	a	way	to	
escape	the	trauma	of	their	past:	the	act	of	signing	oneself	over	to	the	Dollhouse	is	a	way	of	
dissociating	from	the	pain	and	having	to	relive	the	traumatic	experience.	This	does	not	work	for	Tony,	
because	the	technology	is	unable	to	wipe	away	the	traumatic	memories	with	the	rest	of	his	
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personality,	and	it	does	not	work	for	Priya	because	she	is	raped	again	in	the	Dollhouse.	In	both	cases	
the	memories	appear	to	be	embedded	so	deeply	into	the	subconscious	that	even	having	themselves	
technologically	wiped	of	all	personality	does	not	erase	them.	These	flashbacks	come	to	a	head	in	the	
eighth	episode	of	Season	One	(“Needs”)	in	which	the	Actives	are	briefly	implanted	with	their	original	
personalities	and	set	free	in	order	to	resolve	(or	work	through)	their	trauma	because	the	flashbacks	
are	ruining	their	missions	and	rendering	them	unusable.	These	flashbacks	are	similar	to	Freud’s	
observation	that	trauma	sufferers’	lives	are	disrupted	by	the	repetition	of	the	event	that	originally	
traumatised	them,	and	the	episode	in	which	they	seek	closure	can	be	read	as	them	working	through	
their	trauma.	Indeed,	the	stylistic	way	in	which	the	flashbacks	are	shot	and	inserted	into	the	episodes	
make	obvious	the	ways	in	which	trauma	affects	its	sufferers.	In	the	seventh	episode	of	Season	One	
episode	(“Echoes”),	the	Actives	come	into	contact	with	a	drug	which	affects	their	memories,	and	this	
increases	the	number	of	flashbacks	they	are	experiencing.	We	see	extreme	close-ups	of	Priya	and	
Tony’s	faces	as	the	memories	are	triggered,	the	shots	blurring	as	the	episode	quickly	cuts	to	moments	
of	their	trauma:	Priya	being	raped	by	her	handler,	and	Tony	trying	to	help	a	civilian	in	Iraq	before	a	
bomb	goes	off.	The	memories	are	intercut	with	quick	flashes	of	Priya	and	Tony	in	the	present	day,	
and	further	distinguished	by	the	desaturated	camera	filter	overlaid	on	the	memories	which	gives	
them	a	distinct	look	compared	to	the	present	day.	When	some	of	the	same	images	appear	in	Priya’s	
traumatic	flashbacks	in	the	following	episode,	they	are	now	overexposed	and	harshly	lit,	jumping	
more	quickly	between	Priya’s	handler	telling	her	they’re	going	to	“play	a	game”	and	a	shot	of	him	
raping	her	which	focuses	on	Priya’s	face.	The	repetition	of	the	memories	is	further	cut	up	and	
distorted	here,	partly	because	the	audience	should	now	be	familiar	with	the	scenes	having	seen	them	
in	the	previous	episode,	but	also	to	clearly	represent	traumatic	repetition	and	the	reliving	of	
traumatic	experience.	The	jumbled	nature	of	these	images	mimics	the	effect	of	trauma	in	disrupting	
time	in	particular:	the	flashback	scenes	are	not	filmed	in	a	continuous	style,	but	are	cut	up	into	
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smaller	moments,	and	further	intercut	with	the	present	day	shots	of	Priya	and	Tony	experiencing	the	
memories.	The	way	in	which	the	flashbacks	are	filmed	serves	as	a	clear	visual	metaphor	for	the	effect	
of	the	traumatic	memories	on	Priya	and	Tony.		
Unfortunately,	Priya	does	not	truly	work	through	her	trauma	in	this	episode	and	we	see	signs	
of	it	again	in	the	fourth	episode	of	Season	Two	(“Belonging”).	In	this	episode,	the	viewer	discovers	
exactly	what	happened	to	Priya	and	why	she	came	to	be	in	the	Dollhouse,	which	had	only	been	
hinted	at	in	previous	episodes.	Priya	was	a	young	Australian	artist	who	had	come	to	American	illegally	
without	a	visa	and	is	selling	her	art	pieces	from	a	stall	on	a	California	boardwalk.	There	she	catches	
the	attention	of	a	man,	Nolan	Kinnard,	who	desires	her,	and	becomes	violent	after	she	refuses	his	
advances.	Kinnard	is	a	doctor	with	a	specialism	in	‘neuroleptic’	drugs,	and	he	uses	his	power	and	
influence	to	destroy	Priya’s	life,	kidnapping	her	and	injecting	her	with	drugs	which	make	her	exhibit	
the	symptoms	of	schizophrenia.	He	then	arranges	for	the	Dollhouse	to	‘help	her’	by	offering	her	a	
way	out	of	the	mental	health	facility	he	has	locked	her	up	in.	Believing	she	has	no	other	choice,	Priya	
accepts.	Kinnard	then	pays	the	Dollhouse	to	have	her	implanted	with	a	similar	version	of	her	original	
personality,	only	altered	slightly	so	that	she	‘loves	him	back.’	This	can	be	read	as	rape	because	Priya	is	
quite	clear	in	the	episode’s	flashbacks	that	she	does	not	love	him	and	never	will,	despite	what	the	
Dollhouse	technology	later	makes	her	do.	She	is	traumatised	by	these	continued	engagements	with	
Kinnard,	and	signs	of	it	begin	to	appear	at	the	Dollhouse,	even	when	she	is	in	her	blank	Doll	state.	In	
the	episode’s	flashbacks	to	the	time	before	she	was	an	Active,	we	see	several	pieces	of	art	that	Priya	
has	created.	They	all	feature	bright	colours	and	a	recurring	bird	motif,	which	a	number	of	characters	
comment	could	be	viewed	as	a	representation	of	Priya,	the	free-spirited	travelling	artist.	The	bird	
represents	freedom	in	her	flashbacks,	and	she	continues	to	draw	them	in	her	Doll-state	in	the	
Dollhouse,	only	now	her	birds	are	surrounded	by	large	black	shadows,	threatening	to	cover	them	up.	
She	draws	a	number	of	pictures	like	this,	which	Echo	(who	is	starting	to	remember	the	personalities	
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she	is	implanted	with	and	is	becoming	self-aware)	says	represents	the	bad	man	who	“makes	[Priya]	
sad	over	and	over.”	Both	Echo’s	language	here	and	Priya’s	continued	drawing	of	the	birds	and	black	
shadows	reference	the	traumatic	repetition.	The	large	blocks	of	black	next	to	the	birds	on	the	
drawings	are	eventually	replicated	at	the	end	of	the	episode,	where	after	a	fight	Priya	succeeds	in	
killing	Kinnard.	She	stands	up,	and	is	silhouetted	against	a	large	brightly	coloured	canvas	Kinnard	
commissioned	from	her	in	one	of	his	early	attempts	to	seduce	her.	The	canvas	completely	fills	the	
background	of	the	frame;	Priya	stands	up,	rising	into	the	frame	and	taking	up	half	the	frame,	while	
the	largest	image	visible	on	the	canvas	behind	her	is	a	white	bird.	It	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	Priya’s	
darkness,	which	represents	both	the	original	trauma	of	being	imprisoned	in	the	Dollhouse	following	
Kinnard’s	abuses	and	this	new	trauma	of	having	killed	a	man.	Rather	than	the	black	shadow	she	
draws	representing	the	“bad	man	who	makes	Priya	sad”	it	represents	Priya	herself,	and	the	inner	
trauma	she	experiences.	At	the	end	of	the	episode,	Priya	willingly	returns	to	the	Dollhouse	and	asks	
never	to	be	given	the	memory	of	this	day	back	because	she	knows	she	can’t	live	with	it.	She	asks	that	
when	her	time	with	the	Dollhouse	is	up,	they	return	to	her	only	her	memories	from	before	she	met	
with	Kinnard,	so	she	will	never	again	have	to	remember	the	traumatic	events	she	has	been	through.	
This	is	a	clear	refusal	to	work	through	her	trauma.	Instead,	she	would	rather	dissociate	from	it	
completely	by	removing	the	memories.		But	this	dissociation	is	what	leads	to	DID	and	a	disordered	
state	of	being	and	so	too	it	does	not	work	for	Priya.	In	the	tenth	episode	of	the	second	season	(“The	
Attic”)	she	once	against	experiences	traumatic	dreams/memories	relating	to	Kinnard:	in	her	dreams	
she	is	with	Tony	who	turns	into	Kinnard’s	dead	body,	wearing	the	same	clothes	as	when	she	killed	
him,	bleeding	from	the	fatal	wounds	she	gave	him.	The	choice	to	use	Kinnard	from	this	moment	is	
significant	and	demonstrates	that	even	through	Priya	believes	the	memories	have	been	wiped	from	
her	brain,	the	trauma	remains.							
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Clearly,	Priya	and	Tony’s	experiences	in	Dollhouse	can	be	read	as	an	allegorical	representation	
of	dissociative	identity	disorder.	They	have	both	experienced	trauma,	go	to	the	Dollhouse,	where	they	
are	wiped	of	their	original	personality	and	implanted	with	new	ones,	are	given	the	opportunity	to	
gain	closure,	serve	out	their	five	year	contracts	and	then	resume	their	lives	as	good	as	new.	So	far,	so	
typical;	this	is	nothing	that	we	have	not	seen	in	other	DID	novels,	though	the	science	fiction	setting	is	
new.	What	makes	Dollhouse	significant	in	terms	of	DID	is	its	treatment	of	its	main	character,	Caroline,	
who	signs	herself	in	to	the	Dollhouse	in	order	to	escape	prison	time	and	becomes	Echo.	Over	the	
course	of	the	series,	Echo	develops	the	ability	to	remember	and	access	the	different	personalities	she	
is	implanted	with	for	various	missions.	Echo	is	closest	to	having	‘true’	multiple	personalities	then,	and	
she	is	soon	able	to	access	whichever	personality	she	needs	for	certain	situations	in	the	same	way	that	
Andrew	can	in	Set	This	House	In	Order.	In	addition,	Echo	is	able	to	learn	from	her	personalities	and	
develops	from	her	blank	Doll	state	into	a	fully	formed	person	in	a	way	that	the	other	Actives	do	not.	
She	is	eventually	re-implanted	with	her	original	Caroline	personality	and	instead	of	wiping	away	the	
other	personalities,	Caroline	and	Echo	merge	to	form	one	dominant	personality	who	is	still	able	to	
access	the	other	personalities	that	she	has	absorbed	over	the	course	of	the	series.	Echo	does	not	seek	
a	cure	for	this	‘DID’	or	want	to	rid	herself	of	the	multiple	personalities	that	she	now	possesses.	
Indeed,	it	is	this	ability	to	access	the	different	personalities	and	their	skill	sets	that	enables	Echo	to	
fight	the	corrupt	corporation	that	owns	the	Dollhouse	after	the	technology	is	unleashed	and	
threatens	to	destroy	the	world;	her	DID	becomes	a	‘superpower’,	allowing	her	to	save	the	world.	
Significantly,	at	the	end	of	the	series	Echo	chooses	to	keep	all	of	her	personalities	despite	being	
offered	the	chance	to	return	to	her	original,	pre-Active,	Caroline	personality,	effectively	choosing	to	
live	with	her	DID	and	ignoring	the	chance	to	be	cured.	This	leads	to	time	forever	being	disrupted	by	
the	trauma	of	seeing	North	America	be	almost	completely	destroyed	by	the	personality	wiping	
technology	of	the	Dollhouse	as	Echo,	Tony	and	Priya	become	some	of	the	only	people	in	the	world	to	
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remember	what	happened	once	the	world	(and	memories	of	what	happened)	have	been	completely	
reset	for	everybody	else.	
Echo	is	frequently	referred	to	as	‘special’	and	is	the	only	character	able	to	absorb	
personalities	in	this	way.	She	chooses	to	live	with	her	personalities	in	a	similar	way	to	Andrew	in	Set	
This	House,	and	her	storyline	is	much	more	radical	than	Priya	and	Tony’s	more	typical	narrative.	In	
addition,	Echo	can	be	read	as	a	dissociative	character	more	clearly	than	Priya	and	Tony	can,	though	of	
course	Dollhouse	is	still	not	a	true	DID	text.	Echo	does	not	seek	a	cure,	and	she	does	not	try	to	
reintegrate	her	personalities.	Instead,	she	encourages	them	and	knowingly	implants	herself	with	
more	personalities.	This	acceptance	of	her	condition	is	even	more	striking	when	we	consider	that	she	
and	her	friends	have	just	prevented	society	at	large	from	being	taken	over	and	destroyed	by	the	
Dollhouse	technology.	At	the	end	of	the	series,	everyone	else	has	been	returned	to	a	time	before	
they	had	been	implanted	with	different	personalities,	but	Echo	chooses	to	remain	multiple,	at	odds	
with	the	rest	of	society.	On	the	surface,	everyone	else	appears	to	have	been	‘cured’	and	yet	Echo	
cannot,	or	will	not,	‘cure’	herself,	perhaps	because	Echo	and	her	friends	have	merely	removed	the	
symptoms,	but	not	the	cause	of	the	dissociation.	Indeed,	having	fought	for	survival	for	many	years	by	
the	time	of	the	series’	end,	Echo	is	arguably	more	traumatised	than	she	has	ever	been,	even	as	the	
text	seems	to	have	arrived	at	a	happy	ending.	This	is	brought	into	sharp	contrast	by	the	death	of	her	
love	interest	in	the	final	episode	of	the	series:	Echo	is	clearly	grieving	for	him,	and	this	instance	of	
trauma	is	the	last	significant	event	to	happen	to	her	at	the	end	of	the	series.	Perhaps	Echo	cannot	be	
cured	because	she	is	traumatised	by	Paul’s	death	and	has	not	yet	had	time	to	work	through	this	
traumatic	event.	In	many	ways,	this	ending	functions	in	much	the	same	way	as	the	sinister	implication	
at	the	end	of	Fight	Club	that	Durden	could	return	at	any	time.	On	the	surface,	the	problem	has	been	
solved,	but	the	deeper	causes	of	the	condition	remain.		
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Dollhouse	is	quite	radical	in	terms	of	Echo’s	character	development	(and	choice	to	‘keep’	her	
alter	personalities),	then,	but	more	conservative	when	it	comes	to	Priya	and	Tony	in	much	the	same	
way	that	Set	This	House	is	quite	radical	when	it	comes	to	Andrew	and	less	so	when	it	comes	to	Penny.	
These	texts	are	both	keen	to	present	all	the	options;	they	avoid	a	complete	departure	from	narrative	
norms,	but	indicate	that	resistance	is	possible.	Resisting	norms	is	a	common	theme	in	the	DID	texts	I	
have	discussed	in	this	chapter.	These	texts	all	explore	different	treatment	options,	express	concern	
over	available	treatment	methods,	or	display	scepticism	at	the	idea	that	the	disorder	can,	or	should,	
be	treated	at	all.	Tara	and	Set	This	House	are	the	only	texts	to	overtly	reference	reintegration	
therapy—the	treatment	whereby	the	fractured	personalities	are	reunited	into	a	unified	self	after	the	
patient	has	faced	the	traumatic	events	that	caused	them	to	split—though	both	express	scepticism	
that	this	treatment	works.	Given	that	this	should	be	the	natural	cure	to	the	problem	I	identified	early	
in	this	chapter,	that	is,	that	trauma	has	destroyed	and	shattered	the	self	and	that	it	is	only	by	facing	
this	trauma	that	the	individual	can	put	themselves	back	together,	it	is	important	to	note	that	almost	
every	text	resists	this	narrative	or	questions	its	effectiveness	as	a	treatment	method.		
Clearly,	despite	the	prevalence	of	trauma	in	the	DID	texts,	and	the	clear	link	between	
traumatic	events	and	the	cause	of	the	disorder,	authors	are	choosing	to	resist	following	this	
metaphor	through	to	its	logical	conclusion	and	suggest	that	DID	might	be	cured.	In	addition,	many	
texts	suggest	that	society	itself	is	dissociative	and	to	blame	for	characters’	dissociative	identity	
disorder	due	to	the	pressure	society	places	on	people	to	conform	to	the	roles	expected	of	them.	In	
Fight	Club	and	United	States	of	Tara,	being	dissociative	and	multiple	is	not	a	condition,	but	simply	the	
best	way	to	relate	to	the	world	that	insists	on	forcing	people	into	specific	roles.	Having	DID	becomes	
indicative	of	the	‘postmodern	condition’;	people	are	disconnected	and	under	pressure	to	constantly	
conform	to	the	different	normative	roles	Western	society	expects	of	them.	When	people	fail	to	live	
up	to	these	expectations,	they	dissociate	in	order	to	cope.	In	this	way,	the	dissociative	identity	
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disorder	text’s	resistance	to	narratives	of	curing	is	non-normative,	and	reflects	the	character’s	desire	
to	subvert	normative	roles.	This	non-normativity	is	a	clear	theme	within	these	texts,	and	it	is	one	that	
not	only	appears	within	the	texts’	generic	strategies,	but	also	within	the	texts’	representations	of	
hegemonic	systems	more	generally.	We	see	this	in	Andrew’s	resistance	to	everyday	norms,	such	as	
the	clothes	he	wishes	to	wear,	but	we	also	see	it	in	the	pressures	Sebastian	feels	because	of	his	non-
normative	gender	identity	and	feelings	of	emasculation	in	Fight	Club.	It	is	evident	in	the	way	that	the	
supporting	characters	of	Tara	feel	so	strongly	that	they	must	conform	to	heteronormative	values	that	
they	force	themselves	to	take	on	identities	at	odds	with	their	own.	Many	of	these	texts	suggest	that	
the	pressure	on	individuals	to	conform	to	socially-approved	roles	in	some	way	causes	or	contributes	
to	the	cause	of	characters’	dissociative	identity	disorder.	I	would	go	further	with	this	reading,	and	
suggest	it	is	normative	Western	society,	and	the	pressures	to	conform	to	hegemonic	values,	that	
these	texts	position	as	a	contributing	cause	of	DID.		
Instances	of	non-normativity	therefore	become	key	in	DID	texts	and	should	be	examined	in	
more	detail.	With	this	in	mind,	the	next	chapter	examines	narrative	and	genre	theory	to	see	if	the	
texts’	formal	strategies	are	also	non-normative	and	resistant	to	generic	convention.	We	have	already	
seen	how	these	texts	all	reject	what	we	might	think	of	as	‘typical	endings’,	and	particularly	what	we	
expect	from	a	narrative	that	focuses	on	characters	with	an	illness	(i.e.	we	would	usually	expect	that	
character	to	be	cured	by	the	end	of	the	text.)	The	next	chapter	examines	these	endings	in	more	detail	
by	examining	the	way	that	‘illness’	functions	in	these	texts	and	interacts	with	generic	convention.		 	
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Chapter	4		
Disease	Metaphors	and	Resisting	Generic	Convention	
	
The	previous	chapter	discussed	the	links	between	trauma	and	dissociative	identity	disorder	and	the	
ways	in	which	DID	texts	use	trauma	within	their	narratives.	In	the	primary	texts	I	discuss,	there	is	a	
common	theme	to	be	found:	while	some	of	the	texts	allow	their	characters	to	work	through	their	
traumatic	memories—as	theoretical	discussions	of	trauma	suggest	must	happen	in	order	to	rid	
characters	of	the	effects	of	trauma—this	does	not	result	in	a	cure.	Given	that	trauma	is	most	often	
cited	as	the	cause	of	DID	by	those	who	believe	DID	to	be	a	real	disorder	(which	is	to	say,	not	
iatrogenic	or	the	result	of	patients	with	other	disorders	copying	what	they	have	seen	in	the	media)	
and	given	that	the	texts	I	discuss	most	often	suggest	traumatic	incidents	in	the	characters’	pasts	
caused	their	DID,	we	might	expect	that	working	through	trauma	should	result	in	the	characters	being	
cured	of	their	DID.	The	fact	that	this	does	not	happen	in	these	fictional	texts	is	at	odds	with	the	
medical	discourse	surrounding	both	trauma	and	dissociative	identity	disorder,	which	suggests	that	
trauma	needs	to	be	worked	through	and	mastered,	and	that	DID	patients	need	to	come	to	terms	with	
the	(traumatic)	incident	in	their	pasts	which	caused	them	to	split.	I	am	interested	in	the	DID	texts’	
resistance	to	these	medical	models	and	other	ideas	found	within	the	field	of	psychology.	These	
fictional	texts	are	seemingly	uninterested	in	treating	DID	as	a	disorder	or	illness	which	needs	to	be	
cured	within	their	narratives,	and	are	certainly	uninterested	in	centring	the	narratives	on	the	
characters’	experiences	of	being	ill	and	their	struggles	to	regain	their	health.	While	there	are	some	
elements	of	the	narratives	that	could	be	set	to	fit	this	model—Tara	searching	for	her	rapist	in	season	
one	and	undergoing	different	types	of	therapy	throughout	the	series;	Andrew	trying	to	find	out	what	
made	Andy	Gage	split;	Penny	attempting	reintegration	therapy—the	texts	refuse	to	cure	the	
characters	of	their	DID	even	when	characters	find	answers	and	remember	original	traumas.	We	must	
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consider	why	this	is	the	case,	and	what	it	is	about	the	disorder	specifically	that	allows	the	authors	of	
these	texts	to	use	DID	within	their	texts	in	this	same	way.	If	DID	is	used	by	these	texts	as	a	metaphor	
for	something	else—the	disconnectedness	of	contemporary	Western	capitalist	society	and	the	
performative	nature	of	contemporary	identity	within	this	system,	perhaps—then	we	are	in	danger,	as	
Susan	Sontag	discussed	in	her	seminal	work	Illness	as	Metaphor,	of	divorcing	meaning	from	the	
experiences	of	real	patients’	experiences	in	favour	of	potentially	damaging	metaphors.	If	everybody	is	
dissociative,	or	the	disorder	is	not	really	an	illness,	or	the	disorder	is	equated	to	a	positive	experience	
that	allows	characters	to	transgress	social	norms	and	escape	systems	of	oppression,	then	where	does	
that	leave	people	who	suffer	from	this	disorder	in	the	real	world?	This	tension	between	fictional	
texts’	metaphorical	use	of	illness	and	the	real-world	experiences	of	people	with	that	illness	is	a	
difficult	problem	to	unpick,	as	it	is	within	much	cultural	studies	work	on	representations	of	illness	and	
disease.	This	chapter	examines	Sontag’s	work	alongside	other	theoretical	work	on	illness	narratives	to	
determine	how	DID	in	these	texts	interacts	with	and	fits	into	concepts	of	illness,	and	to	begin	to	tease	
out	the	metaphorical	meaning	authors	assign	to	DID.	The	scope	of	the	chapter	then	broadens	to	look	
at	genre	more	widely,	to	determine	if	this	interest	in	breaking	with	conventions	of	texts	featuring	
illness	can	be	linked	to	a	wider	interest	the	texts	have	in	breaking	generic	convention	and	including	
non-normativity	more	widely	within	their	narratives.	
	 To	begin	with,	then,	I	want	to	look	at	theoretical	work	on	illness	narratives,	beginning	with	
Sontag’s	work,	in	which	she	argues	that	“the	most	truthful	way	of	regarding	illness—and	the	
healthiest	way	of	being	ill—is	one	most	purified	of,	most	resistant	to,	metaphoric	thinking”	(Sontag:	
3),	and	moving	on	to	look	at	what	Morris	calls	the	“biocultural”	model	of	illness	(Morris:	57),	in	which	
we	cannot	divorce	the	metaphorical	meanings	of	illness	within	specific	cultures	from	the	medical	
experience	of	being	ill.	With	reference	to	further	theoretical	work	on	illness	by	Arthur	Kleinman,	
Richard	Ohmann,	and	Barbara	Clow,	I	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	DID	texts	align	themselves	with	
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this	biocultural	model	of	illness	through	their	narrative	strategies,	before	moving	on	to	discuss	how	
this	is	replicated	in	their	generic	and	representational	strategies.	
	 Sontag’s	Illness	as	Metaphor	was	written	in	the	wake	of	her	own	diagnosis	with	cancer,	and	
aimed	to	tackle	the	taboo	around	discussing	illnesses	such	as	cancer	in	anything	other	than	
metaphorical	terms.	Desiring	a	frank,	medical	discussion	of	her	illness,	she	argued	that	different	
illnesses	have	been	associated	with	different	metaphorical	meanings	throughout	human	history	and	
that	the	latest	illness	to	be	treated	in	this	way	is	cancer.	This	is,	she	argues,	damaging	to	patients,	
because	other	people	make	assumptions	about	their	experiences	based	on	these	metaphorical	
meanings,	and	the	metaphors	therefore	risk	erasing	the	individual	experiences	of	those	who	suffer	
from	these	diseases.	In	short,	the	metaphors	erase	the	real-life	experience	of	being	ill.	Like	other	
critics	(most	notably	Morris,	whose	work	I	discuss	shortly,	but	also	Deborah	Lupton),	Sontag	offers	
tuberculosis	as	the	classic	example,	describing	the	way	in	which	TB	became	associated	with	bohemian	
artistic	feeling	in	the	nineteenth	century:	“So	well	established	was	the	cliché	which	connected	TB	and	
creativity	that	at	the	end	of	the	century	one	critic	suggested	that	it	was	the	progressive	
disappearance	of	TB	which	accounted	for	the	current	decline	of	literature	and	the	arts”	(Sontag:	37).	
In	Chapter	2	I	discussed	the	way	in	which	similar	links	have	been	made	between	some	of	the	
contemporary	syndromes	and	disorders:	characters	with	Tourette’s	syndrome	are	often	able	to	
express	themselves	through	music	and	hide	great	musical	skills	within	fiction	dealing	with	the	
disorder,	while	autistic	characters	are	often	mathematical	geniuses.	These	sorts	of	stereotypes	can	
lead	to	an	assumption	among	the	general	population	that	all	autistic	people	have	an	affinity	for	
mathematics,	or	that	all	people	with	Tourette	syndrome	are	musically	talented,	which	can	be	
damaging	for	those	in	the	real	world	who	do	not	have	these	skills.	There	is	a	danger	of	real-life	
experiences	being	erased,	and	people	who	do	not	have	these	stereotypical	skills	may	be	regarded	as	
not	‘truly’	having	the	disorder	if	they	do	not	conform	to	these	stereotypes	and	behaviours.	It	is	these	
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behaviours	that	are	read	by	people	who	may	only	be	familiar	with	the	cultural	meanings	or	
representations	of	illness,	and	a	lack	of	these	stereotypical	symptoms	or	behaviours	means	that	the	ill	
person	cannot	be	read	as	suffering	from	that	illness.	We	see	this	erasure	in	other	forms	of	identity	as	
well,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	identities	that	are	largely	performative	or	socially	constructed.	For	
example,	the	narrative	(both	medical	and	cultural)	that	has	built	up	around	transgender	people	being	
‘born	in	the	wrong	body’	seems	to	be	a	useful	shorthand	to	describe	the	experience	of	those	people	
who	wished	to	transition	to	a	gender	different	from	the	one	assigned	them	at	birth.	However,	if	we	
view	gender	as	a	system	of	socially	policed	performative	elements,	this	narrative	actually	reinforces	
the	heteronormative	gender	binary,	and	means	that	the	experiences	of	those	(trans	or	cisgender)	
individuals	who	cannot	or	will	not	conform	to	binary	gender	norms	and	beauty	standards	are	often	
erased	or	discounted	as	being	less	than	those	who	are	able	to.	This	is	not	just	damaging	to	trans	
people,	of	course,	but	also	to	anyone	who	does	not	conform	to	binary	gender	expectations	(either	
through	gender	presentation	or	behaviour),	regardless	of	their	gender	identity.	There	is	therefore	a	
danger	that	these	sorts	of	illness	metaphors	can	become	another	way	of	policing	social	norms	linked	
to	identity.	
	 Sontag	describes	the	metaphors	associated	with	tuberculosis—that	is	came	to	be	associated	
with	a	Romantic	spiritual	feeling,	or	that	it	came	about	from	an	imbalance	within	the	self	and	
repression	of	(sexual)	feeling—and	explains	that	ultimately	these	metaphors	risk	putting	the	“onus	of	
the	disease	on	the	patient	and	not	only	weaken	the	patient’s	ability	to	understand	the	range	of	
plausible	medical	treatment	but	also,	implicitly	direct	the	patient	away	from	such	treatment”	(Sontag:	
48).	She	argues	that	this	is	how	cancer	functions,	and	that	given	the	prevalence	of	cancer	and	how	
many	people	it	affects,	this	risks	becoming	just	as	damaging	as	the	tuberculosis	metaphors.	Sontag	is	
particularly	scathing	of	the	metaphorical	language	used	to	discuss	treatment	for	cancer	sufferers,	
such	as	calling	this	process	a	‘fight’	against	cancer.	This	type	of	language	implies	that	all	a	person	
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needs	to	do	is	fight	hard	enough	and	they	can	win;	for	people	who	cannot	be	cured	of	cancer,	the	
blame	is	seemingly	once	again	with	them.	The	use	of	this	type	of	language,	Sontag	suggests,	implies	
patients	can	“choose	not	to	die	of	the	disease”	(58).	For	someone	who	has	been	diagnosed	with	
terminal	cancer	this	is	a	damaging	message.	Deborah	Lupton	also	discusses	the	idea	that	for	some	
diseases,	patients	are	blamed	for	contracting	the	disorder	(91).	Most	diseases	viewed	in	this	way	can	
be	linked	to	behaviour	which	is	easily	viewed	through	a	moral	lens,	such	as	HIV/AIDS	and	or	other	
diseases	which	can	be	sexually	transmitted,	but	Lupton	also	discusses	how	cancer	can	be	viewed	in	
this	way.	As	scientists	research	and	uncover	more	foods	and	materials	which	can	be	linked	to	cancer	
and	the	causes	of	cancer,	there	is	a	growing	sense	that	cancer	patients	who	did	not	eat	the	right	
foods	or	exercise	regularly,	or	who	smoke	and	drink,	may	in	some	way	be	to	blame	for	their	condition	
(93).		
Sontag’s	work	is	important	for	any	scholar	wishing	to	look	at	disease	and	its	fictional	
representations	because	it	insists	on	reframing	fictional	representations	of	illness	through	a	real-
world	lens.	That	is	to	say,	it	insists	that	literary	theorists	or	film	critics	remember	that	these	illnesses	
are	not	just	something	that	appear	in	fictional	work	and	can	be	divorced	from	the	real	world.	There	is	
a	clear	tension	between	the	metaphors	surrounding	illness	(used	in	fiction	and	more	widely)	and	the	
real-world	experiences	of	those	who	suffer	from	these	diseases.	In	a	media-saturated	contemporary	
Western	society,	it	is	easy	for	fictional	representations	to	become	ingrained	in	popular	consciousness	
and	risk	erasing	how	diseases	actually	function	in	the	real	world.	I	have	already	discussed	some	of	
these	fictional	stereotypes	in	this	thesis:	the	autistic	mathematical	savant,	the	multiple	personality	
with	a	secret	‘evil’	alter,	the	superhuman	disabled	person	with	an	extra	skill	which	‘compensates’	for	
their	disability.	These	stereotypes	frequently	appear	in	fiction,	and	though	some	of	them	appear	
more	damaging	that	others—much	criticism	has	been	written	by	disability	theorists	on	the	so-called	
‘supercrip’	stereotype,	for	example—all	of	them	obscure	the	objective	medical	truth	of	the	illness.	In	
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Sontag’s	reading	of	illness	as	metaphor,	in	which	a	return	to	a	purely	medical	model	of	illness	free	of	
metaphor	is	desired.	For	critics	of	Sontag’s	work,	however,	this	is	not	so	simple.	
For	Arthur	Kleinman	and	David	B.	Morris,	it	is	not	possible	to	divorce	cultural	meanings	of	
illness	(commonly	accepted	metaphors,	and	narratives	surrounding	particular	illnesses)	from	a	purely	
medical	understanding	of	illness.	Morris	argues	that	in	contemporary	Western	postmodern	society,	
“culture	and	disease	[...]	create	a	loop	in	which	one	feeds	off	and	nourishes	the	other”	(Morris:	19).	
For	Morris,	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	separate	an	objective	medical	model	of	illness	from	a	subjective	
cultural	one.	This	is	because	Morris’	understanding	of	illness	is	constructed	through	the	lens	of	
postmodernism,	in	which	everything	is	socially	constructed	and	has	a	cultural	element.	The	sort	of	
meaning	found	through	the	use	of	metaphors	and	narrative	“is	not	just	something	we	can	do	but	
something	we	cannot	help	doing”,	and	so	it	is	no	longer	possible	to	separate	illness	from	the	cultural	
narratives	surrounding	it	(Morris:	254).	Morris	does	not	find	this	problematic,	though	he	does	
reference	Sontag’s	work	to	acknowledge	the	criticism	of	his	views.	In	contrast	to	Sontag,	Morris	
thinks	that	returning	illness	to	science	“simply	leaves	it	in	the	grip	of	a	reductive,	positivist,	
biomedical	narrative	that	focuses	solely	on	bodily	processes”	and	risks	ignoring	the	positive	use	to	
which	metaphor	can	be	put,	and	the	positive	meaning	which	patients	can	find	through	metaphor,	
particularly	in	non-Western	cultures	(Morris:	270).	
In	Morris’	work,	the	biomedical	facts	of	illness	are	a	base	on	which	cultural	understandings	of	
illness	and	illness	experiences	build,	and	the	cultural	meanings	of	illness	contextualise	the	medical	
facts.	Morris	describes	the	way	in	which	different	illnesses	have	been	viewed	in	different	ways	
throughout	history	and	points	to	this	as	evidence	that	his	biocultural	model	of	illness	(a	merging	of	
the	biomedical	and	cultural)	is	how	we	should	view	illness.	He	uses	many	of	the	same	metaphors	and	
historical	examples	as	Sontag	does	in	her	work—for	example,	he	discusses	tuberculosis	in	much	the	
same	way	as	Sontag,	calling	it	”a	theater	of	illness	complete	with	tacit	rules,	recurrent	images,	and	
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complex	social	meanings	that	came	to	dominate	the	imagination	of	an	entire	century”	(Morris:	55)—
but	rather	than	argue	that	all	metaphors	are	damaging	and	should	be	avoided,	Morris	is	instead	
interested	in	the	way	in	which	we	use	narratives	and	metaphors	to	describe	certain	illnesses	in	
different	time	periods.	The	most	prominent	illnesses	and	their	metaphors	in	any	period	reveal	a	lot	
about	that	period	and	what	is	culturally	relevant	at	the	time.	So	for	example,	the	prominence	of	
hysteria	as	something	of	a	catch-all	diagnosis	for	women	with	a	range	of	different	problems,	reveals	a	
lot	about	cultural	attitudes	towards	women	in	the	Victorian	era,	or	the	way	that	eating	disorders	
(largely	among	women)	have	increased	in	number	in	recent	years	can	be	viewed	as	a	by-product	of	
Western	cultural	attitudes	towards	‘health’	and	weight	loss.	The	way	in	which	these	illnesses	come	to	
prominence	reveal	what	Morris	calls	the	environmental	and	cultural	context	in	which	illnesses	
operate,	and	it	is	this	which	creates	a	feedback	loop	with	disease	as	Morris	describes.	The	cultural	
context,	including	metaphors	and	narratives,	is	therefore	not	something	which	can	easily	be	taken	
away	from	the	biomedical	‘truth’	of	illness.	To	use	the	example	above,	while	there	is	no	doubt	
anorexia	is	a	real	disease,	there	is	also	no	doubt	that	its	current	prevalence	in	contemporary	Western	
society	is	due	to	the	cultural	pressures	placed	on	people	to	appear	thin,	‘healthy’,	and	therefore	more	
attractive	according	to	Western	heteronormative	beauty	standards.	Thus,	the	environment	and	
cultural	attitudes	feed	into	and	give	meaning	to	the	medical	illness.		
This	is	the	sort	of	model	from	which	fictional	representations	of	DID	operate.	In	the	primary	
texts	I	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	there	is	a	strong	link	between	the	disorder	and	the	society	in	
which	the	characters	live,	most	notably	in	Fight	Club,	in	which	capitalist	Western	society	causes	
Sebastian’s	DID:	it	is	Sebastian’s	failure	to	conform	to	a	masculine	ideal	under	the	constraints	placed	
on	him	by	capitalism	that	causes	his	disorder.		We	also	see	elements	of	this	in	United	States	of	Tara	
and	Set	This	House	in	Order,	which	are	also	both	strongly	interested	in	performative	identity	and	non-
normativity:	Tara’s	alters	Buck	and	Alice	are	both	American	cultural	stereotypes	(the	redneck	and	the	
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50s	housewife),	while	many	of	the		other	characters	appear	to	be	(knowingly)	performing	elements	of	
their	identity;	Andrew’s	male	gender	identity	is	at	odds	with	the	female	body	he	inhabits,	and	leads	to	
an	awkward	conversation	about	sexuality	and	gender	identity	with	a	female	colleague	he	wishes	to	
pursue	a	romantic	relationship	with.	If	we	use	Morris’	biocultural	model,	are	these	examples	
therefore	indicative	of	the	texts	contextualising	the	disorder	through	the	type	of	society	(a	North	
American	late	capitalist,	heteronormative	society)	in	which	DID	most	frequently	appears?	I	discussed	
in	Chapter	1	how	some	criticism	of	the	disorder	from	within	the	medical	community	claims	that	the	
disorder	is	‘culture-bound’	and	linked	in	some	way	to	the	United	States.	Fictional	representations	
might	appear	to	be	making	this	link	explicit	and	contextualising	the	symptoms	of	DID	through	an	
understanding	of	North	American	society.	While	Sontag	might	say	this	cultural	reading	of	DID	is	
damaging	to	people	who	suffer	from	DID	in	the	real-world,	Morris	would	instead	point	to	this	as	a	
clear	example	of	the	sort	of	cultural	and	medical	feedback	loop	he	describes	in	his	work.	Indeed,	
Morris	suggests	at	one	point	that	multiple	personality	disorder	(it	had	not	yet	been	renamed	when	he	
was	writing)	might	be	the	disease	most	closely	associated	with	contemporary	Western	society:	“it	
seems	a	perfect	metaphor	to	describe	our	stressed-out	era	in	which	the	self—reduced	by	some	
theorists	to	a	babble	of	competing	discourses—is	pulled	in	a	dozen	directions	by	the	various	
pressures	and	options	of	postmodern	life”	(Morris:	57).	Morris	ultimately	concludes	that	it	cannot	be	
because	it	is	not	sufficiently	well-known,	is	diagnosed	too	infrequently,	and	there	still	exists	a	debate	
over	its	existence.		Morris’	book	was	published	in	2000:	since	then	DID	has	become	more	well	known,	
and	appears	more	frequently	in	fiction	as	this	thesis	demonstrates.	Though	the	debate	over	its	
existence	continues,	DID	might	well	be	on	its	way	to	becoming	the	representative	modern	illness,	in	
the	same	way	that	TB	was	in	the	nineteenth	century.		
Whether	or	not	we	believe	this	to	be	the	case,	what	is	obvious	is	that	the	texts’	use	of	DID	fits	
within	Morris’	biocultural	model.	Ultimately,	Morris	thinks	that	there	is	a	place	for	metaphor	within	
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illness	narratives,	arguing	that	“the	slipperiness	of	metaphor	can	be	turned	to	good	use	as	well	as	to	
ill,	much	as	racist	taunts	can	be	transformed	into	tools	of	resistance”	(270).		While	Morris	is	not	
arguing	that	we	need	to	reclaim	metaphor	in	the	same	way	that	members	of	some	racial	or	social	
groups	have	reclaimed	slurs	that	were	once	used	against	them,	he	is	instead	calling	for	an	ability	to	
contextualise	and	understand	that	‘biological’	and	‘cultural’	are	not	exclusive	categories	which	cannot	
be	separated	rather	than	creating	a	false	binary	in	which	all	medical	discourse	is	good	and	all	
metaphorical	or	cultural	discussion	of	medicine	and	illness	is	bad.	Indeed,	in	earlier	chapters	we	have	
seen	that	medical	discourse	can	be	shaped	by	cultural	forces.	I	am	thinking	particularly	of	Merskey	
and	Piper,	who	were	quick	to	disregard	victims	of	sexual	violence	if	there	was	no	proof	(outside	of	the	
victims’	testimony)	of	the	crimes	perpetrated	against	them,	or	much	early	psychoanalysis	writings	
about	hysteria	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	From	a	feminist	point	of	view,	
these	writings	have	been	shaped	by	dominant	patriarchal	attitudes	towards	women,	with	Merksey	
and	Piper	also	seemingly	influenced	by	the	anti-woman	messages	perpetuated	by	rape	culture.		
Morris	is	not	alone	in	his	assertion	that	we	do	not	need	to	be	wary	of	metaphor	itself,	but	
only	the	uses	to	which	to	is	put.	Barbara	Clow	arrives	at	much	the	same	conclusion	in	her	article,	
“Who’s	Afraid	of	Susan	Sontag?”	(2001).	Clow	offers	an	analysis	of	obituaries,	medical	literature	and	
fiction	to	argue	against	Sontag’s	assertion	that	the	true	medical	validity	of	cancer	is	most	often	
obscured	by	unhelpful	metaphors	which	leave	patients	either	placing	the	blame	on	themselves	for	
not	fighting	the	disease	or	not	knowing	the	true	facts	of	their	cases,	finally	concluding:	“we	must	
approach	the	study	of	disease	and	discourse	with	greater	care	and	caution	than	Sontag	has	done;	
otherwise	we	risk	obscuring	the	subtleties	and	complexities	of	illness	experiences	as	well	as	the	finer	
nuances	of	myth	and	symbol”	(311).	Jackie	Stacy	arrives	at	the	same	conclusion	in	Teratologies:	A	
Cultural	Study	of	Cancer	(1997),	arguing	that	it	is	not	“metaphor	of	which	we	should	be	wary	per	se,	
but	the	cultural	uses	to	which	its	heightened	applications	may	be	put”	(63).	I	am	not	listing	these	
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examples	as	simply	a	way	to	discredit	Sontag’s	work,	but	to	instead	show	that	there	are	critics	who	
view	meaning-making	metaphors	as	an	important	part	of	illness.	My	own	interest	in	examining	the	
metaphors	and	uses	to	which	authors	put	DID	in	fictional	texts	comes	out	of	this	work.	What	I	am	
taking	from	Sontag	is	the	importance	of	remembering	that	DID	exists	in	the	real	world	(if	you	
subscribe	to	that	side	of	the	psychology	debate	about	whether	or	not	DID	is	a	real	disorder)	and	that	
fictional	representations	should	not	be	used	to	make	a	claim	for	how	the	disease	therefore	functions	
in	the	real	world.	Instead,	authors	are	using	this	disease	to	comment	upon	the	real	world,	which	I	
believe	is	an	important	distinction	to	make.	DID	is	thus	used	metaphorically	within	fiction	as	a	way	to	
make	obvious	the	effects	on	the	self	of	contemporary,	postmodern,	late	capitalist	Western	society.	
DID	is	used	to	comment	upon	perceived	negative	effects	of	this	cultural	moment,	and	the	nature	of	
contemporary	(performative	and/or	normative)	identity.	I	will	return	to	this	reading	of	DID	as	a	
metaphor	in	later	chapters.	
To	return	to	an	examination	of	the	functions	of	illness	narratives	specifically	then,	Arthur	
Kleinman	also	views	the	role	that	cultural	forces	and	metaphor	play	in	relation	to	illness	as	an	
important	part	of	contemporary	experiences	of	disease.	Kleinman	approaches	illness	from	a	medical	
background—he	has	a	medical	degree,	and	is	a	psychiatrist—and	describes	illness	narratives	as	the	
stories	patients	tell	their	doctors	and	friends	in	order	to	explain	their	symptoms	and	experiences:	
“the	plot	lines,	core	metaphors,	and	rhetorical	devices	that	structure	the	illness	narrative	are	drawn	
from	cultural	and	personal	models	for	arranging	experiences	in	meaningful	ways	and	for	effectively	
communicating	those	meanings”	(49).	This	relates	back	to	Morris’	assertion	that	employing	
metaphors	in	order	to	create	meaning	is	something	that	we	cannot	help	doing;	for	Kleinman	it	is	the	
only	way	for	patients	to	explain	to	doctors	what	is	wrong	with	them	that	enables	doctors	to	
understand	and	diagnose	their	diseases,	“for	the	practitioner,	too,	has	been	socialised	into	a	
particular	collective	experience	of	an	illness”	(Kleinman:	5).	This	seems	to	negate	Sontag’s	argument	
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that	doctors	are	able	to	remain	above	such	cultural	readings	of	disease.	For	Kleinman,	doctors	are	
subject	to	cultural	pressures	and	systems	like	any	other	member	of	that	society,	and	the	meaning	
that	patients	find	through	metaphorical	explanations	of	their	symptoms	can	aid	doctors	in	diagnosing	
their	illnesses.	Like	any	other	form	of	narrative	then,	this	means	that	norms	relating	to	specific	
illnesses	and	associated	symptoms	are	perpetuated	through	retelling,	such	that	“there	are	normal	
ways	of	being	ill	(ways	that	our	society	regards	as	appropriate)	as	well	as	anomalous	ways”	
(Kleinman:	5).		
This	is	significant	because	it	allows	us	to	read	illness	and	its	associated	narratives	in	the	same	
way	we	would	any	other	fiction.	That	is	to	say,	we	can	read	into	illness	narratives	metaphorical	
meanings,	motifs,	stock	figures,	and	plot	lines.	Illness	in	this	way	becomes	a	type	of	social	fiction,	
constructed	through	the	meanings	we	and	others	read	into	it.	This	works	in	the	same	way	as	
someone	assigning	meaning	to	their	own	romantic	relationship	by	comparing	it	to	other	people’s	
relationships,	or	by	comparing	it	to	romance	novels	or	romantic	comedies,	for	example.	Or	the	way	in	
which	normative	gender	identities	are	constructed	by	conforming	to	a	series	of	heteronormative	
behaviours	and	visual	cues,	capable	of	being	read	as	‘man’	or	‘woman’	by	other	people.	There	is	a	
certain	way	these	things	should	operate	according	to	social	convention,	and	we	cannot	help	
measuring	ourselves	and	others	against	this	norm.		
If	illness	can	be	read	as	a	system	with	its	own	sets	of	norms,	this	leads	readers	familiar	with	
normative	systems	to	question	what	happens	to	people	who	do	not	conform	to	the	normative	ways	
of	being	ill.	In	other	systems,	those	who	do	not	conform	are	often	‘punished’	in	some	way,	or	there	
are	discriminatory	systems	in	place	designed	to	keep	them	from	assuming	positions	of	power	over	
those	of	the	dominant	normative	group.24	An	example	of	this	is	the	way	non-white	people	are	
																																								 																				
24	This	sort	of	ideological	system	is	based	on	Michel	Foucault’s	work	on	punishment	in	Discipline	and	Punish	
(1975),	and	has	since	come	to	influence	other	critics	such	as	Judith	Butler’s	theoretical	work	on	gender	as	a	
performative	system.	Butler	argues	that	gender	is	a	social	construction	with	strict	rules	which	must	be	obeyed	
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punished	through	cultural	and	institutional	racism.		At	first	glance,	there	is	no	analogous	institutional	
way	that	those	who	are	not	ill	in	the	expected	way	are	punished.	To	return	to	an	earlier	example,	
autistic	people	without	incredible	mathematical	skills	are	not	refused	treatment	because	they	don’t	
conform	to	this	dominant	narrative	perpetuated	by	fiction.	Instead,	to	find	how	normativity	operates	
in	terms	of	illness	narratives,	I	believe	we	must	look	instead	to	the	way	that	certain	illnesses	or	
disorders	are	politicised	in	different	time	periods.	Hysteria	(described	in	detail	elsewhere	in	this	
thesis)	was	a	catch-all	diagnosis	for	women	who	had	any	number	of	different	problems	which	were	
usually	related	to	not	conforming	to	the	norms	expected	of	them	in	that	particular	time	period.	In	the	
Victorian	period,	for	example,	hysterical	women	often	had	problems	fitting	into	the	very	tight,	
narrowly	defined	patriarchal	expectations	of	that	society.	Treatment	was	designed	to	return	them	to	
behaving	in	a	more	conventional	way	(see	Chapter	3).		Hysteria	was	a	disease	most	often	diagnosed	
in	those	whose	problems	stemmed	from	the	society	into	which	they	could	not	fit.	These	women	were	
hysterics,	because	it	was	easier	to	‘cure’	them	than	to	address	the	patriarchal	attitudes	and	cultural	
expectations	placed	on	women	in	that	time	period.	Medical	doctors,	who	at	this	time	would	have	
almost	exclusively	been	male,	had	no	interest	in	changing	social	attitudes	to	which	they	themselves	
would	have	subscribed	(and,	of	course,	put	them	in	a	position	of	superiority	compared	to	the	women	
they	were	treating,	and	continually	reaffirmed	this	superiority).		
Similarly,	early	treatment	of	trans	people,	involving	development	of	male-to-female	gender	
reassignment	surgery	by	doctors	such	as	John	Money,	Richard	Green,	and	Harry	Benjamin,	was	
designed	to	uphold	heteronormative	ideals	at	every	point	during	treatment.	In	this	case,	gender	
dysphoria	was	a	disorder	that	could	be	treated	by	‘fixing’	a	person’s	body	so	that	their	identity	fit	into	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																														
in	order	for	us	to	be	read	as	one	of	two	binary	gender	options.	Heteronormative	societies	have	social	and	
cultural	pressures	in	place	designed	to	keep	their	members	conforming	to	the	system.	Homophobic	and	
transphobic	discrimination	are	therefore	the	punishment	which	keeps	us	conforming.	Butler’s	work	was	further	
developed	by	later	queer	theorists	such	as	Kate	Bornstein,	and	I	will	briefly	discuss	some	of	this	work	in	the	next	
chapter,	which	looks	at	representations	of	gender	within	the	DID	texts.		
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a	more	conventional	category.	Indeed,	Benjamin	wrote	in	his	book	The	Transsexual	Phenomenon	
(1966)	that	sex	reassignment	surgery	was	only	‘successful’	if	it	allowed	trans	women	to	have	“normal	
peno-vaginal	sex	relations”	afterward	(and	it	is	crucial	to	point	out	here	that	whether	or	not	trans	
women	were	able	to	feel	pleasure	from	this	act	was	unimportant,	it	was	simply	an	ability	for	the	basic	
functions	of	heterosexual	sex	to	be	completed)	(113).	Benjamin’s	goal,	then,	is	to	aid	trans	women	in	
conforming	to	all	the	norms	associated	with	being	a	heterosexual	woman.	There	was	no	room	in	
Benjamin	or	Money’s	work	for	queer	trans	people.	Indeed,	Benjamin	suggests	in	a	number	of	places	
that	trans	people	dislike	homosexual	men	because	they	were	frequently	mistaken	for	gay	by	the	
heterosexual	population	(265).	While	it	may	have	been	necessary	to	make	this	distinction	in	1966	in	
order	to	establish	the	need	for	the	medical	community	to	develop	ways	of	treating	trans	people	and	
the	need	for	the	medical	community	to	differentiate	trans	people	from	queer	people	(who	were	still	
subject	to	psychiatric	treatment	in	the	60s),	it	implies	that	all	trans	people	are	heterosexual	and	
desire	a	heterosexual	relationship	after	they	have	transitioned	which	is,	of	course,	not	the	case.	Kate	
Bornstein	addresses	this	in	Gender	Outlaw	(1993)	and	argues	that	part	of	the	reason	for	the	
perpetuation	of	this	myth	is	that	early	medical	and	autobiographical	literature	about	trans	people	
continually	followed	this	heteronormative	narrative.	As	a	result,	in	order	to	access	treatment	and	
surgery,	trans	people	continued	to	adhere	to	these	values	and	tell	psychiatrists	that	they	were	
heterosexual	men	and	women	‘trapped	in	the	wrong	bodies.’	Consequently,	more	medical	and	
autobiographical	literature	was	written	with	a	heteronormative	bias	which	encouraged	trans	people	
to	tell	these	heteronormative	stories	to	doctors,	which	then	caused	the	doctors	to	write	more	
medical	literature	with	a	heteronormative	bias,	and	so	on	in	a	cyclical	fashion.	If	trans	people	wanted	
access	to	surgery	and	hormones,	they	had	to	follow	the	established	medical	narrative.	Even	Benjamin	
seems	aware	of	this	in	some	form	as	he	writes	at	one	point	that	“there	are	also	patients	who	want	to	
please	the	doctor	with	their	statements”	(135).	But	whose	fault	is	this?	If	trans	patients	do	not	adhere	
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to	a	certain	medical	narrative,	they	can	be	denied	treatment	and	face	the	rest	of	their	lives	living	in	an	
identity	and	body	with	which	they	are	uncomfortable.	This	is	a	way	in	which	those	who	don’t	conform	
to	the	culturally-approved	illness	narratives	are	punished.	Again	then,	the	early	treatment	of	trans	
people	was	designed	to	perpetuate	social	norms	by	helping	people	who	found	themselves	outside	of	
a	normative	identity	fit	back	into	their	expected	role.		
What	both	of	these	examples	highlight	is	the	way	in	which	the	treatment	of	these	diseases	is	
designed	to	‘cure’	the	person	rather	than	address	why	these	people	were	seen	as	problematic	
(according	to	social	convention)	in	the	first	place.	Indeed,	Kleinman	states	that	“we	manage	as	
medical	problems	the	symptoms	resulting	from	the	social	sources	of	distress	and	disease”	rather	than	
fix	the	thing	that	causes	the	problem	(21).	Kleinman’s	contemporary	example	of	this	is	the	way	
doctors	treat	people	for	stress	rather	than	change	the	situation	that	has	made	the	person	feel	
stressed.	This	has	clear	parallels	to	the	DID	texts.	If,	as	I	have	already	suggested,	DID	texts	suggest	
that	it	is	social	pressures	or	society	that	in	some	way	causes	the	characters	to	dissociate,	then	it	
makes	sense	that	the	characters	in	these	texts	are	frequently	not	cured	of	their	DID	by	the	end	of	the	
narrative.	The	characters	cannot	be	cured	because	society	is	not	cured;	any	cure	would	be	temporary	
before	the	same	forces	that	caused	the	characters	to	dissociate	in	the	first	instance	begin	to	work	
again.	This	is	particularly	the	case	for	Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	and	for	Tara	in	United	States	of	Tara.		
This	issue	is	highlighted	by	Richard	Ohmann	in	his	essay	“The	Shaping	of	a	Canon”	in	which	he	
discusses	illness	narratives	of	the	60s	and	70s.	In	these	texts,	Ohmann	argues	“social	contradictions	
were	easily	displaced	into	images	of	personal	illness”	because	illness	narratives	worked	“to	nourish	
the	suspicion	that	any	perceived	lack	was	one’s	own	fault.	If	unhappy,	one	must	be	personally	
maladjusted,	perhaps	even	neurotic”	(212).	This	presents	us	with	a	clear	problem	in	terms	of	any	
cure,	as	Ohmann	is	quick	to	point	out:	“If	these	novels	thematise	social	contradictions	as	personal	
neurosis,	one	would	expect	any	recovery	to	be	a	problem,	for	individual	cures	cannot	address	the	
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causes	of	the	illness”	(218).	Until	society	can	be	‘cured’,	any	‘cure’	for	DID	would	not	address	why	the	
person	had	become	dissociative	in	the	first	place.	Ohmann	suggests	that	instead	of	solving	social	ills,	
illness	narratives	can	therefore	only	“produce	a	kind	of	adjustment”	(218).	We	see	this	kind	of	
adjustment	in	the	DID	texts:	Andrew	manages	his	condition	through	the	house	in	his	head;	Tara	
embraces	all	of	her	alters	at	the	end	of	the	series	and	understands	that	they	need	to	find	a	solution	to	
managing	the	condition	together.	In	both	cases,	the	texts	are	resistant	to	a	typical	curing	narrative	
based	on	medical	understanding	of	the	disorder.	In	Chapters	1	and	3,	I	discussed	how	the	usual	
pattern	of	treatment	involves	the	dissociative	person	confronting	and	accepting	memories	of	the	
trauma	which	caused	them	to	dissociate	through	therapy.	For	both	Andrew	and	Tara,	they	find	out	
exactly	what	the	trauma	was	that	made	them	dissociate,	but	neither	is	cured	or	manages	to	
reintegrate	their	alters	after	they	discover	this	truth.	Similarly,	Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	is	not	cured	of	
his	disorder	by	the	end	of	the	text,	and	again	we	read	the	text	in	this	way	because	the	social	
pressures	which	led	Sebastian	to	dissociate	still	exist.	The	texts	therefore	resist	what	we	might	think	
of	as	the	typical	medical	model	for	dealing	with	DID.		
So	far	then,	what	is	becoming	clear	is	that	fictional	texts	dealing	with	dissociative	identity	
disorder	have	a	common	interest	in	resisting	or	rejecting	norms	and	conventions.	This	interest	
threads	through	various	elements	of	the	texts:	we	have	seen	how	dissociative	identity	disorder	is	
often	associated	with	non-normative	identities	(for	example	cross-gender	alters);	how	the	texts	resist	
a	normative	medical	model	of	allowing	the	characters	to	work	through	their	trauma	in	order	to	cure	
the	disorder;	and	the	way	in	which	a	biocultural	reading	of	illness	(into	which	the	texts’	use	of	DID	
fits)	is	often	used	to	politicise	or	critique	some	element	of	contemporary	society.	These	specific	
instances	of	non-normativity	or	unconventionality	start	to	form	a	bigger	picture	when	viewed	
collectively.	I	now	turn	my	attention	to	a	wider	reading	of	narrative	and	genre	within	these	DID	texts,	
to	determine	if	this	interest	is	reflected	in	these	texts’	generic	strategies.		
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My	texts	all	come	from	very	different	genres—Set	This	House	in	Order	and	Fight	Club	are	
thrillers,	United	States	of	Tara	is	a	comedy/drama,	Dollhouse	is	science-fiction—and	yet	I	have	
consistently	claimed	them	as	‘dissociative	identity	disorder	texts’	throughout	this	thesis.	I	can	make	
this	assertion	because	they	all	feature	characters	suffering	from	DID,	and	despite	their	various	
narratives	and	genres,	they	all	employ	similar	generic	strategies	in	dealing	with	this	disease.	There	are	
narrative	similarities	between	these	texts—characters	dealing	with	trauma,	cross-gender	alter	
personalities,	characters	‘losing’	time	when	other	personalities	are	in	control,	notions	of	‘traumatised’	
gender	roles—that	allow	the	reader	to	view	these	texts	as	part	of	the	same	genre.	Indeed,	in	many	
ways,	the	texts’	narrative	strategies	can	be	better	understood	through	this	intertextual	framework.	In	
addition,	these	texts	are	all	illness	narratives,	and	yet	they	resist	the	typical	medical	model	of	the	
illness	they	are	representing,	and	further,	resist	a	typical	illness	journey	by	not	curing	the	characters	
by	the	narratives’	end.		
Indeed,	the	texts	frequently	resist	‘curing’	the	condition	and	even	go	as	far	as	to	suggest	that	
there	does	not	need	to	be,	nor	is	there,	a	cure.	The	notion	of	curing	within	illness	narratives	is	
something	that	is	usually	essential	to	the	successful	completion	of	narrative	expectations.	As	I	
discussed	in	Chapter	2,	many	other	syndrome	and	disorder	texts	fulfil	these	expectations:	texts	
featuring	autistic	children	are	often	coming-of-age	novels	in	which	the	protagonists	overcome	the	
difficulties	they	face	as	a	result	of	their	condition	and	learn	more	successfully	to	integrate	themselves	
into	society.	While	this	is	not	a	‘cure’	in	the	traditional	sense	(largely	because	there	is	no	‘cure’	for	
autism),	it	solves	the	problems	set	up	by	the	narrative,	and	by	illness	narratives	more	generally,	and	
the	reader	understands	the	character	to	be	in	a	‘healthier’	place	than	they	were	at	the	start	of	the	
text.	Texts	featuring	characters	with	Tourette	syndrome	often	accomplish	similar	narrative	goals,	as	I	
discussed	in	Chapter	2.		
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In	other	illness	texts	dealing	with	psychological	disorders	or	syndromes,	such	as	autism	and	
Tourette	syndrome	texts,	the	condition	is	very	much	a	challenge	that	needs	to	be	overcome	and	
prevents	the	character	from	living	a	‘normal’	life	or	fully	integrating	into	society,	but	dissociative	
identity	disorder	texts	do	not	function	in	this	way.	In	Set	This	House	In	Order,	for	example,	Penny	sees	
her	condition	as	a	challenge	because	her	personalities	are	unruly	and	frequently	take	over	without	
her	knowledge	or	consent,	while	Andrew	is	further	along	in	his	treatment	and	now	sees	his	condition	
as	no	kind	of	obstacle	at	all.	Andrew’s	fellow	personalities	have	routines	set	up	to	allow	them	time	in	
control	of	the	body,	and	they	frequently	share	their	skills	and	knowledge	with	each	other	in	order	to	
fulfil	day-to-day	tasks	to	the	best	of	their	ability.	For	Andrew,	the	challenge	is	not	the	condition	itself,	
but	rather	how	best	to	organise	the	personalities	so	that	they	can	live	together	rather	than	seeking	to	
erase	or	reintegrate	them,	which	is	frequently	seen	as	the	‘cure’	for	dissociative	identity	disorder.	In	a	
similar	way,	Tara	seeks	to	manage	her	personalities	and	refuses	the	medication	that	has	been	keeping	
them	suppressed	prior	to	the	start	of	Season	1.	The	show	frequently	problematises	the	idea	that	Tara	
can	be	cured	of	the	condition,	and	though	the	series	finale	ends	with	her	going	to	see	a	doctor	in	
Boston	who	specialises	in	the	treatment	of	DID,	the	audience	has	no	way	of	knowing	if	this	treatment	
will	work.	Due	to	this,	one	can	continue	to	believe	that	there	is	no	cure	for	Tara’s	condition	if	one	is	
so	inclined.	Furthermore,	the	finale	suggests	that	Tara	has	finally	come	to	accept	her	alters,	and	that	
she	is	seeking	the	treatment	not	to	rid	herself	of	the	alters,	but	to	manage	them,	perhaps	in	a	similar	
way	to	Andrew	in	Set	This	House	In	Order.	In	both	of	these	texts,	the	very	notion	of	a	‘cure’	is	called	
into	question.	
While	Fight	Club	is	not	as	radical	as	Set	This	House	and	United	States	of	Tara,	it	also	suggests	
that	the	Sebastian’s	DID	is	not	really	cured	at	the	end	of	the	novel	by	hinting	that	Tyler	Durden	is	still	
present,	as	members	of	Fight	Club	frequently	tell	him	that	they	look	forward	to	Durden	returning.	As	I	
mentioned	previously,	Fight	Club	is	something	of	an	anomaly	in	that	there	is	absolutely	no	medical	
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discussion	of	Sebastian’s	condition	or	dissociative	identity	disorder	within	its	pages,	and	so	the	last	
sentences	in	which	this	is	discussed—ending	the	novel	on	an	ominous	note	in	keeping	with	the	
thriller	genre—are	the	only	comment	upon	Sebastian’s	illness	throughout	the	novel.	Nevertheless,	
this	still	suggests	that	Sebastian’s	condition	has	not	been	truly	cured	by	the	novel’s	end.		
My	final	text,	Dollhouse,	can	be	read	as	an	allegorical	representation	of	DID,	as	I	have	argued	
elsewhere.	Though	it	is	not	a	‘true’	DID	text,	it	is	still	useful	to	consider	the	extent	to	which	the	
characters	are	‘cured’	by	the	end	of	the	narrative,	and	whether	or	not	Dollhouse	works	in	similar	ways	
to	the	other	texts.	The	series	finale	of	Dollhouse	works	in	a	similar	way	to	Set	This	House,	in	that	while	
two	of	the	characters	with	allegorical	DID	have	been	restored	to	singular	personalities	at	the	end	
(though	crucially,	with	the	knowledge	and	memories,	if	not	the	skill	sets,	they	gained	from	their	time	
as	Dolls),	the	main	character,	Echo,	keeps	all	of	her	personalities	and	actively	refuses	the	‘cure’	that	
could	revert	her	to	a	time	when	she	had	only	her	‘original’	personality.	All	three	characters	keep	their	
memories	of	what	has	happened	to	them	throughout	the	series,	despite	being	offered	the	‘cure’	of	
being	restored	to	a	time	before	the	start	of	the	series	and	being	wiped	of	their	memories	of	what	has	
happened	to	them,	including	the	traumatic	events	that	lead	them	to	the	Dollhouse	in	the	first	place.	
One	could	argue,	then,	that	this	is	an	instance	of	the	characters	refusing	a	cure	akin	to	therapy—
working	through	and	mastering	their	trauma—and	while	the	series	ends	on	a	hopeful	note	for	some	
of	the	characters—Tony	and	Priya	are	reunited	and	seen	sitting	with	their	son—keeping	these	
memories	means	that	not	only	do	they	remember	their	original	traumas,	they	also	remember	the	
way	the	technology	that	implanted	them	with	multiple	personalities	almost	destroyed	the	world,	and	
the	awful	things	they	have	seen	and	had	to	do	as	a	result	of	this.	They	are,	arguably,	more	
traumatised	now	than	they	were	at	the	start	of	the	series	and	even	though	it	is	only	Echo	who	retains	
her	multiple	personalities,	none	of	them	are	truly	‘cured.’		
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From	this	summary	of	the	primary	texts	it	becomes	obvious	that	notions	of	curing	can	be	
debated,	as	well	as	endings	more	generally.	In	all	cases,	the	characters	with	DID	are	not	cured	by	the	
end	of	the	texts,	against	generic	expectations	held	by	the	reader.	Generic	convention	dictates	that	if	a	
character	has	a	disease	they	should	be	cured	of	it	by	the	end	of	the	text	(or	if	that	disease	is	a	
terminal	one	they	could	instead	be	dead	by	the	end	of	the	text);	this	is	not	so	with	the	DID	texts.	Rick	
Altman	suggests	that	genre	functions	as	a	series	of	crossroads,	at	which	the	reader	must	choose	to	
continue	in	the	company	of	the	‘outlaw’	or	return	to	the	safety	of	the	‘law’:	“More	thrills…	or	safety	
at	last”	(154).	He	goes	on	to	suggest	that	these	crossroads	embody	the	“conflict	between	generic	and	
cultural	values”	and	that	the	reader	gains	pleasure	each	time	they	choose	to	continue	on	in	the	
company	of	the	‘outlaw’	(152).	To	offer	an	example,	the	reader	gains	pleasure	from	spending	time	in	
Andrew’s	company	in	Set	This	House	because	he	is	outside	the	norm	and	does	not	exemplify	
heteronormative,	singular,	hegemonic	values.	The	reader	derives	pleasure	from	achieving	insights	
into	a	world	which	he	or	she	does	not	usually	see,	but	the	ultimate	pleasure,	Altman	argues,	is	gained	
from	the	return	to	cultural	values	at	the	text’s	end:	“The	greater	the	risk,	the	greater	the	pleasure	of	
the	return	to	safety”	(153).	At	the	end	of	Set	This	House	in	Order,	however,	the	reader	is	still	very	
much	in	Andrew’s	company	and	has	not	been	returned	to	dominant	cultural	values.		
This	return	is	how	texts	should	function	according	to	generic	convention;	they	allow	counter-
cultural	characters	and	activities	to	reign	for	a	short	time	before	returning	these	characters	and	the	
audience	to	the	‘safety’	of	dominant	cultural	values.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	illness	narratives	usually	
cure	their	protagonists	by	the	end	of	the	narrative,	and	why,	for	example,	queer	and	gender	variant	
characters	are	often	‘cured’	or	indeed,	punished,	at	the	end	of	texts.	This	discussion	of	the	outlaw	
strengthens	the	link	between	dissociative	characters	and	gender	variance	as	represented	by	cross-
gender	alters	and	Andrew’s	male	identity	and	female	body,	as	it	allows	us	to	reconsider	Kate	
Bornstein’s	work	in	Gender	Outlaw	in	which	she	argues	that	transgender	people	are	uniquely	
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positioned	to	occupy	the	role	of	the	“clowns,	fools,	jesters	and	tricksters”	in	contemporary	life	(89).	
Bornstein	argues	that	these	‘clowns’	“don’t	play	by	the	rules,	they	laugh	at	most	rules,	and	they	
encourage	us	to	laugh	at	ourselves.	Their	pranks	of	substituting	one	thing	for	another	create	
instability	and	uncertainty,	making	visible	the	lies	imbedded	in	a	culture”	(89).	These	‘clowns’	have	
the	ability	to	subvert	social	norms	and	binaries	in	the	same	way	that	I	have	argued	dissociative	
characters	do.	In	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	United	States	of	Tara	the	protagonists	are	allowed	to	
continue	to	play	the	‘fool.’		
Ultimately,	texts	pursue	conventional	generic	strategies	in	order	to	sell.	By	reflecting	
hegemonic	values,	texts	are	able	to	appeal	to	the	largest	audience,	and	are	much	more	likely	to	
attract	publishers,	producers,	and	avoid	cancellation.	This	is	the	reason	why	there	are	almost	no	
mainstream	texts	that	champion	‘minority’	values:	stories	in	which,	for	example,	LGBTQ+	people	or	
members	of	racial	minorities	are	the	main	characters	are	believed	to	have	limited	audience	appeal	
and	so	companies	are	less	likely	to	invest	money	into	their	production.	Fictional	representations	
therefore	reproduce	and	perpetuate	the	hegemonic	cultural	beliefs	of	their	time	periods	and	
societies.		
Having	established	why	texts	conform	to	genre	norms,	I	now	examine	why	the	DID	texts	are	
able	to	resist	these	norms.	In	all	cases,	the	texts	do	not	return	us	to	the	safety	of	the	‘law’	(dominant	
cultural	values)	by	the	end	of	the	text.	Even	in	the	rare	instances	that	a	text	does	attempt	to	do	this—
Penny	seeks	reintegration	therapy	to	cure	her	DID	at	the	end	of	Set	This	House	in	Order;	Sebastian	is	
receiving	treatment	for	his	DID	at	the	end	of	Fight	Club—there	is	some	suggestion	that	this	return	to	
safety	is	a	temporary	one,	or	one	that	will	ultimately	fail:	Andrew	receives	a	letter	from	the	
reintegrated	Penny	with	a	postscript	from	one	of	her	alter	personalities,	and	everyone	around	
Sebastian	assumes	that	Tyler	Durden	will	return.	These	texts	keep	us	in	the	company	of	the	outlaw,	
refuse	to	‘cure’	DID,	and	once	again	we	must	ask	why	they	are	able	to	do	this.	
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Umberto	Eco’s	distinction	between	open	and	closed	endings	is	useful	here,	as	it	allows	us	to	
view	these	problematic	endings,	the	lack	of	a	cure,	as	an	intentional	strategy	designed	to	reflect	the	
dissociative	identity	disorder	of	the	main	characters.	Eco	argues	that	‘closed’	endings	are	ones	which	
are	designed	to	be	read	in	one	way	but	which	can	be	read	‘against’	by	different	types	of	readers;	
closed	endings	are	“frequently	interpreted	against	the	background	of	codes	different	from	those	
intended	by	the	author”	(8).	Conversely,	Eco	argues	that	‘open’	endings	are	ones	which	allow	for	
multiple	modes	of	meaning	so	that	“you	cannot	use	the	text	as	you	want,	but	only	as	the	text	wants	
you	to	use	it”	(9).	In	this	example,	it	is	not	possible	to	read	the	text	‘against’	its	intended	meaning	
because	there	is	nothing	to	oppose;	texts	allow	for	multiple	possibilities	and	multiple	interpretations.	
The	DID	narratives	seem	to	fit	into	this	second	category,	in	that	they	allow	for	a	celebration	of	
postmodern	multiplicity,	both	in	a	literal	sense	in	terms	of	the	characters’	DID	but	also	in	allowing	
characters	to	remain	outside	of	the	law	and	refusing	to	return	them	to	socially	sanctioned	
heteronormative	gender	categories,	for	example.	(The	text	never	presents	Andrew’s	female	body	as	a	
problem,	despite	the	majority	of	the	alter	personalities	being	male.)	They	are	‘open’	endings	because	
they	allow	for	the	interpretation	that	the	condition	could	be	‘cured’—Penny	is	‘reintegrated’;	Tara	is	
on	her	way	to	get	treatment;	Sebastian	is	receiving	treatment—whilst	at	the	same	time	
problematising	these	situations.	If	the	texts	were	‘closed’	ones	they	would	simply	argue	that	the	
disease	could	not	be	cured,	and	end	the	narratives	in	such	a	way	that	this	was	the	case,	with	no	hope	
for	the	future.	By	more	subtly	hinting	that	the	disease	cannot	be	cured	whilst	still	allowing	for	that	
interpretation	(if	one	wants	to	believe	that	Tara	found	her	cure	with	a	specialist	in	Boston	after	the	
end	of	Season	3,	for	example,	one	can	do	so)	the	texts	account	for	all	modes	of	meaning	whilst	
highlighting	that	multiple	meanings	are	exactly	the	goal	here	and	prioritising	the	meaning	in	which	
the	text	is	ultimately	interested:	that	the	very	notion	of	the	‘cure’	is	problematic.	Dissociative	identity	
disorder	is	a	disease	that	is	concerned	with	multiplicity,	after	all,	and	only	to	allow	for	one	
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interpretation	of	that	disease	when	the	literary	value	and	aim	in	celebrating	that	multiplicity	is	
disingenuous	and	would	go	against	the	narrative	strategies	established	in	the	earlier	parts	of	the	
texts.		
Eco’s	work	on	endings	allows	us	to	understand	why	the	texts	function	in	this	way,	but	it	also	
once	again	highlights	the	tension	between	fictional	representations	of	this	disease	and	the	real	world	
experience	of	people	with	that	disease.	This	is	an	issue	that	Altman’s	work	also	draws	attention	to.	
Earlier	in	the	chapter,	I	drew	on	the	work	of	Kleinman,	Morris	and	others	to	argue	that	the	texts’	use	
of	illness	have	more	in	common	with	a	postmodern	biocultural	model	of	illness,	and	while	the	use	of	
this	model	is	valuable	in	examining	the	representation	of	DID,	generic	convention	would	prefer	that	
texts	at	least	fulfil	their	narrative	goal	of	curing	disease,	which	would	fall	in	line	with	medical	
discourse	and	reflect	the	typical	narrative	surrounding	illness	in	the	real	world.	In	rejecting	this	real-
world	norm	and	suggesting	that	the	disease	does	not	need	to	be	cured,	the	texts	are	potentially	doing	
something	much	more	dangerous	than	just	resisting	generic	norms.	Sontag	would	find	this	use	of	
dissociative	identity	disorder	troubling,	as	I	suggested	earlier	in	this	chapter,	but	it	is	nevertheless	a	
narrative	element	that	recurs	throughout	these	texts.	Indeed,	this	tension	is	further	demonstrated	
within	DID	texts	because	the	texts	which	resist	curing	the	condition	are	very	much	set	in	a	
recognisable	version	of	the	‘real	world’	(even	Dollhouse,	while	science	fiction,	is	set	in	a	world	
extrapolated	from	our	own,	with	part	of	the	series	devoted	to	explaining	how	our	world	turned	into	
that	one).	This	relationship	is	important,	and	John	Frow’s	‘generic	frameworks’	can	be	used	as	a	
starting	point	to	examine	it.	
Frow	argues	that	generic	frames	“[specify]	how	to	use	the	text,	[and]	what	one	can	expect	to	
happen	at	different	stages”	(104)	because	they	“work	to	define	the	text	against	those	things	which	it	
is	not”	(106).	A	suitable	generic	frame	to	use	for	these	DID	texts	could	be	that	of	the	illness	narrative,	
then,	drawing	on	Morris’	biocultural	model	and	assuming	a	generic	convention	in	which	the	sick	
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person	is	made	well	again,	though	of	course	these	texts	deny	this	convention	by	problematising	the	
notion	of	a	cure.	In	this	case,	the	texts	are	playing	with	generic	conventions,	but	it	is	still	necessary	to	
recognise	the	frame	they	are	using	in	order	to	recognise	the	subversion.	These	texts	are	still	illness	
narratives,	then,	though	the	texts	resist	some	of	this	frame’s	conventions;	this	frame	is	still	the	‘best	
fit’	and	allows	us	to	read	the	text	for	meaning,	and	define	it	against	that	which	it	is	not.	As	new	texts	
are	added,	it	may	become	possible	to	create	a	new	framework	to	understand	them,	based	on	the	
initial	illness	narrative	framework:	that	of	the	dissociative	identity	disorder	text.	While	this	legitimises	
DID	texts	as	a	subgenre	of	illness	texts,	and	allows	the	open	uncured	ending	to	itself	become	a	
generic	convention,	it	does	not	answer	the	question	raised	by	the	conflict	between	fictional	
representations	and	real	world	experience:	why	is	it	possible	for	these	texts	frequently	to	resist	
dominant	real-world	values?		
Frow	argues	that	frames	“work	both	as	an	enclosure	of	the	internal	fictional	space	and	as	an	
exclusion	of	the	space	of	reality	against	which	it	is	set”,	which	suggests	that	frames	work	to	define	
texts	as	fictional	and	separate	from	the	‘real	world’	(107).	However,	I	demonstrated	earlier	that	texts	
frequently	resolve	narrative	issues	in	line	with	real-world	social	values	and	offered	reasons	why	this	is	
the	case.	Rather	than	frames	functioning	to	separate	texts	from	the	real	world,	we	should	consider	
the	‘real	world’	a	generic	framework	in	its	own	right,	albeit	an	invisible	one	that	is	often	taken	for	
granted.	Texts	that	can	be	understood	through	the	use	of	a	‘real	world’	generic	framework	are	
recognisable	to	audiences	because	the	world	in	which	they	take	place	follows	the	same	social	rules	as	
their	own.	In	this	case,	the	fulfilment	of	the	conventions	of	this	framework	comes	in	the	form	of	
conformity	to	dominant	social	values.	Characters	must	be	returned	to	the	safety	of	the	law	at	the	end	
of	the	narrative	because	this	shores	up	these	dominant	values,	and	proves	to	the	audience	that	they	
are	both	‘normal’	and	‘correct.’		
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This	framework	functions	as	a	representation	of	the	real	world	and	socially	constructed	
normative	values;	a	representation	that	works	to	conceal	its	construction	in	the	same	way	that	the	
heteronormative,	performative	version	of	gender	that	Judith	Butler	describes	in	Gender	Trouble	
(1990)	does:	by	pretending	that	these	normative	values	are	‘natural.’	Both	are	self-perpetuating	
systems	that	conceal	their	construction.	Like	heteronormative	gender,	the	real-world	frame	is	taken	
for	granted	by	readers	of	fictional	texts	because	they	believe	it	to	be	natural,	and	are	just	as	adept	at	
reading	these	values	as	they	are	any	other	generic	convention	or	social	system.	Indeed,	mainstream	
audiences	expect	their	values	to	be	upheld	because	it	validates	their	place	within	society	and	assures	
them	that	society	shares	these	values.	Of	course,	these	normative	values	are	just	as	much	a	construct	
as	the	representation	of	the	‘real	world’	contained	within	the	texts.	Normative	behaviours,	such	as	
heteronormative	gender,	are	socially	constructed	and	reproduced	through	socialisation	and	
punishment,	while	representations	of	the	real	world	within	fictional	texts	can	only	ever	be	a	
reproduction	of	the	real	world	itself.	The	real-world	frame	becomes	visible	when	we	recognise	it	as	
such;	by	viewing	this	representation	as	a	genre	and	recognising	that	it	is	a	fiction,	we	are	able	to	
subvert	it	in	the	same	way	we	can	any	other	generic	convention.	Indeed,	to	return	to	Frow,	the	
frame’s	“exclusion	of	the	space	of	reality”	here	allows	us	not	to	acknowledge	that	the	text	is	
completely	separate	from	our	reality,	but	that	it	takes	place	in	a	fictional	representation	of	reality	in	
which	expected	cultural	norms	can	be	subverted	and	destabilised.	
In	the	same	way	that	an	illness	narrative	frame	allows	the	texts	to	subvert	notions	of	curing	
and	the	typical	end	to	these	narratives,	a	real-world	frame	allows	the	texts	to	play	with	real-world	
values,	which	include	conventional	narratives	around	illness	and	how	we	expect	illnesses	to	function	
in	the	real	world.	The	reader	must	be	able	to	recognise	the	generic	conventions	and	framework	in	
order	to	be	able	to	play	with	it.	For	example,	though	Set	This	House	and	Tara	both	use	unusual	
metaphors	and	filmic	techniques	to	explain	or	demonstrate	the	nature	of	their	protagonists’	
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conditions—the	house	in	Andy’s	head;	Tara’s	ability	to	‘see’	and	hold	conversations	with	her	alters	in	
later	seasons—the	texts	clearly	take	place	in	our	reality,	albeit	one	able	to	employ	these	techniques	
due	to	their	fictional	nature.		
These	texts	take	place	in	the	‘real	world’	and	are	therefore	able	to	subvert	cultural	hegemony	
in	the	same	way	that	they	subvert	the	typical	illness	narrative	ending.	Fictional	representations	of	the	
real	world	rely	upon	their	own	sets	of	conventions	in	the	same	way	that	different	genres	do,	in	order	
for	the	reader	to	recognise	those	texts	as	part	of	their	world.	But	this	recognition	is	what	allows	the	
texts	to	subvert	the	reader’s	expectations	and	resist	real-world	norms.	Subversion	only	works	if	the	
original	can	be	recognised:	once	the	reader	recognises	the	fictional	world	as	their	own,	texts	are	able	
to	subvert	expectations	in	order	to	comment	upon	these	norms.	Indeed,	certain	genres	have	certain	
in-built	values,	or	particular	ideologies	that	come	to	the	fore	time	and	again—we	can	see	this	with	
female	gender	roles	in	horror	films,	for	example.	A	‘real-world’	genre	should	perpetuate	dominant	
cultural	values,	but	in	the	same	way	that	there	have	been	horror	films	that	allow	women	to	be	the	
heroes	rather	than	the	victim	in	order	to	comment	upon	gender	roles	within	the	genre,	texts	using	a	
‘real-world’	frame	are	able	to	subvert	these	dominant	values	to	comment	upon	the	structures	that	
keep	them	in	place.	A	‘real-world’	frame	allows	the	text	to	play	with	real	world	conventions,	in	a	way	
that	the	real	world	itself	does	not	allow.	
In	DID	texts,	this	use	and	subversion	of	genre	expectations	reflects	the	state	of	the	
dissociative	characters;	it	becomes	a	generic	metaphor	for	the	condition	itself.	The	‘open’	endings	
celebrate	multiplicity	in	the	same	way	the	characters’	identities	do,	while	the	texts’	subversion	of	
generic	conventions	is	reflected	in	elements	of	the	characters’	non-normative	identities	(particularly	
when	it	comes	to	gender	identity).	Obviously,	there	is	an	etymological	link	between	‘gender’	and	
‘genre’	here,	with	both	coming	from	the	root	‘genus’	which	means	a	‘type’	or	‘class’.	Both	are	systems	
of	classification,	and	both	are	disrupted	within	DID	texts.	Generically,	the	texts	are	all	illness	
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narratives	that	resist	illness	narrative	conventions;	they	both	are	and	are	not	part	of	that	category.	In	
terms	of	gender	representation,	the	texts	disrupt	the	heteronormative	binary	by	having	characters	
with	gender	identities	that	do	not	match	their	sex,	and	further,	having	them	change	gender	identities	
depending	upon	which	personality	is	in	control.	The	texts	are	interested	in	disrupting	binaries	then—
man/woman,	singular/multiple,	disease/cure—and	we	see	this	again	in	the	texts’	generic	strategy.	
The	texts	both	are	and	are	not	generic,	existing	in	some	third	space	in	between	these	two	opposite	
states.	By	this	I	mean	both	that	the	texts	are	illness	narratives	that	resist	illness	narrative	conventions,	
and	also	that	they	are	real-world	texts	that	resist	a	return	to	real-world	values.	Disrupting	binaries	in	
this	way	and	occupying	this	third	space	creates	another	link	to	Kate	Bornstein’s	gender	theory,	in	
which	she	argues	that	trans	people	who	do	not	want	to	conform	to	either	‘man’	or	‘woman’	are	
uniquely	placed	to	‘queer’	the	binary	and	occupy	a	‘third	space’	(97-98).	It	should	be	clarified	that	
Bornstein	does	not	argue	that	every	trans	person	should	do	this,	but	rather	that	the	option	is	
available	for	those	who	wish	to	do	so.	Indeed,	it	would	be	at	odds	with	her	stated	aims	if	she	were	to	
argue	for	some	universal	trans	third	space	essentialism,	as	this	would	be	just	as	much	of	an	
oppressive	gender	system	as	the	binary	she	wishes	to	disrupt.	Similarly,	though,	Bornstein	ties	this	
ability	to	disrupt	binaries	to	one’s	status	as	an	outlaw,	thus	creating,	once	again,	a	link	to	the	
dissociative	characters	and	their	ability	to	be	‘outlaws’	in	accordance	with	Altman’s	genre	theory.	In	
terms	of	Sontag’s	work,	this	reading	presents	us	with	a	problem.	We	are	in	danger	here	of	claiming	
that	DID	is	somehow	‘positive’	because	it	allows	characters	the	ability	to	resist	social	norms	and	break	
with	social	constraints	(which	the	texts	position	as	a	desirable	quality).	While	the	fictional	texts	can	be	
read	in	this	way,	I	want	to	be	clear	here	that	I	am	in	no	way	claiming	that	this	is	how	the	disease	does	
or,	indeed	should,	function	in	the	real	world.	Instead,	I	am	arguing	that	this	is	how	the	disorder	is	
used	within	fiction,	and	in	the	context	of	the	cultural	moment	in	which	the	texts	were	written.		
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The	DID	texts’	positioning	of	these	characters	outside	established	binaries	is	indicative	of	
fiction’s	utopian	function,	in	this	case	manifested	in	the	suggestion	that	there	is	a	way	to	break	free	of	
oppressive	social	norms:	“the	pleasures	and	transgressions	involved	in	the	experience	of	popular	
fiction	are	a	constant	reminder	that	a	better,	more	fulfilled	life	is	a	possibility”	(McCracken:	14).	I	will	
discuss	this	idea	in	more	detail	in	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis,	but	for	now	I	want	to	return	to	the	
role	of	genre,	and	reasons	why	the	texts	employ	these	generic	strategies.	
This	generic	strategy	is	representative	of	the	dissociative	identity	disorder	depicted	in	the	
text,	and	the	disruption	of	generic	convention	mirrors	the	disruption	of	social	norms	and	values.	In	
this	reading,	the	form	of	the	text	becomes	a	metaphor	for	the	characters’	condition,	and	one	more	
element	of	the	literary	representation	of	this	disease.	It	is	possible	to	go	further	than	this,	however,	
and	suggest	instead	that	this	narrative	strategy	is	in	fact	a	literary	representation	of	the	effects	of	
trauma,	which	we	also	see	in	all	of	these	texts.	Traumatic	experience	is	the	cause	of	the	characters’	
DID,	and	I	discussed	in	Chapter	3	the	way	that	trauma	works	to	disrupt	meaning,	language,	time,	and	
history,	and	that	this	ultimately	leads	to	the	destruction	of	the	self	as	a	singular	entity,	which	is	what	
causes	characters	to	split	into	multiple	personalities.	The	therapeutic	cure	for	trauma	is	to	‘work	
through’	it	and	‘master’	it,	and	this	mastery	ultimately	allows	people	with	dissociative	identity	
disorder	to	reintegrate	and	return	to	a	singular	state.	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	3	how	the	DID	texts	
resist	this	idea,	and	link	trauma	to	society	and	the	pressure	to	conform	to	normative	social	roles.	
Because	trauma	is	bound	up	with	society,	these	characters	never	overcome	their	trauma	and	so	
cannot	be	cured.	They	do	not	and	cannot	conform	to	social	norms	and	until	such	time	as	society	is	
changed,	the	characters	will	remain	‘ill’.	Indeed,	we	see	this	in	Fight	Club	where	Sebastian’s	trauma	is	
an	economic	one:	he	is	emasculated	and	traumatised	by	capitalist	society	and	his	position	as	a	
worker.	By	the	end	of	the	novel,	this	system	has	not	changed,	so	how	can	Sebastian	truly	be	cured	of	
his	dissociative	identity	disorder?		
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Indeed,	this	is	seemingly	confirmed	in	the	sequel	comic	book	Fight	Club	2,	which	itself	plays	
with	notions	of	endings.	Durden	of	course	returns	in	the	comic,	though	Sebastian	believes	the	
medication	he	is	taking	(an	on-going	treatment	of	DID,	not	a	cure,	it	should	be	noted)	is	keeping	
Durden	supressed	despite	the	late	capitalist	society	in	which	Sebastian	lives	and	works	remaining	the	
same.	In	many	ways,	the	comic	is	Palahniuk’s	way	of	commenting	upon	the	popularity	of	the	original	
novel	(particularly	after	the	film	adaptation	was	released),	and	sees	Palahniuk	(who	appears	as	a	
character	within	the	comic)	trying	to	“resolve”	Durden,	who	he	now	sees	as	an	“idea”	embedded	in	
cultural	consciousness	(Fight	Club	2	issue	8).	Palahniuk’s	solution	is	to	kill	Sebastian,	Marla	and	
Durden	by	burying	them	in	a	cave-in	at	the	end	of	issue	9,	though	this	‘ending’	proves	to	be	a	false-
start.	The	final	issue	(issue	10)	begins	with	an	angry	mob	of	readers	protesting	outside	of	Palahniuk’s	
house	to	try	and	get	him	to	change	the	ending.	Though	Palahniuk	argues,	the	fans	override	him,	take	
a	vote,	and	take	Palahniuk	with	them	to	dig	the	central	characters	out	of	the	cave-in	caused	by	the	
bomb	explosion	at	the	end	of	the	previous	issue.	Durden	therefore	endures,	the	very	cultural	‘idea’	
that	Palahniuk	wishes	he	could	‘resolve’	and	destroy.	The	ending	of	the	comic	reinforces	some	of	the	
ideas	I	have	discussed	in	this	chapter,	as	Sebastian	is	once	again	not	cured	by	the	end	of	the	narrative.	
Indeed,	Palahniuk	(the	character)	overtly	rejects	this	cathartic	narrative	by	stating,	“I	refuse	to	give	
readers	an	uplifting	faux	experience	engineered	to	comfort	them	and	perpetuate	the	sociopolitical	
and	economic	status	quo”	(Fight	Club	2	issue	10).	Sebastian	cannot	be	cured	of	his	DID	because	
Palahniuk	is	not	interested	in	conforming	to	narrative	norms	and	giving	the	reader	a	typical	cathartic	
story.	Those	familiar	with	Palahniuk’s	work	will	not	be	surprised	to	hear	this,	but	for	readers	who	only	
know	Fight	Club—and	those	who,	like	some	of	the	fans	at	the	end	of	the	comic,	have	only	seen	the	
film	which	significantly	changed	the	novel’s	ending	so	that	it	was	more	hopeful—this	is	a	clear	
address	from	Palahniuk	about	his	intentions	as	an	author.25			
																																								 																				
25	The	novel	ends	with	Sebastian	in	a	psychiatric	hospital	while	people	with	bruised	faces	address	him	as	Mr	
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If	the	societies	depicted	in	these	texts	contribute	to	the	causes	of	the	characters’	dissociation	
and	remain	unchanged	by	the	end	of	the	novel,	if	the	characters	are	still	‘traumatised’	by	their	
inability	to	conform	to	its	expectations,	it	makes	sense	that	the	dissociative	characters	cannot	be	
‘cured’	of	their	dissociative	identity	disorder.	In	a	similar	way,	given	that	the	traumas	found	within	
these	texts	and	associated	with	each	dissociate	character	are	usually	linked	to	gender—sexual	
violence	for	the	female	characters;	the	emasculating	effects	of	late	capitalist	on	Sebastian;	Victor’s	
PTSD	from	fighting	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan—it	would	make	sense	that	the	texts	are	able	to	resist	a	
return	to	real-world	heteronormative	gender	norms	because	these	traumas	are	caused	by	or	related	
to	these	norms.	Patriarchal	attitudes	to	women	create	the	kind	of	culture	in	which	sexual	violence	is	
possible,	while	the	pressures	to	be	a	‘real	man’	(whatever	that	is),	to	which	Victor	and	Sebastian	are	
unable	to	conform,	are	what	cause	them	to	be	traumatised	by	their	experience.	This	seemingly	raises	
the	question	of	endings	again,	because	though	there	is	no	‘end’	to	the	trauma	and	social	pressure	to	
conform,	there	is	clearly	an	‘end’	to	the	texts.	How	can	the	texts	end	if	the	trauma	continues?	Generic	
convention	dictates	that	these	issues	should	be	resolved	before	the	text	can	truly	end,	but	this	is	not	
the	case	in	these	examples.		
These	endings	can	be	viewed	as	arbitrary	cut	off	points,	and	indeed,	many	of	them	imply	
events	that	will	happen	after	the	end	of	the	texts:	United	States	of	Tara	ends	with	Tara	going	to	get	
help	from	a	DID	specialist	in	Boston	though	we	never	see	what	happens	when	she	gets	there;	Set	This	
House	ends	with	Andrew	waiting	for	a	visit	from	Penny,	with	the	suggestion	that	she	isn’t	as	
reintegrated	as	she	thinks.	In	the	real	world,	these	characters	would	go	on	to	live	the	rest	of	their	
lives,	it	is	just	that	in	fiction	we	do	not	get	to	witness	what	happens	to	them	outside	the	narrative	
scope	of	the	text.	To	use	a	slightly	facetious	example,	fairy	tales	frequently	end	with	the	phrase	‘…and	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																														
Durden	and	tell	him	they’re	all	waiting	for	him	to	get	out.	The	film	ends	with	Sebastian	and	Marla	reunited	and	
holding	hands	as	they	watch	the	bombs	that	Project	Mayhem	have	set	in	a	number	of	high-rise	office	buildings	
explode.	
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they	lived	happily	ever	after’	and	this	generic	convention	neatly	sums	up	this	fictional	paradox:	the	
characters	do	not	cease	to	exist	after	the	end	of	the	novel,	it	is	just	that	we	as	readers	are	not	told	
how	they	live	the	rest	of	their	lives.		
In	many	ways,	this	convention	exists	because	the	point	of	fairy	tales	is	that	the	characters	
have	overcome	adversity	and	the	issues	that	made	their	lives	difficult;	by	the	end	of	the	text	these	
obstacles	to	their	happiness	have	been	removed	and	they	go	on	to	live	long	and	happy	lives,	which	
are	so	uneventful	as	to	provide	no	opportunities	for	further	narration.	It	is	a	widely	held	belief	that	
narratives	cannot	work	without	conflict,	something	to	fight	against,	or	allow	the	characters	room	to	
grow	and	develop.	Indeed,	Altman	talks	about	this	in	relation	to	generic	crossroads:	“Plots…	require	
opposition	or	exception;	they	cannot	be	built	around	uniformity”	(154).	According	to	Altman,	it	is	for	
this	reason	that	texts	allow	us	to	spend	time	in	the	company	of	an	outlaw	before	returning	us	to	the	
safety	of	the	law	at	the	end.	Spending	time	with	the	outlaw	is	exciting	and	offers	thrills	for	the	
audience,	and	to	return	to	my	fairy	tale	example,	it	is	for	this	reason	that	there	are	no	fairy	tales	that	
continue	post-happy	ending;	without	conflict,	there	is	nothing	to	drive	the	plot	and	keep	the	reader	
interest.	The	conflict	in	the	original	fairy	tale	is	the	interesting	part,	what	happens	after	the	happy	
ending	is	not,	and	yet	with	the	DID	texts,	what	happens	after	the	ending	could	very	much	be	of	
interest	to	the	reader.	At	the	end	of	United	States	of	Tara,	the	reader	is	left	to	wonder	if	Tara	is	
ultimately	cured	by	the	specialist	in	Boston;	at	the	end	of	Set	This	House	the	reader	does	not	discover	
if	Penny’s	reintegration	therapy	worked;	and	at	the	end	of	Fight	Club	it	is	suggested	but	never	
confirmed	that	Tyler	Durden	could	resurface	again.	By	refusing	to	cure	the	characters,	by	refusing	to	
‘properly’	(according	to	generic	convention)	end	the	narratives,	the	reader	is	left	with	questions	that	
can	never	definitively	be	answered.		
Though	the	texts’	plots	outside	of	the	representation	of	DID	are	ended,	thus	offering	some	
narrative	closure,	there	is	no	‘happy	ending’	when	it	comes	to	the	characters’	disease.	We	are	back	to	
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Eco’s	‘open’	endings,	then,	in	which	there	are	multiple	possibilities,	a	narrative	strategy	that	reflects	
the	very	condition	the	texts	represent.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	the	suggestion	that	characters	could	
be	cured	after	the	end	of	the	text	(Tara,	for	example),	while	on	the	other	the	narratives	present	
evidence	that	problematises	the	very	nature	of	a	cure.	In	addition,	if	Tara	is	cured	after	the	end	of	the	
narrative	and	we	as	readers	never	see	it	happen,	can	it	be	said	to	have	happened	at	all?	This	storyline	
does	not	exist	in	the	canon	of	the	show,	it	is	merely	hinted	at,	and	there	is	no	definitive	canonical	
proof	to	point	to	as	evidence	of	Tara	being	cured.	Of	course,	there	is	no	proof	that	she	is	not	cured	in	
Boston,	either.		
These	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	problematise	the	notion	of	a	cure,	and	this	in	turn	
disrupts	the	generically	conventional	ending	that	we	expect	from	an	illness	narrative.	Further,	this	
disruption	can	be	read	as	a	generic	metaphor	for	dissociative	identity	disorder	and	the	issues	that	the	
texts	perceive	to	be	at	stake:	multiplicity	of	identity	within	the	characters	becomes	multiplicity	of	
meaning	and	interpretation	within	generic	form.	This	ability	to	play	with	and	subvert	generic	
convention	is	reflected	in	the	texts’	ability	to	play	with	and	subvert	dominant	cultural	values,	
particularly	in	terms	of	the	texts’	representation	of	gender	variance.	The	cause	of	these	disruptions	
could	be	said	to	be	trauma;	both	the	traumatic	events	that	cause	the	characters’	DID	and	the	trauma	
of	heteronormative	gender	expectations.	There	is	no	end	to	this	trauma,	no	way	to	work	through	or	
master	it,	and	so	there	is	no	real	‘end’	to	the	narratives.	I	argued	in	Chapter	3	that	trauma	disrupts	
meaning	and	it	seems	to	be	case	here	that	trauma	disrupts	singular	meaning,	leaving	meaning	as	
fragmented	and	multiple	as	the	traumatic	events	left	the	dissociative	characters.	Genre,	or	the	DID	
texts	as	a	genre	in	particular,	are	seemingly	‘traumatised’	in	a	similar	way	to	the	characters.	The	
disruption	of	genre	thereby	works	as	a	neat	literary	metaphor	for	the	experiences	of	the	characters,	
and	ultimately	recreates	their	experiences	in	literary	form.	These	are	texts	that	ultimately	celebrate	
plurality	and	people	who	function	on	the	fringes	of	society	for	whatever	reason.	Their	generic	
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strategy	mirrors	this	celebration,	and	offers	the	reader	multiple	interpretations	and	meanings.	
Conformity	to	generic	convention	would	go	against	this	celebration,	and	prevent	the	texts	from	
exploring	these	issues.		
I	have	largely	limited	my	analysis	to	a	reading	of	the	texts’	representation	of	dissociative	
identity	disorder	by	focussing	my	analysis	through	a	biocultural	model	of	illness	(narrative)	in	order	to	
determine	what	the	texts	are	saying	about	cultural	values,	social	norms,	or	Western	contemporary	
society	more	generally.	I	have	included	Sontag’s	work	in	this	chapter	because	I	am	aware	that	some	
critics	find	this	approach	problematic,	but	the	counter-arguments	offered	by	the	work	of	Morris,	
Kleinman	and	others	validate	this	theoretical	approach	to	examining	the	representation	of	DID.	The	
use	of	a	biocultural	model	of	illness	allows	us	to	examine	why	these	texts	appeared	in	this	moment,	
with	this	particular	narrative	and	generic	approach	to	DID.	Why	is	dissociative	identity	disorder	
employed	metaphorically	within	these	fictional	texts	as	a	link	to	an	ability	to	resist	social	norms	and	
exist	outside	of	established	social	binaries?	Kleinman	argues	that	“Illness	has	meaning	in	a	second	
sense,	insofar	as	particular	symptoms	and	disorders	are	marked	with	cultural	salience	in	different	
epochs	and	societies”	and	from	my	reading	of	these	texts	so	far	it	seems	to	be	the	case	that	DID	has	a	
particular	cultural	salience	for	contemporary	Western	late-capitalist	society	(18).	The	next	chapter	
picks	up	this	interest	and	examines	non-normativity	within	the	texts	more	closely	by	focussing	on	
their	approaches	to	identity	and	how	this	interest	in	breaking	social	norms	and	conventions	is	
reflected	within	the	characters	themselves,	with	a	particular	focus	on	gender.		
	 	
150	
	
	
	
Chapter	5		
The	Social	Construction	of	Gender	and	Resisting	Heteronormativity	
	
The	previous	chapter	discussed	the	ways	in	which	DID	texts	engage	with	concepts	of	normativity,	
particularly	the	ways	in	which	they	subvert	narrative	and	generic	expectations.	These	texts	frequently	
resist	curing	the	characters	of	their	disorder,	even	when	they	are	able	to	work	through	their	trauma,	
and	this	is	part	of	a	wider	interest	in	the	ways	that	social	pressures	to	conform	to	certain	behaviours	
act	to	keep	people	in	socially	sanctioned	roles.	In	some	texts	such	as	Fight	Club,	and	United	States	of	
Tara,	these	social	pressures	are	linked	to	dissociative	identity	disorder,	and	it	is	for	this	reason	that	
Sebastian	is	not	cured	by	the	end	of	the	novel:	the	social	pressures	which	led	him	to	dissociate	have	
not	been	removed,	so	he	cannot	be	cured.	Similarly	with	Tara,	everyone	else	is	able	to	adopt	different	
personas	to	operate	within	society,	but	Tara’s	alters	are	a	disordered	version	of	this	performance	
because	she	is	not	able	to	control	their	appearance.	Until	she	can	do	so,	Tara	too	remains	‘ill’	at	the	
end	of	the	text.	In	problematising	these	narratives	of	curing,	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	
suggest	a	link	between	illness	and	the	society	in	which	this	illness	appears,	namely	that	“social	
contradictions	[are]	easily	displaced	into	images	of	personal	illness	[...]	to	nourish	the	suspicion	that	
any	perceived	lack	was	one’s	own	fault”	(Ohmann:	212).	Indeed,	the	previous	chapter	demonstrated	
that	social	pressures	to	conform	to	norms	are	a	type	of	‘trauma’	within	dissociative	identity	texts	(as	
Sebastian	clearly	demonstrates	in	Fight	Club).	Those	who	do	not	conform	are	therefore	said	to	be	‘ill’,	
and	some	illness	narratives	seek	to	cure	‘illness’	by	having	characters	learn	to	better	fit	into	their	
society	(particularly	texts	dealing	with	autism	and	Asperger’s	syndrome,	as	discussed	elsewhere	in	
this	thesis).	Narratives	which	choose	to	‘cure’	characters	by	having	them	better	fit	into	society	ignore	
the	fact	that	society	itself	is	‘ill’	in	Ohmann’s	reading;	Ohmann	argues	that	these	illness	narratives	
give	the	characters	the	condition	rather	than	admit	the	extent	to	which	normative	identities	are	
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socially	constructed,	and	that	it	is	possible	to	resist	social	pressures	to	conform.	If	the	social	
construction	of	identity	is	not	problematised	and	is	accepted	as	‘normal’,	there	is	no	need	to	change	
(or	cure)	the	dominant	social	forces,	and	so	the	condition	given	to	the	characters	as	a	way	of	excusing	
their	inability	to	fit	into	dominant	cultural	values	(for	example,	Asperger’s	or	autism)	is	not	cured	by	
the	end	of	the	text.	
I	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter	that	this	interest	in	resisting	cathartic	illness	narrative	
conventions	is	linked	to	a	wider	interest	in	endings,	and	problematising	the	notion	of	what	an	ending	
should	be.	United	States	of	Tara	ends	before	Tara	gets	to	Boston	to	work	with	a	DID	specialist	and	
hopefully	cure	her	condition;	people	keep	referring	to	Sebastian	as	Mr	Durden	and	assume	Tyler	will	
return	at	the	end	of	Fight	Club	(which	he	does,	in	the	sequel	comic	Fight	Club	2);	Echo	chooses	to	
retain	her	alter	personalities	at	the	end	of	Dollhouse;	at	the	end	of	Set	This	House	in	Order	Penny’s	
reintegration	therapy	does	not	work,	while	Andrew	chooses	not	to	pursue	further	treatment	but	
instead	continues	to	manage	his	condition.	This	interest	in	resisting	norms	extends	to	the	texts’	
approach	to	the	form	of	the	texts	and	generic	convention;	texts	resist	the	pressure	to	cure	characters,	
and	end	the	narratives	in	some	cases	before	characters	have	even	attempted	treatment.	
Ultimately,	these	texts	are	interested	in	resisting	norms,	then;	both	the	social	norms	the	
characters	should	conform	to,	and	the	generic,	formal	and	representational	norms	of	the	texts	
themselves.	These	texts	celebrate	plurality	and	the	ability	to	resist	social	pressures	to	conform,	and	
this	is	further	demonstrated	through	the	texts’	approach	to	gender	identity.	This	chapter	uses	a	queer	
theory	framework	to	examine	the	way	gender	identity	operates	within	these	texts.	Many	of	the	
characters	have	non-normative	gender	identities	(Andrew	is	female-bodied;	Sebastian	is	not	
traditionally	masculine,	forced	into	a	‘feminine’	consumer	role	by	the	conventions	of	capitalism	as	
discussed	elsewhere),	or	overly	stereotypical	normative	gender	identities	(Tara’s	alters	Alice,	a	1950s	
housewife,	and	her	cross-gender	alter,	Buck,	a	Southern	redneck	Vietnam	veteran;	the	hyper-
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masculine	Tyler	Durden).	This	chapter	examines	the	extent	to	which	the	choice	to	include	these	
gender	identities	supports	the	texts’	interest	in	subverting	or	playing	with	social	expectations	and	
non-normativity.		In	these	texts,	gender	identity	is	another	mark	of	difference	which	is	traditionally	
frowned	upon	by	society.	If	DID	is	read	as	a	celebration	of	multiplicity	and	non-normativity,	then	the	
various	gender	identities	of	the	alter	personalities	emphasise	this	aspect	of	the	condition	and	serve	
further	to	highlight	the	break	from	society’s	expectations	inherent	within	dissociative	identity	
disorder.	What	I	mean	by	this	is	that	if	DID	is	a	subversion	of	the	socially	dominant	idea	of	the	unified	
self,	then	the	choice	to	give	dissociative	characters	gender	variant	alters	further	emphasises	the	break	
from	societal	norms	and	expectations.	This	chapter	offers	a	brief	overview	of	queer	theorists’	
approaches	to	a	heteronormative	gender	binary,	and	the	ways	in	which	contemporary	American	
social	forces,	including	(briefly)	fictional	representations,	perpetuate	this	normative	binary,	before	
moving	on	to	examine	how	gender	and	gender	identity	is	represented	within	DID	texts.	By	
demonstrating	the	way	in	which	(heteronormative,	binary)	gender	is	constructed	and	understood	in	
the	contemporary	U.S.,	a	clear	contrast	emerges	in	the	way	DID	texts	represent	transgender	and	
cross-gender	alter	identities,	once	again	demonstrating	these	texts’	interest	in	unconventional	or	
non-normative	identity.	The	chapter	seeks	to	determine	if	representations	of	non-normative	gender	
identity	fit	into	the	wider	interest	in	non-normativity	evident	within	DID	texts.	
Queer	theorists	such	as	Judith	Butler	and	Kate	Bornstein	argue	that	there	is	nothing	more	
strictly	policed	by	contemporary	Western	society	than	the	binary	gender	system.	Everyone	is	placed	
into	one	of	two	boxes	at	birth	and	then	kept	there	through	strictly	enforced	gender	codes:	there	are	
men	and	there	are	women	and	nothing	in	between.	Gender	identity	is	only	a	problem	because	
contemporary	American	society	makes	it	so;	heteronormative	notions	of	gender	are	reinforced	
through	social	and	legal	pressures	which	ostracise	anyone	who	does	not	conform	to	these	ideals.	A	
good	example	of	this	is	the	recent	passing	of	a	number	of	‘bathroom	bills’	in	the	Southern	United	
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States,	most	notably	North	Carolina,	which	legalise	discrimination	against	trans	people	by	forcing	
them	to	use	public	bathrooms	which	match	the	sex	they	were	assigned	at	birth.	These	laws	seem	to	
be	motivated	by	nothing	but	transphobia	on	the	part	of	the	conservative	Republicans	who	advocate	
for	them.	Gender	variant	people	are	made	to	be	the	problem	here,	rather	than,	for	example,	the	
conservative	Republicans	in	the	North	Carolina	Senate	who	wrote	and	passed	the	law.	To	return	to	
Ohmann’s	idea,	the	contradiction	(not	everyone	conforms	to	the	binary	gender	system)	is	glossed	
over	and	dominant	social	attitudes	say	that	people	who	do	not	conform	have	the	‘illness’	
(transgender,	intersex,	and	other	genderqueer	people).	This	is	similar	to	the	way	that	DID	texts	treat	
illness.	Many	of	the	dissociative	characters	do	not	or	cannot	conform	to	the	social	roles	expected	of	
them—Sebastian	cannot,	Andrew	will	not,	for	example—and	it	is	they	who	have	the	disease.	Indeed,	
Andrew	is	the	most	obvious	example	of	this:	he	is	resistant	to	social	norms,	does	not	want	to	‘cure’	
his	condition,	and	has	a	female	body	at	odds	with	his	male	gender	identity.		 	
To	begin	with	then,	I	want	to	examine	this	idea	that	gender	is	socially	constructed	through	
the	performance	of	norms,	an	idea	largely	attributed	to	Judith	Butler.	In	Gender	Trouble	(1990),	she	
states:	
Because	there	is	neither	an	“essence”	that	gender	expresses	or	externalizes	nor	an	
objective	ideal	to	which	gender	aspires,	and	because	gender	is	not	a	fact,	the	various	
acts	of	gender	create	the	idea	of	gender,	and	without	those	acts,	there	would	be	no	
gender	at	all.	Gender	is,	thus,	a	construction	that	regularly	conceals	its	genesis;	the	
tacit	collective	agreement	to	perform,	produce,	and	sustain	discrete	and	polar	
genders	as	cultural	fictions	is	obscured	by	the	credibility	of	those	productions—and	
the	punishments	that	attend	not	agreeing	to	believe	in	them;	the	construction	
“compels”	our	belief	in	its	necessity	and	naturalness.	(190)	
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What	Butler	means	by	this	is	that	gender	is	not	the	natural	system	that	it	is	believed	to	be;	it	is	a	
cultural	classification,	the	way	that	members	of	a	society	are	conditioned	to	‘read’	sex.	For	Butler,	
there	is	no	‘truth’	of	gender	other	than	that	assigned	by	the	culture;	dominant	social	convention	
considers	one	particular	behaviour	or	visual	signifier	‘female’	and	so	anyone	who	behaves	in	this	way,	
or	looks	this	way,	is	perceived	to	be	a	woman.	Indeed,	gender	is	believed	to	follow	on	from	sex—all	
female-bodied	people	are	women	and	all	male-bodied	people	are	men—and	behaviour	is	believed	to	
follow	on	from	gender—women	are	feminine	while	men	are	masculine.	Gender	is	‘performative’	
because	it	only	exists	through	our	actions,	traits	and	appearance;	it	is	only	real	when	these	actions	or	
traits	are	performed.	These	combine	to	create	gender	because	they	allow	the	rest	of	society	to	read	
people	as	male	or	female.	One’s	gender	identity	is	only	valid	or	‘successful’	if	the	rest	of	society	
recognises	you	as	male	or	female,	and	the	punishments	visited	upon	those	who	do	not	conform	
compel	people	to	keep	up	the	performance,	perpetuating	the	notion	that	gender	is	a	‘natural’	
system.	By	‘punishments’	Butler	is	referring	to	homophobia	and	transphobia	that	can	lead	to	the	
denial	of	services,	legal	and	political	representation,	as	well	as	violent	hate	crimes	committed	against	
queer	and	gender	variant	people,	and	the	more	general	microaggressions	that	queer,	trans	and	
genderqueer	people	can	face	on	a	daily	basis.	From	this	description,	it	is	possible	to	see	that	the	late	
capitalist	system	that	emasculates	Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	is	also	a	normative	gender	system:	feeling	
trapped	in	a	traditionally	‘feminine’	consumer	role,	he	creates	the	hyper-masculine	Tyler	Durden	to	
destroy	the	capitalist	system	that	keeps	him	oppressed.	Indeed,	different	hegemonic	systems	such	as	
gender,	race	and	class	are	often	tightly	entwined,	and	this	is	particular	evident	within	DID	texts	as	the	
above	example	demonstrates.		
	 In	most,	(if	not	all)	Western	societies,	both	sex	and	gender	are	viewed	as	binary	systems	with	
little	room	for	other	options,	despite	the	fact	that	there	are	many	intersex,	trans,	and	other	gender	
variant	people	who	live	outside	these	binaries.	Indeed,	trans	and	intersex	people	problematise	binary	
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constructions	of	sex	and	gender,	and	immediately	reveal	the	construction	in	the	same	way	that	
dissociative	characters	like	Tara	make	obvious	her	friends’	and	family’s	role	playing.	U.S.	society’s	
adherence	to	a	binary	system	of	sex	and	gender	has	been	challenged	by	critics	such	as	Anne	Fausto-
Sterling,	who	argues	that,	based	on	combinations	of	male	and	female	sex	characteristics	such	as	
chromosomes	and	genitals,	one	could	make	the	case	for	five	or	more	sexes.26	Despite	the	activities	of	
gender	activists	such	as	Cheryl	Chase,	gender	theorists	like	Kate	Bornstein,	and	academics	like	Fausto-
Sterling,	gender	identities	outside	of	‘male’	and	‘female’	are	largely	unrecognised	by	society	as	valid	
options.	As	a	result,	the	people	who	belong	to	these	unrecognised	categories	must	be	forced	back	
into	‘male’	and	‘female’;	intersex	children	are	often	subjected	to	‘corrective’	surgeries	without	their	
knowledge,	for	example,	while	trans	people	hoping	to	transition	must	carefully	adhere	to	the	
heteronormative	notions	of	gender	established	by	the	medical	and	psychiatric	communities	in	order	
to	access	treatment	such	as	hormones	and	sexual	reassignment	surgery.	These	treatments	serve	to	
force	gender	variant	people	back	into	the	‘safe’	categories	that	society	recognises,	with	the	ultimate	
goal	of	erasing	their	problematic	gender	identities.		
	 As	well	as	being	policed	by	the	medical	establishment,	gender	is	reproduced	through	social	
conditioning	and	within	the	media.	A	clear	example	of	this	in	the	sorts	of	toys	male	and	female	
children	are	expected	to	play	with	in	the	U.S:	boys	stereotypically	like	toy	soldiers	and	trucks,	while	
girls	are	expected	to	play	with	dolls.	These	stereotypes	and	cultural	norms	are	so	ingrained	that	any	
moment	of	transgression	is	often	seen	as	an	indication	that	something	might	be	‘wrong’,	usually	
because	of	some	belief	that	transgressing	gender	norms	like	these	when	young	might	indicate	a	child	
																																								 																				
26	Fausto-Sterling	originally	made	the	case	for	five	sexes—male,	female,	true	hermaphrodites,	male	
pseudohermaphrodites,	and	female	pseudohermaphrodites—but	in	a	later	article	she	argues	that	this	is	
perhaps	just	as	reductive	as	the	original	binary	system,	and	instead	calls	for	the	understanding	“that	people	
come	in	an	even	wider	assortment	of	sexual	identities	and	characteristics	than	mere	genitals	can	distinguish”	
(The	Five	Sexes,	Revisited:	22).	
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could	grow	up	to	be	queer.	The	notion	that	particular	clothes	or	toys	could	‘make’	someone	gay	or	
transgender	is	absurd,	but	these	things	can	and	have	been	harshly	policed	in	Western	society.27	These	
sorts	of	divisions	are	further	(re)produced	through	advertising,	which	‘genders’	products	such	as	
razors	(black,	silver	and	blue	for	men,	pink	or	turquoise	for	women)	and	even	biro	pens.28	
	 Non-normative	gender	identity	and	queer	sexuality	have	also	been	policed	by	film	and	
television	representations	of	queer,	trans	and	intersex	people.	In	the	early	days	of	Hollywood,	the	
Motion	Picture	Production	Code	prevented	queer	people	from	being	depicted	on	screen.	As	a	result,	
when	gay	or	trans	people	were	allowed	past	the	censors	they	often	had	to	be	highly	coded,	and	never	
explicitly	reference	homosexuality	or	gender	variance.	As	a	result,	the	‘sissy’	characters	of	the	30s	and	
40s	rose	to	prominence,	and	while	no	reference	was	made	to	sexual	practice	the	violation	of	gender	
codes	(so	often	linked	with	an	ability	to	‘read’	people	as	queer)	allowed	these	characters	to	be	read	
as	homosexual	if	one	chose	to	do	so.	Following	the	removal	of	the	Motion	Picture	Production	Code,	
homosexuality	gradually	began	to	be	referenced	more	overtly	on	screen,	but	these	characters	were	
often	punished	in	some	way	for	their	open	homosexuality,	because	it	had	to	be	made	clear	to	the	
(mainstream)	audience	that	queer	lifestyles	were	not	a	valid	option.	This	is	similar	to	the	way	that	
Altman	describes	genre	as	a	means	of	spending	time	with	an	‘outlaw’	(that	is,	a	person	who	is	not	
representative	of	hegemonic	values);	queer	characters’	deaths	are	one	way	to	return	the	reader	to	
the	safety	of	the	law	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	As	a	result,	these	characters	were	often	lonely,	
unhappy,	and	frequently	committed	suicide	or	were	killed	at	the	end	of	the	film.	This	became	such	a	
common	occurrence	that	Russo	includes	a	‘necrology’	at	the	end	of	The	Celluloid	Closet	listing	the	
																																								 																				
27	The	idea	that	gender	transgression	was	reflective	of	a	queer	sexuality	had	been	the	subject	of	study	by	
sexologists	like	George	Rekers,	Ivar	Lovaas,	and	Richard	Green	during	the	1960s	and	70s.	See	Richard	Green,	
The	“Sissy	Boy	Syndrome”	and	the	Development	of	Homosexuality	(1987)	and	George	Rekers	and	Ivar	Lovaas,	
“Behavioural	Treatment	of	Deviant	Sex-Role	Behaviours	in	a	Male	Child.”	Journal	of	Applied	Behaviour	Analysis	
7.2	(Summer	1974).	This	research	treated	non-typical	gender	identity	as	a	sign	of	homosexuality,	and	sought	to	
socialise	children	back	into	normative	roles	in	order	to	‘prevent’	them	from	becoming	homosexual	in	later	life.		
28	See	the	recent	backlash	against	Bic’s	range	of	pens	‘For	Her’:	Anna	Pollitt.	“Bic’s	pen	‘For	Her’	backlash.”	
Stylist.	http://www.stylist.co.uk/life/bics-pen-for-her-backlash	[Accessed	August	2016].	
157	
	
	
	
details	of	forty-four	queer	characters	and	how	they	died	(347-349).	These	sorts	of	representations	
and	the	punishments	visited	on	LGBTQ+	characters	unfortunately	continue	to	the	present	day,	
particularly	when	it	comes	to	fictional	queer	women.	Between	January	and	July	2016,	there	have	
been	18	queer	female	characters	killed	on	U.S.	television	shows.29	The	death	of	Lexa	on	The	100	
(revisiting	the	very	worst	of	LGBTQ+	stereotypes:	Lexa	was	killed	shortly	after	consummating	her	
romantic	relationship	with	the	show’s	female	protagonist	Clarke,	which	had	been	unfolding	on	screen	
for	two	seasons)	and	resulting	fan	backlash	(largely	because	the	writers	had	spent	time	reassuring	
queer	fans	in	the	hiatus	between	seasons	that	nothing	bad	was	going	to	happen	to	Lexa)	brought	
awareness	of	the	so-called	‘Bury	Your	Gays’	trope	into	the	mainstream	news	for	the	first	time,	
including	coverage	by	BBC	News,	the	Hollywood	Reporter	and	Variety.30		
	 It	is	not	just	an	increased	chance	of	death	that	LGBTQ+	fictional	characters	have	to	contend	
with.		There	have	been	other	trends	evident	in	film	and	television	representations	that	act	to	police	
either	queer	sexuality,	gender	identity,	or	both.	The	first	is	that	LGBTQ+	characters	also	frequently	
find	themselves	the	villains	in	mainstream	films.	It	is	particularly	significant	that	two	of	the	horror	
films	I	mentioned	in	Chapter	2—Psycho	and	Haute	Tension—not	only	feature	killers	that	are	LGBTQ+	
(Norman	Bates	cross	dresses	as	his	mother,	Marie	is	in	love	with	her	[female]	best	friend	Alex),	but	
also	have	dissociative	identity	disorder	(Norman	seems	to	have	internalised	his	mother	as	a	separate	
																																								 																				
29	In	response	to	this,	queer	lifestyle/media	website	Autostraddle	compiled	a	list	of	all	the	dead	queer	female	
characters	to	ever	appear	on	TV.	When	the	list	was	originally	posted	it	contained	65	deaths,	following	input	
from	readers	the	list	grew	to	160	deaths	as	of	July	2016,	including	an	additional	17	characters	that	died	since	
the	list	was	first	published.	The	list	is	still	growing.	See	Autostraddle.	‘All	160	Dead	Lesbian	and	Bisexual	
Characters	on	TV,	and	How	They	Died.’	11	March	2016.	http://www.autostraddle.com/all-65-dead-lesbian-and-
bisexual-characters-on-tv-and-how-they-died-312315/		
30	See	‘Bury	Your	Gays’	on	tvtropes.com	http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/BuryYourGays;	BBC	
News.	“Fans	revolt	after	gay	TV	character	killed	off.”	11	March	2016.	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-
trending-35786382;	Variety.	“Why	the	Controversial	Death	on	‘The	100’	Matters.”	4	March	2016	
http://variety.com/2016/tv/columns/the-100-lexa-dead-clarke-relationship-13-1201722916/;	The	Hollywood	
Reporter.	‘Bury	Your	Gays:	Why	‘The	100,’	‘Walking	Dead’	Deaths	Are	Problematic.	21	March	2016.	
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/bury-your-gays-why-100-877176							
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personality,	the	killer	in	Haute	Tension	is	an	alter	personality	created	through	Marie’s	repression	of	
her	feelings	for	Alex).	In	both	cases,	their	sexuality	is	more	evidence	of	their	mental	instability;	their	
motives	for	the	crimes	they	commit	are	nothing	more	than	that	they	are	both	mentally	disturbed	
queer	people	with	split	personalities.	Psycho	ends	with	a	psychologist	explaining	Norman’s	split	
personality	while	he	sits	in	a	cell,	taken	over	by	his	‘Mother’	personality,	and	Haute	Tension	ends	with	
Marie	locked	in	a	psychiatric	hospital,	muttering	to	herself	that	she	“won’t	let	anyone	come	between	
us	[Marie	and	Alex]	ever	again.”	Their	‘disturbed’	sexuality	and	gender	identities	are	reflections	of	
their	‘disturbed’	mental	health;	the	audience	is	encouraged	to	see	the	link	between	them.	This	idea	is	
also	frequently	seen	on	television,	particularly	on	older	procedural	crime	shows,	such	as	Law	and	
Order	or	the	original	CSI:	Crime	Scene	Investigation.31	In	older	examples,	the	LGBTQ+	characters	are	
often	sexually	repressed	killers,	and	in	many	cases	the	characters’	queer	identity	and	gender	
representation	are	held	up	as	evidence	of	their	perversion	and	disturbed	minds,	in	the	same	way	that	
they	are	in	Psycho	and	Haute	Tension.		
	 The	second	trend	is	linked	to	the	policing	of	heteronormative	gender	identity.	While	it	seems	
to	be	something	of	a	truism	that	gay	men,	when	they	appear	on	screen,	are	most	often	
stereotypically	camp	(perhaps	because	camp	characters	are	often	also	desexualised	and	therefore	
rendered	somewhat	‘safe’	for	a	mainstream	audience),	lesbians	on	the	other	hand	are	portrayed	as	
overwhelming	feminine.	The	majority	of	lesbian	and	bisexual	main	characters	that	have	appeared	on	
U.S.	television	in	recent	years—on	shows	such	as	Grey’s	Anatomy,	Pretty	Little	Liars,	Glee,	Lost	Girl,	
Chicago	Fire,	Orphan	Black,	Sense8,	Black	Sails,	Transparent,	The	100,	Wynonna	Earp,	and	Orange	is	
the	new	Black—are	conventionally	attractive,	feminine	characters.	While	some	of	these	characters	
occasionally	dress	in	what	could	be	considered	a	more	‘masculine’	style—most	notably	Paige	in	Pretty	
																																								 																				
31	See	“Lesbian	and	Bisexual	Women	on	Law	and	Order”	AfterEllen.2005.		http://www.afterellen.com/tv/4414-
lesbian-and-bisexual-women-on-law-and-order.	(Accessed	August	2016).	
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Little	Liars,	and	Nicole	in	Wynonna	Earp	(who	is	referred	to	as	butch	in	a	derogatory	fashion	by	the	
first	season’s	main	villain)—they	are	still	usually	returned	to	a	more	traditionally	‘feminine’	style	at	
various	points.32	They	are	allowed	to	subvert	gender	codes	for	a	little	while,	then,	before	they	are	
returned	to	a	conventional	‘heteronormative’	gender	presentation.	This	could	be	a	wider	problem	
with	U.S.	television	as	a	form;	it’s	possible	that	these	characters	are	all	conventionally	attractive	and	
feminine	simply	because	there	is	no	place	on	television	for	a	woman	who	does	not	fit	these	criteria.	
U.S.	television,	like	other	forms	of	media,	acts	to	shore	up	dominant	values,	even	through	characters	
that	do	not	belong	to	dominant	social	groups.	Indeed,	television	shows	often	work	extra	hard	to	
police	the	gender	identities	of	queer	characters,	something	that	became	particularly	clear	during	the	
trend	of	portraying	older	lesbian	couples	almost	exclusively	as	mothers	during	the	early	2000s.	By	
confirming	these	characters’	desire	to	have	children,	these	shows	make	their	characters’	femininity	
clear,	and	as	heteronormative	as	possible.	This	storyline	has	appeared	on	shows	such	as	ER	(1994-
2009),	Queer	as	Folk	(US	version)	(2000-2005),	The	L	Word	(2004-2009),	Friends	(1994-2004),	and	
more	recently	on	both	Grey’s	Anatomy	and	Chicago	Fire.	It	seems	that	the	shows’	aggressive	
reassertion	of	these	characters’	femininity	is	the	cost	of	their	ability	to	be	openly	queer.	Even	in	a	
modern	era	in	which	the	Motion	Picture	Production	Code	no	longer	operates,	these	characters	must	
be	traditionally	gendered,	and	they	must	conform	to	traditional	gender	roles.	This	demonstrates	that	
even	though	there	is	no	official	list	of	rules	in	place	governing	the	portrayal	of	queer	and	trans	
characters,	contemporary	U.S.	television	does,	to	some	extent,	police	itself	in	line	with	hegemonic	
values	and	social	norms.	These	portrayals	demonstrate	the	extent	to	which	heteronormative	gender	
																																								 																				
32	Interestingly,	the	shows	from	this	list	which	buck	the	trend	somewhat	and	feature	masculine-presenting	
queer	female	characters	who	are	able	to	resist	being	forced	back	into	a	more	feminine	identity,	Transparent	
and	Orange	is	the	New	Black,	are	both	shows	made	by	streaming	companies:	Transparent	is	made	by	Amazon,	
while	OITNB	is	made	by	Netflix.	It	is	possible	we’re	starting	to	see	a	split	between	traditional	television	shows	
(which	operate	within	social	hegemonic	structures)	and	streaming	shows	which	are	afforded	more	freedom.	
These	two	shows	are	of	course	also	both	notable	for	being	based	around	the	lives	of	trans	and	queer	
characters,	as	well	as	for	the	racial	diversity	among	the	cast	of	OITNB.		
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systems	are	shored	up	through	all	aspects	of	the	media.		
	 Throughout	this	chapter	so	far	I	have	accepted	Butler’s	explanation	of	gender—that	is,	that	
gender	is	a	socially	constructed	performance—without	offering	any	critique	of	this	position.	I	have	
demonstrated	that	‘ideal’	heteronormative	gender	codes	are	(re)produced	in	our	everyday	lives	
through	how	we	act	and	dress,	and	also	that	the	media,	film	and	television	especially,	add	further	
pressure	and	perpetuate	normative	gender	codes	through	the	representation	of	men,	women,	and	
queer	people.	While	there	is	evidently	a	huge	amount	of	social	pressure	on	us	to	perform	our	gender	
correctly,	and	it	is	clear	that	homophobia	and	transphobia	serve	as	a	means	of	policing	
(heteronormative)	gender,	I	want	briefly	to	problematise	this	construction	of	gender	and	highlight	the	
tension	between	all	gender	as	a	performative	fiction	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	realities	of	gender	
identity	for	gender	variant	people	on	the	other.	There	is	a	tension	here	between	academic	theories	of	
gender	and	the	real-life	experiences	of	trans,	intersex	and	genderqueer	people,	for	whom	the	nature	
of	gender	is	not	something	to	be	debated	but	a	very	important	part	of	their	lives,	similar	to	the	way	
that	the	fictional	representation	of	DID	often	differs	from	the	real-life	experience	of	people	with	the	
disorder	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	Gender	does	not	feel	like	a	performative	fiction	to	a	
trans	person	struggling	to	access	the	medical	tools	required	for	transition,	in	the	same	way	that	real-
life	people	with	DID	do	not	view	their	condition	as	a	means	of	resisting	social	systems	and	norms.	
Having	discussed	this	issue	in	the	previous	chapter	I	return	to	it	here.	Following	this,	I	offer	close	
readings	of	my	primary	DID	texts	to	determine	how	they	represent	gender,	and	gender	variance	in	
particular,	within	their	narratives.	Is	gender	variance	used	metaphorically	in	the	texts	in	the	same	way	
that	DID	is,	despite	this	tension	between	academic	thought	and	real-world	experience?	And	are	the	
characters’	gender	variant	identities	another	form	of	resistance	the	texts	exhibit?		
I	alluded	earlier	to	the	need	for	transgender	people	to	conform	to	heteronormative	gender	
norms	in	order	to	access	medical	treatment	such	as	hormones	and	gender	confirmation	surgery.	The	
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process	of	transition	is	a	long	one,	and	requires	medical	validation	at	each	step	along	the	way;	trans	
people	who	want	to	take	hormones	or	receive	surgery	have	to	convince	psychiatrists	of	their	true	
gender	identity	and	prove	that	they	can	function	as	a	member	of	that	gender	for	a	period	of	time	
before	their	doctors	will	even	consider	putting	them	forward	for	surgery.	This	is	especially	important	
in	the	U.S.	where	trans	people	are	reliant	upon	health	insurance	companies	covering	the	cost	of	their	
treatment.	Not	all	companies	cover	gender	confirmation	surgery	or	related	treatment,	and	those	that	
do	will	often	only	cover	the	cost	of	treatment	if	it	is	a	medical	necessity;	that	is,	if	not	receiving	
surgery	offers	a	very	real	risk	to	the	patient’s	mental	or	physical	well-being.	This	system	acts	to	
medicalise	gender	difference,	and	is	yet	another	way	that	the	binary	gender	system	is	reproduced;	in	
this	system	trans	people	have	to	prove	that	they	can	conform	to	one	of	the	two	binary	options	and	
are	shifted	from	one	option	to	the	other,	with	no	room	for	deviation	from	the	norm.	
	 The	oft	repeated	idea	that	trans	people	are	‘born	in	the	wrong	body’	suggests	that	their	
gender	identities	are	fixed	at	birth,	and	seemingly	resistant	to	all	efforts	to	condition	them	into	a	
gender	that	matches	their	sex.	This	metaphor	suggests	that	trans	people	are	able	to	resist	the	
socialisation	they	receive	as	children,	that	attempts	to	police	their	gender	identity	have	failed.	And	
yet	they	are	still	subject	to	the	same	pressures	as	other	members	of	society—the	high	instance	of	
violence	against	trans	people	indicates	that	this	is	the	case.	How	then	can	we	reconcile	the	
heteronormative	gender	system	with	the	experiences	of	trans	people?	Kate	Bornstein	suggests	the	
idea	that	trans	people	are	‘born	in	the	wrong	body’	is	a	convenient	metaphor	the	trans	community	
uses	to	access	medical	treatment	and	conform	to	the	medical	community’s	(hetero)normative	ideas	
of	gender	identity.	She	argues	that	this	offers	the	path	of	least	resistance	for	trans	people;	the	
medical	community	believes	that	there	are	two	discrete	gender	identities	and	so	trans	people	are	
forced	to	conform	to	this	model	in	order	to	access	treatment.	It	reinforces	the	biological	and	medical	
terms	of	the	debate,	taking	it	away	from	a	sense	of	cultural	conditioning.	If	they	were	‘born	in	the	
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wrong	body’,	the	medical	community	will	aid	them	in	transitioning	into	the	correct	one,	and	so	the	
heteronormative	gender	system	is	maintained.	This	becomes,	in	many	ways,	another	form	of	social	
pressure;	another	way	of	forcing	trans	people	to	conform	to	the	binary.	In	this	model,	they	are	not	
resistant	to	the	pressures	of	normativity	at	all,	because	they	have	to	prove	that	they	can	conform	to	
traditional	gender	roles.	The	medical	profession	then	aids	them	in	transitioning	into	the	‘correct’	
body	in	line	with	their	(normative)	gender	identity,	and	the	result	of	treatment	is	that	trans	people	
now	conform	to	social	pressures	and	the	heteronormative	system.		
	 Bornstein	takes	issue	with	this	medical	narrative,	and	instead	would	rather	see	a	third	space	
for	people	to	develop	their	own	gender	identities	away	from	heteronormative,	binary	notions	of	what	
gender	should	be.	Bornstein	argues	that	the	next	step	for	trans	people	is	to	“establish	a	truly	
transgender	world	view	in	concert	with	other	transgender	people,	because	virtually	all	the	books	and	
theories	about	gender	and	transsexuality	to	date	have	been	written	by	non-transsexuals	who,	no	
matter	how	well	intentioned,	are	each	trying	to	figure	out	how	to	make	us	fit	into	their	world	view”	
(63).	Bornstein	rejects	this	medical	narrative	and	its	aim	of	heteronormativity,	taking	particular	issue	
with	the	way	it	produces	and	reproduces	the	gender	binary	as	outlined	above.	She	goes	further	than	
Butler	in	that	while	she	recognises	the	ways	that	gender	is	constructed,	she	argues	for	a	complete	
dismantling	of	the	system,	and	calls	on	trans	people	to	problematise	the	binary	and	create	a	third	
space	because	she	believes	they	are	uniquely	placed	to	do	so.	This	call	to	arms	has	been	taken	up	by	
some	in	the	trans	community	who	strive	to	live	their	lives	without	a	recognised	gender,	or	cross	
backwards	and	forwards	between	gender	categories	at	will.		
	 While	Bornstein	is	radically	arguing	against	binary	constructions	of	gender,	one	must	be	
careful	to	not	assume	that	Bornstein’s	view	is	that	of	all	trans	people,	or	indeed,	that	of	all	queer	and	
gender	theorists.	Some	trans	people	are	perfectly	happy	with	their	transition	from	one	gender	to	
another,	and	some	cisgender	people	are	perfectly	happy	to	live	their	lives	within	the	gender	they	
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were	assigned	at	birth,	and	never	give	their	gender	identities	a	second	thought.	Indeed,	some	trans	
people	like	Julia	Serano	argue	against	the	idea	that	gender	is	a	performative	fiction.	Serano	is	very	
specific	in	her	criticism:	she	takes	issue	with	the	assumption	that	all	gender	is	performance:	“it	is	a	
crass	oversimplification,	as	ridiculous	as	saying	all	gender	is	genitals,	all	gender	is	chromosomes,	or	all	
gender	is	socialisation”	(85).	Serano	draws	on	her	own	experiences	to	argue	that	gender	does	not	feel	
like	a	performative	fiction	when	you	are	trans	and	face	the	prospect	of	interacting	with	people	when	
you	are	living	as	one	gender	and	all	your	legal	documents	refer	to	you	as	the	other,	or	when	you	are	a	
young	child	convinced	that	you	should	be	the	opposite	gender.	Instead	Serano	calls	for	people	to	
recognise	that	gender	is	not	simply	one	thing	or	another:	“It’s	an	amalgamation	of	bodies,	identities,	
and	life	experiences,	subconscious	urges,	sensations,	and	behaviours,	some	of	which	develop	
organically,	and	others	which	are	shaped	by	language	and	culture....	Instead	of	saying	that	all	gender	
is	performative,	let’s	admit	that	sometimes	gender	is	an	act,	and	other	times	it	isn’t”	(87).	Serano	calls	
for	a	recognition	of	gender	as	a	multi-faceted	construction,	more	in	line	with	the	real-world	
experience	of	trans	and	gender	variant	people	
I	offer	Serano’s	essay	here	as	evidence	of	the	important	work	that	theorists	are	still	
contributing	to	our	understanding	of	gender.	Serano	does	not	think	that	all	gender	is	performance,	
but	rather	a	collection	of	factors	that	vary	from	person	to	person.	Towards	the	end	of	the	essay,	
Serano	boldly	states:	“How	about	this:	let’s	stop	pretending	that	we	have	all	the	answers,	because	
when	it	comes	to	gender,	none	of	us	is	fucking	omniscient”	(87)	and,	despite	the	slightly	tongue-in-
cheek	tone	of	this	sentence,	I	would	agree	with	this	assessment.	Serano’s	essay	provides	space	for	
individual	difference,	and	an	intersectional	engagement	with	issues	like	race	and	class.	The	normative	
gender	model	I	have	discussed	throughout	this	chapter	does	not	do	that,	precisely	because	it	is	a	
hegemonic,	normative	model.	It	is	primarily	a	white,	middle/upper	class	model	of	gender—for	
example,	while	in	the	past	this	model	said	that	women	should	stay	at	home	to	look	after	their	
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children,	working	class	women	could	rarely	afford	to	do	so.	While	these	issues	are	largely	outside	the	
scope	of	this	thesis,	it	is	important	to	note	heteronormativity’s	intersection	with	other	areas	of	
hegemony.	Whether	or	not	one	believes	that	all	gender	is	performative	and	only	real	to	the	extent	
that	it	is	performed	through	acts	and	behaviours,	one	must	acknowledge	the	heteronormativity	of	
Western	society	and	the	multiple	ways	in	which	heterosexual	cisgender	people	are	privileged	in	this	
culture.	The	way	that	social	and	cultural	pressures	act	to	perpetuate	heteronormativity,	as	outlined	in	
this	chapter,	clearly	demonstrates	this.	
This	is	the	model	of	(heteronormative)	gender	that	is	useful	when	it	comes	to	the	dissociative	
identity	disorder	texts.	Whether	or	not	one	takes	the	view	that	gender	is	a	performative	fiction	
(which	can	be	seen	at	odds	with	some	trans	people’s	experience),	one	cannot	deny	that	
heteronormative	cissexist	modes	of	gender	presentation	and	behaviour	are	privileged	and	considered	
the	norm	within	contemporary	Western	cultures	and	societies.	As	such,	the	dissociative	identity	
disorder	texts,	themselves	cultural	artefacts	produced	within	the	contemporary	U.S.	(all	by	
heterosexual,	white	writers)	should	conform	to	these	expectations	when	it	comes	to	representations	
of	gender.	U.S.	society	has	a	clear	problem	with	people	who	do	not	fit	into	the	gender	binary.	Queer	
people	are	often	identified	and	discriminated	against	due	to	their	violations	of	gender	codes;	intersex	
children	are	coerced	into	‘corrective’	surgeries	often	without	their	knowledge;	and	trans	people	are	
forced	to	conform	to	the	gender	binary	if	they	wish	to	access	treatment.	Media	representations	of	
gender	and	sexuality	usually	privilege	heteronormative	identity,	as	I	outlined	above,	but	the	authors	
of	the	DID	texts	are	seemingly	able	to	resist	reproducing	heteronormative	identity	within	their	work.	
This	resistance	to	social	norms	(both	from	the	characters	within	the	texts,	but	also	on	the	part	of	the	
authors)	mirrors	the	texts’	ability	to	resist	generic	and	formal	norms	that	I	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter.			
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	Gender	variance,	or	some	inclusion	of	non-normative	gender	identity,	is	a	fixture	of	the	DID	
texts	I	discuss.	Andrew	is	female-bodied	in	Set	This	House	In	Order;	Sebastian	is	not	traditionally	
masculine	while	Tyler	Durden	is	hypermasculine;	Tara	has	a	male	alter	who	enters	into	a	relationship	
with	a	woman	without	Tara’s	knowledge;	and	Dollhouse	has	featured	cross-gender	alter	personalities,	
most	notably	Victor	accidentally	being	implanted	with	a	female	personality	named	‘Kiki’	whilst	on	a	
mission	in	the	third	episode	of	the	second	season.	This	shared	interest	in	using	alters	as	a	means	of	
exploring	gender	is	significant,	and	points	to	the	texts’	wider	interest	in	all	forms	of	non-normativity	
and	resisting	convention	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	in	relation	to	genre	and	narrative	and	
formal	convention	(illnesses,	resisting	cures,	endings).	This	chapter	seeks	to	draw	out	these	links	
between	gender	variance	and	the	unconventional	representation	of	illness	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter	to	build	a	more	detailed	picture	of	the	texts’	interest	in	non-normativity.	I	begin	with	Set	This	
House	in	Order,	which	offers	the	most	overt	example	of	gender	variance	of	the	DID	texts.	
Throughout	the	first	half	of	Set	This	House	In	Order,	the	reader	believes	that	the	protagonist,	
Andy	Gage,	the	‘main’	personality	Andrew,	and	the	body	all	the	personalities	inhabit,	is	male,	but	it	is	
later	revealed	that	the	body	is	female	and	that	‘Andy’	is	short	for	Andrea.	This	is	revealed	when	
Andrew	is	about	to	have	sex	with	his	friend	Julie.	She	stops	him	when	she	realises	that	he	has	a	
female	body,	and	the	two	quickly	get	into	an	argument	about	the	original	Andy	Gage’s	gender	
identity:	
“When	you	talk	about	Andy	Gage…	the	original	Andy	Gage…	you	always	say	‘he,’	not	
‘she.’”	
“Well…	yeah.”	
“But	if	Andy	Gage	was	a	girl,	then—“	
“Julie…”	Of	all	the	times	to	start	talking	about	metaphysics…	but	it	seemed	important	
to	her,	so	I	curbed	my	impatience.	“I	call	Andy	Gage	‘he’	because,	well,	because	my	
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father	always	does…	and	Adam,	and	Aunt	Sam,	and	everybody	else	in	the	house	too.”	
“But	if	Andy	Gage	was	female…”	
“His	body	was	female,	but	his	soul	was	male.”	I	didn’t	actually	know	this	for	a	fact,	
but	it	made	the	most	sense—and	I	wasn’t	about	to	call	my	father	out	for	
confirmation.	
“You	said	that	souls	and	bodies	were	twins,	though.	Reflections	of	each	other.”	
“In	people	who	are	singular.	But—“	
“But	Andy	Gage	was	singular.	I	mean	he	was	the	original	soul,	right?	He…she…existed	
before	the	split.	So—“	
“Julie,”	I	interrupted,	“Julie,	I	don’t	want	to	be	rude,	but…why	does	this	matter?”	
(Ruff:	237-238)	
The	original	Andy	Gage	was	trans,	then,	or	at	least	gender	variant;	their33	gender	identity	did	not	
match	their	body’s	sex	characteristics.	This,	at	least,	is	Andrew’s	assumption,	and	it	is	never	corrected	
by	any	of	the	other	personalities,	so	the	reader	is	inclined	to	take	his	word	for	it.	Indeed,	it	is	difficult	
to	ascertain	the	truth	of	Andrew’s	belief.	We	are	told	that	the	original	Andy	Gage	was	‘murdered’	by	
their	stepfather	very	shortly	after	their	birth,	and	that	seven	personalities	were	formed	from	the	
splitting	of	Andy	Gage’s	soul.	Of	these	seven	personalities,	five	were	later	‘killed’	by	the	stepfather,	
and	the	two	survivors—Aaron	and	Gideon—were	forced	to	split	themselves	in	order	to	cope.	The	two	
‘original’	personalities	that	we	meet	from	the	first	split	are	male,	but	we	still	have	no	way	of	knowing	
the	gender	identity	of	the	original	Andy	Gage.	We	cannot	assume	that	Andy	Gage	had	a	male	gender	
identity	simply	because	male	personalities	were	formed	when	their	soul	was	split;	the	personalities	
that	we	meet	later	include	the	female	Sam,	who	was	presumably	formed	from	the	splitting	of	Aaron	
																																								 																				
33	I	am	using	they/them/their	pronouns	as	singular	gender-neutral	to	refer	to	Andy	Gage,	in	line	with	
contemporary	queer	and	trans	usage.	
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or	Gideon.	From	this	we	know	that	any	personalities	formed	by	the	splitting	of	another	do	not	
necessarily	have	the	same	gender	identity	as	the	personality	from	which	they	split.		
	 Andrew	also	talks	about	semi-formed	souls	called	‘Witnesses’	who	were	created	by	each	act	
of	abuse	by	the	stepfather.	These	are	largely	children,	but	they	are	also	of	both	genders,	and	we	have	
no	way	of	knowing	whose	soul	they	are	fragments	of.	Indeed,	the	most	important	Witness	in	the	
novel,	who	relives	the	moment	of	abuse	that	created	her	with	Andrew	and	allows	him	to	understand	
that	Andy	Gage’s	mother	knew	about	and	yet	feigned	ignorance	of	the	abuse,	is	described	as	“a	girl	of	
eleven	or	twelve”	(171).	The	reader	does	not	know	which	personality	was	in	charge	of	the	body	when	
this	act	of	abuse	happened	or	whose	soul	the	Witness	fragmented	from,	but	the	reader	can	
determine	that	Andy	Gage	was	living	in	a	female	identity	throughout	childhood.	Indeed,	when	
Andrew	revisits	their	childhood	home,	he	finds	dresses	in	Andy’s	room,	and	is	addressed	as	if	he	is	
female	by	his	neighbours	and	people	who	knew	Andy	when	he	was	younger.	It	should	be	pointed	out,	
of	course,	that	Andy	was	the	subject	of	systematic	emotional	and	sexual	abuse,	and	from	the	one	
memory	we	see,	seemed	to	live	in	a	constant	state	of	fear.	They	wouldn’t	have	had	the	opportunity	
to	develop	a	trans	identity	or	seek	gender	confirmation	treatment,	even	if	they	had	realised	it.	In	
addition,	there	seems	no	way	that	their	parents	would	co-operate	with	treatment	or	pay	any	
attention	to	their	wishes;	their	stepfather	continually	abused	them,	and	their	mother	knew	about	this	
abuse,	resented	the	attention	that	they	received	from	the	stepfather,	and	blamed	Andy	for	it.		
	 Even	after	the	stepfather	died	and	the	abuse	stopped,	we	have	no	way	of	knowing	which	
gender	Andy	Gage	was	living	in	during	the	years	before	Aaron	formed	the	house	and	called	the	
personalities	to	order.	During	this	time,	the	personalities	could	take	over	at	any	time,	and	Aaron,	who	
was	in	charge,	frequently	lost	time	and	had	no	memory	of	doing	things	that	he	had	done,	much	like	
Penny	at	the	start	of	the	novel.	We	are	told	that	Sam	had	a	relationship	with	a	man	before	Andy	Gage	
left	his	hometown,	but	we	do	not	know	if	this	means	that	Andy	Gage	was	living	in	a	female	identity	
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on	a	consistent	basis	or	not—Aaron	was,	presumably,	still	the	dominant	personality	at	this	time.	This	
ambiguity	leaves	the	reader	with	several	unanswerable	questions	in	relation	to	Andy	Gage’s	gender	
identity.	Indeed,	the	novel	does	not	offer	the	reader	a	definitive	explanation	of	Andy	Gage’s	original	
gender	identity,	or	the	history	of	the	formation	of	the	souls	or	which	souls	split	from	which.	But,	I	
would	argue,	it	does	not	necessarily	need	to.	Andrew,	who	is	the	personality	most	often	in	charge	of	
the	body—indeed,	was	created	solely	for	this	purpose	by	Aaron—is	male	and	he	inhabits	a	female	
body.	By	any	definition,	this	sex/gender	link	is	a	queer	one.	Whether	we	want	to—or	indeed,	
should—assign	a	specific	label	of	‘transgender’	or	not,	Andrew’s	gender	identity	does	not	follow	
society’s	heteronormative	expectations.	Andrew	doesn’t	see	why	this	is	an	issue	because	he	does	not	
truly	understand	social	conventions	and	expectations,	and	because	the	original	Andy	Gage	is	long	
dead;	the	personalities	that	exist	now	are	largely	male,	with	a	few	exceptions	such	as	Andrew’s	‘Aunt	
Sam’,	whose	nickname	(from	Samantha)	is	usually	a	male	name,	further	adding	to	the	blurring	of	
heteronormative	gender.	The	body	is	not	a	reflection	of	the	personalities	that	live	inside	it	now,	as	
Andrew	believes	most	singular	people	are,	so	it	does	not	matter	to	him	that	the	body	is	female	and	
he	is	male.	
	 Further,	Andrew	is	already	outside	of	the	norm	in	the	sense	that	he	has	multiple	
personalities,	and	even	more	so	because	he	refuses	to	seek	a	cure	for	his	treatment	in	the	
conventional	way.	He	is	already	living	a	life	outside	of	society’s	conventions,	so	why	should	he	care	if	
his	gender	identity	is	an	unconventional	one	as	well?	Indeed,	there	are	other	moments	in	the	novel	
which	suggest	that	Andrew	is	not	particularly	concerned	with	social	conventions.	Very	early	on	he	
describes	the	process	of	getting	ready	in	the	morning	and	how	each	personality	is	allowed	a	moment	
outside	in	the	shower	or	to	help	brush	the	body’s	teeth,	for	example.	He	concludes	by	explaining	that	
his	‘father’	Aaron	helps	him	get	dressed	because	“I	was	born	with	no	fashion	sense,	and	I	think	my	
father	feels	guilty	about	that”	(11).	After	Aaron	vetoes	his	shirt	selection—a	bright	yellow	plaid	shirt	
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with	red	and	green	checks—and	advises	him	not	to	wear	it	out	in	public,	Andrew	reluctantly	finds	
something	else	to	wear:	“I	did	like	the	shirt,	and	I	hate	having	to	give	things	up	just	because	of	what	
other	people	might	think”	(11).		
Andrew’s	lack	of	concern	with	social	conventions	is	not	shared	by	Julie,	however.	Julie	is	only	
able	to	view	Andrew’s	female	body	and	think	about	the	ways	in	which	it	will	affect	her:	
“I’m	not	a	lesbian,	Andrew.”	
This	was	such	a	non	sequitur	that	for	a	moment	I	was	completely	lost.	“What?”	
“I’m	not	a	lesbian.	I—“	
“But…	I’m	not	a	lesbian,	either.”	I	felt	a	brief,	irrational	surge	of	hope	that	died	when	I	
saw	Julie’s	expression	hadn’t	changed.	She	didn’t	care	whether	I	was	a	lesbian;	she	
cared	that	Andy	Gage’s	body	was	female.	Case	closed.	(238)	
Andrew’s	gender	variance	is	a	problem	for	Julie	because	it	challenges	her	own	sexual	identity.	She	is	
unable	to	see	past	Andrew’s	sex	and	find	his	gender,	even	though	she	has	known	him	for	several	
years	and	never	doubted	that	he	is	male.	In	her	view,	in	having	sex	with	him,	a	male	identified	person	
with	a	female	body,	she	is	having	sex	with	a	‘woman’	and	so	she	could	be	considered	a	lesbian.	Julie	is	
so	bound	by	social	convention	that	she	cannot—or	will	not—break	the	heteronormative	link	that	
society	assumes	between	sex,	gender	and	desire,	and	is	incapable	of	seeing	how	Andrew	could	be	
male	if	he	has	a	female	body.	In	sharp	contrast	to	Julie,	when	Penny	discovers	the	truth	about	
Andrew’s	body	she	reacts	with	initial	surprise,	but	doesn’t	particularly	care:	
“Your	mother	named	you	Andrea?”	
“Yes,”	Andrew	tells	her,	his	voice	sullen.	“The	body	is	female.”	He	looks	at	her	
expectantly,	but	all	Mouse	can	think	to	say	is:	“Oh…OK.”	
“OK?”	says	Andrew.	“You’re	not	freaked	out?”	
Mouse	shakes	her	head.	“I’m…	surprised,	I	guess.	But	freaked	out?	No.”	She	waves	an	
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arm,	trying	to	encompass,	in	a	gesture,	everything	that	has	happened	since	she	
started	work	at	the	Reality	Factory	three	weeks	ago.	“You	know	at	this	point…”	
“Right!”	Andrew	says,	as	if	he’s	been	waiting	for	someone	to	see	things	this	way.	
“Right,	exactly,	it’s	not	that	big	of	a	deal.	I	never	thought	it	was.	But	Julie…”	He	stops	
and	thrusts	his	hands	out,	as	if	pushing	something	away.	“No…	I’m	not	going	to	get	
going	on	that	again.”	(380)	
Penny	and	Andrew	are	both	used	to	living	outside	social	norms,	and	having	identities	that	the	society	
depicted	in	the	novel	tells	them	are	‘abnormal.’	The	idea	that	Andrew	could	be	male	and	also	have	a	
female	body	is	not	one	that	they	find	particularly	troubling	as	they	live	with	the	reality	of	having	
multiple	personalities	(of	both	genders)	and	the	fact	that	their	bodies	do	not	perfectly	represent	the	
personalities	that	live	within	them.	Interestingly,	even	their	non-dominant	personalities	don’t	seem	
to	find	this	arrangement	anything	out	of	the	ordinary;	Penny’s	protector	personality,	Maledicta,	asks	
Sam	if	the	body	is	female	and	when	Sam	replies	in	the	affirmative	says,	“I	fucking	thought	so....	You	
can’t	really	tell,	you	know,	when	Andrew	or	Aaron	are	in	the	fucking	driver’s	seat,	but	with	you	in	the	
body,	it’s	just	fucking	obvious’”	(330).	Beyond	asking	the	question,	Maledicta	doesn’t	seem	to	care	
one	way	or	the	other	and	this	foreshadows	Penny’s	reaction	later	in	the	novel.	
	 Andrew	and	Penny’s	treatment	of	Andy	Gage’s	trans	identity	is	accepting,	and,	most	
importantly,	does	not	seek	to	explain	it,	medicalise	it,	or	cure	it.	In	the	same	way	that	the	novel	
presents	a	new	way	of	managing	dissociative	identity	disorder	rather	than	seeking	a	true	cure	to	the	
condition—one	that	might	not	exist	anyway,	as	Penny’s	failed	reintegration	suggests—it	presents	a	
new	way	to	treat	trans	issues,	which	is	to	say,	to	treat	them	as	a	non-issue.	No	one	in	the	novel	tries	
to	police	Andrew’s	gender	identity;	he	is	not	subject	to	institutional,	legal	or	cultural	discrimination	
due	to	his	trans	identity;	and	nothing	within	the	novel	suggests	that	Andrew’s	male	identity	and	
female	body	is	something	which	needs	to	be	fixed	and	forced	in	line	with	heteronormative	values.	
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The	sections	of	the	novel	that	I	have	quoted	are	really	the	only	occasions	that	attention	is	drawn	to	
the	disparity	between	Andrew’s	gender	and	that	of	the	body,	and	indeed,	the	psychologists	that	
appear	in	the	novel	(the	only	representatives	of	the	medical	community)	do	not	mention	the	issue	at	
all,	concentrating	only	on	dissociative	identity	disorder	and	various	forms	of	treatment.		
	 Set	This	House	In	Order	is	the	only	novel	overtly	to	mention	trans	identities,	but	it	is	not	
unusual	for	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	to	deal	with	issues	of	gender	variance	more	covertly.	In	
United	States	of	Tara,	Tara	has	a	male	alter	named	Buck	who	is	a	stereotypically	masculine,	
homophobic	redneck.	At	the	beginning	of	the	first	season	he	fulfils	this	stereotype	in	almost	every	
way:	continually	drinking	beer,	watching	pornography,	working	on	his	motorcycle,	and	belittling	
Tara’s	gay	son	for	his	sexuality	(and	by	extension,	his	gender	identity).	It	seems	at	first	that	Buck	
wants	very	little	to	do	with	Tara’s	family,	but	this	changes	over	the	course	of	the	season	as	the	viewer	
sees	him	act	as	a	‘protector’	figure:	beating	up	Kate’s	controlling	ex-boyfriend,	looking	after	
Charmaine	after	her	cosmetic	surgery,	and	even	developing	a	more	accepting	attitude	to	Marshall	
and	teaching	him	how	to	bowl.	It	becomes	clear	that	Buck	isn’t	quite	as	harsh	as	he	first	appears,	and	
this	continues	into	the	second	season.	At	the	start	of	Season	2,	Buck	has	a	sexual	relationship	with	
another	woman,	Pammy,	without	Tara’s	knowledge,	and	this	raises	questions	of	sexual	identity	and	
gender	identity.	Buck	is	male,	but	he	inhabits	Tara’s	female	body,	and	has	sex	with	another	woman.	
Pammy	identifies	as	straight	yet	enters	into	a	sexual	relationship	with	Buck.	And	Buck	uses	Tara’s	
body	so	does	this	relationship	have	any	impact	on	Tara’s	identity?		
	 The	relationship	between	Buck	and	Pammy	is	analogous	to	that	between	a	(pre-	or	non-
operative)	trans	man	and	a	heterosexual	woman,	so	it	is	possible	to	say	that	the	relationship	is	a	
transgender	or	queer	(in	the	umbrella	sense	of	the	word)	one.	This	is	reinforced	by	the	only	sex	scene	
the	viewer	sees	being	Buck	performing	oral	sex	on	Pammy.	The	camera	lingers	on	a	close-up	of	
Pammy’s	face,	documenting	her	pleasure,	before	panning	down	her	body	to	reveal	Buck’s	head	under	
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her	skirt.	This	sex	act	is	significant	because	it	is	one	associated	with	queer	women,	and	further	
centres	their	lovemaking	on	Pammy’s	pleasure,	rather	than	Buck’s.	The	final	shot	of	the	scene	
reinforces	this:	Pammy,	sprawled	in	a	reclining	armchair,	takes	up	most	of	the	space	in	the	frame,	
while	Buck	kneels	in	front	of	the	chair.	Despite	this,	Pammy	or	Buck	would	arguably	not	use	the	term	
‘queer’	to	describe	their	relationship.	Indeed,	Pammy	is	able	to	see	past	what	Buck’s	female	body	
means	for	her	own	identity	in	the	way	that	Julie	in	Set	This	House	could	not.	Pammy	never	refers	to	
herself	as	a	lesbian,	or	as	gay,	or	as	queer,	though	she	does	say	that	she	has	never	been	with	a	
woman	before	in	the	second	episode	of	Season	2,	so	she	does	at	least	acknowledge	Buck’s	body.	She	
also	continues	to	refer	to	Buck	with	male	pronouns	despite	this	awareness.	We	can	infer	that	Pammy	
sees	Buck	as	completely	male,	then,	despite	his	female	body,	and	does	not	question	her	own	identity	
based	on	her	relationship.	We	are	never	given	a	reason	for	Pammy’s	ability	to	reject	traditional	
heteronormative	assumptions	about	identity,	but	it	is	clear	that	this	is	a	radical	representation	of	a	
truly	queer	relationship.	This	is	perhaps	owing	to	the	fact	that	Tara	is	made	by	a	subscription	cable	
channel	rather	than	a	mainstream	network.	Subscription	cable	channels	such	as	HBO	and	Showtime	
are	able	be	a	little	more	radical	than	their	network	counterparts	because	they	do	not	rely	on	
attracting	advertisers	to	fund	their	programming.	Whether	or	not	this	freedom	does	contribute	to	the	
portrayal	of	the	relationship	between	Buck	and	Pammy,	it	does	not	change	the	fact	that	the	
relationship	occurs	with	very	little	soul	searching	or	the	need	to	label	it.	This	is	extremely	rare	on	
television,	and	just	one	more	area	in	which	Tara	is	willing	to	push	back	against	stereotypical	
narratives	and	work	to	offer	something	new.	It	is	one	more	rejection	of	normativity,	from	a	show	
which	continually	problematises	the	‘norm’.	
	 I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	4	the	extent	to	which	Tara	problematised	the	idea	that	Tara’s	
dissociative	identity	disorder	could	be	cured,	and	whether	or	not	there	was	one	moment	that	caused	
Tara	to	become	a	multiple	personality.	I	also	argued	that	the	other	characters	in	the	show	knowingly	
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take	on	other	roles	or	personalities	due	to	pressure	to	conform	to	different	social	norms.	Tara	cannot	
do	this,	and	that	is	why	she	is	said	to	be	‘ill’	and	has	this	disease	socially	imposed	upon	her	while	the	
others	do	not.	By	refusing	to	paint	Tara’s	condition	as	something	that	needs	to	be	cured,	the	show	is	
able	to	offer	radical	alternatives	to	the	typical	illness	narrative	and	medical	discourse	surrounding	
DID,	particularly	in	terms	of	identity	and	notions	of	the	unified	self.	Indeed,	Tara’s	identity	is	multiple	
and	fragmented,	and	constantly	shifting	as	the	alters	vie	for	position	and	spend	differing	amounts	of	
time	on	the	outside,	fulfilling	their	own	agendas.	The	show	also	raises	the	question	of	whether	or	not	
Tara	could	unknowingly	have	a	new	Tara-like	alter	in	the	eighth	episode	of	Season	2.	Though	this	idea	
is	not	developed	further,	it	does	position	the	show	closely	with	Set	This	House	In	Order	in	terms	of	its	
understanding	of	DID	and	how	alters	are	formed,	and	the	indeterminate	nature	of	a	multiple	
personality’s	identity.	This	indeterminateness	is	reflected	in	the	show’s	treatment	of	Buck	and	
Pammy’s	relationship;	it	is	a	queer	one,	for	all	the	reasons	I	mentioned	earlier,	but	it	is	left	undefined.	
By	allowing	both	Tara’s	condition	and	issues	of	sexuality	and	gender	identity	to	remain	
indeterminate,	the	show	leaves	room	to	explore	these	issues	in	ways	that	conventional	narratives	
(i.e.	the	illness	narrative	of	curing,	the	typical	‘coming	out’	narrative	often	found	on	television)	do	not	
allow.	
	 Indeed,	we	also	see	this	in	Marshall’s	storyline	in	the	second	season,	to	some	extent.	Though	
he	never	comes	out	or	labels	himself	as	such,	it	is	assumed	and	accepted	by	everyone	throughout	the	
first	season	that	Marshall	is	gay	and	his	relationship	with	Jason	would	seem	to	confirm	this.	Indeed,	in	
the	pilot	episode	the	first	time	we	see	Marshall	in	his	bedroom	hints	at	his	sexuality.	His	bedroom	is	
beautifully	decorated	in	a	very	different	style	to	the	rest	of	the	house,	he	is	wearing	monogrammed	
pyjamas,	and	he	has	classic	movie	and	jazz	singer/album	covers	on	his	walls.	While	these	are	difficult	
to	see	due	to	the	way	the	shots	are	centred	around	Marshall	lying	on	his	bed,	the	mise-en-scene	of	
his	bedroom	is	more	visible	later	on,	confirming	Marshall’s	non-typical	hobbies.	These	are	
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stereotypically	non-masculine	traits	(a	passion	for	interior	design,	a	love	of	classic	cinema	and	jazz),	
which	are	particularly	unusual	when	we	consider	the	setting	of	the	show	in	the	Mid-West,	where	
Buck’s	overt	masculinity	is	the	more	typical	gender	presentation.	Later	in	the	same	episode,	we	see	
Marshall	baking	cupcakes,	which	Buck	suggests	are	“homo-made”	with	a	sneer.	Buck	then	says	he	is	
going	to	go	to	the	shooting	range	which	Max	quickly	says	is	their	“guy	thing.	Us	three”	meaning	
himself,	Buck	and	Marshall.	The	episode	smash	cuts	to	a	static	shot	of	the	three	of	them	at	the	
shooting	range:	Max	and	Buck	are	in	a	cubicle	each,	feet	spread	apart	in	a	typical	‘masculine’	stance,	
shooting	their	guns	while	Marshall	sits	on	a	stool	in	the	final	cubicle,	out	of	sight	of	the	others,	
reading	a	book.	The	pilot	episode	leaves	us	the	viewer	with	the	assumption	that	Marshall	is	queer	
then,	being	as	his	more	feminine	hobbies	and	appearance	are	so	often	associated	with	queer	male	
sexuality	in	fictional	representations.	
	 In	the	second	season,	Marshall	resists	the	need	to	label	himself	and	embarks	on	an	ultimately	
unsuccessful	relationship	with	a	girl,	which	ends	immediately	following	their	attempts	to	have	sex.	It	
is	at	this	point	that	Marshall	first	labels	himself	as	gay	and	comes	out	to	his	father,	who	is	happy	that	
Marshall	has	accepted	and	is	comfortable	with	his	sexuality.	Marshall’s	initial	unwillingness	to	label	
himself	turns	what	could	have	been	a	controversial	storyline	(a	‘gay’	teen	deciding	that	he	isn’t	gay	
after	all)	into	something	more	interesting	and	subtle,	more	to	do	with	Marshall’s	uncertainty	about	
his	identity	as	a	gay	man—an	identity	that	has	almost	been	given	to	him	by	everyone’s	assumptions	
(including	the	viewers)	rather	than	one	he	has	arrived	at	himself—rather	than	a	wholesale	
questioning	of	his	sexuality.	
	 Buck	and	Pammy’s	similar	refusal	to	label	their	relationship	allows	the	storyline	to	develop	
without	falling	back	on	the	LGBTQ+	stereotypes	and	narratives	generally	found	on	television.	Buck	
and	Pammy’s	relationship	isn’t	about	whether	or	not	they	are	lesbians	or	if	their	relationship	is	a	
transgender	or	a	queer	one,	it	is	about	the	impact	that	this	relationship	has	on	Tara	and	her	family,	
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particularly	her	marriage	to	Max.	Is	Tara	committing	adultery	because	Buck	is	having	a	sexual	
relationship	with	someone	else,	for	example?	This	raises	important	debates	about	whether	or	not	
Tara	is	responsible	for	the	behaviour	of	her	body	when	the	alters	are	in	control	and	the	extent	to	
which	she	could	be	held	accountable	for	their	behaviour,	particularly	as	she	is	the	one	who	frequently	
has	to	deal	with	the	consequences	of	their	actions.	There	are	no	easy	answers	to	these	questions.	We	
are	told	in	Season	1	that	Max	used	to	have	sex	with	Alice	and	T	but	that	he	and	Tara	decided	he	
should	stop	because	Tara	felt	like	Max	was	having	sex	with	other	people—she	wasn’t	there,	and	had	
no	memory	of	the	incidents	even	though	they	involved	her	body.	In	the	case	of	Buck	and	Pammy,	
Buck	is	not	Tara,	though	he	uses	her	body,	and	Tara	has	no	input	into	Buck’s	decision	to	enter	into	a	
relationship.	Tara	did	not	make	the	choice	to	have	sex	with	someone	else,	even	though	her	body	is	
the	one	being	used,	and	she	is	not	aware	of	what	is	happening	when	Buck	is	with	Pammy.	She	is,	in	
many	ways,	an	innocent	bystander,	and	it	is	for	this	reason	that	one	could	argue	that	she	does	not	
commit	adultery.	Max	would	probably	disagree.	It	is	implied	that	though	he	stopped	having	sex	with	
the	alters	as	per	Tara’s	request,	he	didn’t	really	feel	that	he	was	in	the	wrong	as,	physically,	there	was	
no	difference	in	him	having	sex	with	T	and	Tara	because	they	are	identical.	This	notion	gets	turned	on	
its	head	in	the	second	season	when	he	finds	out	about	Buck	and	Pammy	(and	that	Tara	had	been	
hiding	the	re-emergence	of	her	alters)	and	sleeps	with	Pammy	himself	as	an	act	of	revenge.	Max	
obviously	feels	betrayed,	as	evidenced	by	his	sleeping	with	Pammy;	he	does	so	in	an	attempt	at	
retribution,	as	it	were,	something	he	wouldn’t	feel	the	need	to	do	if	he	believed	that	Buck	sleeping	
with	someone	else	did	not	constitute	adultery.	
	 This	is	a	complex	issue	which	could	have	completely	overwhelmed	what	the	show	was	trying	
to	do	with	the	storyline.	Pammy	only	features	in	a	small	number	of	episodes,	and	the	show	seems	
purposefully	to	leave	the	relationship	ambiguous	and	avoid	answering	these	questions	in	order	to	
allow	the	viewer	to	focus	on	what	the	storyline	means	for	the	characters	involved	without	becoming	
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overburdened	by	terminology	and	sexual	politics.	Indeed,	this	is	really	a	story	about	Max	and	Tara’s	
relationship	and	marriage,	and	their	inability	to	communicate	with	each	other	about	what	is	
happening	in	their	lives.	It	is	not	a	story	about	sexual	politics	or	gender	identity,	which	for	a	storyline	
and	relationship	as	complex	as	Buck	and	Pammy’s,	is	incredibly	rare	on	television.	The	show’s	
established	rejection	of	norms	allows	it	to	reject	typical	LGBTQ+	storylines	without	seeming	
disingenuous:	in	the	wider	context	of	the	show,	this	is	simply	one	more	set	of	norms	to	reject.	In	this	
regard,	Tara	is	much	the	same	as	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	Andy	Gage’s	female	body;	by	simply	
presenting	the	facts	but	refusing	to	label	them,	the	texts	leave	room	for	radical	reinterpretations	of	
typical	narratives	and	the	representation	of	illness	and	queer	and	trans	identities.		
So	far,	then,	both	Set	This	House	and	United	States	of	Tara	have	offered	examples	of	radical	
queer	and	trans	characters,	and	queer	and	trans	relationships.	Both	texts	treat	these	issues	in	much	
the	same	way	as	they	do	dissociative	identity	disorder,	which	is	to	say	in	new	and	interesting	ways,	
divorced	from	typical	narratives	and	stereotypes.	My	other	primary	texts	do	not	overtly	deal	with	
queer	or	trans	issues	in	the	same	way	as	these	two	texts,	but	they	are	nevertheless	concerned	with	
gender,	particularly	masculinity	and	femininity.	In	Fight	Club	this	interest	manifests	itself	in	the	
contrast	between	Sebastian’s	emasculation	and	Tyler	Durden’s	hyper	masculinity,	and	the	two	are	at	
odds	throughout	the	novel.	Sebastian	embodies	a	kind	of	failed	masculinity	caused	by	capitalism;	his	
white	collar	office	job	removes	him	from	the	masculine	tradition	of	blue	collar	workers,	and	his	
position	as	a	constant	consumer	further	emasculates	him,	as	it	is	one	traditionally	associated	with	
women.	In	order	to	escape	this	life,	he	creates	Tyler	Durden	as	a	sort	of	wish	fulfilment:	Durden	is	
everything	that	he	is	not,	including	traditionally	masculine.	Sebastian,	then,	is	the	one	with	the	
problematic	gender	identity,	whereas	Durden	seems	the	perfect	heteronormative	stereotype,	and	
indeed,	he	frequently	talks	of	his	desire	to	return	the	world	to	a	time	pre-civilisation	where	men	
hunted	and	lived	off	the	land:		
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‘Imagine,’	Tyler	said,	‘stalking	elk	past	department	store	windows	and	stinking	racks	
of	beautiful	rotting	dresses	and	tuxedos	on	hangers;	you’ll	wear	leather	clothes	that	
will	last	you	the	rest	of	your	life,	and	you’ll	climb	the	wrist-thick	kudzu	vines	that	
wrap	the	Sears	Tower.	Jack	and	the	beanstalk,	you’ll	climb	up	through	the	dripping	
forest	canopy	and	the	air	will	be	so	clean	you’ll	see	tiny	figures	pounding	corn	and	
laying	strips	of	venison	to	dry	in	the	empty	car	pool	lane	of	an	abandoned	
superhighway	stretching	eight-lanes-wide	and	August-hot	for	a	thousand	miles’	
(Palahniuk:	125).	
This	desire	speaks	to	Durden’s	masculinity,	and	the	buildings	and	places	that	he	mentions	
(department	stores,	the	Sears	Tower,	car	pool	lanes)	are	all	symbols	of	Sebastian's	life,	of	the	
capitalism	that	Durden	wants	to	abolish	in	order	to	free	men	from	the	economic	system	that	keeps	
them	trapped	and	unable	to	fulfil	their	true	(masculine)	roles.	The	extent	to	which	Sebastian	is	
emasculated	is	reinforced	in	the	sequel	comic	Fight	Club	2,	as	I	discussed	in	previous	chapters.	
Sebastian,	now	married	to	Marla,	has	a	son	he	struggles	to	connect	with.	Marla	is	dissatisfied	with	
their	sex	life	and	relationship	in	general.	Sebastian	feels	disconnected	from	his	roles	of	‘husband’	and	
‘father’,	and	Durden	is	lurking	in	the	background,	waiting	to	enact	his	plan	to	bring	Sebastian’s	son	
over	to	his	side,	and	fulfil	his	wish	to	destroy	the	world	in	order	to	return	everyone	to	the	pre-civilised	
world	he	describes	above.	This	is	made	overt	when	Sebastian	returns	home	early,	intending	to	
surprise	Marla	on	their	anniversary	with	flowers,	to	find	the	babysitter	on	the	phone	to	the	police,	
telling	them	a	“crazed	man”	just	entered	the	house.	Sebastian	protests,	“I’m	not	a	man”	(Fight	Club	2	
#1).	
	 Interestingly,	though	Durden	is	the	one	with	the	more	traditional	gender	identity	when	
compared	to	that	of	Sebastian,	he	is	the	one	that	is	living	on	the	fringes	of	society	and	does	not	care	
about	social	expectations.	For	example:	he	works	several	low-paid	night	jobs	(compared	to	
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Sebastian's	more	traditional	office	job);	he	lives	in	the	damaged,	abandoned	house	on	Paper	Street	
without	proper	furniture,	water	and	electricity	(compared	to	Sebastian's	Ikea-furnished	condo);	and	
he	starts	Fight	Club	and	later	turns	it	into	Project	Mayhem,	which	is	committed	to	and	encourages	
acts	of	domestic	terrorism.	Durden	does	not	seem	to	care	about	or	conform	to	society’s	expectations	
in	his	economic	life,	then,	but	does	so	in	terms	of	his	gender	presentation.	Conversely,	Sebastian	
conforms	to	everything	expected	of	him	in	his	economic	life	but	this	very	conformity	threatens	his	
gender	identity,	and	leaves	him	emasculated:	a	‘failed’	example	of	masculinity.	This	seems	as	though	
the	two	personalities	are	a	simple	inversion	of	each	other.	However,	it	is	possible	to	argue	that	even	
Durden’s	masculinity	could	be	said	to	be	something	of	a	subversion.	Early	on	in	the	novel,	Durden	and	
Sebastian	sneer	at	men	who	spend	their	time	in	gyms	“trying	to	look	like	men,	as	if	being	a	man	
means	looking	the	way	a	sculptor	or	an	art	director	says”	whereas	they	have	gained	their	muscles	
through	their	activities	in	Fight	Club	(50).	Of	course,	this	is	perhaps	ironic	given	the	casting	choices	for	
the	movie	(Durden	is	played	by	Brad	Pitt)	but	in	terms	of	the	book,	this	differentiation	is	important	
because	it	highlights	the	difference	between	the	masculinity	that	advertising,	movies	and	television	
are	selling,	in	which	the	point	of	having	a	gym-toned	body	is	to	look	good	and	match	a	socially	
sanctioned	‘ideal,’	and	the	kind	of	‘pure’	masculinity	offered	by	Fight	Club,	in	which	the	members	
often	beat	each	other	raw	and	bloody	and	do	not	care	how	they	appear	as	proved	by	the	delight	
Sebastian	takes	in	arriving	at	work	with	his	bloody	face,	for	example.	The	first	is	a	normative	
masculinity	closely	tied	to	capitalism,	while	the	second	is	the	kind	of	masculinity	Durden	is	talking	
about	when	he	talks	about	hunting	elk	in	his	post-civilisation	world;	it	seems	to	be	something	innate,	
pre-dating	the	world	but	long	dormant.	The	irony	is	that	this	‘natural’	masculinity,	pre-dating	
civilisation,	is	a	myth.34	It	is	just	as	much	a	myth	as	the	kind	of	normative	masculinity	promoted	by	the	
																																								 																				
34	This	idea	became	popular	when	Robert	Bly’s	Iron	John:	A	Book	About	Men	was	published	in	1990	and	
consequently	topped	the	New	York	Times	Best	Seller	list	for	a	number	of	weeks.	The	work	went	on	to	inform	
some	beliefs	of	the	so-called	Men’s	Rights	Movement.	
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adverts	and	the	media	that	Tyler	condemns.	He	is	so	committed	to	his	beliefs	and	his	desire	to	rid	the	
world	of	capitalism	that	he	cannot	see	this,	and	so	ends	up	simply	slavishly	shoring	up	another	value	
system	that	could	be	just	as	damaging	if	not	more	so:	to	fail	at	this	masculinity	would	mean	to	fail	at	
hunting	and	providing	for	oneself,	a	failure	of	survival	skills	that	could	ultimately	lead	to	death.	
Indeed,	Durden’s	conformity	to	this	gender	identity	serves	further	to	highlight	the	dangers	of	
normative	systems.		
	 It	is	possible	to	read	Durden’s	ultra,	heteronormative	masculinity	as	something	more	
subversive,	then,	and	in	this	way	it	is	possible	to	say	that	both	Sebastian	and	Durden	have	somewhat	
problematic	gender	identities,	in	the	sense	that	neither	is	exactly	what	society	expects.	Though	there	
is	no	examination	of	queer	or	trans	identity	in	Fight	Club,	it	is	very	concerned	with	these	issues	of	
masculinity,	and	what	it	means	to	be	a	‘man.’	Like	Set	This	House	and	Tara,	Palahniuk	doesn’t	really	
offer	an	answer	to	this	question;	he	does	not	attempt	to	‘cure’	the	problem,	as	it	were.	Indeed,	he	
cannot	cure	the	problem,	because	the	society	that	created	these	gender	identities	still	exists.	It	is	for	
the	same	reason	that	the	text	does	not	cure	Sebastian's	DID.	The	novel	implies	the	answer	to	the	
characters’	problematic	gender	identities	is	located	somewhere	between	the	two,	a	‘reintegration’	
(to	borrow	a	term	from	dissociative	identity	discourse)	of	the	two	gender	identities.	Of	course,	as	we	
have	seen	in	other	DID	texts—and	in	Fight	Club	to	some	extent	if	we	read	the	ending	to	mean	that	
Durden	is	still	there	and	will	always	be	there	despite	Sebastian's	hospitalisation—reintegration	is	not	
always	a	solution,	and	does	not	always	work	“because	every	once	in	a	while,	somebody	brings	me	my	
lunch	tray	and	my	meds	and	he	has	a	black	eye	or	his	forehead	is	swollen	with	stitches,	and	he	says:	
‘We	miss	you	Mr	Durden’”	(208).	
What	Fight	Club	makes	clear	is	that	the	trauma	which	causes	Sebastian	to	dissociate	is	tied	up	
with	his	gender	identity,	and	normative	ideas	of	gender.	This	idea	of	gendered	trauma	is	something	
we	see	in	Dollhouse	as	well.	I	mentioned	earlier	that	in	my	other	DID	texts	(Set	This	House,	Tara)	the	
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traumatic	cause	of	the	DID	in	the	female	characters	is	sexual	abuse.	(And	I	think	we	can	include	Andy	
Gage	within	this	assertion,	even	though	I	discussed	their	complicated	trans	identity	earlier,	because	
the	stepfather	saw	them	as	female,	and	that	is	what	the	stepfather	was	responding	to	when	he	
assaulted	Andy	Gage.)	In	Dollhouse,	this	pattern	continues	with	one	of	the	female	characters,	Priya,	
being	sexually	assaulted	by	her	handler,	the	man	assigned	to	look	after	her	on	missions,	and	then	
continually	symbolically	raped	by	the	man	who	put	her	in	the	Dollhouse.	So	far,	so	typical,	then,	but	
Dollhouse	actually	offers	us	a	contrast	to	this	typically	female	experience	through	the	character	of	
Victor,	a	veteran	of	the	wars	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	who	suffers	from	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	
due	to	his	experiences	before	he	enters	the	Dollhouse.		
	 PTSD	from	wartime	experiences	is	a	stereotypically	masculine	condition,	and	the	image	of	the	
shell-shocked	soldier	is	a	well-known	one	in	both	literary	and	filmic	representations	of	war,	and	
psychology	work	on	trauma	(see	Chapter	3).	The	image	of	the	traumatised	soldier	is	a	uniquely	
masculine	one	in	popular	culture,	despite	women’s	presence	in	modern	armies,	and	it	seems	an	
interesting,	and	yet	slightly	perturbing,	parallel	that	men’s	DID	is	often	caused	by	this	‘masculine’	
trauma,	as	it	were,	while	women’s	DID	is	often	caused	by	the	‘feminine’	trauma	of	sexual	assault.	It	is	
a	troubling	split	which	implies	that	female	DID	is	caused	by	sex	and	sexuality,	while	male	DID	is	
caused	by	war	and	aggression,	and	one	that	no	text	seems	adequately	to	engage	with.	Why	is	this	
trauma	gendered	at	all,	when	these	texts	are	ostensibly	about	characters	with	DID,	a	mental	disorder	
seemingly	free	of	gendered	associations,	not	about	characters	with	gender	identity	issues?	Even	texts	
that	do	not	make	this	divide	overt,	such	as	Fight	Club,	still	offer	examples	of	gendered	trauma,	though	
of	a	different	kind.	In	Fight	Club,	Sebastian	suffers	from	trauma	that	is	tightly	bound	up	with	his	
gender	identity:	it	is	the	emasculating	effects	of	society	that	cause	him	to	dissociate.		
	 It	is	possible	to	say,	then,	that	the	traumatic	cause	of	these	characters’	dissociative	identities	
is	most	often	linked	to	gender:	Tara,	Andy	Gage,	Penny	Driver	and	Priya	are	all	sexually	assaulted,	
181	
	
	
	
while	Victor	has	PTSD	from	his	time	in	the	army	and	Sebastian	is	emasculated	by	capitalism.		
Dissociative	identity	disorder	seems	bound	up	with	gender	even	before	we	look	closer	and	find	cross-
gender	alters	and	queer	and	trans	identities	within	Set	This	House	and	Tara.	This	link	exists	because	
trauma	works	to	fragment	the	unified	self	by	causing	a	singular	personality	to	fragment	and	become	
multiple,	allowing	for	the	creation	of	any	number	of	different	identities.	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	3	
how	trauma	works	to	disrupt	time,	meaning,	and	language,	and	now	it	is	disrupting	gender.	The	
gendered	element	of	this	trauma	works	to	disrupt	a	singular	(heteronormative)	gender	identity	and	
allows	for	the	fragmentation	and	creation	of	multiple	gender	identities,	from	all	possible	genders,	
sexualities	and	combinations	thereof,	at	least	within	these	fictional	examples.	I	am	not	suggesting	
that	a	woman	who	has	been	sexually	assaulted	will	suddenly	become	a	lesbian	or	decide	to	transition	
to	a	male	identity	as	a	result,	but	that	this	(fictionalised	account	of)	gendered	trauma	creates	the	
possibility	of	multiple	gender	identities	in	the	same	way	that	trauma	creates	the	possibility	of	
multiple	selves.	The	trauma	does	not	create	specific	personalities,	and	the	gendered	trauma	does	not	
create	specific	gender	identities;	instead	they	both	cause	fragmentation	but	do	not	determine	what	
form	the	fragments	take.	In	this	way,	trauma	and	gendered	trauma	are	both	able	to	destroy	
normativity:	the	first	by	destroying	the	unified	self,	and	the	second	by	destroying	heteronormative	
gender	identities.	That	many	of	my	texts	feature	gender	variant	alters,	or	gender	identities	that	fall	
outside	of	the	accepted	binary	confirms	this,	and	further,	cements	these	characters’	position	as	
people	outside	of	society	and	working	against	social	expectations.	What	better	way	to	reinforce	this	
idea	than	through	queer	and	trans	identities?	Indeed,	these	identities	are	at	odds	with	and	working	
against	society’s	expectation	of	‘natural’	gender	and	sexual	identity	in	the	same	way	that	the	multiple	
selves	of	the	dissociative	characters	are	at	odds	with	and	working	against	society’s	expectation	of	the	
‘natural’	unified	self.	
	 All	of	the	dissociative	characters	within	these	texts	exist	outside	of	society’s	expectations	due	
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to	their	multiple	identities,	and	the	gender	identities	that	I	have	discussed	within	this	chapter	serve	as	
one	further	way	to	emphasise	this.	These	characters	refuse	to	conform	to	heteronormative	gender	
roles,	and	are	resistant	to	fictions’	usual	attempt	to	police	identity	in	line	with	hegemonic	values	as	
described	elsewhere	in	this	thesis.	In	the	same	way	that	my	texts	offer	a	more	radical	interpretation	
of	DID,	they	also	offer	a	more	radical	interpretation	of	gender	identity,	and	in	both	cases	they	refuse	
to	conform	to	narrative	conventions	and	expectations.	Through	the	lens	of	identity	politics,	the	texts’	
employment	of	DID	as	a	metaphor	for	an	ability	to	resist	normative	social	structures	and	identities	
seems	to	be	positive,	or	even	utopian.	Queer	and	feminist	theory,	for	example,	is	often	sceptical	of	
these	normative	social	systems	and	identities	and	something	which	would	allow	people	to	break	free	
of	these	systems	would	be	welcomed.	However,	DID	is	a	real	medical	disorder	from	which	real	people	
suffer.	In	the	real	world,	DID	is	not	associated	with	an	ability	to	transgress	social	norms	and	break	free	
of	normative	social	systems,	and	attempting	to	make	this	link	is	damaging	to	people	who	suffer	from	
DID,	in	the	way	Sontag	talks	about	in	Illness	as	Metaphor.	However,	acknowledging	this	does	not	
mean	we	cannot	follow	the	texts’	interest	in	non-normativity,	or	attempt	to	examine	why	the	texts	
make	this	connection	again	and	again.	To	that	end,	the	next	chapter	examines	the	texts’	engagement	
with	the	ability	to	resist	social	norms	through	a	discussion	of	fictions’	ability	to	create	utopias.	Viewed	
through	the	lens	of	identity	politics	and	post-structuralism,	DID	(and	its	representation	within	fiction)	
becomes	a	useful	metaphor	to	explore	identity,	performance	and	conformity	to	and	subversion	of	
social	norms.	I	explore	this	issue	in	further	detail	in	the	next	chapter,	and	question	the	extent	to	
which	DID	can	and	should	be	universalised	in	this	way.		
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Chapter	6		
The	Dissociative	Critical	Dystopia	
	
In	the	previous	chapters,	I	discussed	the	way	in	which	DID	texts	are	resistant	to	generic	and	narrative	
norms,	and	include	representations	of	non-normative	identity	within	their	narratives.	At	the	end	of	
the	previous	chapter,	I	suggested	that	this	could	be	considered	an	example	of	fiction’s	utopian	
function:	fiction’s	ability	to	imagine	better	worlds	and	ways	of	solving	social	ills.	The	DID	texts’	formal	
and	representational	strategies	present	a	solution	to	the	‘problem’	of	normativity	through	the	
multiplicity	of	the	main	characters.		Within	these	fictional	texts,	DID	therefore	becomes	a	positive	
condition;	one	capable	of	improving,	to	some	extent,	the	lives	of	those	who	suffer	from	it	by	enabling	
them	to	resist	social	pressures	to	conform	to	normative	identity.	Metaphorical	uses	of	illness	within	
fiction	such	as	this	highlight	the	tension	between	fictional	representation	of	illness	and	the	real-world	
experience	of	people	suffering	from	these	diseases,	as	I	discussed	in	Chapter	4.	Turning	DID	into	a	
metaphor,	and	further,	arguing	that	it	could	have	positive	outcomes,	negates	the	experiences	of	
people	who	struggle	to	live	with	what	can	be	a	very	difficult	condition.	As	the	psychology	texts	I	
discussed	in	Chapter	1	demonstrated,	the	condition	is	classified	as	a	disorder	within	the	DSM,	and	
while	there	are	those	who	argue	DID	is	overdiagnosed	or	iatrogenic,	it	is	viewed	in	the	real	world	as	a	
disordered	set	of	behaviours	which	must	be	cured	through	medical	treatment.	This	is	not	always	the	
case	within	fictional	texts,	as	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	4:	cathartic	narratives	are	often	rejected	in	
favour	of	characters	learning	to	manage	their	condition,	rather	than	cure	it	completely.		
The	tension	between	fictional	representations	of	disease	which	frequently	employ	illness	as	
metaphor	and	the	real-world	experience	of	people	suffering	from	those	illnesses	has	been	discussed	
throughout	this	thesis.	There	is	no	simple	way	to	unpick	this	problem	though	I	have	detailed	different	
critical	approaches	in	Chapter	4.	I	have	concentrated	my	analysis	on	the	representation	of	DID	within	
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fiction	by	utilising	what	Morris	calls	a	‘biocultural’	model	of	illness,	that	is	a	model	which	considers	it	
important	to	view	not	only	the	medical	facts	of	an	illness	but	also	the	cultural	and	metaphorical	
meanings	we	assign	to	certain	illnesses	or	symptoms	(see	Chapter	4).	By	using	this	model,	it	is	
possible	to	examine	the	use	to	which	authors	put	DID	within	their	narratives	without	arguing	that	this	
is	how	DID	should	be	or	is	viewed	in	the	real	world:	while	fiction	is	often	reflective	of	the	culture	in	
which	it	is	produced,	it	remains	a	fictional	representation	of	the	real	world.	My	utopian	reading	of	DID	
within	fiction	should	not	be	blindly	applied	to	real-world	cases	of	DID.	Instead,	I	am	interested	in	what	
this	utopian	impulse	reveals	about	the	texts’	approaches	to	normativity,	and	why	the	texts	might	be	
choosing	to	comment	upon	social	normativity	in	this	way.		
	 This	chapter	examines	the	extent	to	which	there	is	a	utopian	impulse	at	work	within	fictional	
DID	texts	by	mapping	the	concept	of	the	‘critical	dystopia’	on	to	these	narratives.	In	so	doing,	I	
problematise	the	simple	binary	opposition	between	utopia	and	dystopia,	and	detail	the	ways	in	which	
DID	texts	incorporate	elements	of	utopia	and	dystopia	within	their	narratives	in	order	to	critique	
normative	modes	of	behaviour	found	within	contemporary	U.S.	society.	This	chapter	begins	by	setting	
out	the	texts’	approach	to	utopia	and	dystopia	more	generally	within	their	broader	narratives,	before	
focussing	on	the	idea	of	a	‘critical	dystopia’	and	arguing	that	the	DID	texts	fit	into	this	category.	I	
conclude	by	offering	close	readings	of	the	texts	which	demonstrate	specific	examples	of	what	I	see	as	
their	engagement	with	concepts	of	critical	dystopia.	
	 Fiction	allows	readers	and	writers	to	imagine	better	worlds,	and	this	is	particularly	clear	in	
utopian	fiction,	which	provides	“a	blueprint	of	a	better	society”	(McCracken:	104).	This	is	a	trope	
often	employed	by	science	fiction,	which	imagines	future	worlds	free	from	poverty	or	disease,	for	
example,	as	well	as	specific	social	issues	tied	to	elements	of	identity.	Some	utopian	fiction	grew	out	of	
specific	activist	movements	so,	for	example,	there	are	many	‘feminist	utopias’	found	in	science	fiction	
from	the	1970s	which	imagine	a	world	without	men,	or	without	sexual	and	gender	difference,	such	as	
185	
	
	
	
Joanna	Russ’	The	Female	Man	(1975),	and	Ursula	Le	Guin’s	Left	Hand	of	Darkness	(1969)	and	The	
Dispossessed	(1974).	These	utopias	offer	a	solution	to	a	problem	that	the	author	perceives	within	
their	society	and	are	often	an	attempt	to	rearrange	the	world	to	suit	their	ideals.	Whether	one	agrees	
that	these	new	worlds	are	‘utopias’	or	not	depends	if	they	agree	with	the	political	view	of	its	creator,	
and	utopias	can	take	many	different	forms	as	a	result	of	a	wide	range	of	political	views.	Fredric	
Jameson	argues	that	‘utopian’	“has	come	to	be	a	code	word	on	the	left	for	socialism	or	communism,	
while	on	the	right	it	has	become	synonymous	with	‘totalitarianism’	or,	in	effect,	with	Stalinism”	(“The	
Politics	of	Utopia”,	35).	He	argues	that	those	on	the	left	see	money	and	greed	as	a	force	which	
corrupts,	and	so	a	socialist	society	would	erase	this	issue,	while	those	on	the	right	see	a	utopia	as	a	
system	which	must	be	maintained	against	human	nature,	through	dictatorship.	Even	from	this	brief	
overview,	we	can	see	the	wide	range	of	utopias	found	within	fiction,	and	the	conflicts	between	those	
who	believe	in	very	different	types	of	‘utopia’.	Indeed,	whether	one	views	something	as	utopian	or	
dystopian	often	depends	upon	their	political	or	moral	beliefs.	Dystopian	worlds	are	also	frequently	
found	in	science	fiction,	often	as	a	warning	for	what	our	world	could	turn	into	if	humanity	continues	
along	a	certain	path.	For	example,	as	concerns	about	climate	change	have	increased,	these	sorts	of	
texts	often	have	ecological	messages,	warning	against	pollution	and	the	damage	done	to	the	planet	
and	environment,	and	the	consequences	this	could	have	for	future	generations.	Even	Disney	Pixar’s	
Wall˖e	(2008),	a	film	aimed	at	children,	carries	this	message	in	its	dystopian	future	in	which	humans	
have	left	earth	utterly	ruined	and	full	of	waste,	incapable	of	sustaining	life.		
	 Dystopias	often	also	emerge	where	utopias	fail;	as	another	problem	emerges	to	be	‘fixed’	or	
characters	become	dissatisfied	with	life	in	their	new	world.	In	these	narratives,	characters	often	
become	dissatisfied	with	being	told	what	to	do	and	losing	their	individuality;	the	utopia	becomes	
another	system	in	which	the	characters	are	trapped	and	from	which	they	want	to	break	free.	Indeed,	
the	idea	that	everybody	is	the	same	is	one	frequently	found	within	utopias,	with	Jameson	suggesting	
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that	“citizens	of	utopia	are	grasped	as	a	statistical	population;	there	are	no	individuals	any	longer,	let	
alone	any	existential	‘lived	experience’”	(“The	Politics	of	Utopia”,	39).	He	continues:	
“depersonalisation	is	a	very	fundamental	part	of	what	utopia	is	and	how	it	functions”	(40).	This	idea	
of	sameness,	originally	seen	as	a	positive	thing	within	utopian	fiction—everyone	is	‘equal’	because	no	
difference	exists	anymore,	which	eliminates	prejudice	and	bigotry,	as	well	as	class	systems	and	
poverty—frequently	turns	a	utopia	into	a	dystopia.	To	cite	a	classic	example,	George	Orwell’s	
Nineteen	Eighty-Four	(1949)	features	a	totalitarian	dystopian	future	in	which	all	individualism	and	
independent	thinking	is	harshly	policed	and	punished,	and	similar	ideas	are	seen	in	later	texts	as	well:	
Alan	Moore’s	comic	book	series	(and	later	film	adaptation)	V	for	Vendetta	(comic	1989;	film	2005)	
depicts	a	similar	future	in	which	all	sexual	and	racial	minorities	and	political	opponents	of	the	fascist	
government	are	exterminated	in	concentration	camps	(everyone	is	the	same	because	the	ruling	party	
killed	those	that	were	not).	Indeed,	to	use	one	of	my	primary	texts,	Fight	Club	demonstrates	the	
problems	found	in	swapping	one	system	of	control	for	another	as	Tyler	Durden’s	Project	Mayhem	
descends	into	a	dystopia	that	traps	its	inhabitants	in	exactly	the	same	way	the	capitalist	system	traps	
Sebastian	at	the	start	of	the	novel.	Durden’s	‘space	monkeys’—the	name	Sebastian	gives	to	those	
who	join	Project	Mayhem—are	encouraged	to	lose	all	traces	of	their	individuality;	they	dress	in	the	
same	’uniform’,	shave	their	heads,	and	even	burn	their	fingerprints	off.	They	are	taught	to	follow	
Durden’s	orders	and	the	rules	of	Project	Mayhem	without	question,	blindly	believing	and	conforming	
to	their	new	‘utopian’	life.		
Jameson	highlights	this	use	of	sameness	and	conformity	within	utopia,	suggesting	that:	 
Salvation	will	be	possible	only	at	the	price	of	allowing	the	entire	personality—the	past	
and	its	memories,	all	the	multiple	influences	and	events	that	have	combined	to	form	
this	current	personality	in	the	present—to	be	wiped	away	without	a	trace:	a	
consciousness	will	alone	remain,	after	this	operation,	but	by	what	effort	of	the	reason	
187	
	
	
	
or	imagination	can	it	still	be	called	‘the	same’	consciousness?	(“The	Politics	of	
Utopia”,	52) 
This	again	brings	to	mind	Durden’s	space	monkeys,	but	we	also	see	this	at	work	in	Dollhouse	when	
the	‘Dolls’	are	technologically	wiped	of	all	traces	of	personality	and	become	completely	blank,	doing	
whatever	they	are	told	until	such	time	that	they	are	implanted	with	a	new	personality	and	become	
capable	of	thinking	independently	again.	There	is	a	utopian	impulse	behind	this	idea	is	designed	to	
keep	the	Dolls	safe	and	well	cared	for:	while	in	their	blank	states,	the	Dolls	are	fed	healthy	food	and	
made	to	exercise	so	that	they	are	in	peak	physical	condition.	However,	a	closer	examination	of	this	
situation	allows	us	to	recognise	that	this	is	actually	a	dystopian	system	in	which	the	Dolls	sign	
themselves	over	to	the	Dollhouse	for	a	specified	period	of	time	and	are	strictly	controlled	by	their	
‘owners’	during	this	time	period.	They	are	given	new	personalities	in	order	to	fulfil	tasks	for	the	
owners	of	the	Dollhouse	and	their	wealthy	clients,	and	are	wiped	of	these	personalities	at	the	end	of	
the	job.	Everyone	is	the	same	in	their	blank	Doll	state,	and	though	they	live	in	a	safe,	strictly	
controlled	environment,	they	have	lost	all	of	their	individuality,	even	down	to	the	same	clothes	that	
they	wear	and	the	new	names	that	they	are	given	based	on	the	NATO	Phonetic	Alphabet.	In	fact,	
once	one	Doll	leaves,	another	one	takes	their	place	and	is	given	the	same	‘name’,	further	erasing	the	
Dolls’	individuality.		
	 This	system	offers	a	sort	of	false	hope	for	the	Dolls	then,	the	possibility	of	utopia	but	one	that	
fails	because	the	reality	does	not	match	the	fantasy.	Indeed,	this	is	the	very	point	of	utopia:	it	is	not	
reality	and	never	can	be	because	it	then	ceases	to	be	utopian.	At	the	end	of	their	stay	the	Dolls	are	
technologically	returned	to	their	original	personalities,	and	so	the	‘utopia’,	such	that	it	is,	is	ultimately	
proven	to	be	unstable;	it	offers	consolation	for	a	little	while,	but	it	is	one	that	falls	apart	long	before	
the	dolls	are	returned	to	their	previous	lives.	This	links	to	my	discussion	of	Rick	Altman’s	work	on	
genre	in	Chapter	4,	in	which	he	argues	that	genres	are	able	to	offer	temporary	alternatives	to	real-
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world	norms	before	they	return	the	audience	to	something	more	conventional	and	expected.		While	
DID	texts	were	able	to	suspend	the	moment	of	return	to	generic	norms,	it	seems	they	are	not	able	to	
resist	the	possibility	of	utopias	‘failing’	and	becoming	dystopias.	
	 The	idea	of	utopias	failing	sets	up	a	binary	opposition	between	utopia	and	dystopia,	but	we	
have	already	seen	that	the	DID	texts	are	not	interested	in	simple	binary	categories.		It	is	useful	here	
then	to	examine	the	texts	more	closely	to	see	if	there	is	something	else	at	work.	These	texts	blur	
elements	of	utopianism	and	dystopianism	in	order	to	present	narratives	in	which	social	normativity	is	
criticised.	It	therefore	makes	sense	to	view	them	as	‘critical	dystopias’:	texts	which	“maintain	hope	
outside	their	pages,	if	at	all;	it	is	only	possible	if	we	consider	dystopia	as	a	warning	that	we	as	readers	
can	hope	to	escape	its	pessimistic	future”	(Baccolini	and	Moylan:	7).	Indeed,	these	texts,	and	here	I	
am	thinking	of	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	specifically,	explore	a	problem—normative	behaviour—and	
warn	against	the	kind	of	oppressive	system	to	which	this	can	lead.	In	Dollhouse	in	particular,	the	
viewer	is	left	knowing	that	the	world	has	been	‘saved’	from	this	dystopia	and	yet	the	narrative	ends	
inside	the	Dollhouse	without	showing	the	viewer	if	the	world	has	been	returned	to	normal,	or	if	the	
‘utopian’	solution	enacted	by	the	protagonists	has	worked.	The	viewer	and	the	three	main	characters	
are	left	with	the	hope	that	it	has,	in	the	same	way	that	Sebastian	is	left	with	the	hope	that	Tyler	
Durden	has	truly	gone	in	Fight	Club.	Set	This	House	in	Order	works	in	a	similar	way:	we	are	presented	
with	the	problem	of	normative	behaviour,	to	which	Andrew	offers	a	solution,	and	yet	the	wider	world	
is	not	changed	as	this	solution	is	not	put	into	practice.	Indeed,	Raffaella	Baccolini	and	Tom	Moylan	
state	that	“critical	dystopias	allow	both	readers	and	protagonists	to	hope	by	resisting	closure:	the	
ambiguous	open	endings	of	these	novels	maintain	the	utopian	impulse	within	the	work”	(7).	This	
concurs	with	my	texts’	use	of	open	endings	which	not	only	resist	cathartic	curing	impulses,	but	also	
suspend	the	implementation	of	the	utopian	solution	the	characters	have	created.		By	refusing	to	
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enact	these	utopias	we	do	not	see	them	fail	(and	become	dystopian)	and	they	therefore	maintain	
their	utopian	status.		
Furthermore,	these	critical	dystopias	have	an	interest	in	hybridity	and	fluidity,	and	are	often	
characterised	by	the	practice	of	genre	blurring.	They	“recognise	the	importance	of	difference,	
multiplicity,	and	complexity”	in	the	same	way	that	dissociative	identity	disorder	texts	do,	and	this	
offers	us	another	explanation	for	the	texts’	resistance	to	conventional	generic	forms	(Baccolini	and	
Moylan:	7).	I	demonstrated	in	Chapter	4	the	ways	that	DID	texts	resist	the	usual	illness	narrative	form,	
not	least	by	refusing	to	cure	the	dissociative	characters	by	the	texts’	end,	and	also	discussed	the	
different	genres,	besides	illness	narrative,	to	which	each	text	belongs:	Set	This	House	is	a	thriller,	for	
example,	while	Dollhouse	is	science	fiction,	and	United	States	of	Tara	is	a	family-based	
drama/comedy.	I	suggested	that	these	varied	genres,	and	the	texts’	resistance	to	a	tidy	generic	form,	
was	indicative	of	their	resistance	to	social	norms,	and	their	view	that	normative	behaviour	is	a	
problem	which	needs	to	be	solved.	The	texts	not	only	challenge	hegemonic	values	in	the	fictional	
world	of	the	text,	but	also	challenge	generic	form	as	well.	Baccolini	and	Moylan,	presumably	
influenced	by	Derrida’s	“Law	of	Genre”,	suggest	that	this	is	a	feature	of	critical	dystopias	more	
generally,	and	that	it	is	this	“impure	genre,	with	permeable	borders	which	allow	contamination	from	
other	genres,	that	represents	resistance	to	a	hegemonic	ideology	that	reduces	everything	to	a	global	
monoculture”	(Baccolini	and	Moylan:	8).	That	is,	it	is	this	impurity	of	genre	that	allows	the	text	to	
approach	the	problem	of	normative	behaviour,	and	critique	a	hegemonic	ideology	that	forces	
everyone	to	be	the	same.	‘Critical	dystopia’	offers	a	useful	way	of	looking	at	these	texts	then:	the	
term	explains	the	suspended	moment	at	the	end	of	these	texts	which	offers	a	utopian	solution	but	
stops	short	of	putting	it	into	practice	for	fear	that	it	will	fail	and	become	truly	dystopian.	
	 By	rejecting	and	critiquing	normative	behaviour,	the	dissociative	critical	dystopia	is	one	of	
endless	possibility	in	terms	of	identity	and	yet	this	works	against	a	traditional	understanding	of	utopia	
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which,	McCracken	argues,	has	the	“disadvantage	of	closing	down	other	possible	ways	of	imagining	
improvement”	(104).	We	have	already	seen	that	the	DID	texts	are	deeply	concerned	with	creating	
multiple	modes	of	being:	DID	texts	often	have	open	endings	and	multiple	interpretations,	leaving	it	
up	to	the	reader	to	decide	if	the	condition	should	be	cured,	or	in	some	cases,	if	the	‘cures’	the	
characters	find	for	themselves	work	at	all.	In	all	cases,	these	open	endings	are	linked	to	the	texts’	
interest	in	disrupting	generic	norms	and	resisting	the	usual	path	of	illness	narratives,	an	interest	in	
line	with	their	characters’	ability	to	subvert	social	norms.	This	interest	in	multiple	modes	of	being	and	
ways	of	imagining	improvement	is	a	strategy	the	texts	employ	to	resist	the	risk	of	the	utopia	failing	
and	returning	to	a	binary	understanding	of	utopia/dystopia.	I	have	already	alluded	to	several	texts	in	
which	utopias	become	dystopias	as	the	system	struggles	to	sustain	itself,	specifically	referring	to	Fight	
Club,	which	warns	against	the	dangers	of	a	limited	utopia	in	which	everyone	is	the	same,	as	well	as	
discussing	the	failed	utopia	in	Dollhouse.	DID	texts’	concern	with	multiplicity,	reflective	of	the	
disorder	these	texts	feature,	is	a	clear	sign	that	these	texts	are	not	interested	in	engaging	with	the	
concept	of	utopia	in	any	simple	way.		
	 In	Chapter	4	I	argued	that	the	disruption	of	generic	form	and	the	refusal	to	cure	the	
characters’	dissociative	identity	disorder	mirrored	the	dissociative	characters’	disruption	of	binaries	
and	subversion	of	social	norms.	This	narrative	choice	acts	as	a	generic	metaphor	for	DID,	and	
reinforced	the	texts’	criticism	of	normative	behaviour.	I	also	discussed	narrative	and	genre,	and	the	
ability	of	fiction	to	position	the	reader	with	an	‘outlaw’—someone	outside	of	traditional	social	
norms—at	least	for	a	short	while,	before	returning	the	outlaw	and	the	reader	to	the	safety	of	the	law	
at	the	end	of	the	text.	In	contrast	to	this	expectation,	DID	texts	allow	the	reader	to	remain	in	the	
company	of	the	outlaw	by	refusing	to	cure	the	outlaw	DID	characters	of	their	condition.	So	Andrew	
remains	an	outlaw	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	for	example,	because	he	not	only	chooses	to	live	with	
his	multiple	personalities,	but	is	also	uninterested	in	seeking	gender	reassignment	surgery	or	
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‘normalising’	his	gender/body	in	line	with	heteronormative	standards.	This	suspension	of	generic	
norms	is	important	for	the	idea	of	the	critical	dystopia.	Utopias	do	not	only	fail	as	difference	is	
eliminated	and	their	citizens	become	a	statistical	unit	but	because,	ultimately,	“[they]	must	remain	
somehow	unrealisable”	in	order	to	truly	be	considered	a	utopia	(Jameson	“Utopia	and	Failure”,	1).	
Utopias	are	fantasies	that	fail	when	you	attempt	to	put	them	into	practice,	and	can	only	ever	offer	
consolation	and	false	hope.	Indeed,	Bülent	Somay	states	that	utopias	offer	“meaningful	solutions	to	
social	problems	when	there	exists	no	possibility	of	such	solutions”	and	that	they	are	“devices	of	
patronising,	benevolent	deceit”	(33).	The	suspending	endings	of	the	DID	texts	therefore	position	
them	as	clear	critical	dystopias:	preventing	the	possibility	of	the	utopia	failing	and	sustaining	hope	for	
the	characters	and	readers	that	the	solutions	the	texts	offer	to	the	problem	of	normative	behaviour	
can	work.		
	 Indeed,	this	is	the	only	way	that	the	utopia	can	continue	to	exist	as	a	valid	solution	to	the	
problem	of	normative	behaviour.	The	texts	end	with	the	possibility	of	utopia,	having	imagined	a	
solution	to	the	problem	of	normative	behaviour	without	attempting	to	rebuild	the	world	in	line	with	
this	solution.	Both	Set	This	House	In	Order	and	United	States	of	Tara	explore	the	possibility	of	a	utopia	
based	on	multiplicity	in	which	it	is	possible	to	break	free	from	social	norms,	but	the	texts	refuse	to	
expand	these	possibilities	into	a	concrete	utopia	to	which	everyone	must	belong.	In	this	way,	the	
suspended	moment	of	these	open	endings	also	suspends	the	transition	back	to	reality,	and	this	is	
mirrored	in	the	texts’	generic	strategies.	It	is	for	the	same	reason	that	DID	texts	leave	us	in	the	
company	of	the	outlaw	without	attempting	to	return	us	to	the	safety	of	real	world	norms.	They	leave	
the	reader	with	a	different	view	of	reality	once	the	book	has	closed—they	make	visible	hidden	
systems	of	normativity	and	allow	the	reader	critically	to	engage	with	the	debate	surrounding	their	
creation	and	perpetuation.	This	is,	ultimately,	all	that	fiction	can	do.	
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The	idea	that	these	texts	are	critical	dystopias	and	that	they	purposefully	subvert	and	re-
appropriate	generic	form	in	order	to	support	the	utopian	solution	that	they	offer	is	intrinsically	bound	
up	with	the	use	of	disease	as	metaphor.	It	is	the	use	of	the	disease	as	a	means	of	offering	an	
alternative	to	normative	behaviour,	combined	with	the	subversion	of	generic	expectation	and	
narrative	form,	that	enables	this	reading.	This	reading	is	only	possible	because	without	this	
metaphorical	use	of	the	disease	the	text	would	have	no	utopian	solution	to	offer,	or	at	least	no	neat	
way	to	explain	the	characters’	ability	to	have	multiple	identities	and	live	outside	of	social	norms.	That	
is	to	say,	without	the	support	of	the	texts’	generic	strategy,	it	would	not	be	possible	to	employ	
dissociative	identity	disorder	as	a	metaphor	for	multiplicity	and	a	way	of	subverting	normative	
behaviour,	because	the	characters	would	no	longer	have	DID	and	would,	presumably,	be	returned	to	
more	normative	social	roles.	This	becomes	another	reason	for	the	suspended	moment	of	an	open	
ending,	and	further	cements	the	link	between	the	texts’	use	and	subversion	of	generic	convention	
and	the	use	of	DID	as	a	metaphor.	Similarly,	it	would	not	be	possible	for	dissociative	identity	disorder	
to	be	used	in	this	way	if	the	texts	did	not	suspend	generic	convention	and	resist	conventional	
endings.	In	both	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	we	see	what	happens	when	these	utopian	solutions	are	
enacted:	in	both	cases	the	utopia	quickly	becomes	a	dystopia	and	the	solution	is	proved	
unsustainable.	It	is	only	though	the	multi-meaning	open	ending,	the	resistance	of	a	cathartic	
conclusion	to	the	narrative,	the	representation	of	non-heteronormative	gender	identities,	and	the	
multiplicity	afforded	the	characters	through	DID	working	together	that	the	texts	can	be	critical	of	
normative	behaviour	and	explore	alternatives	to	it.	These	elements	work	together	to	cement	the	
texts	as	a	dissociative	critical	dystopia.		
	 This	has	still	not	addressed	the	problem	of	using	diseases	as	metaphors,	and	particularly	the	
suggestion	that	DID	is	being	used	here	as	a	‘positive’	condition	and	way	of	solving	a	problem.	
However,	I	think	it	is	possible	here	to	make	a	distinction	between	dissociative	identity	disorder	itself	
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as	a	utopian	condition,	and	the	things	that	it	stands	for	which	enable	this	utopian	solution.	DID	
represents	a	celebration	of	multiplicity	and	shifting	identity,	an	ability	to	move	between	categories	
that	comes	naturally	to	people	with	multiple	personalities,	but	is	not	only	available	to	them.	
Dissociative	identity	disorder	therefore	becomes	a	convenient	metaphor	for	talking	about	multiplicity	
of	identity	and	the	ability	to	exist	outside	of	social	norms,	but	it	is	not	the	only	way	to	do	so.	Indeed,	
there	are	other	means	of	disrupting	binary	notions	of	identity	which	exist	outside	of	DID:	some	trans	
or	non-binary	people	seek	to	live	their	lives	outside	of	the	established	gender	binary	or	cross	between	
binary	gender	presentations	while	biracial	identities	can	problematise	the	binary	opposition	of,	for	
example,	whiteness	and	blackness.	These	are	examples	of	ways	in	which	social	norms	to	do	with	
identity	can	be	challenged,	and	the	‘multiplicity’	here	does	not	involve	DID.	In	the	DID	texts	we	are	
even	offered	an	example	of	this	with	Andrew	in	Set	This	House	in	Order:	though	it	is	never	explicitly	
stated	that	the	original	Andy	Gage	was	trans,	statements	made	by	Andrew	imply	that	this	could	be	
the	case,	and	so	Andy	Gage	would	have	been	trans	regardless	of	whether	he	was	dissociative.	
Andrew’s	gender	presentation—he	has	a	male	identity	but	is	female-bodied—is	one	of	the	main	
pieces	of	evidence	for	his	ability	to	subvert	social	norms,	and	yet	the	text	allows	for	the	interpretation	
that	this	has	nothing	to	do	with	his	multiple	personalities,	creating	the	possibility	for	the	two	to	be	
divorced	from	each	other.	Andrew	is	the	only	character	to	offer	an	alternative	way	of	breaking	social	
norms—Buck’s	relationship	with	Pammy	in	United	States	of	Tara	is	undeniably	queer,	but	something	
that	is	enabled	by	Tara’s	DID—and	though	he	is	only	one	example,	he	is	important	in	demonstrating	
that	the	ability	to	subvert	social	norms	is	not	exclusively	linked	to	DID.	I	have	argued	that	it	is	
problematic	for	texts	to	use	diseases	as	metaphors,	for	all	the	reasons	I	previously	mentioned,	but	in	
this	case	it	is	not	the	disease	itself	that	the	metaphor	is	actually	interested	in,	it	is	the	ability	to	exist	
outside	of	social	norms	and	subvert	normative	roles.	It	would	be	wholly	problematic	if	the	texts	were	
suggesting	that	DID	was	in	some	way	utopian	because	it	enables	this	behaviour,	but	they	are	not	
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suggesting	this.	Andrew	here	becomes	very	important	as	he	demonstrates	that	it	is	possible	to	exist	
outside	of	social	norms,	in	this	case	heteronormative	gender	roles,	and	proves	that	this	utopian	
solution	is	not	only	available	to	people	with	multiple	personalities.	Indeed,	it	is	the	ability	to	exist	
outside	of	social	norms	that	is	utopian	rather	than	the	disease,	and	this	is	an	ability	available	to	
everyone	because	social	norms	are	constructions	that	can	be	broken	once	the	truth	of	their	
construction	has	been	revealed.	Once	we	become	aware	of	all	the	ways	that	we	are	gendered,	for	
example,	we	can	begin	to	challenge	these	heteronormative	standards	in	our	everyday	lives.	
	 As	I	have	suggested	here,	then,	the	use	of	dissociative	identity	disorder	in	these	texts	creates	
an	easy	opportunity	for	writers	to	challenge	social	norms,	but	it	is	not	the	only	way	that	this	can	
happen.	It	is	not	DID	itself	that	is	utopian,	then,	but	rather	the	ability	to	have	multiple,	shifting	
identities	that	is.	In	this	case,	multiplicity	and	an	ability	to	break	social	norms	is	utopian,	and	more	
specifically,	it	is	a	utopian	solution	to	the	‘problem’	of	normative	behaviour.	Dissociative	identity	
disorder	is	a	convenient	metaphor	that	easily	enables	characters	to	change	behaviours	and	roles,	but	
it	is	actually	the	multiplicity	rather	than	the	condition	that	the	texts	are	interested	in.	An	ability	to	
change	identity	in	this	way	should	not	be	limited	to	those	with	multiple	personalities,	but	is	simply	
the	chosen	form	from	which	authors	can	explore	this	utopian	solution.		
	 It	seems,	then,	that	we	are	left	in	an	uneasy	position	in	which	the	disease	both	is	a	metaphor	
and	is	not	a	metaphor.	It	is	not	so	much	that	DID	itself	is	the	metaphor	but	that	multiplicity	is.	This	is	
supported	by	Set	This	House	In	Order,	which	suggests	that	multiplicity	may	be	available	without	the	
presence	of	dissociative	identity	disorder.	The	significance	of	this	novel’s	separation	of	DID	and	the	
ability	to	challenge	social	norms	should	not	be	ignored.	Indeed,	it	is	this	multiplicity,	this	ability	to	
shift	identities	and	live	outside	of	social	norms	that	provides	the	utopian	solution	to	the	problem	of	
normative	behaviour.	The	texts	explore	multiplicity,	hybridity	and	fluidity	through	generic	form	and	
the	metaphor	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	and	offer	readers	an	alternative	to	normative	
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behaviour.	The	texts	stop	short	of	putting	this	utopia	into	practice	in	the	same	way	that	the	endings	
stop	short	of	a	tidy	generic	conclusion,	and	this	serves	to	maintain	the	possibility	that	this	utopia	is	
attainable	and	a	valid	solution	to	the	problem.	In	addition,	the	suspended	ending	resists	the	transition	
from	a	fictional	world	to	the	real	world,	by	refusing	to	put	this	utopia	into	wider	practice	in	a	way	we	
would	recognise.	The	reader	remains	in	the	company	of	the	‘outlaw’	without	having	to	see	them	
normalised	and	returned	to	a	dominant	cultural	norm,	and	maintains	hope	that	the	solution	found	by	
these	characters	might	work	in	a	wider	context.	By	resisting	all	norms,	both	social	and	generic,	the	
text	creates	the	possibility	for	an	alternative	to	normative	behaviour,	and	leaves	the	reader	open	to	
the	possibility	that	this	is	possible	and	encourages	them	to	arrive	at	their	own	conclusions	as	to	
whether	such	a	solution	could	work.	These	dissociative	critical	dystopias	create	the	possibility	of	
critical	discourse	surrounding	normative	behaviour,	which	is	one	of	fiction’s	chief	and	most	exciting	
functions.	I	now	examine	in	more	detail	how	this	works	within	my	primary	texts. 
To	begin	with,	Fight	Club	offers	the	reader	a	clear	critique	of	a	social	system	which	traps	
those	within	it	by	forcing	them	blindly	to	conform	to	social	norms—in	this	case	a	normative	system	
based	on	capitalism.	On	the	surface,	Fight	Club	can	be	read	as	a	critique	of	consumerism	and	an	
extreme,	overly	cynical	version	of	capitalism:	Sebastian	feels	trapped	by	the	demands	of	his	job	and	
his	place	as	a	consumer,	and	dissociates	until	he	creates	an	alter	ego	capable	of	freeing	him	from	this	
system.	As	described	above,	Fight	Club	highlights	the	problem	with	simply	exchanging	one	system	of	
control	for	another,	as	Sebastian	quickly	discovers	that	Project	Mayhem	and	the	anarchy	it	offers	is	
no	better	than	the	capitalist	system	in	which	he	was	trapped	at	the	beginning	of	the	novel.	Indeed,	if	
we	look	more	closely	and	examine	the	utopian	ideology	at	work	in	the	novel,	it	becomes	possible	to	
say	that	the	text	is	actually	critiquing	systems	of	normative	behaviour	itself,	whatever	‘norms’	they	
feature,	rather	than	the	capitalist	or	anarchist	systems	portrayed	throughout	the	text.	This	criticism	of	
‘sameness’	becomes	particularly	obvious	when	we	consider	the	differences	between	Sebastian’s	job	
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and	the	jobs	that	Durden	holds,	and	what	this	says	about	Durden’s	‘utopian’	ideology.	
	 At	the	start	of	the	narrative,	Sebastian	works	for	an	insurance	company	as	a	recall	campaign	
coordinator,	as	he	explains: 
Wherever	I’m	going,	I’ll	be	there	to	apply	the	formula.	I’ll	keep	the	secret	intact.		
It’s	simple	arithmetic.		
It’s	a	story	problem.		
If	a	new	car	built	by	my	company	leaves	Chicago	traveling	west	at	60	miles	per	hour,	
and	the	rear	differential	locks	up,	and	the	car	crashes	and	burns	with	everyone	
trapped	inside,	does	my	company	initiate	a	recall?		
You	take	the	population	of	vehicles	in	the	field	(A)	and	multiply	it	by	the	probable	
rate	of	failure	(B),	then	multiply	the	result	by	the	cost	of	an	average	out-of-court	
settlement	(C).		
A	times	B	times	C	equals	X.	This	is	what	it	would	cost	if	we	don’t	initiate	a	recall.		
If	X	is	greater	than	the	cost	of	a	recall,	we	recall	the	cars	and	no-one	gets	hurt.		
If	X	is	less	than	the	cost	of	a	recall,	then	we	don’t	recall.	(Palahniuk:	30)	 
At	first,	this	appears	to	be	a	callous	side	effect	of	capitalism;	a	system	more	concerned	with	how	
much	things	cost	than	the	human	lives	that	are	lost	as	a	result	of	the	car	failures.	Sebastian’s	job	in	
this	system	is	purposefully	to	ignore	the	human	lives	that	his	company	damages	and	destroys,	
because	profits	are	all	that	matter.	Indeed,	the	callousness	with	which	he	discusses	the	recall	and	
prioritises	money	and	profits	above	the	human	cost	of	the	car	failure	rate	suggests	that	this	is	normal	
and	an	expected	aspect	of	his	job.	He	boils	his	job	down	to	“simple	arithmetic,”	to	a	“story	problem”	
(similar	to	those	one	studies	in	mathematics	classes	at	school)	in	an	effort	to	distance	himself	from	
what	it	is	he	does.	It	becomes	clear	that	he	already	dissociates	himself	from	the	true	nature	of	his	job	
here,	in	order	to	make	it	possible	for	him	to	fulfil	his	role	at	the	company.	Indeed,	the	“story	
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problem”	here	can	more	properly	be	described	as	a	lack	of	historical	awareness,	a	lack	of	concern	
with	cause	and	effect,	and	we	see	this	mirrored	in	the	space	monkeys’	repeated	tasks	within	Project	
Mayhem	later	in	the	novel;	they	each	have	one	task	that	together	form	a	larger	whole,	but	with	no	
sense	of	what	the	overall	effect	will	be.	This	is	itself	a	form	of	dissociation,	a	refusal	to	see	the	larger	
ramifications	of	one’s	work.	It	should	be	noted,	of	course,	that	Sebastian	himself	does	not	know	the	
overall	goal	or	structure	of	Project	Mayhem	either;	he	is	just	as	much	subject	to	Durden’s	
management	and	control	as	the	space	monkeys.	Sebastian,	used	to	dissociating	from	his	office	job,	
finds	himself	dissociating	from	Project	Mayhem	in	the	same	way,	and	indeed,	in	a	much	more	literal	
way	when	Durden	takes	over.	Though	the	reader	will	not	discover	that	Durden	is	Sebastian’s	alter	
personality	until	much	later	in	the	novel,	we	already	see	the	way	that	the	capitalist	system	described	
at	the	beginning	of	the	novel	causes	Sebastian	to	dissociate,	and	the	implicit	way	that	it	asks	its	
subjects	to	dissociate	in	order	to	put	the	system	and	money	before	everything	else.	Sebastian	
promises	that	he	will	“keep	the	secret	intact”	and	here	he	means	both	the	small	secret	of	the	
formula,	but	also	the	larger	secret:	that	he	is	being	asked	to	dissociate	in	this	way,	and	that	he	is	not	
the	only	one.	Sebastian’s	dissociation	is	the	cost	of	doing	business,	and	probably	not	even	something	
that	he	is	aware	of	at	this	point.		
	 The	capitalist	system	that	Palahniuk	describes	is	a	very	cynical	one,	pointedly	exaggerated.	It	
is	the	sort	of	system	described	by	Mark	Fisher	in	Capitalist	Realism:	“the	widespread	sense	that	not	
only	is	capitalism	the	only	viable	political	and	economic	system,	but	also	that	it	is	now	impossible	
even	to	imagine	a	coherent	alternative	to	it”	(2).	Fisher’s	work,	itself	polemical,	goes	on	to	describe	
capitalist	realism	as	“a	pervasive	atmosphere,	conditioning	not	only	the	production	of	culture	but	also	
the	regulation	of	work	and	education,	and	acting	as	a	kind	of	invisible	barrier	constraining	thought	
and	action”	(16).	Whether	or	not	one	believes	that	this	is	a	description	of	all	capitalist	systems,	this	
clearly	describes	the	system	Sebastian	finds	himself	trapped	in	and	highlights	the	sense	to	which	his	
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behaviour	under	this	system	is	inevitable.	It	is	a	self-perpetuating	system	designed	to	keep	everyone	
in	place,	whilst	ignoring	the	human	cost	of	doing	business	and	the	effects	that	this	system	has	on	the	
mental	health	of	its	workers.	Indeed,	Fisher	describes	poor	mental	health	as	an	ever-increasing	side	
effect	of	capitalist	realism,	arguing	that	this	suggests	“that	instead	of	being	the	only	social	system	that	
works,	capitalism	is	inherently	dysfunctional,	and	that	the	cost	of	it	appearing	to	work	is	very	high”	
(19).	Once	again,	this	is	evident	in	the	novel,	where	men	of	all	professions	join	first	Fight	Club	and	
then	Project	Mayhem,	seeking	a	form	of	escape	from	their	lives	under	capitalism.	While	these	men	
may	not	be	mentally	ill	in	the	sense	that	they	have	a	particular	mental	health	condition,	they	are	
seeking	an	escape	from	the	capitalist	system	they	find	themselves	trapped	in	and	a	means	of	
expressing	themselves	in	ways	that	system	prevents	them	from	doing	so.	Of	course,	Fight	Club	and	
Project	Mayhem	are	both	created	by	Sebastian’s	alter	personality,	and	Sebastian	clearly	does	have	a	
mental	health	condition,	so	perhaps	the	point	stands.		
	 The	system	Fisher	describes	is	based	upon	Fredric	Jameson’s	understanding	of	late	capitalism,	
and	so	the	workers’	mental	health	is	ignored	and	instead	emphasis	is	placed	on	“a	reductive,	hedonic	
model	of	health	which	is	all	about	‘feeling	and	looking	good’”	(Fisher:	73).	We	see	this	belief	echoed	
in	the	novel.	Soon	after	creating	Fight	Club,	Sebastian	discusses	reasons	why	men	go	to	gyms:	“as	if	
being	a	man	means	looking	the	way	a	sculptor	or	art	director	says”	(Palahniuk:	50).	In	the	film	
adaptation,	this	idea	is	emphasised	when	Durden	and	Sebastian	sneer	at	a	Calvin	Klein	advert	on	a	
bus,	and	Durden	asks	“Is	that	what	a	man	looks	like?”35	In	this	system,	their	worth	as	men	is	defined	
by	how	they	look	and	whether	they	measure	up	to	a	fictional	ideal	supported	by	underwear	models	
and	the	consumer	capitalist	system	that	encourages	its	members	to	buy,	for	example,	Calvin	Klein	
																																								 																				
35	This	is	of	course	somewhat	problematised	by	the	film’s	choice	to	cast	Brad	Pitt	in	the	role	of	Durden.	Pitt	has	
built	a	career	upon	playing	the	leading	man	in	a	number	of	films	and	is	often	seen	as	a	sex	symbol.	We	can	turn	
Durden’s	question	over	to	Pitt,	then,	and	ask	is	he	what	a	man	looks	like?	It	is	difficult	to	reconcile	Durden’s	
question	with	Pitt’s	image.	
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underwear.	Here,	designer	underwear	becomes	an	aspirational	item,	one	that	you	not	only	have	to	
work	to	afford,	but	also	to	look	good	in.	Later	in	the	novel,	this	suggestion	of	what	makes	a	‘real	man’,	
if	such	a	term	can	be	said	to	exist,	is	sharply	contrasted	with	the	men	who	attend	Remaining	Men	
Together,	a	support	group	for	men	with	testicular	cancer.	In	the	support	meetings,	the	members	are	
able	to	be	openly	emotional,	even	crying	together,	free	of	the	judgement	associated	with	breaking	
the	gender	norm	which	suggests	men	do	not	cry.	Here,	the	men	have	non-typical	bodies—many	of	
them	have	had	to	have	their	testicles	removed	during	treatment,	for	example—and	do	not	fit	with	
the	ideal	offered	by	the	Calvin	Klein	advert	or	other	consumer	capitalist	expressions	of	
heteronormative	gender	norms.	Indeed,	Bob,	who	now	has	breasts	as	a	result	of	hormone	therapy	
after	having	his	testicles	removed,	describes	how	he	was	a	bodybuilder	and	it	was	steroid	abuse—
chemical	‘help’	to	achieve	the	‘perfect’	male	body—that	lead	to	his	having	cancer	(Palahniuk:	21-22).	I	
will	return	to	the	importance	of	the	support	group	in	more	detail	later.	
	 It	is	clear	that	the	sort	of	capitalism	Palahniuk	describes	has	very	real	effects	on	workers’	
mental	health,	and	we	see	this	in	the	early	chapters	which	describe	Sebastian’s	and	Durden’s	jobs.	
The	extent	to	which	Sebastian	has	to	dissociate	from	his	work	in	order	to	complete	it	is	emphasised	
throughout	the	chapter	as	his	job	description	is	intercut	with	an	explanation	of	Durden’s	work	as	a	
movie	projectionist:	
Stand	there	between	the	two	projectors	with	a	lever	in	each	hand,	and	watch	the	
corner	of	the	screen.	The	second	dot	flashes.	Count	to	five.	Switch	one	shutter	closed.	
At	the	same	time,	open	the	other	shutter.		
Changeover.		
The	movie	goes	on.		
Nobody	in	the	audience	has	any	idea.		
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The	alarm	is	on	the	feed	reel	so	the	movie	projectionist	can	nap.	A	movie	
projectionist	does	a	lot	he’s	not	supposed	to.	(28)	 
This	is,	of	course,	a	hint	at	the	fact	that	Sebastian	and	Durden	are	the	same	person	even	though	
“nobody	in	the	audience	has	any	idea,”	but	the	continued	jumps	between	Sebastian’s	description	of	
his	job	and	Durden’s	work	highlights	the	extent	to	which	Sebastian	has	to	dissociate	in	order	to	work	
for	his	company,	as	though	he	cannot	consider	his	own	job	for	long	without	thinking	of	the	person	
who	allows	him	to	escape	it.	Indeed,	Sebastian	tells	us	“I	don’t	know	how	long	Tyler	had	been	
working	on	all	those	nights	I	couldn’t	sleep”	(27).	This	highlights	the	fact	that	he	does	not	know	when	
he	began	to	dissociate	but	that	it	has	been	happening	for	a	long	time,	perhaps	as	long	as	he	has	been	
working	for	the	car	company.	Furthermore,	Sebastian’s	insomnia	is	linked	to	his	job,	and	it	is	cured	by	
crying	at	support	groups	for	people	with	terminal	diseases.	It	is	only	when	Marla	Singer	goes	to	his	
support	groups,	faking	the	diseases	the	same	way	he	does,	that	his	insomnia	returns:	“This	should	be	
my	favorite	part,	being	held	and	crying	with	Big	Bob	without	hope.	We	all	work	so	hard	all	the	time.	
This	is	the	only	place	I	ever	really	relax	and	give	up.	This	is	my	vacation”	(18).	The	idea	that	
somewhere	that	allows	him	to	be	emotional	is	an	escape	from	his	job	is	significant,	particularly	
because	the	support	group	he	is	talking	about,	Remaining	Men	Together,	is	for	men	with	testicular	
cancer.	Sebastian	is	encouraged	to	be	an	emotionless	drone	at	work,	and,	indeed,	he	compares	
himself	to	a	‘worker	bee’,	who	simply	has	a	task	and	must	fulfil	it	for	the	good	of	the	‘queen’,	a	role	
filled	by	the	business	owners.	This	is	of	course	a	further	gendered	image,	referencing	the	fact	that	
Sebastian	feels	emasculated	under	this	system	where	he	is	forced	into	a	feminine	consumer	role	and	
expresses	himself	by	crying	at	Remaining	Men	Together.	
	 If	we	return	to	the	idea	of	Sebastian’s	formula,	it	becomes	possible	to	draw	links	between	the	
product	recall	and	the	workforce’s	mental	state.	Durden	is	the	result	of	a	capitalist	system	which	
causes	some	subjects	to	dissociate.	The	system	does	not	change	because	this	human	cost	is	ignored	
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in	the	same	way	the	human	cost	of	the	product	recall	is.	The	damage	to	the	workforce’s	mental	state	
is	perceived	to	be	‘worth	it’	by	the	people	in	charge	of	the	system.	In	the	case	of	the	decision	to	carry	
out	a	recall,	the	human	cost	is	secondary	to	the	financial	cost.	In	the	case	of	the	novel’s	
representation	of	capitalism,	the	human	cost	is	secondary	to	any	profits	the	company	might	make;	no	
one	cares	about	Sebastian’s	well-being	as	long	as	he	keeps	performing	his	job,	no	matter	what	the	job	
is	doing	to	him.	Indeed,	this	idea	is	later	grossly	parodied	by	Durden	when	he	creates	the	Paper	Street	
Soap	Company,	which	makes	soap	and	sells	it	to	expensive	department	stores.	Durden	makes	the	
soap	himself,	first	rendering	fat	that	Marla’s	mother	has	had	liposuctioned	out	of	herself	(at	Durden’s	
encouragement)	and	later	sending	members	of	Project	Mayhem	to	steal	sacks	of	human	fat	from	
liposuction	clinics:	“Our	goal	is	the	big	red	bags	of	liposuctioned	fat	we’ll	haul	back	to	Paper	Street	
and	render	and	mix	with	lye	and	rosemary	and	sell	back	to	the	very	people	who	paid	to	have	it	sucked	
out.	At	twenty	bucks	a	bar,	these	are	the	only	folks	who	can	afford	it”	(150).	The	sort	of	capitalist	
system	that	urges	people	to	buy	designer	soap	is	the	same	as	the	capitalist	system	that	encourages	its	
members	to	conform	to	beauty	norms	and	undergo	liposuction	surgery	in	the	first	place.	Here	Durden	
is	making	money	by	exploiting	people	and	using	parts	of	their	body,	capitalism	in	microcosm.		
	 The	testicular	cancer	support	group	offers	an	escape	from	this	emotionless	system	in	which	
all	workers	are	encouraged	unthinkingly	to	perform	their	jobs	without	considering	the	consequences.	
Instead,	Remaining	Men	Together	offers	an	environment	where	Sebastian	is	encouraged	to	express	
his	emotions	and	become	human	once	again.	I	argued	in	earlier	chapters	that	Sebastian	often	feels	
emasculated	by	his	job	because	it	forces	him	into	a	consumer	role	traditionally	held	by	women,	and	
so	it	is	significant	that	the	only	place	he	can	go	to	express	this	is	somewhere	where	all	of	the	men	are	
equally	‘emasculated’,	according	to	traditional	gender	norms.	That	is	to	say,	the	men	who	attend	this	
group	do	not	behave	in	the	way	that	society	expects,	and	have	non-traditional	bodies	as	a	result	of	
their	disease.	According	to	normative	binary	notions	of	gender	and	the	social	expectations	this	places	
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upon	them,	these	men	do	not	fit	in	or	conform	in	the	way	that	they	should.	Indeed,	the	first	thing	we	
learn	about	Bob	is	that	he	has	“new	sweating	tits	that	hang	enormous,	the	way	we	think	of	God’s	as	
big”	(16)	due	to	the	hormone	therapy	he	received	after	he	had	his	testicles	removed.	Surrounded	by	
men	who	feel	the	same	way	that	he	does—or,	arguably,	worse	than	he	does—Sebastian	finds	an	
escape	from	the	demands	of	his	job,	somewhere	that	they	can	“remain	men	together”	despite	what	
the	outside	world	and	the	rest	of	society	tells	them.	When	Sebastian	starts	Fight	Club	with	Durden,	he	
stops	going	to	this	support	group	because	he	has	found	a	way	to	reclaim	the	kind	of	primitive	hyper-
masculinity	that	Durden	offers	him;	the	emotional	immediacy	that	the	fights	offer	is	the	same	escape	
that	crying	in	support	groups	offers,	except	Fight	Club	lets	him	reclaim	his	masculinity,	whereas	the	
support	group	is	a	place	where	his	emasculation	is	no	longer	unusual.36		
	 This	hyper	masculinity	is	something	tightly	linked	to	Durden’s	appeal,	and	we	even	see	this	in	
his	jobs.	Sebastian’s	occupation	is	sharply	contrasted	with	Durden’s	low	paid,	part-time	employment	
that	frequently	operates	outside	usual	office	hours:	“Tyler	worked	part-time	as	a	movie	projectionist.	
Because	of	his	nature,	Tyler	could	only	work	night	jobs”	(25).	Durden	can	only	work	night	jobs,	of	
course,	because	that	is	the	time	that	he	is	in	control	of	the	body	while	Sebastian	is	sleeping,	but	the	
reader	does	not	know	this	yet.	Instead,	it	seems	one	more	difference	between	them,	particularly	as	
Sebastian	goes	on	to	say	that	“some	people	are	night	people.	Some	people	are	day	people.	I	could	
only	work	a	day	job”	(25).	We	are	also	told	that	Durden	works	as	a	banquet	waiter	at	a	hotel,	which	is	
also	implied	to	be	part-time.	Immediately,	then,	we	see	the	differences	between	them,	differences	
highlighted	by	the	chapter’s	jumps	between	descriptions	of	the	two.		
	 Sebastian’s	job	is	a	white-collar	office	job,	and	we	assume	that	he	is	quite	well-off	financially	
																																								 																				
36	It	worth	mentioning	here	that	one	of	the	ways	Durden	stops	the	police	from	raiding	the	bars	where	Fight	
Clubs	are	held	is	by	threatening	to	castrate	people	in	positions	of	power,	notably	the	police	commissioner:	
“’How	far	do	you	think	you’ll	get	in	politics	if	the	voters	know	you	have	no	nuts’”	(165).	This	is	obviously	a	threat	
to	normative	masculinity,	and	positions	castration	as	one	of	the	worst	things	that	could	happen	to	a	man.	At	the	
end	of	the	novel,	the	space	monkeys	almost	castrate	Sebastian	while	he’s	trying	to	shut	down	Project	Mayhem	
before	he	manages	to	escape.	
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due	to	the	descriptions	of	his	apartment	and	possessions,	though	he	does	make	reference	on	a	
number	of	occasions	to	being	overdrawn	at	the	bank	(this	is	actually	as	a	result	of	Durden	spending	
his	money	without	his	knowledge).	In	contrast	to	this,	Durden	works	multiple	part-time	jobs,	one	as	a	
waiter	and	the	other	as	a	movie	projectionist,	which,	though	it	requires	skill	and	training,	is	also	low-
waged.	Neither	is	what	could	be	called	a	career,	whereas	we	might	use	that	word	to	describe	
Sebastian’s	job.	This	difference	is	important	because	it	highlights	the	‘freedom’	that	Durden	
represents	to	Sebastian	and	makes	him	more	desirable	because	he	is	not	trapped	within	a	dull	office	
job	in	the	same	way	Sebastian	is.	Durden’s	jobs	allow	him	to	break	free	of	the	confines	of	the	
traditional	workplace,	and	this	is	reflected	in	the	opportunities	he	finds	within	these	jobs	to	break	the	
rules	and	fight	back	against	his	employers.	Such	opportunities	seem	unavailable	to	Sebastian	at	the	
start	of	the	novel	but	he	finds	them	with	Durden’s	guidance,	a	fact	which	is	neatly	summed	up	by	the	
chapter	in	which	both	characters	blackmail	their	bosses	into	continuing	to	pay	their	wages	in	
exchange	for	their	silence	over		workplace	transgressions:	Durden	splices	single	frames	of	
pornography	into	the	reels	of	film	at	the	movie	theatre	and	Sebastian	taints	food	that	he	served	to	
people	at	the	hotel.37	
	 If	Sebastian’s	job	represents	conformity	to	a	capitalist	system,	then	Durden’s	represents	the	
ability	to	fight	that	system	from	within.	Indeed,	Durden	ignores	the	rules	that	govern	his	behaviour,	
whereas	Sebastian	is	bound	by	them.	Durden	believes	that	it	is	he	who	has	the	power,	because	he	
has	nothing	to	lose	and	his	employers	have	everything.	While	Sebastian’s	conformity	to	the	demands	
of	his	job	is	tied	to	his	desire	to	purchase	expensive	designer	furniture,	Durden	owns	almost	no	
possessions	and	has	no	desire	simply	to	become	another	‘cog	in	the	machine’.	For	Sebastian,	Durden	
																																								 																				
37	In	the	novel,	Durden	quits	his	movie	projectionist	job,	and	then	sends	Sebastian	to	quit	the	banquet	waiter	
job	Durden	got	for	him	(112-117).	The	movie	version	changes	this	to	Sebastian	quitting	his	office	job,	but	this	
does	not	happen	in	the	novel,	as	one	of	Durden’s	final	acts	is	to	blow	up	Sebastian’s	office	building	and	kill	his	
boss.	(185).	
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represents	freedom	from	the	system	that	traps	him,	and	indeed,	Durden	himself	believes	that	he	is	
working	towards	a	utopian	future	that	will	arise	after	the	fall	of	civilisation	brought	about	by	Project	
Mayhem.	Sebastian’s	conformity	to	this	system	and	the	social	norms	that	it	creates	are	seen	as	the	
largest	problem;	it	is	this	conformity	to	consumerism	that	emasculates	him	and	leaves	him	as	one	
part	of	a	machine	exactly	the	same	as	all	the	others,	working	because	he	is	told	to	and	not	because	he	
wants	to.	Durden	believes	that	if	he	brings	down	this	system,	something	better	can	be	built	in	its	
place,	and	this	is	his	ultimate	goal.	Indeed,	this	problem	of	normative	behaviour	is	one	that	Durden	
specifically	mentions	during	the	frequent	speeches	to	Sebastian	in	which	he	explains	his	philosophy:	
“Our	culture	has	made	us	all	the	same.	No	one	is	truly	white	or	black	or	rich,	anymore.	We	all	want	
the	same”	(134.)	It	is	this	sameness	and	loss	of	individuality—the	mass	of	office	drones	who	cannot	
think	for	themselves	but	just	do	as	they	are	told,	like	Sebastian—that	are	seen	as	the	problem.	
Unfortunately,	Durden’s	attempts	to	enact	his	utopian	solution	to	break	away	from	these	norms	
ultimately	end	up	creating	a	new	system	of	control	and	conformity.		
	 Durden’s	‘space	monkeys’,	as	he	calls	them,	are	recruited	from	Fight	Clubs	and	inducted	into	
Project	Mayhem,	where	they	all	wear	the	same	uniform	of	black	shirts,	trousers	and	shoes,	and	own	
nothing	but	their	clothes,	a	mattress,	a	towel,	and	a	plastic	bowl	to	eat	out	of,	and	even	go	as	far	as	to	
burn	their	fingerprints	off	with	lye,	thus	completely	erasing	their	individuality.38	Durden	organises	
these	people	into	teams,	all	with	small,	specific	tasks,	so	that	they	become	components	in	a	larger	
system,	and	gives	them	no	idea	of	the	overall	goals	of	their	work:	“You	do	the	little	job	you’re	trained	
to	do.	Pull	a	lever.	Push	a	button.	You	don’t	understand	any	of	it	and	then	you	just	die”	(12).	The	
space	monkeys	are	trained	to	not	ask	questions	and	simply	follow	orders,	in	what	becomes	an	
extreme	version	of	the	capitalist	system	Sebastian	sought	to	escape	at	the	start	of	the	novel.	Though	
the	space	monkeys	are	not	performing	these	jobs	in	exchange	for	money,	they	are	taught	blindly	to	
																																								 																				
38	List	of	equipment:	127-128.	Marla	says	the	space	monkeys	are	burning	their	fingerprints	off:	157.	
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conform	to	this	new	system	instead	of	the	old	one.	Durden’s	Project	Mayhem	seeks	to	make	
everyone	the	same	and	erase	individuality	more	obviously	than	the	social	norms	that	operate	in	
Sebastian’s	capitalist	society,	with	the	space	monkeys	literally	becoming	interchangeable,	as	
evidenced	by	Sebastian’s	continued	labelling	of	them	as	‘space	monkeys.’		
	 Earlier	I	discussed	the	idea	of	sameness	in	a	utopia,	with	the	idea	that	this	sameness,	though	
desired,	was	often	where	a	utopia	became	a	dystopia	because	people	became	dissatisfied	with	their	
loss	of	choice	and	individuality	and	sought	to	fight	back.	Sebastian	at	the	beginning	of	the	novel	is	a	
good	example	of	this:	he	feels	pressure	to	conform	to	a	certain	role	in	a	capitalist	system	and	this	
conformity	leads	to	him	becoming	dissatisfied	to	the	extent	that	he	dissociates	and	creates	a	violent	
alter	personality	who	seeks	to	destroy	that	very	system.	However,	Fight	Club	demonstrates	that	the	
system	Durden	creates	is	no	better	than	the	one	he	has	replaced:	Durden’s	utopia	quickly	becomes	a	
dystopia	to	Sebastian,	and	he	must	find	a	way	to	escape	this	new	system	as	well.	Project	Mayhem	has	
become	self-perpetuating	at	this	point,	because	the	space	monkeys	all	have	small	jobs	that	enable	
Project	Mayhem	to	continue	and	grow	despite	Durden’s	‘disappearance’	towards	the	end	of	the	
novel,	and	Sebastian	struggles	to	escape	from	this	new	system	of	norms	in	the	same	way	that	he	
struggled	to	escape	from	the	norms	of	capitalism	before	Durden	appeared.	We	may	more	properly	
describe	the	text	as	a	critical	dystopia	then	because	it	draws	attention	to	the	problems	of	tightly	
conforming	to	systems	of	control	and	the	norms	within	them,	whatever	those	systems	might	be.		
	 Indeed,	by	trying	to	enact	a	utopia,	the	system	often	fails	as	it	quickly	becomes	untenable	and	
creates	new	problems	to	be	solved.	In	the	case	of	Fight	Club,	Sebastian	is	dissatisfied	with	his	life	
under	the	old	system	and	dreams	of	some	way	to	escape.	Durden	appears	with	his	new	system,	but	
this	one	has	many	of	the	same	problems	as	the	old	one,	notably	the	problem	with	conformity	and	
control,	and	this	system	fails	in	its	turn.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	it	is	not	just	a	matter	of	
capitalism	versus	the	anarchy	offered	by	Project	Mayhem	and	the	new	system	that	will	arise	once	
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capitalism	has	been	done	away	with,	but	also	the	difference	between	Sebastian’s	‘failed’	(by	
normative	standards)	masculinity	and	Durden’s	hyper-masculinity	that	the	members	of	Fight	Club	
mimic.	In	the	same	way	that	Project	Mayhem	is	created	to	be	a	‘utopian’	solution	to	the	problems	
offered	by	capitalism,	Durden’s	hyper-masculinity	is	also	‘utopian’:	society’s	ideal	version	of	
masculinity,	as	demonstrated	by	the	Calvin	Klein	advert	in	the	film	adaptation.	It	is	one	Sebastian	
should	aspire	towards	as	a	way	of	escaping	his	emasculation.	Yet	in	the	same	way	that	Project	
Mayhem	demands	further	conformity	from	its	members,	so	too	does	Durden’s	gendered	ideal,	
ultimately	replacing	one	system	of	control	and	conformity	for	another.	In	many	ways,	it	is	the	strain	
created	by	trying	to	conform	to	a	socially	constructed	masculine	ideal	that	leads	Sebastian	to	
dissociate	and	create	Durden,	who	is	able	to	meet	those	ideals	and	offer	Sebastian	a	way	to	meet	
them	as	well.	It	is	through	the	hyper-masculine	performance	of	the	fights	at	Fight	Club	that	a	man’s	
body	is	admired.	The	rules	state	that	participants	must	not	wear	shirts	in	order	to	show	off	the	
muscles	and	scars	they	have	gained	through	Fight	Club.	Masculine	strength	is	glorified;	their	bodies	
are	the	only	tool	permitted	to	be	used	as	they	attack	each	other.	This	links	to	Durden’s	desire	to	
reclaim	a	kind	of	pre-civilisation	masculinity,	one	where	man	is	a	hunter-gatherer	and	provides	for	
himself	by	using	the	skill	of	his	hands.	Of	course,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	5,	this	is	just	as	much	a	false	
ideal	or	romanticised	myth	as	that	offered	by	the	Calvin	Klein	advert	discussed	earlier:	it	is	one	that	
ultimately	does	not	exist.	The	novel	points	out	the	problem	of	normative	behaviour	in	a	number	of	
different	systems,	and	highlights	the	strain	placed	on	those	who	have	to	conform	to	problematic	
ideals.	The	novel	also	warns	against	trying	to	overthrow	the	current	system	or	produce	a	solution	to	
these	systems	that	would	create	a	new	‘utopia’,	as	this	is	also	likely	to	fail	and	create	more	problems.	
Fight	Club	can	quite	clearly	be	described	as	a	critical	dystopia,	then,	though	one	that	purposefully	
does	not	suspend	enacting	the	utopian	solution	to	the	problems	it	sets	out.	In	the	novel,	Durden’s	
solution	ultimately	fails	too,	further	highlighting	the	problems	with	systems	of	control	and	the	norms	
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found	within	them.	The	failure	of	Project	Mayhem	enables	the	reader	to	see	that	these	systems	of	
control	should	be	critically	engaged	with	in	the	way	that	critical	dystopias	suggest.39		
	 Fight	Club	is	not	the	only	text	to	highlight	problems	with	sameness	and	conformity.	I	now	turn	
my	attention	to	Dollhouse,	which	includes	many	links	to	the	issues	raised	by	my	reading	of	Fight	Club.	
In	the	Season	1	episode	“Needs”,	Dollhouse	explores	the	Dolls’	subconscious	desires	that	are	
overpowering	the	blank	doll	state	and	causing	the	Dolls’	programming	to	fail,	leading	to	them	ruining	
missions.	The	characters	live	in	the	Dollhouse	when	they	are	in	their	blank	doll	states,	and	have	all	of	
their	needs	taken	care	of	by	the	Dollhouse	staff.	The	staff	aim	to	keep	the	Dolls	in	peak	physical	
condition	so	that	they	are	ready	for	whatever	mission	may	be	demanded	of	them	by	clients,	from	
fulfilling	sexual	fantasies	to	aiding	law	enforcement	agencies	with	specific	cases	that	demand	special	
skills.	Everything	the	Dollhouse	does	is	designed	to	protect	their	investment	in	the	Dolls	and	the	
technology	they	have	been	implanted	with,	leading	Joshua	Clover	to	comment	that	the	Dolls	
represent	“the	ideal	workers	for	the	era	in	which	the	prostitute	is	not	an	exception,	but	metaphoric	
representative	of	the	labor	force”	(6),	Indeed,	we	can	see	similarities	here	with	the	workforce	
represented	by	Sebastian	in	Fight	Club	and	the	workforce	that	Fisher	describes	in	Capitalist	Realism:	
the	emphasis	is	placed	on	physical	health	while	mental	health	is	ignored.	In	Dollhouse,	the	Dolls’	
personalities,	their	ability	to	think	and	feel	emotion,	is	technologically	erased,	suggesting	that	this	has	
no	place	in	the	economy	of	the	Dollhouse.	Once	again,	the	‘worker’s’	mental	health	suffers,	as	the	
Dolls’	suppressed	emotions	start	to	overpower	their	programming,	causing	them	to	remember	things	
and	show	signs	of	developmental	progress.	The	staff	of	the	Dollhouse	put	into	place	a	plan	that	would	
																																								 																				
39	It	is	perhaps	significant	here	that	the	film	adaptation	changed	the	ending	to	feel	more	hopeful	in	the	way	that	
Baccolini	and	Moylan	identify	in	their	work.	In	the	film,	Sebastian	and	Marla	are	reunited	in	a	high	rise	office	
building,	Durden	defeated,	as	they	hold	hands	and	watch	the	offices	around	them	explode.	This	is	a	true	
suspension	of	the	ending:	here	Durden’s	plan	to	blow	up	the	symbols	of	capitalism	(high	rise	office	buildings)	
works,	but	we	never	see	what	result	this	has	in	the	wider	world.	Sebastian	and	Marla’s	romantic	reunion	is	also	
hopeful	in	a	way	generically	familiar	to	viewers:	the	hero	(Sebastian)	defeats	the	villain	(Durden)	and	gets	the	
girl	(Marla.)	Without	the	final	chapter	featuring	Sebastian	in	the	mental	health	facility,	the	film	achieves	a	sense	
of	closure	not	evident	in	the	novel,	but	it	too	features	an	open	ending	that	enables	the	audience	to	find	
different	meanings	in	the	film’s	ending.	
208	
	
	
	
give	certain	priority	cases	back	their	original	personalities	and	allow	them	to	work	through—to	return	
to	Freud’s	original	definition	of	trauma—the	issues	plaguing	their	subconscious.	The	four	chosen	
Dolls—Echo,	Sierra,	Victor	and	November—are	implanted	with	their	original	personalities—Caroline,	
Priya,	Tony	and	Madeline—without	their	knowledge,	and	wake	up	in	their	sleeping	pods	in	the	
Dollhouse	with	no	memories	of	what	has	happened	to	them.	The	fact	that	they	awaken	with	their	
personalities	restored,	thus	regaining	their	individuality	from	the	system	that	urges	them	to	conform,	
is	obviously	a	well-used	trope	within	science-fiction	and	particularly	within	futuristic	sci-fi	dystopias.	It	
is	those	people	who	have	been	awakened	to	the	problems	in	the	system	that	are	able	to	escape	from	
it,	while	those	who	remain	asleep	are	blind	to	the	system	that	traps	them.40	(There	is	also	a	
metaphorical	link	here	to	Sebastian’s	insomnia	in	Fight	Club:	Sebastian	can’t	sleep	because	he	can	see	
the	problems	with	the	system,	but	he	has	no	way	of	fixing	it	until	he	dissociates	and	Durden	takes	
over.)	In	this	case,	the	Dolls’	awakening	is	fake—the	staff	of	the	Dollhouse	engineer	it.	Indeed,	this	
inversion	of	the	trope	is	mirrored	in	the	scenes	in	which	the	Dolls	return	from	missions	and	are	
returned	to	their	blank	doll	state,	signalled	by	a	scripted	call	and	response	exercise	with	the	
technician	responsible	for	wiping	their	personalities:	“’Did	I	fall	asleep?’	‘For	a	little	while.’”	In	this	
case,	the	dolls	are	‘asleep’	when	they	are	implanted	with	personalities	and	go	out	to	perform	their	
missions,	and	‘awake’	when	they	return,	devoid	of	personality,	to	the	house.	The	audience	witnesses	
this	scene	over	and	over	again	in	almost	every	episode,	and	this	serves	to	highlight	the	levels	of	
																																								 																				
40	This	same	metaphor	is	employed	in	The	Matrix	(1999),	for	example,	when	Neo	literally	awakens	in	the	real	
world	after	being	unplugged	from	the	Matrix.	There	are	many	other	similarities	between	the	two:	Echo,	like	
Neo,	is	the	chosen	one	born	with	the	ability	to	subvert	the	system	and	save	those	within	it,	and	like	Neo	she	is	
technologically	implanted	with	the	skills	that	allow	her	to	do	so.	Even	the	imprinting	method—in	both	cases	a	
chair	like	device	that	the	person	sits	in—are	similar,	though	the	dolls	do	not	need	to	be	plugged	in	via	a	port	on	
the	back	of	their	necks	in	the	same	way	that	Neo	is	as	the	Dollhouse’s	technology	works	wirelessly.	Obviously,	
then,	this	is	a	well-used	trope	within	science	fiction.	In	recent	years,	‘stay	woke’	has	also	come	to	be	used	
amongst	the	African-American	community	(and	particularly	among	activists	and	those	involved	in	the	Black	
Lives	Matter	movement)	to	remind	each	other	of	the	need	to	stay	aware	of	institutional	barriers	and	racism	
African-Americans	face	on	a	daily	basis,	despite	what	white	America	might	deny.	(See:	
http://www.staywoke.org/)	
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control	evident	in	the	Dollhouse.	When	we	awaken	from	one	system,	there	is	another	there	already	
controlling	us.	This	is	confirmed	in	the	very	last	scene	of	the	series,	when	Echo,	having	saved	the	
world	from	dystopian	sameness,	returns	to	the	Dollhouse	and	goes	to	sleep	in	one	of	the	Dollhouse’s	
sleeping	pods,	suggesting	that	while	she	may	have	saved	the	world	from	one	system	of	control,	there	
will	be	another	to	take	its	place.	Indeed,	the	way	this	final	scene	of	the	series	is	filmed	reinforces	this	
idea.	When	she	jumps	down	into	the	sleeping	pod	(a	recess	built	into	the	floor),	the	camera	shoots	
her	from	above	and	remains	here	as	it	pans	back.	Echo	becomes	a	tiny	figure	in	the	shot,	looked	
down	on	in	the	same	way	that	the	Dolls	in	the	Dollhouse	always	are:	the	house	is	full	of	security	
cameras	fixed	to	the	ceilings	from	which	the	Dollhouse	staff	can	look	down	on	and	monitor	their	
charges.	The	camera’s	gaze	becomes	authoritarian	here:	mirroring	the	security	cameras	and	
suggesting	that	the	subject	of	the	gaze	is	in	a	position	of	submission.		
	 To	return	to	the	episode	at	hand,	“Needs”,	the	four	characters	that	have	awakened	from	
their	blank	doll	states	immediately	seek	to	escape	from	the	Dollhouse,	trying	to	blend	in	among	the	
other	Dolls	and	pretend	that	they	are	all	the	same.	Indeed,	the	one	other	member	of	their	sleeping	
chamber,	Mike,	who	does	not	manage	to	conform	and	act	the	same	way	as	everyone	else,	is	taken	
away	and	wiped	again,	to	show	the	remaining	awakened	Dolls	just	how	serious	the	situation	is.	(It	is	
suggested	in	the	episode	that	this	is	a	deliberate	move	by	the	staff	in	charge	of	the	Dollhouse,	
because	the	awakened	dolls’	“freedom	must	be	earned”	and	they	need	“obstacles”	to	fight	against;	
wiping	Mike’s	personality	raises	the	stakes	for	the	awakened	Dolls.	Once	free,	each	awakened	Doll	
immediately	acts	to	find	a	solution	to	the	issue	that	has	been	bothering	them:	Madeline	goes	to	find	
her	child’s	grave,	Priya,	with	Tony’s	help,	confronts	the	man	who	put	her	in	the	Dollhouse	(Tony’s	
‘need’	is	that	he’s	in	love	with	Priya	and	wants	to	help	her),	and	Caroline	tries	to	free	the	rest	of	the	
Dolls	from	imprisonment	within	the	Dollhouse.	Once	they	escape	and	start	to	separate,	Priya	quickly	
emphasises	what	is	at	stake	for	them	over	Tony’s	protestations—“That’s	why	we	left,	we	decide	for	
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ourselves	now”—and	Tony	quickly	gives	in,	recognising	that	free	will	and	their	ability	to	control	
themselves	now	they	have	escaped	the	oppressive	environment	of	the	Dollhouse	is	paramount.	With	
that	knowledge,	Caroline	breaks	back	into	the	Dollhouse	and	seeks	to	lead	everyone	to	freedom,	
stealing	weapons	and	holding	some	of	the	staff	hostage	until	they	agree	to	let	everyone	go.	This	
foreshadows	Caroline’s	ability	to	retain	the	personalities	and	skill	sets	with	which	she	is	implanted,	as	
well	as	her	future	position	as	the	leader	of	the	group	fighting	to	reclaim	the	world	when	the	
technology	takes	over	at	the	end	of	the	series.	In	the	very	last	episode,	“Epitaph	Two:	Return”,	
Caroline	leads	the	group	that	returns	to	the	Dollhouse	and	sets	off	the	device	to	reset	everyone	to	
their	original	personalities,	thus	‘saving’	everyone,	though	she	herself	remains	‘uncured’	with	Tony	
and	Priya	in	the	ruins	of	the	Dollhouse.	Indeed,	just	before	they	manage	to	return	the	world	to	
‘normal’,	Adelle	DeWitt,	the	former	manager	of	the	Dollhouse,	tells	Echo/Caroline	that	it	is	“funny	
that	the	last	fantasy	the	Dollhouse	should	fulfil	would	be	yours”	and	this	makes	it	clear	that	Caroline’s	
primary	motivation	throughout	the	series	has	been	to	fight	back	against	the	‘utopian’	system	that	has	
kept	her	trapped.	
	 It	makes	sense	that	it	is	Echo/Caroline	who	is	capable	of	saving	the	world,	as	she	is	the	only	
Doll	able	to	retain	the	personalities	with	which	she	is	implanted	due	to	a	quirk	of	biology.	This	is	
emphasised	even	more	in	“Epitaph	Two:	Return”	when	Kilo	explains	that	her	small	group	of	‘tech	
heads’,	led	by	Tony,	are	still	able	to	implant	themselves	with	skills	as	long	as	they	take	something	out	
first	“if	they	wanna	stay	sane.”	Echo/Caroline,	then,	is	the	true	individual	at	a	biological	level	as	she	is	
the	only	one	with	the	ability	to	accept	and	store	multiple	personalities.	She	is,	ironically,	the	truest	
individual	because	of	this	multiplicity,	as	it	is	the	skills	of	all	the	personalities	she	retains	that	allow	
her	to	fight	back	against	the	system.	Indeed,	in	the	future	dystopia	shown	in	the	last	episode	of	
Season	1	(“Epitaph	One”)	and	the	last	episode	of	Season	2	(“Epitaph	Two:	Return”),	the	technology	
that	allows	people	to	be	wiped	of	their	personalities	has	‘escaped’	from	the	Dollhouse	and	covered	
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the	world,	with	the	vast	majority	of	the	world’s	population	reduced	to	‘dumbshows’,	people	in	the	
blank	doll	state,	or	‘butchers’,	people	originally	implanted	with	soldier	skills	who	are	now	equally	
blank	but	still	violent.	Neither	of	these	have	personalities,	and	are	referred	to	interchangeably	by	the	
few	‘actuals’	(people	who	still	have	personalities)	left.	The	butchers	and	dumbshows	act	in	opposition	
to	the	actuals,	who	are	fighting	back	and	seeking	to	return	everyone	to	the	way	they	were.		
	 We	can	compare	Dollhouse’s	dystopian	future	with	Fight	Club’s	Project	Mayhem,	as	both	
indicate	the	dangers	of	a	‘utopia’	going	too	far	and	becoming	a	dystopia	when	new,	or	indeed	old,	
problems	(re)surface.	In	Project	Mayhem,	the	space	monkeys	lose	even	more	individuality	than	the	
workers	under	capitalism,	becoming	simple	cogs	in	the	machine	to	a	much	greater	extent,	trained	
blindly	to	accept	orders	and	not	ask	questions.	In	Dollhouse,	the	small	‘utopia’	of	the	Dollhouse—
everyone	is	the	same,	protected	and	well	cared	for—breaks	down	when	it	is	put	into	the	world;	the	
technology	is	used	for	personal	gains	and	against	people’s	wishes,	reducing	them	to	mindless	killing	
machines	or	wiping	all	traces	of	personality,	identity,	and	desire	away.	In	the	episode	“Needs”,	when	
the	Dolls	awaken	and	examine	the	Dollhouse	for	the	first	time,	Madeline	suggests	that	“maybe	
something	bad	happened	to	us	and	they’re	helping	us	heal”	and	is	immediately	ignored	by	the	other	
members	of	her	group,	and	yet	this	is	what	the	Dollhouse	is	doing	for	some	of	its	dolls,	notably	
Madeline,	who	cannot	deal	with	the	death	of	her	child,	and	Tony,	who	suffers	from	PTSD	as	a	result	
of	service	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	Tony	and	Madeline	agreed	to	work	for	the	Dollhouse	for	a	fixed	
period	of	time,	during	which	their	subconscious	minds	would	be	able	to	work	through	their	trauma,	
after	which	the	Dollhouse	promises	to	return	them	to	their	original	personalities.	Indeed,	there	is,	to	
some	extent,	a	utopian	impulse	at	work	in	the	Dollhouse,	though	the	way	in	which	it	tries	to	‘help’	
these	characters	is	morally	questionable.	It	is	never	explicitly	stated	if	the	Dollhouse	tells	its	Dolls	
what	kind	of	‘missions’	their	bodies	will	be	used	for;	a	lot	of	the	missions	are	sexual	in	nature,	raising	
issues	of	consent,	as	well	as	sexual	health	and	safety.	Once	the	technology	escapes	into	the	wider	
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world	this	utopian	impulse	disappears,	and	the	world	becomes	a	dystopia	that	the	main	characters	
must	fight	against	in	order	to	restore	the	world	to	its	previous	state.	The	characters	who	are	capable	
of	fighting	this	system	are	the	ones	who	retain	their	individuality,	and	so	once	again	difference,	rather	
than	sameness,	is	celebrated	and	championed	in	the	text.		
	 I	have	included	Dollhouse	in	this	thesis	because	I	have	argued	that	it	can	be	allegorically	read	
as	a	DID	text,	despite	the	text	not	mentioning	the	disorder	or	claiming	such	a	status	for	itself.	
Ultimately,	the	reason	that	I	have	done	so	is	because	it	is	Echo’s	innate	biological	tendency	towards	
multiplicity	that	allows	her	to	fight	back	so	effectively	against	this	system.	Indeed,	the	issues	that	I	
have	explored	within	this	chapter	neatly	line	up	with	those	of	other	DID	texts.	Both	Fight	Club	and	
Dollhouse	explore	the	problems	with	systems	of	control,	normativity	and	sameness	and	what	
happens	when	you	try	to	enact	a	utopian	solution	in	a	real-world	setting.	In	both	of	these	texts,	
multiplicity,	or	the	ability	to	retain	one’s	individuality,	to	be	different,	is	what	enables	the	main	
characters	to	fight	back	against	the	systems	of	control	that	they	find	themselves	within.	It	is	therefore	
possible	to	classify	these	texts	as	critical	dystopias	because	they	both	warn	of	the	problem	of	
normative	behaviour,	and	how	eliminating	difference	is	problematic	and	leads	to	dystopian	futures.	
The	texts	both	stop	short	of	showing	the	reader	exactly	how	these	problems	can	be	reversed,	
however—at	the	end	of	Fight	Club	Sebastian	is	unsure	if	Durden	is	truly	gone	and	believes	that	
Project	Mayhem	may	continue	without	him	(it	is	later	shown	to	in	Fight	Club	2);	in	Dollhouse	
everyone	is	reverted	back	to	their	original	personalities	but	we	do	not	see	how	or	if	the	world	can	be	
put	right	again.	These	open	endings	are	another	mark	of	the	critical	dystopia.	I	argued	in	Chapter	4	
that	open	endings	and	resistance	to	narrative	closure	are	often	a	feature	of	DID	texts	and	I	return	to	
this	idea	now.	My	other	primary	texts	do	not	engage	in	a	utopia/dystopia	narrative	in	such	a	clear	
way	as	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	do,	but	they	do,	nevertheless,	feature	open	endings	and	utopian	
impulses	which	allow	them	to	be	read	in	the	same	way.	By	more	subtly	referencing	utopianism	within	
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their	narratives,	these	texts	offer	a	clear	example	what	Baccolini	and	Moylan	mean	when	they	discuss	
critical	dystopias.	
	 In	earlier	chapters,	I	discussed	the	significance	of	Andrew’s	choice	not	to	seek	a	‘cure’	for	his	
multiplicity	in	Set	This	House	In	Order,	and	how	this	resistance	to	narrative	closure	and	reliance	on	an	
open	ending	reflected	Andrew’s	multiplicity	and	the	novel’s	celebration	of	resistance	to	social	norms.	
While	Andrew’s	ability	to	reject	social	norms,	and	particularly	gender	norms,	is	not	wholly	reliant	on	
his	multiplicity—there	is	enough	evidence	in	the	novel	to	suggest	that	Andy	Gage	was	already,	or	
would	grow	up	to	be,	trans	even	if	he	was	not	multiple—the	fact	that	he	is	multiple	is	the	main	thing	
that	keeps	him	from	being	normal	in	the	eyes	of	mainstream	society	(because,	from	what	we	are	told,	
he	passes	quite	successfully	for	a	male-bodied	person).	Indeed,	during	the	section	of	the	novel	in	
which	Andrew	recounts	Aaron’s	struggle	with	the	psychiatric	treatment	he	underwent	for	DID,	
Andrew	explains	that	though	their	methods	varied,	all	of	the	psychiatrists	Aaron	saw	agreed	that	
“Andy	Gage	would	never	be	healed	until	he	was	one	soul	again”	(Ruff:	108).	This	need	for	Andy	Gage	
to	return	to	a	singular	identity	so	that	he	can	be	the	same	as	everyone	else	is	further	highlighted	by	
something	one	of	the	psychiatrists	tells	Aaron:	“’Of	course	you’ve	got	to	reintegrate!	Don’t	you	want	
to	be	normal?’”	(108).	This	clearly	positions	being	singular	as	a	norm,	one	that	Andrew	transgresses	
on	a	daily	basis,	and	exemplifies	the	normalising	narrative	that	is	linked	to	many	forms	of	medical	
treatment.		
	 Andrew	refuses	to	see	his	condition	as	something	that	needs	to	be	fixed,	however,	in	much	
the	same	way	as	he	views	his	trans	identity.	Julie	and	Adam,	one	of	the	other	personalities,	think	it	is	
an	issue,	but	Andrew	views	it	as	just	another	part	of	himself:	 
“Nothing	major.”		
In	the	pulpit	Adam	let	out	a	snort.	“Sure	nothing	major.	Nothing	except—“		
“Adam!”	I	warned.	(25)	 
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If	Andrew’s	trans	identity	is	no	obstacle,	then	neither	is	his	multiplicity.	Indeed,	he	manages	his	
condition	quite	successfully	through	the	‘house’	inside	his	head	that	allows	each	personality	their	
own	room	and	enables	them	to	interact	with	one	another.	However,	the	text	makes	clear	that	this	is	
a	solution	that	works	for	Andrew,	but	it	is	not	necessarily	a	solution	that	would	work	for	everyone,	as	
Penny’s	choice	to	have	reintegration	therapy	at	the	end	of	the	novel	suggests.	Andrew	is	vehemently	
opposed	to	Penny’s	reintegration	because	he	believes	it	will	mean	the	death	of	her	alter	personalities	
(and	because	it	goes	against	Andrew’s	celebration	of	their	shared	condition)	but	when	the	two	meet	
again	it	becomes	clear	that	her	reintegration	is	not	as	simple	as	he	initially	believed	it	to	be: 
“Maledicta	and	the	others,”	I	said.	“Are	they…?”	
“Still	alive?”	Penny	nodded.	“It	isn’t	like	I	thought	it	would	be—they,	we,	we’re	all	still	
here,	just,	less	separate	than	we	used	to	be.	We	don’t	have	to	occupy	the	body	one	
at	a	time	now;	we	coexist	in	it.”	
“Coexist?	So	you’re	still	multiple?”	
“Yes	and	no.”	She	laughed	again.	(471) 
This	suggests	that	the	ultimate	cure	for	the	condition,	one	Aaron	was	pushed	towards	by	the	
psychiatrists,	does	not	actually	work,	or	does	not	work	in	the	way	that	it	is	said	to.	Penny	is,	to	some	
extent,	still	multiple,	an	idea	reinforced	by	the	email	she	sends	to	Andrew	at	the	end	of	the	novel	
with	a	postscript	from	one	of	her	personalities	that	Penny	presumably	does	not	know	about:	“PS	teLl	
(sic)	Sam	I	fucking	said	hi…	M”	(478).	The	novel	problematises	the	idea	that	the	condition	can	be	
cured	or	if	it	should	be	cured	at	all,	allowing	the	reader	to	draw	their	own	conclusions	about	Penny’s	
current	mental	state.	The	ending	is	open	because	it	stops	short	of	enacting	Andrew’s	utopian	
solution—that	one	can	manage	their	multiplicity	and	that	it	is	a	positive	condition—on	other	
characters	and	the	wider	world.	If	the	reader	believes	that	Penny’s	cure	has	failed,	then	naturally	they	
must	view	Andrew’s	management	of	his	condition	as	a	better	way	of	dealing	with	multiplicity,	at	least	
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in	the	world	the	novel	shows	us.	Though	the	novel	suggests	this,	it	does	not	show	us	a	world	in	which	
this	solution	is	forced	onto	everyone,	because	if	it	did,	the	novel’s	utopian	impulse	might	fall	apart,	in	
the	same	way	that	the	utopian	solutions	enacted	in	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	do.		
	 Indeed,	Julie’s	business,	the	Reality	Factory,	where	Andrew	and	Penny	work,	is	further	
evidence	of	this.	Julie	owns	a	small	software	company	that	works	with	virtual	reality	and	is	building	
software	that	would	allow	the	user	to	create	and	interact	with	their	own	virtual	world.	When	she’s	
explaining	the	software	to	Andrew,	Julie	offers	this	example,	amongst	others,	to	highlight	the	
software’s	utopian	function: 
“Let’s	suppose	you’ve	had	a	spinal	injury	that	leaves	you	partially	paralyzed,	with	no	
feeling	in	your	legs.	You	might	be	stuck	in	a	wheelchair	for	the	rest	of	your	life.	But	
with	this”—she	tapped	the	back	of	the	data	glove—“you	can	still	get	up	and	dance	
any	time	you	want	to.”	(39) 
Andrew	is	intrigued	by	Julie’s	software	because	it	would	provide	people	with	the	ability	to	create	
their	own	geographies,	just	as	Aaron	‘built’	the	house	and	the	land	it	stands	on	inside	Andy	Gage’s	
head.	The	Reality	Factory’s	purpose	is	very	similar	to	Andrew’s	management	of	his	condition,	but	
goes	further	and	tries	to	give	that	ability	to	anyone	who	wants	it.	Crucially,	we	can	read	this	as	an	
attempt	to	take	Andrew’s	solution—he	builds	a	‘virtual	reality’	inside	his	head	in	which	his	
personalities	interact—and	put	it	into	the	wider	world.	However,	we	have	seen	how	this	is	
problematic	in	the	other	texts,	and	in	line	with	this	reading,	at	the	end	of	the	novel	the	Reality	
Factory	closes	after	it	runs	out	of	money.	The	software	project,	which	has	been	ongoing	for	years	as	
they	try	to	perfect	their	virtual	world,	ends	with	one	of	the	coders	telling	Julie:	“’You	know	as	well	as	I	
do	that	it’s	never	gonna	be	finished.	I’m	sick	of	it’”	(465).	This	mimics	utopian	thinking,	and	
particularly	the	idea	that	a	utopia	is	unrealisable	and	that	there	will	always	be	problems	to	be	fixed.	In	
addition,	though	it	is	a	subtle	narrative	thread,	it	suggests,	again,	that	Andrew’s	solution	is	unique	to	
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him,	and	that	any	attempt	to	more	widely	enact	this	solution	would	fail.	In	this	way,	multiplicity	
extends	to	the	utopian	solution	as	well;	there	must	be	multiple	solutions	to	the	problem	of	normative	
behaviour	because	any	attempt	to	enact	one	solution	goes	against	the	very	multiplicity	needed	to	
solve	the	problem.	This	is	why	Andrew’s	solution	is	only	available	to	him,	in	the	same	way	that	
Penny’s	solution,	whether	fully	reintegrated	or	not,	is	only	available	to	her.		
	 The	Reality	Factory’s	failure	warns	against	trying	to	enact	one	utopian	solution—Andrew’s	
solution—for	everyone,	and	demonstrates	that	it	will	often	fail,	as	I	have	argued	elsewhere	in	relation	
to	other	texts.	This	serves	to	warn	against	the	danger	of	simply	enacting	Andrew’s	solution	in	a	wider	
world,	and	further	works	to	suspend	the	normative	ending.	Andrew	is	not	‘cured’	of	his	condition	in	
the	way	the	reader	expects—narrative	norms	demand	that	the	disorder	should	be	cured	rather	than	
managed—and	his	solution	is	not	enacted	on	the	wider	world,	saving	the	fictional	world	of	the	novel	
from	the	dangers	associated	with	creating	utopias	in	a	fictionalised	version	of	the	real	world	as	
depicted	in	the	novel.	Indeed,	the	fictional	world	of	Set	This	House	In	Order	is	very	much	one	in	line	
with	the	contemporary	capitalist	society	Western	readers	will	be	familiar	with.	So	any	attempt	to	
bring	Andrew’s	solution	into	the	wider	world	of	the	novel—as	the	Reality	Factory	attempts—can	be	
read	as	an	attempt	to	enact	this	solution	in	the	‘real	world’,	where	the	real	world	here	means	
contemporary	Western	society.		This	is	once	again	demonstrative	of	the	novel’s	open	ending,	
suspending	the	transition	into	the	real	world,	where	Andrew’s	‘cure’	would	be	expected	to	work	for	
everyone.	Instead,	the	novel	leaves	us	in	a	position	to	debate	the	‘problem’	of	normative	behaviour	
and	the	‘solution’	of	multiplicity,	enabling	a	dialogue	about	real-world	issues	without	trying	to	change	
or	improve	the	real	world	itself.	While	not	engaging	with	a	utopia/dystopia	narrative	in	the	same	way	
that	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	do,	there	are	clear	threads	of	these	narratives	within	Set	This	House	In	
Order,	allowing	us,	once	again,	to	read	multiplicity	and	difference	as	a	utopian	condition,	and	the	text	
as	a	critical	dystopia.	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	are	warnings	against	what	can	happen	when	the	
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characters	attempt	to	enact	utopian	solutions	to	the	‘problem’	of	normative	behaviour,	while	Set	This	
House	In	Order	relegates	the	warning	to	a	smaller	narrative	thread	with	the	Reality	Factory,	instead	
choosing	to	‘suspend’	the	ending	that	we	expect—that	is,	Andrew’s	DID	is	not	‘cured’	in	line	with	real-
world	medical	norms—and	thus	enabling	a	dialogue	surrounding	normative	behaviour	and	
multiplicity	without	offering	what	the	novel’s	‘solution’	to	this	problem	would	look	like	on	a	wider	
scale.	The	novel	inspires	debate	and	maintains	hope,	allowing	the	belief	in	the	utopia	to	remain	as	
well	as	allowing	readers	to	question	the	very	notion	of	utopia.	
	 United	States	of	Tara	works	in	a	similar	way	to	position	Tara’s	multiplicity	as	a	more	positive	
force,	at	least	as	it	is	positioned	against	the	performed	identities	that	the	other	characters	in	the	
series	take	on	throughout	the	series.	I	argued	in	earlier	chapters	that	Tara	is	the	only	character	who	is	
‘honest’	about	her	dissociation	and	different	alter	identities.	The	other	characters	assume	false	
personae	throughout	the	series,	and	try	to	suppress	their	true	identities	in	various	ways—Marshall	
hides	his	queer	sexuality	in	Season	2,	Charmaine	does	everything	she	can	to	pretend	she	is	not	in	love	
with	Neil	throughout	the	series,	Kate	pretends	to	be	a	comic	book	character	in	Season	2—and	this	is	
very	much	positioned	as	a	negative	construction	of	identity,	one	at	odds	with	Tara’s	‘true’	
multiplicity.	While	it	is	clear	Tara’s	DID	is	not	necessarily	a	good	thing,	particularly	in	Season	3	when	
her	new	alter,	Bryce,	tries	systematically	to	destroy	Tara’s	life,	Tara’s	honesty	about	her	(multiple)	
identity	is	positioned	against	the	other	characters’	performances,	with	them	ultimately	realising	that	
they	should	embrace	their	true	identities	instead	of	trying	to	perform	the	roles	that	society	believes	
they	should	hold.	This	is	particularly	true	for	Marshall,	who	spends	much	of	Season	2	pretending	to	be	
heterosexual,	and	Charmaine,	who	tries	to	bury	herself	in	a	relationship	with	the	‘perfect’	man	at	the	
expense	of	the	man	she	really	loves,	just	because	Neil	is	not	conventionally	attractive	and	does	not	
hold	a	good	job.		
	 It	is	not	possible	to	say	that	Tara’s	DID	is	a	wholly	positive	condition,	as	the	disorder	is	
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frequently	shown	to	cause	problems	in	her	personal	and	professional	lives,	particularly	in	Season	3	
when	Bryce	tries	to	take	over	and	live	as	Tara	full	time,	doing	his	best	to	destroy	Tara’s	life	in	the	
process.	However,	what	is	positive	is	her	ability	to	be	honest	about	her	identity	and	transgress	social	
norms,	as	we	see	through	Buck	and	his	relationship	with	Pammy	in	particular.	Indeed,	this	ability	is	
something	the	text	celebrates,	as	we	clearly	see	with	the	above	examples	of	Marshall	and	Charmaine;	
their	character	arcs	for	the	entire	series	are	based	on	their	accepting	their	true	identities	and	learning	
not	to	care	whether	or	not	society	approves	of	those	identities.	The	text	highlights	the	‘problem’	of	
normative	behaviour	and	how	forcing	a	person	to	perform	a	more	socially	accepted	role	is	ultimately	
damaging	to	both	them	and	those	around	them.	In	addition,	once	again,	the	text	stops	short	of	
showing	Tara	receiving	a	‘cure’	for	her	DID,	and	indeed,	once	Bryce	has	been	‘killed’	by	Tara	in	the	
series	finale	it	is	unclear	if	her	condition	is	now	as	damaging	as	it	once	was.	It	is	suggested	throughout	
the	series	that	the	other	alters	often	work	together	to	‘help’	Tara	in	various	situations,	such	as	when	
Alice	declares	that	“Tara	is	not	equipped	to	handle	this	family	at	the	moment	and	we’ve	all	come	to	a	
consensus	and	I	think	you	need	me	right	now”	in	Season	1.	With	Bryce	gone,	Tara	and	the	other	alters	
might	be	able	to	find	a	way	to	work	together	to	live	Tara’s	life	and	face	the	challenges	DID	creates.	In	
fact,	the	series	ends	more	positively	than	it	initially	seems	regarding	Tara’s	DID:	though	Tara	is	leaving	
to	seek	a	cure	for	her	condition	with	a	therapist	in	Boston,	the	way	she	leaves	suggests	that	her	idea	
of	a	cure	might	not	be	losing	her	alters	altogether.	In	the	last	episode	of	the	series,	“The	Good	Parts”,	
Tara	and	Max	drive	to	Boston	together.	When	they	start	to	drive	away	Tara	climbs	up	in	her	seat	and	
climbs	up	in	her	seat	to	lean	out	of	the	window	with	a	smile	on	her	face,	enjoying	the	sun	and	the	last	
time	she’ll	see	her	neighbourhood	for	the	next	few	months.	The	scene	has	no	dialogue,	but	Tara	
blinks	slowly—the	usual	sign	of	a	transition	to	another	personality—and	her	body	language	suggests	
that	first	Buck,	then	Alice,	then	T	takes	over	her	body	before	Tara	resumes	control.	This	suggests	that	
though	she	herself	is	embracing	her	future	and	seeking	a	cure,	it	is	some	sort	of	‘cure’	that	includes	
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her	alters,	as	she	lets	them	each	enjoy	the	happiness	she	feels	in	that	moment,	sharing	her	feelings	
and	the	experience	with	them	as	she	perhaps	wishes	to	share	the	rest	of	her	life.		
	 We	can	make	a	link	here	to	Penny’s	reintegration	therapy,	which	is	not	an	attempt	to	rid	
herself	of	her	alters,	but	rather	an	attempt	to	link	them	more	closely	and	enable	them	all	to	share	her	
life.	More	significantly,	it	also	suggests	a	level	of	control	over	her	transitions,	which	is	not	
demonstrated	throughout	the	series,	suggesting	that	she	is	already	in	a	much	healthier	place	than	she	
has	been	for	much	of	the	final	season	when	being	terrorised	and	controlled	by	Bryce.	Could	Tara	be	
on	the	way	to	managing	her	condition	in	a	similar	way	to	Andrew	in	Set	This	House	In	Order?	Indeed,	
there	is	a	further	link	to	Andrew	here,	as	Tara	embraces	her	gender-variant	alter,	Buck,	in	the	same	
way	that	Andrew	embraces	his	gender	variance;	in	both	cases,	the	characters	do	not	consider	an	alter	
with	a	different	gender	identity	to	themselves	a	problem,	but	rather	welcome	them	into	their	‘cure’.	
If	we	assume	that	Tara	is	indeed	seeking	a	cure	that	is	similar	to	Andrew	or	Penny’s—that	is	to	say,	
the	goal	is	not	to	rid	herself	of	her	alters	but	allow	them	to	co-exist	and	work	together—then	we	
must	assume	she	finds	no	issue	with	including	a	male	personality	in	her	plans.	Once	again,	this	speaks	
to	multiplicity’s	ability	to	challenge	and	subvert	dominant	social	and	gender	norms,	and	Tara’s	
willingness	to	embrace	a	non-normative	identity.	Indeed,	even	the	act	of	climbing	up	to	lean	out	of	
the	window—half	in	and	half	out	of	the	car,	not	quite	fitting	into	the	seat	in	the	way	she	is	supposed	
to—is	reflective	of	this	tendency	to	challenge	norms	and	exist	outside	of	expected	roles.	This	sort	of	
symbolism	is	evident	throughout	the	series,	perhaps	most	notably	during	Tara’s	video	diaries	
throughout	Season	2;	Tara	films	herself	on	her	mobile	phone,	speaking	into	the	camera	about	the	
challenges	she	is	facing	as	a	result	of	transiting	unexpectedly.	The	camera	takes	on	the	mobile	
phone’s	view,	and	we	see	Tara	in	extreme	close-up,	not	fitting	in	the	frame.	Given	that	these	diaries	
are	filmed	for	Tara	by	Tara,	we	can	surmise	that	this	is	how	she	sees	herself:	not	fitting	in	to	the	
expectations	people	have	for	her.	The	recurrence	of	this	imagery	further	cements	Tara’s	ability	to	
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subvert	expectations	and	norms—in	this	case,	the	formal	ones	of	filmic	convention—in	the	mind	of	
the	viewer.	
	 This	open	ending—we	do	not	know	what	exactly	Tara’s	‘cure’	is—suspends	the	transition	
back	to	the	real	world	by	suspending	the	real	world	norms	that	suggest	that	DID	must	be	cured	and	
the	personalities	must	be	reintegrated.	It	does	not	suggest	definitively	that	DID	is	the	cure	for	
normative	behaviour,	but	demonstrates	that	Tara’s	multiplicity	enables	her	to	be	honest	and	
accepting	of	her	non-normative	behaviour,	which	the	text	positions	positively,	as	the	desired	effect.	
Indeed,	the	other	characters	are	all	on	the	brink	of	moving	forward	with	their	own	lives	after	refusing	
to	perform	false	roles	anymore,	most	notably	Charmaine	who,	after	spending	a	year	raising	their	baby	
with	Neil,	asks	him	to	marry	her	in	a	gendered	subversion	of	a	proposal.	Tara’s	‘ending’	works	in	a	
similar	way	to	the	end	of	Set	This	House	In	Order,	and	while	it	is	not	as	obviously	utopian	as	that	
novel,	it	still	positions	multiplicity,	difference,	and	the	ability	to	transgress	social	norms	as	a	desired	
outcome,	something	more	positive	than	the	alternative.		
I	have	examined	these	texts	as	a	collective	throughout	this	thesis	because	it	is	useful	to	
identify	both	the	similarities	and	differences	between.	This	is	particularly	true	in	the	case	of	their	
utopian	approach	to	normativity,	because	it	reiterates	that	the	extent	to	which	these	texts	engage	
with	normativity	and	are	able	to	resist	it	exists	on	a	scale	and	that	there	is	some	variation	in	their	
championing	of	difference	and	the	subversion	of	social	norms.	Indeed,	we	clearly	see	this	within	the	
other	DID	texts:	Set	This	House	in	Order	is	probably	the	most	radical	in	terms	of	its	resistance	to	
normativity	and	the	way	in	which	it	holds	on	to	the	hope	of	a	dissociative	utopia	by	not	allowing	it	to	
be	enacted	and	risk	becoming	a	dystopia;	United	States	of	Tara	could	also	be	placed	at	the	more	
radical	end	of	the	scale	with	the	suggestion	that	Tara	wishes	to	embrace	all	her	alters	when	she	goes	
to	seek	a	‘cure’,	while	texts	like	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse,	which	warn	of	the	dangers	of	conformity	
without	really	offering	a	clear	alternative,	could	be	positioned	as	the	more	conservative	texts.	This	
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collection	of	texts	then	forms	a	larger	image	of	the	problems	the	characters	face	as	a	result	of	
conformity	to	social	norms,	and	offers	a	variety	of	solutions	or,	indeed,	no	solution	at	all.	The	texts	
demonstrate	that	there	are	multiple	ways	to	be	multiple,	and	multiple	solutions	to	the	problem	of	
normative	behaviour.	Indeed,	the	variety	of	narratives	on	offer	is	reflective	of	my	reading	of	the	texts:	
the	texts	do	not	blindly	conform	to	one	narrative	which	perfectly	‘solves’	the	problem.	To	do	so	
would	be	to	swap	one	system	of	conformity	for	another,	in	the	same	way	that	Sebastian	swaps	
capitalism	for	Project	Mayhem	in	Fight	Club.	Together	the	texts	allow	the	reader	to	recognise	the	
problem	of	normative	behaviour,	and	encourage	debate	and	critical	thinking	about	hegemony,	and	
the	perpetuation	of	dominant	cultural	values.	
	 All	of	the	texts	I	have	examined	within	this	chapter	raise	questions	about	normative	
behaviour,	with	‘sameness’	in	particular	being	something	that	is	often	damaging	to	individuals	and	
their	sense	of	identity.	We	see	this	in	particular	in	the	texts’	representations	of	gender	and	gender	
identity,	which	frequently	problematise	the	notion	of	a	‘natural’	gender,	or	social	constructions	of	
heteronormative	gender	ideals.	We	also	see	it	their	approach	to	multiple	identity	as	being	at	odds	
with	conventional	singular	identity	which	the	societies	depicted	in	the	texts	expect.	Though	the	texts	
raise	this	problem,	and	suggest	that	multiplicity	is	a	way	to	break	social	norms,	they	are	careful	not	to	
enact	one	solution	that	would	risk	causing	more	problems.	This	obviously	positions	multiplicity	as	a	
utopian	condition,	but	the	texts	are	seemingly	aware	of	the	problems	surrounding	utopian	thinking,	
particularly	the	idea	that	a	utopia	must,	ultimately,	remain	unrealisable	if	it	is	to	remain	a	utopia.	This	
is	why	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	feature	societies	that	descend	into	dystopia	through	individuals	
losing	their	sense	of	identity	and	any	differences	they	once	possessed.	In	both	cases,	it	was	the	
attempted	enactment	of	a	utopia	that	lead	to	the	creation	of	a	dystopia,	and	the	texts	are	quick	to	
point	this	out.	Indeed,	Set	This	House	in	Order	and	United	States	of	Tara	stake	their	claims	for	the	
positivity	of	multiplicity	much	more	subtly,	and	the	suspended	endings	of	both	these	texts	work	to	
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prevent	the	utopias	being	realised	and	put	into	practice.	Andrew	in	particular	is	non-normative	as	a	
multiple	person	and	because	he	has	a	trans	gender	identity,	and	so	seems	to	be	the	clearest	example	
of	someone	who	is	able	to	transgress	social	norms	without	negatively	affecting	himself	or	those	
around	him.	All	of	the	texts	enable	the	reader	or	viewer	to	question	the	nature	of	normative	
behaviour	and	enable	debate	surrounding	the	issue,	without	suggesting	exactly	what	the	solution	
might	be,	because	ultimately	any	solution	offered	would	have	to	be	unrealisable	to	be	a	true	utopia.	
For	this	reason,	we	can	more	accurately	describe	the	utopian	narrative	within	these	texts	as	a	critical	
dystopia,	a	useful	term	as	it	suggests	criticism	and	debate	surrounding	issues,	such	as	normative	
behaviour,	and	this	is	very	much	what	these	texts	do.	Fight	Club	and	Dollhouse	in	particular	depict	
dystopias	that	have	arisen	from	utopian	impulses	and	enable	the	reader/viewer	to	recognise	the	
problems	that	the	‘utopia’	originally	tried	to	fix.	By	leaving	the	reader/viewer	in	a	position	to	debate	
and	critique	when	the	novel	or	show	has	ended,	the	texts	fulfil	their	chief	job	as	both	critical	dystopia	
and	speculative	fiction.	
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Conclusion	
	
Throughout	this	thesis	I	have	argued	that	texts	featuring	dissociative	identity	disorder	are	
overwhelmingly	resistant	to	norms,	both	in	terms	of	the	representation	of	identity	(resisting	
heteronormative	representations	of	binary	gender,	and	allowing	trans	and	queer	identity	to	exist	
without	‘normalising’	it)	and	also	in	terms	of	the	generic	and	formal	structures	of	the	texts	(open	
endings	enabling	multiple	readings	of	the	narrative,	resisting	curing	DID	in	line	with	expectations	of	
illness	narratives	and	the	norms	of	DID	treatment).	By	viewing	all	these	elements	together,	it	
becomes	clear	that	normativity	(usually	the	social	norms	of	contemporary	U.S.	society)	is	an	issue	
within	these	texts,	one	that	they	are	interested	in	critiquing	and	problematising.	This	positions	DID	
texts	within	the	emerging	subgenre	of	fictional	work	which	deals	with	mental	health	illnesses,	many	
of	which	I	discussed	within	Chapter	2,	which	often	metaphorically	employ	syndromes	and	disorders	in	
a	way	which	links	the	disorder	to	a	difficulty	with	fitting	into	society	(which	I	discussed	with	particular	
reference	to	autism	and	Asperger’s	syndrome	and	Tourette’s	syndrome).	While	there	has	been	
particular	critical	attention	paid	to	the	representation	of	autism	and	Asperger’s	syndrome,	and	
Tourette’s	syndrome,	this	has	not	been	the	case	for	representations	of	DID.	This	work	therefore	fills	a	
gap	in	the	literature	by	closely	examining	representations	of	this	disorder	within	contemporary	
fiction.		
I	began	by	giving	an	overview	of	medical	discourse	surrounding	DID	in	Chapter	1	which	aimed	
to	contextualise	representations	of	the	disorder	by	providing	some	background	on	how	the	disorder	
is	currently	viewed	in	the	real	world,	including	the	debate	around	its	validity.	This	chapter	highlighted	
that	debates	around	the	cause	and	validity	of	the	condition	are	on-going,	and	served	as	an	important	
foundation	for	my	analysis	of	fictional	texts.	It	has	been	suggested	by	the	psychiatrist	Lisetta	Lovett	
that	fictional	representations	can	be	useful	to	medical	professionals	if	these	representations	are	
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portrayed	with	“sensitivity	and	accuracy”	because	they	can	“facilitate	real	understanding	and	
empathy”	for	people	who	suffer	from	disorders	and	syndromes	(179).	By	beginning	with	an	overview	
of	medical	discourse,	I	demonstrated	that	the	fictional	texts	I	engage	with	in	this	thesis	represent	
elements	of	DID	to	different	extents,	from	the	accurate	(Tara,	and	Set	This	House)	to	the	less	accurate	
(Fight	Club,	Dollhouse).	But	even	the	texts	we	can	categorise	as	less	accurate	do	engage	with	concepts	
highlighted	in	medical	discourse	about	DID,	such	as	trauma,	and	can	therefore	be	useful	in	the	way	
Lovett	describes.	Following	this	overview	in	Chapter	1,	I	examined	in	turn	the	DID	texts’	engagement	
with	trauma	and	the	issue	of	‘working	through’	traumatic	memories,	narrative	and	generic	
convention,	heteronormative	gender	identity,	and	utopia/dystopia.	In	all	cases,	the	texts	were	
resistant	to	what	we	might	think	of	as	convention	or	norms:	characters	do	not	work	through	their	
trauma,	the	texts	resist	curing	their	protagonists	and	problematise	the	notion	of	a	cure,	the	open	
endings	of	the	texts	enable	readers	to	consider	multiple	modes	of	meaning,	the	texts	are	able	to	
represent	non-heteronormative	gender	identities	and	sexualities	without	normalising	them,	and	the	
texts	use	a	critical	dystopia	framework	to	address	normativity	and	systems	of	social	control	within	
their	narratives.	
	 My	assessment	of	the	texts	as	critical	dystopias	in	Chapter	6	highlighted	what	has	been	a	
recurring	theme	throughout	this	work:	the	tension	between	fictional	representations	on	one	hand,	
and	real-world	experience	on	the	other.	This	tension	appears	again	and	again:	the	texts	all	depict	
societies	based	on	contemporary	Western	late-capitalist	social	systems,	with	similar	hegemonic	
structures	to	those	present	in	the	real	world,	and	they	metaphorically	employ	a	mental	health	
disorder	which	is	considered	by	medical	professionals	to	have	a	disruptive	effect	on	those	who	suffer	
from	it	as	a	means	of	rejecting	and	critiquing	those	norms.	If	we	accept	that	the	fictional	texts	under	
discussion	in	this	work	are	using	the	disorder	in	this	way,	then	we	cannot	help	but	consider	what	
effect	this	has	on	the	real	world.	Are	the	texts	arguing	that	dissociative	identity	disorder	should	be	
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viewed	as	a	positive	condition	in	the	real	world,	one	which	enables	its	sufferers	to	break	free	of	social	
normativity	and	forge	their	own	identities	free	of	social	restraints	and	power	structures?	The	
suspended,	open	endings	of	the	DID	texts	here	become	a	way	of	suspending	the	transition	back	to	
reality,	and	mean	that	the	texts	are	simply	drawing	attention	to	and	critiquing	the	problem	of	
normative	behaviour	without	advocating	for	DID	as	a	solution	to	this	problem	in	reality.	But	this	is	
somewhat	unsatisfactory.	Are	we	to	be	content	that	this	is	all	fiction	can	do,	and	that	the	compelling	
argument	put	forth	by	the	texts	is	simply	there	to	inspire	debate	about	the	problem	of	normativity	
and	the	implicit	rules	which	govern	our	everyday	lives?	
It	is	useful	here	to	consider	Slavoj	Žižek’s	final	chapter	in	the	second	edition	of	Enjoy	Your	
Symptom!	In	it,	Žižek	analyses	the	construction	of	reality	in	The	Matrix,	and	contrasts	this	with	the	
Matrix	itself,	a	virtual	reality	programme	designed	to	simulate	the	‘real	world’.	In	a	wide	ranging	
psychoanalytic	discussion,	he	argues	that	The	Matrix	ultimately	positions	the	virtual	reality	world	as	a	
“reduction	of	reality	to	a	virtual	domain	regulated	by	arbitrary	rules	that	can	be	suspended”	(231).	
This	description	could	also	be	applied	to	the	DID	texts.	The	DID	texts	are	a	virtual	domain	(fiction)	
regulated	by	arbitrary	rules	(generic	and	formal	rules,	but	also	socially	constructed	norms	reflective	of	
real	world	norms)	that	the	texts	are	able	to	suspend.	But	they	can	only	do	so	because	they	are	fiction.	
Žižek	argues	that	in	The	Matrix	“freedom	is	only	possible	within	the	system	that	hinders	its	full	
deployment”:	Neo,	upon	re-entering	the	Matrix	now	that	he	can	see	the	rules,	finds	that	he	can	fly	
and	stop	bullets	(228).	This	freedom	is	not	present	in	the	desolate	real	world	in	which	Neo	now	lives,	
but	only	possible	within	the	virtual	reality	offered	by	the	Matrix.	So	too	is	the	freedom	from	social	
norms	only	present	within	the	fictional	worlds	presented	by	the	DID	texts,	and	not	available	to	people	
who	suffer	from	DID	in	the	real	world.		Fiction	can	rewrite	the	arbitrary	rules	of	the	real	world	by	
fictionalising	them	and	the	world.	This	fits	with	Žižek	argument	in	his	introduction,	in	which	he	
suggests	we	are	free	to	discuss	and	argue	against	the	rules	of	our	world,	but	ultimately	continue	to	
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obey	the	rules	which	govern	our	existence	in	a	way	which	shores	up	authority:	“we	know	there	is	no	
truth	in	authority,	yet	we	continue	to	play	its	game	and	obey	it	in	order	not	to	disturb	the	usual	run	of	
things”	(x).		
A	further	philosophical	discussion	of	reality	and	authority	in	relation	to	fictional	
representations	therefore	seems	a	productive	next	step,	following	the	model	that	Žižek	employs.	This	
would	have	benefits	not	only	for	the	representation	of	dissociative	identity	disorder,	but	also	for	
reframing	past	work	on	the	representations	of	syndromes	and	disorders,	and	may	help	to	square	the	
increasing	fictional	use	of	illnesses	with	the	problem	of	real	world	experience.	A	consideration	of	
reality	and	authority	would	also	enable	a	closer	look	at	critical	work	on	society,	hegemony	and	
reproduction	of	dominant	social	forces.	Further	work	on	the	recurring	motif	of	the	house	within	these	
fictional	texts	could	also	be	productive	here,	and	may	help	further	to	tie	the	work	into	the	American	
context:	the	Dolls	live	in	a	Dollhouse	usually	simply	referred	to	as	‘the	house’;	Andrew	manages	his	
condition	via	the	imaginary	house	inside	his	head;	Tara’s	alters	have	their	own	shed	in	the	back	
garden	in	Season	1	which	functions	as	their	safe	space,	while	Max	buys	and	renovates	the	house	next	
door	in	Season	2;	Sebastian	and	Durden	live	in	the	dilapidated	house	on	Paper	Street	after	Durden	
blows	up	Sebastian’s	condo.	The	interiority	implied	by	these	houses	is	in	some	cases	a	metaphor	for	
the	systems	of	control	the	characters	are	able	to	resist	(particularly	the	Dollhouse,	which	the	main	
characters	not	only	break	out	of	but	back	into	during	the	course	of	the	series,	and	Sebastian’s	condo,	
which	Durden	blows	up,	symbolically	freeing	Sebastian	from	his	role	as	a	consumer	under	capitalism)	
but	they	also	suggest	a	domesticity	that	helps	further	cement	DID	as	a	uniquely	American	condition,	
one	which	is	‘culture-bound’,	and	produced	and	reproduced	through	the	medicalised	culture	of	the	
U.S.	For	example,	United	States	of	Tara’s	credits	are	an	animated	sequence	designed	to	look	like	a	
pop-up	book,	but	each	page	shows	a	different	room	in	Tara’s	house	which	is	associated	with	each	of	
her	alters:	Buck’s	motorbike	is	in	the	garage,	for	example,	while	Alice	bakes	cookies	in	the	kitchen.	
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The	extent	to	which	Alice	and	Buck	are	American	stereotypes	has	been	discussed	in	this	thesis,	and	a	
discussion	of	houses	and	domesticity	might	extent	to	re-evaluating	how	these	characters	do	or	do	not	
conform	to	these	stereotypes.	Buck	is	perhaps	the	one	most	worthy	of	study	here,	as	he	consistently	
demonstrates	a	caring	side	not	usually	associated	with	his	gruff	redneck	stereotype:	he	cares	for	
Marshall,	looks	after	Charmaine	after	her	breast	augmentation	surgery,	and	is	seen	looking	after	
Pammy	and	enjoying	domestic	life	with	her	during	a	brief	montage	in	Season	2.		
This	further	work	would	form	the	basis	of	a	more	wide-ranging	analysis	of	hegemonic	power	
structures	and	systems	of	control,	and	would	therefore	provide	a	critical	framework	for	the	issues	
raised	here	to	be	discussed	in	relation	to	the	real	world.		This	thesis,	like	the	DID	texts,	has	ultimately	
aimed	to	identify	the	problems	of	blindly	conforming	to	systems	of	social	normativity	but	suspends	
the	moment	of	being	able	to	apply	the	texts’	solution	to	this	problem	to	the	real	world.	The	further	
work	identified	above	would	aim	to	address	this	problem	and	enable	multiplicity	to	be	discussed	in	
conjunction	with	real	world	hegemonic	structures.	Within	the	fictional	texts,	the	multiplicity	of	those	
suffering	from	dissociative	identity	disorder	enables	them	to	become	free.	Those	of	us	in	the	real	
world	still	have	some	work	to	do.	
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